Exploring an Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering

Authors

Mahdi Saeedi
Ryan Zerr, University of North DakotaFollow

Files

Description

The United States electoral system is facing an unprecedented amount of pressure as distrust amount the voting population rises. An area of interest for us in this work is the redistricting mechanism. Rules inspired by ideas in mathematics are being used to combat partisan gerrymandering. In this work, we explore the relationship between three rules regarding Equal population districts, Compactness, and efficiency gap. Combining these rules leads to an idea of an impossibility theorem for partisan gerrymandering, which states that drawing maps that can satisfy all three rules and allow for a minority party to win becomes impossible.

Publication Date

1-4-2022

Document Type

Poster

Disciplines

Political Science

Comments

Presented at the Fall 2021 Virtual UNDergraduate Showcase, Grand Forks, ND, December 9, 2021.

Recommended Citation

Saeedi, Mahdi and Zerr, Ryan, "Exploring an Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering" (2022). Arts & Sciences Undergraduate Showcase. 10.
https://commons.und.edu/as-showcase/10