

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL  
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS DIVISION  
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STAFF EVIDENCE ANALYSIS By: Felber, Theo.  
Date: 1 October 1946

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Title and/or general nature: Typewritten affidavit signed by Jodl (26 September 1946) in the presence of Fred Kaufmann. Re: Warlimont's activity.

Date: 26 September 1946

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PERSONS, FIRMS OR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED:

Warlimont, Walter Gen.  
Halder, Franz Genobst  
Jeschoneck, Chief of General Staff of German Air Force  
Falkenhorst, Nikolaus Genobst.  
Keitel, Wilhelm  
Zeitzler, Kurt Genobst.  
Junge (?) Navy  
Assmann, Kurt, Adm.

TO BE FILED UNDER THESE REFERENCE HEADINGS:

NOKW- General  
NOKW- Preparation of Agression

SUMMARY (Indicate page nos.):

The main activities of Warlimont as chief of the section Home Defense "Landesverteidigung" in the OKW in October 1938 and as a military adviser of the German foreign office. (p.1). Warlimont's tasks and activities in the WFSt from 1939-1944 (p.2). Warlimont, planning and preparing operations and his discussions with Hitler and the General Staff (p.3-5). Warlimont and Hitler's commando order of 18.10.4 [4 typed over 2]2. (p.6). Warlimont's presence at the most im[-]portant meetings with Hitler and other commanding officers (p.7). Warlimont, Chief of the Special Staff for the case "Weser-Uebung" (operation against Norway) p.8. Warlimont in connection with case "Barbarossa" (p.9). Warlimont's special duties in France (p.10). Warlimont's presence at the attentat of July 20<sup>th</sup> and its effect re his health.

(Edited by Theo. Felber, OCC,

3 October 1946.)

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OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL  
FOR WAR CRIMES

STATEMENT

I, General Alfred JODL, being duly sworn, depose and say:

General WARLIMONT took over my position as Chief of the Department of Nation Defense in the OKW in October 1938. There he had, of course, the same [sic] duties as I. They were: first, the study of the problems of Wehrmacht strategy in general, which was something new with reference to the cooperation of the three branches of the Wehrmacht. Studies (war games) ("Planungen Kriegsspiele") by means of map exercises. Further, all operational preparations for a possible war which was the principal activity and working out HITLER'S directives for such a case. Next, the coordination of the individual deployment plans of Army, Navy and Airforce [sic], further the working out of mobilization preparations of State and people, and of the mobilization of the top Reich authorities. For this purpose, the secretary's office of the Reich defense committee, a committee composed of specialists from all ministries, was added at the time to section L. These were approximately the principal activities.

In 1938, WARLIMONT represented the OKW at the Berlin conference, where the questions of the occupation of the Sudetenland were discussed. This was after the Munich agreement, which had established the border only roughly; and now the countries fixed the border definitely with the participation of the Czechoslovakian legation and of the French Ambassador. WARLIMONT was sent there, I think, either by me or by Field Marshal KEITEL at my suggestion. WARLIMONT was supposed to represent the military interests on the occasion of the fixing of the new borderline, and to say exactly how the line of fortifications should run; at any rate to represent the military points of view concerning establishing the border in relation to the Foreign Office. He was the military advisor of the German Foreign Office.

WARLIMONT'S duties and activities with the Operational Staff of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsfuehrerstab), were (from 1939 to 1944) as follows: principally he directed my entire Staff, I was somewhat separated from my Staff because of HITLER'S habits. Not very far, it is true, but always somewhat separated as I always had to be in HITLER'S immediate vicinity. No very large staff could be there, but it rather had always to be kept small. Consequently my staff was always some distance away depending on the location of Headquarters.

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In Berchtesgaden, the situation was so bad in the beginning, that, while I was in Berchtesgaden, my staff had to work in a staff train in Reichenhall, because there was no room at the Berchtesgaden railroad station. Later on, it was a little better. I worked in the new Reich chancery in Berchtesgaden, and my staff in the local mountain infantry barracks (Gebirgsjaegerkaserne), a good half an hour's [typed over s] walk away. In the larger headquarters in the West or in the East, near Rastenburg, we were closer together, perhaps 15 minutes apart. My staff was not with me, and I had only one or two general staff officers.

WARLIMONT'S principal activity was to assign the entire work of the staff and to issue directives for that work. He supervised everything. He received orders from me concerning his work, discussed it with the general staff officers, examined the drafts, signed and sent them to me.

Another special activity was his direct cooperation with Field Marshal KEITEL, concerning all the questions which I did not handle, problems which did not concern me. I concentrated almost exclusively on operational problems. WARLIMONT handled, without my participation, any other administrative questions in the occupied territories, any economic questions, in short, all questions which were not of any operational nature, which had to be sent in the form of orders by KEITEL, to the other offices.

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As to operational question, he prepared and submitted them to me. As to others, he cooperated independently with KEITEL, who had no staff of his own at headquarters, without my participation, particularly as he was better trained in fact for those matters (political and economic questions), than for the operational ones. He was more concerned with activities, the operational staff of the Armed Forces (WFSt) was in charge of military propaganda, (i.e. not propaganda for the people, but for the troops) propaganda among the enemy, military

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Reports, and censorship, all matters which in your Army were con[-]centrated in the press office under the Chief of the General Staff.

And in a third section which I have already mentioned, - Wehrmacht communication lines - the means of communications were distribution on a large scale. There was naturally some struggle between the three branches of the Wehrmacht for these communication lines. This was taken over by the department for Wehrmacht communications, which also uniformly regulated the call-signals of radio stations within the entire Wehrmacht, and which applied itself, in a separate group, to the re[-]search and construction of new means of communications. Those were the three principal activities of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (WFSt).

WARLIMONT, as deputy chief of WFSt, participated in the prepara[-]tion of operations about as much as I did, for he attended almost all conferences with HITLER, anyway, the main conferences at noon. Later on regularly, in the beginning not so often. Already for the reason that I would not have to repeat to him everything that was discussed on these occasions. He was to hear everything, in order to avoid any mis[-]understanding. Thus, it can be said that he knew about the prepara[-]tion of the individual operations, from their beginning, nearly as much as I did. Of course, there were occasional moments in evening confer[-]ences at which he was not present, when HITLER said something partic[-]ularly important, which he heard afterwards only indirectly from me. As far as there was anything to be worked out in these questions, I had to tell him, I expect, since it was an order, that the staff would work out.

In general, operations were planned and developed by the WFSt ex[-]actly as in general staffs the world over. Laymen often have an er[-]roneous conception of it. As a rule, such operations are not developed in a moment, but, if enough time is available, they develop gradually during weeks. The only difference in our position from the custom formerly prevailing in the German Army, and in contrast to,

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Other countries, where the authoritative chief of the general staff or the chief of the operations section first makes suggestions, was, that in our army, it was exactly the

contrary. HITLER decided in advance that this or that had to be done. In order to be able to do that, he, of course, asked for various facts, viz. maps, estimates as to the enemy's resistance, what was known about the enemy, and so forth. He then retired with this information, brooded one or two nights over it and came back with a final decision, which he ordered to be worked out in detail. It was then arranged in detail, prepared by the officers of the general staff, worked out and examined by WARLIMONT and submitted to me. I changed what appeared to be incorrect and then it was sub[-]mitted to the FUEHRER. Sometimes, he made alterations and said: "No, I want this done in this way." He exerted a stronger influence on the issuing of orders as is customary with commanders-in-chief. This varied in the various campaigns.

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Those that could be prepared a long time in advance, as the campaign in the West, were changed a dozen times in the course of the weeks and months, and gradually altered more and more, until the final plan was altogether different. Or the campaign in the East, the plan of which was changed in many details in the course of the conferences. In the other campaigns, such as the one against Jugoslavia, there were no changes in the plans. Today decisions were made and tomorrow the preparations were begun.

However, I should like to emphasize one thing, it was not the operational plans which the WFSt made, it was only more or less the strategic directives for the individual campaign. The operations plans themselves were worked out by the General Staff of the Army, or the Air Force or the Navy. [. typed over y] The orders were issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces and they were told; this is the situation, things look thus and such is the political and military situation, HITLER's decision is such [c typed over another letter] and such, this is the task of the Army, this the Navy's and this the Luftwaffe's concern.

In the beginning (i.e. until winter 1941-42) the activity of the WFSt with regard to the large strategic [c typed over another letter] instructions for the direction of war had been concerned with these matters exclusively. From winter 1941-42 on it became different, quite different.

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From then on, HITLER assumed the supreme command of the Army. He thus was at the same time, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Supreme Commander of the Army. And now the peculiar situation arose, that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and, therefore, of all three branches of the Wehrmacht, he, with the help of the operatio[o typed over n]nal staff of the Wehrmacht (WFSt) as executive staff, issued directives to the Army, Navy and Air Force, and then he would execute his own directives, theater of operations was so predominant because of its extent and the great number of units, and, because the other theaters of operations were relatively calm and required a particularly close cooperation between the Navy, Air Force and Army, as there was nothing but coast defense – due to these three reasons, the General Staff of the Army and the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces (WFSt) became two General Staffs which worked along parallel lines. The WFSt had no superior authority and the two staffs worked on the same level inasmuch as the General Staff of the Army under HITLER's direct authority, dealt with the entire Eastern theater of operations. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army - \_\_\_\_\_ and later on, \_\_\_\_\_ - dealt solely with the Eastern theater of operations and the WFSt dealt with the other theaters of operations. Thus it was as if there had been under the command of one supreme commander, a section West – North – South and East. HITLER handled, with two high ranking General Staff officers and me, the Western, Northern and Southern theaters of war, and the General Staff of the Army dealt with the Eastern theater of war. This was from winter 1941/42 on. It did not prevent the WFSt from retaining all the problems which were decisive for the conduct of the war as a whole. The forces had to be balanced between the East and the West. The difficult problem of the distribution of forces among the other theaters of war, which was particularly important in our military situation, remained with the WFSt.

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This organization resulted in countless difficulties. It was certainly not very good. The supplying of all theaters of war – including those handled by the WFSt, had to be carried out by the Quartermaster

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General of this Army, because he alone had the necessary organization. Many things were handled by the General Staff of the Army, for instance, the section which dealt with foreign armies (Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen). This section had to report to me, although it was a section of the Army. This resulted in a great many difficulties, which were adjusted in the course of time.

In reference to WARLIMONT's participation in the draft[-]ing, formulating, amending and execution of HITLER's Komman[-]dobefehl" of 18 October 1942, and to the documents 506-PS, 531-PS, 551-PS, 1263-PS, 1279-PS, submitted to me, I declare the following: everytime when the heading is "Wehr[-]machtfuehrungsstab, Qu.", it referred to the quartermaster section. In this case, and as a rule - I would say, as a rule, not always - they were matters which were handled by WARLIMONT directly with Field Marshal KEITEL. Sometimes, I saw one thing or another, but generally not. He partic[-]ipated in such things much more than I did. I have worked but little with the Quartermaster section. In order to keep a clear head, I did not bother with all those things. Therefore, WARLIMONT has participated to a great extent, in all things where it says quartermaster section.

Of course, I saw many things, but most of them I did not see. Of course, I have seen everything pertaining to operational things with which he dealt, except small mat[-]ters of a subordinate nature, which he signed himself once in a while, such as unimportant individual orders about which he may have called me up before. Important matters were prepared by him, and then submitted to me.

In the operational field we had one case, the famous preparation, which had been done without my knowledge. When after the beginning of the Eastern campaign the oper[-]ations took a very rapid and favorable course, my General Staff officers got together and discussed the further con[-]duct of the operations after Russia's collapse. They did this on their own initiative. I do not know, whether WARLI[-]MONT knew about it. Such things run [ r typed over another letter] in the blood of every general staff officer. He is interested in not troddling behind,

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but in being ahead with his drafts. This draft has been submitted by the Russians during the trial. I had not seen it before. It was not signed. It was a draft. [d typed over another letter] And since my staff wanted to know at once and beforehand, if the other branches of the Wehrmacht agreed with it, and also to see if they thought differently, the draft was likewise sent to the Navy. The Navy on its part asked other departments and there it was found. As a rule it was not like that, the first suggestions generally came from HITLER. He voiced such ideas and issued some directives, which passed through my hands. As a rule, WARLIMONT attended the most impor[-]tant conferences. The conferences were held at noon and in the evening. At noon he was present and heard thus directly, when HITLER issued some directives. They were the so-called

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"Situation Conferences", (Lagebesprechungen,) in short "Situation" ("Lage"). Among those present, whenever they were at headquarters, were: Field Marshal KEITEL and his adjutant, myself with both of my general staff officers, General WARLIMONT, who always brought with him the operations expert of the Navy, Captain JUNGE or Captain ASSMANN, of his staff. These Navy people reported the situation of the Navy. They did not belong to the Navy, but to my operations staff, which was composed of three departments, army, navy and air force. Other participants were the chief of the General Staff of the Army, who sometimes brought along 3 or 4 officers and the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with some of his officers. The Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, JESCHONECK, [c typed over k] held this position the longest. The Commanders-in-Chief came less frequently. This depended on whether they were in the vicinity or not. When they were in Berlin they came regularly, but often they were elsewhere and only came occasionally. Then a representative of the Foreign Office was always present as was the Reich Press Chief or his deputy. In the second part of the war, HIMMLER's deputy, Obergruppenfuehrer WOLF and later Gruppenfuehrer FEGELEIN, always was present. Then came the Fuehrer's adjutants, the three adjutants of army, navy, and air force, and the adjutant of the SS. Later on, there was a permanent representative of the Reich Marshal BODENSCHATZ - who also attended and who reported to the Reich Marshal,

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And finally a representative of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. These gentlemen came – let us say – above all to inform their Commanders in Chief, of what was being discussed in general. They were permanent participants.

Then there were the frequent visitors from the front, i.e. the Commanders in Chief, who were asked to report in person, the Commanders in Chief of Army, Navy, Air Force and, occasionally, HIMMLER. This developed, only in the course [sic] of the war, the circle of participants had been much smaller and more restricted.

WARLIMONT was the chief of a special staff for the case "Weser-Uebung". In this capacity, he had no other duties than the usual ones, except that, in this case, for the first time, the WRSt prepared the details of an operation to a greater extent than was customary with our system. This was the first operation prepared without the General Staff of the Army, for reasons of secrecy. For this purpose, a so-called special staff was set up. Practically it consisted of the WFSt as before, some[-]what reinforced by a few specialists detailed for this purpose. They were General Staff officers of the Air Force and of the Navy. I believe, that there was nobody from the Army. I do not know the names of the p [p removed] participants. They were younger men. Later, the staff which was in fact to lead the operations, was designated. It was the FALKENHORST staff, corps staff. This staff FALKENHORST was combined with my opera[-]tions section in the same locality and together they worked out the de[-]tails of a Norway operation. We called this operation "Weser-Uebung". FALKENHORST was independent. For this operation he was under the direct authority of the Fuehrer, since [typed over another word] it was carried out by the OKW, and HITLER was the chief of the OKW. WARLIMONT was a kind of deputy [e typed over another letter] chief of staff. Together they worked out the details of this operation ac[-]cording to HITLER's directives. Since this was the first time that we worked out the details, we called it special staff. The order for the preparation was issued on 27 January 1940, and the order to execute it, was given on 2 April for the 9<sup>th</sup>. During that time I talked daily with WARLIMONT. At that time we were constantly in

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Berlin. I sat in the Reich chancery, and WARLIMONT worked in the offices of the former ministry of war in the Bendlerstrasse, a 5 minute car drive away. Insofar as secrecy allowed it, much was done by telephone. But most of it was discussed verbally. Every day at noon, he reported to the Fuehrer and afterwards, we discussed the various details for weeks and months. WARLIMONT participated to the same extent in the preparation of the plan "Barbarossa", as in all other operational plans. [. typed over ,] At any rate, I informed him for the first time on 29 July, of HITLER's anxiety about the possibility of a further Russian advance in Rumania. The strong deployment in Bessarabia threatened the oil-wells. And from there on, he had to take care of this task with the staff, namely, to examine at the time – at the end of July and the beginning of August – whether a strategic concentration of troops could still be effected during the summer. It was not possible, as the strategic concentration would have taken 4 months and would therefore have lasted well into the winter. We believed, however, that we were not able to conduct any operations in the East in wintertime. Then the whole idea of a war with Russia was discarded, disappeared

altogether, except for one order which was worked out by WARLIMONT with the staff, namely, to improve the deploy[-]ment conditions in the East, so that a strategic concentration could be effected in shorter time; accordingly, to improve ramp installations, to stock supplies, etc.... Such an order was issued in August. And then I gave him in November, according to HITLER's order, the directive to transmit for the first time to the three branches of the Wehrmacht an order, that they should think about, concerning the participation in an operation against Russia.

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This had nothing to do with the political conferences with MOLOTOV, which were intended for the beginning of November. And when these conferences with MOLOTOV according to the information we received, were without result, WARLIMONT was ordered, in the first days of December, to issue the order now to submit a final plan for operations against Russia. This was only the general directive which was then worked out in my staff under direction of WARLIMONT, was then submitted to me, signed by the Fuehrer, and issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.

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The Army was to prepare its own operations plan. In reality, it had already prepared it in advance, according to statements by von BRAUCHITSCH, because HITLER had previously given him a verbal order to that effect.

As to WARLIMONT's special tasks, I sent him for instance to the French, with whom he worked rather closely and with whom he discussed combined operations in Africa. I sent him there because he was a very good linguist and because he like such tasks. He received frequent orders from Field Marshal KEITEL, and he attended conferences in Berlin, where questions of an economic nature were discussed. There he often represented Field Marshal KEITEL in matters about which I did not know anything.

For the rest, I draw attention to the perhaps important fact, that he was present in the conference room at the time of the attempt of 20 July. Except the ear drum injury which everybody had, he had no external injuries. Shortly thereafter, he flew on a special mission to France, to Field Marshal KLUGE, in order to discuss there various matters, such as the conduct of the battle of the beach-head. He was sent there and the result was, that a little later, he broke down completely and had to be sent away because of the concussion of the brain to which he had not paid any attention.

I have read the above statement consisting of ten pages, in German, and declare that it is the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I had occasion to make changes and corrections in the above statement. I made this statement voluntarily, without any promise of reward and I was not exposed to any duress or threat.

26-9-1946 (s) A. JODL

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NUERNBERG:

Before me, Fred KAUFMAN, an US Civilian, A 441649, appeared Generaloberst Alfred JODL, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of ten pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 26<sup>th</sup> day of September 1946.

Fred KAUFMAN

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Fred KAUFMAN

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CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION

12 December 1946

I, MARY E. CARTER, Warrant Officer, WAAF, 2120728, certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of [typed over another word] Document No. NOKW-065 [0 typed over 6].

MARY E. CARTER  
Warrant Officer  
WAAF-2120728