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Belief in Pure Evil as a Trait Predictor of Harsh Judgments of Perpetrator Attributes

Victoria Charlotte Mary-Rose Pocknell

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BELIEF IN PURE EVIL AS A TRAIT PREDICTOR OF HARSH JUDGMENTS OF
PERPETRATOR ATTRIBUTES

by

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Bachelor of Science, Northern Arizona University, 2015
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A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

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for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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This dissertation, submitted by Victoria Pocknell in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

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Victoria Pocknell
May 4, 2019

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To my mother Janice and my father Kieron,
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ABSTRACT

Humans look for a quick and comforting explanation for why bad things happen. One popular explanation is to believe good and evil are active forces affecting people and events. Past research suggests belief in evil is associated with harsher judgments and less prosocial behavior. However, little research has explored what factors influence the development of a belief in evil or its effects in an experimental setting. Using a national sample of Amazon MTurk respondents ($N = 511$), participants completed a series of potential developmental antecedent measures (e.g. personality domains, religiosity, etc.) and viewed a video vignette of a crime with information that the perpetrator was a first time or repeat offender and gave their opinions of the perpetrator. Belief in pure evil (BPE) varied in the sample with women ($M = 97.51$) endorsing stronger beliefs than men ($M = 92.75$). Regression analyses highlighted intrinsic religiosity, cognitive flexibility, authoritarian aggression, personal distress, and observation of parental violence as significant predictors of a strong belief in evil. A multivariate analysis controlling for respondent age was conducted between sex, arrest history, and BPE on judgmental indicators. Higher belief in evil coupled with a past arrest history led to more condemnation of others and reduced chances of rehabilitation compared to a lower belief in evil. Future research should focus on altering severity of crime, investigating racial and gender differences, and including explicit evil symbols in the scenario to assess the impact of BPE.

INTRODUCTION

In order to preserve one's idea of a fair and just world, people tend to look for a quick and comforting explanation when bad things happen (Lerner, 1980). This is especially true when harm is perceived to be conscious and deliberate (Baumeister, 1999; Darley, 1992; Miller, 1999; Staub, 1992). Extreme attitudinal and behavioral response tendencies (Davis & Millon, 1999) may lead to quick judgments regarding the character and motives of others in the absence of situational provocation or justification. One convenient and attractive explanation for why bad things happen is to believe that good and evil are durable and active forces that influence people and events (Staub, 1989, 2003; Zimbardo, 2007). It might be assumed that most people have a mental set of stereotypically diabolical inferences regarding the attributes and motives of "evil-doers". The developmental sources of this cognitive schema are poorly understood but are possibly influenced by religion and culture as seen in symbols (e.g., pentagram) and characterizations (e.g., the devil) of pure evil (Baumeister, 1997; Berkowitz, 1999). Associating evil characteristics with those who perpetrate harm have been shown to increase aggressive reactions and decrease prosocial behavior (Burris & Rempel, 2011; van Prooijen & van de Veer, 2010).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, an attempt was made by Baumeister (1999) to delineate manifestations of human evil. Baumeister (1999) suggested that evil has eight fundamental dimensions: a) intentional infliction of harm; b) pleasure in doing harm; c) belief that the victim is innocent and good; d) representation of the antithesis of peace, order, and stability; e) external source of evil that is stable in the person; f) marked egotism; and g) difficulty maintaining self-control. For example, Gromet, Goodwin, and Goodman (2016) found that actors were viewed as immoral and evil if they appeared to be getting pleasure from making

someone suffer regardless of whether this was explicitly or implicitly described. They went on to posit that it was impossible to reason with these individuals; therefore, they needed to be removed from society to reduce the chances of them inflicting further harm or threat. Humans are more likely to attribute antisocial behavior to internal factors that suggests that bad things are done by bad people (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Furthermore, some researchers found that participants were unlikely to sympathize with these individuals because to do so would be interpreted as condoning the atrocities they may have committed. Burriss and Rempel (2011) found that the application of the “evil” label was associated with extremely negative outcomes and little assuaged participants in reducing their punishment of the perpetrator.

Interest and desire to understand, flush out, and eradicate “evil” people and actions may be linked to the desire to maintain personal moral standards and world views. According to Kelly (1970), people use unique psychological processes called bipolar constructs (e.g. up versus down, right versus wrong) to determine how the world works so that they can anticipate and predict events. Where an individual falls on the bipolar spectrum, in this case believing in good versus evil, may influence how they characterize an event or circumstance and provide a glimpse into how they view and interpret reality (Horley, 2012). To know one’s personal constructs is to better understand the person including attitudinal and behavioral positions. Horley (2012) incorporated one’s value system into Kelley’s theory suggesting certain constructs function as ethical values as they often guide our evaluations of human conduct. Personal constructs provide a sense of personal identity, which is linked to a set of roles and relationships we share in a given social order (Kilmann, 1981). Graham et al. (2013) Individuals place differing importance on care (cherishing and protecting others), fairness (rendering justice according to shared rules), loyalty (standing with one’s group), authority (submitting to tradition and legitimate authority),

and sanctity (abhorrence of displeasing actions or things). These values are not mutually exclusive but differences in the extent individuals endorse these values alter one's perceptions of behavior. The idea of "evil" challenges one's self-cognition and threatens one's nexus of these values, because these individuals may be viewed as having few or clashing personal constructs or values. Reactions to these clashes potentially as a means to protect one's self-identity and belief in predictability of events typically are measured by assessing retribution, forgiveness, and the characteristics and motives of a perceived wrongdoer.

Belief in Pure Evil

People may differ on the degree to which they endorse the belief in evil and these individual differences may predict different responses to adversaries. Survey research in both college and national samples has shown that strong belief in pure evil may lead to harsher treatment of wrongdoers even if the individual does not exhibit prototypical evil traits or when there may be alternative reasons for the antisocial behavior (Vasturia, Webster, & Saucier, 2017). These participants appear to be more likely to neglect or discount contrasting information, suggesting a trend towards the belief that a perpetrator's actions are more stable and global. This may justify their greater blame and harsher treatment of wrongdoers. These individuals may also view the world as more dangerous and viler. Overall, people scoring higher in belief in pure evil preferred more aggressive solutions and may apply a "better safe than sorry" approach to the world (Campbell & Vollhardt, 2014). These individuals may want to better the world but have differing approaches as to how to achieve these goals. For example, higher scores on belief in pure evil tend to predict greater support for criminal punitiveness, more opposition to criminal rehabilitation, greater prejudice and racial attitudes, support for torture, and provoked and

preemptive military aggression and greater opposition for prosocial and social programs (Webster & Saucier, 2013).

Measurement considerations. Past researchers have attempted to construct a measure of the belief in pure evil but have faced several limitations (e.g. sample pool of items, low internal consistency, inadequate sample size, and inconsistent discriminant and convergent validity scores). Webster and Saucier (2013) aimed to address these limitations by constructing the Belief in Pure Evil (BPE) scale. Using two hundred participants, the researchers compiled items they believed to tap into different components of the “myth of evil,” such as infliction of intentional harm and antithesis of peace and order. Baumeister (1999) suggested that religion plays a role in providing vivid explanations of personifying evil. Therefore, these scales were also assessed for correlations with religion to provide a scale that measures a belief distinct from religion. They found that BPE and religiosity were not significantly correlated, perhaps due to the downplaying of the role of battling evil in organized religions over the past century (Webster & Saucier, 2013).

Belief in Pure Good

Pure good can be characterized by intentionally and selflessly helping anyone in need, helping without hurting others, incorruptible, a stable and rare trait, and facilitates peace, order, and stability (Webster & Saucier, 2013). However, few individuals in the world will intentionally and without expectation of reward help others, despite prosociality being key to maintaining and facilitating a better world. “Good” is perceived to be the direct opposite of “evil”; therefore, it may be inferred that the belief in pure evil leads conversely to the belief in pure good. While it is possible that there is a positive association between the belief in pure evil and good, there may also be a negative association because the methods people who belief in

pure evil use to maintain order may be different than those who believe in pure good (Webster & Saucier, 2013). For example, those scoring higher on the belief in pure good (BPG) should exhibit a more prosocial and less aggressive orientation toward others. Therefore, the association of whether BPG predicts the belief in pure evil needs further investigation.

Potential Developmental Antecedents

As previously suggested, personal constructs influence how we interpret the world. Researchers suggest the interplay between culture, past experiences, and predisposed internal mechanisms forms the creation and maintenance of these constructs. The construct under consideration is good versus evil, specifically the effect of belief in evil; therefore, it is important to investigate possible antecedents that shape one's belief in evil to better understand the purpose it serves to protect one's self-identity and interpretation of reality. As little research has explored the origins of the belief in evil as it is defined and operationalized in this paper, the first line of inquiry should focus on factors identified in past research to influence emotional and behavioral reactions.

Religiosity. Due to the explicit connection between evil and religiosity, the role religion plays in one's life may influence the presence and strength of the belief in evil and its effects on human behavior. Religious adherents may turn to their faith and other supernatural elements for perspective, guidance, explanation, and direction in various aspects of life. Some children are primed with or taught a "myth of evil" and to be aware of symbols associated with this myth, such as pentagrams or the all-seeing eye. This is further supported by at least forty Bible verses that use the word "evil" in some capacity, such as warning of symbols or the fight against it. Burris and Rempel (2011) found that when children were primed with these symbols early on, the "evil" label was more salient and readily applied in the future. This may be due to

“evil” symbols acting as a distant early warning system to detect evil individuals as they are taught that only evil people use evil symbols (Burriss & Rempel, 2011). At a distance, these teachings may serve the purpose of protecting their children and employing the “better safe than sorry” approach to nefarious-looking others. This can be seen in the themes of religious groups’ practices in valuing risk management and conformity to in-group norms, which most likely are viewed as providing safety and protection (Ellison & Sherkat, 1993). Furthermore, belief in supernatural evil and the existence of hell are related to stricter parenting behaviors and attitudes (Ellison & Bradshaw, 2009), such as favorable views of corporal punishment. Stricter parenting behaviors and attitudes are utilized as tools to limit the interaction their children have with others who may be seen as “dancing with the devil.” At a larger scale, there are positive correlations between the belief in the devil and attitudes toward capital punishment and the American criminal justice system (Wilson & Huff, 2001; Wilcox, Linzey, & Jelen, 1991; Baker & Booth, 2016). Therefore, a discussion of how someone may develop a belief in pure evil would be bereft if religiosity was not included.

Cognitive flexibility. Our psychological processes, especially our self-cognition, greatly influence our interpretations of reality. Therefore, the time and effort put into the cognitive processing behind the development of the belief in evil needs to be further explored. Human beings are inclined to explain the behavior of others to find reason and meaning, but some are more motivated to use more sophisticated and complex explanations (Ross, 1977; Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Cacioppo and Petty (1982) posited that these differences are rooted in people’s tendency to enjoy effortful cognitive activity. While few people always use complex and detailed explanations for everyday tasks due to the need to make rapid judgments with minimal information, some willingly seek out activities that nurture their

high need for cognition. Those with high and low need for cognition must make sense of their world, but tend to derive meaning, take positions, and solve problems differently. High need for cognition is associated with a natural tendency to seek information, reflect and think about information to make sense of stimuli, relationships, and events in the world to make more thoughtful judgments (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). These individuals may be more inclined to go out of their way to find difficult and complex word puzzles or problems. On the other hand, low need for cognition individuals may rely more on others, cognitive heuristics, or social comparisons as references points to make judgments. These individuals, for example, may use downward comparisons to enhance their outlooks of themselves by seeing oneself as righteous while viewing a wrongdoer as morally inferior (Wills, 1981). There were found to be no significant gender or age differences (Tolentino, Curry, & Leak, 1990; Spotts, 1994), but need for cognition may be moderately related to education and intelligence (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).

Rather than seeing human behavior as an interaction between internal and external factors, people tend to underestimate the role of external, situational determinants in favor of internal ones with further complexity added when considering race, sex, ethnicity, and age differences (Ross, 1977; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Allport, 1954/1979). In other words, most people tend to explain behavior as stable traits of the individual without taking into consideration the situational or environmental constraints or justification. Women, however, tend to be significantly more attributionally complex than men. A cognitive method associated with attributional complexity and the discussion of the belief in evil is demonizing. Demonizing means creating an impression of someone as the personification of evil by stripping away human qualities and making an individual sound to be more like an animal or a machine. Haslam (2006)

posited that animalistic demonizing portrays an individual as being coarse, uncultured, lacking in self-control, childlike, immature, unintelligent, and immoral and motivated by instincts and appetites. On the other hand, mechanistic demonizing is portrayed as lacking emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness, individual agency, and depth (i.e. being more machine-like than human). Early research studies suggest when people are thought of in either manner they are treated more harshly (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Capara, & Pastorelli, 1996). These polarized views of peoples' character as well as generally rigid cognitive styles (e.g. stereotypes and being cognitive misers) may underline the belief in evil people have when minimal cognitive effort is exerted and the lack of integration of information when determining how "evil" someone is (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; van Prooijen & van de Veer, 2010). Therefore, investigating the role of enjoyment in complex cognitive thinking (especially with its association with access to education and intelligence) in the development of a belief in evil schema is essential for better understanding its origins.

Personality pathology. According to McAdams (1995), personality features have the capacity to illustrate why we adopt certain values, goals, and motives, because they reflect a characteristic pattern of the individual's interplay of psychological mechanisms, thoughts, and emotions. Furthermore, personality dimensions were found to predict judgmental behaviors and attitudes (King & Pate, 2004). There were gender differences in attitudes with women endorsing dramatic, emotional or erratic features and men endorsing odd or eccentric features as being more influential in their judgments (King & Pate, 2003). This suggests that personality variables may mediate impression formation depending on the observer's gender. This lends itself to the discussion of bipolar constructs such as the belief in good versus evil as a method to interpret our world and that is potentially birthed from our personality domains.

Investigations using the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) to examine the Big Five personality traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) yielded interesting results in relation to views of others and need to maintain perceived morally appropriate behavior. High levels of agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness to experience were linked to a greater focus on maintaining the rights and welfare of others (Lewis & Bates, 2011). These individuals were more attuned to the needs of ensuring the safety and security of the individuals. However, high levels of conscientiousness and extraversion were linked to strong beliefs in maintaining the social order, suggesting that these individuals are more focused on maintaining and enforcing certain patterns of relating and behavior to others (Lewis & Bates, 2011).

The use of the Personality Inventory for the DSM-5 (PID-5) produced similar results to the NEO-FFI. Individuals with high levels of negative affect are anxious and highly sensitive to threats creating greater concerns about protecting themselves and others, which may translate into greater support for rules and regulations against wrongdoers (Oxley et al., 2008). High levels of antagonism may suggest less concern for harm avoidance or fairness as these individuals may be more deceptive, manipulative, and aggressive and potentially less likely to believe that there is a good versus evil spectrum (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). High disinhibition, on the other hand, may be less likely to condemn harmful acts because of their own tendency to display emotional distress in self-destructive, impulsive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This may lead to less condemnation of others simply based on actions. Studies have also explored the negative associations with Dark Triad personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy), suggesting these individuals are less concerned about the signs of suffering and pain of others (Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt,

2009) and again less likely to believe that there is good and evil in world. The differing methods of interpreting the world and emphasis placed on the safety and security of others may influence one's belief in agentic forces, such as good and evil, underlying human behavior. Therefore, the inclusion of personality domains when investigating the genesis of the belief in evil is essential.

Childhood maltreatment. People that come from a childhood littered with maltreatment, including abuse, neglect, bullying, and teasing, witness the darkest events a child could experience. It is no wonder that childhood abuse and neglect have been shown to lead to a whole host of negative consequences across multiple domains of functioning, including deficits in information and emotion processing and trauma-associated anxiety and depressive symptoms (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Eberhart, Auerbach, Bigda-Peyton, & Abela, 2011; Gilbert, Widom et al., 2009). Finklehor and Browne (1985) suggested that betrayal issues stemming from childhood maltreatment may manifest in poor judgments of who the individual can or should trust, quicker reactions to anger, and contempt and hurting of others to stave off the possibility of re-victimization. While maltreated children may be more alert and better prepared to identify threatening situations, they most likely have an exaggerated response to wrongdoing and few adaptive skills for coping with trust, intimacy, and fear of being re-victimized (Masten et al., 2008). To compensate for feelings of powerlessness stemming from this fear, victims of abuse may show more aggressive and delinquent behavior as a way to be appear tough, powerful, and fearsome. These difficulties are often compounded with low self-esteem and fear of abandonment that follow them into adulthood (Davis & Petretic-Jackson, 2000).

These consequences of childhood maltreatment come from severe interpersonal violations that lead to trust and intimacy issues. Fear and aggression from these events and the anxiety of being placed in a situation to be re-victimized may lead to children seeking

predictability and control in their environments. Predictability and control give these children (and later on as adults) a better chance to prepare and plan to increase the likelihood of their survival and decrease the risk of re-victimization in the future when they know what to expect. Little research is known about the rate at which children with maltreatment histories believe that there is good and evil in the world. However, there is some inclination that abuse victims may have distinct responses to “evil” individuals, including avoiding, attacking, or ignoring. Believing in evil may provide them with a cognitive schema or heuristic to use as a quick way to identify a potential threat in their environment by associating certain acts with “evil” people. This belief may even extend to offering them an explanation as to why such a bad thing, like childhood maltreatment, happened to them (i.e. evil people do evil things). Nonetheless, further investigation is needed to gain a better understanding of this unique population’s belief in evil and how it affects their interpretation of other wrongful acts.

Political ideology. The divide between political ideologies is not just motivated by specific policy options or economic outlooks, but also reflects ethical concerns and differing values to defend their existing social system against perceived instability, threat, and attack (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). We adopt these belief systems to help satisfy some set of psychological needs and are created from a set of premises believers subscribe to and at least partially to reality (Kruglanski, 1999; Kunda, 1990). Therefore, political ideology is a highly influential personal construct that influences how an individual interprets and interacts with the world. Individuals often endorse that their political ideology is an essential component of their personal identity that drive their day-to-day decisions.

Liberals tend to be more concerned about minimizing harm and maximizing fairness, while conservatives and right-wings focus on domains of loyalty and submission to authority and are fearful and anxious of out-groups (Altemeyer, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). This may become personified as a greater tendency to shun and/or punish outsiders and those who threaten or clash with their worldviews and the endorsement of greater severity of punishment, racial prejudice, victim blaming, and acceptance of governmental authorities (Altemeyer, 1998). These outward aggressive tendencies serve as a means to protect themselves from perceived threats to their value systems. In addition, right-wing authoritarians tend to see themselves as more moral than others and more justified in looking down at others who go against their defined authority figures (Whitley, 1999). Endorsing that there is evil in the world may provide these individuals a means of justifying their condemnation of out-groups for the sake of protecting their values. Kelley (1970) posited that personal constructs often shape one another; therefore, it might be possible that the political ideology one possesses affects the presence and strength of one's belief in evil as a way of explaining and maintaining a fair and just world.

Empathy. Empathy is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct containing affective and cognitive components, such as being able to adopt another's perspective, understand others, and emotionally react to the events of others (Davis, 1994). These abilities are important components of everyday social functioning as it promotes pro-social behavior and helps to maintain social relationships (Charbonneau & Nicol, 2002; Noller & Ruzzene, 1991). Typically, when considering the relationship between empathy and evil, a discussion is made concerning traditional models of evil (e.g. psychopaths and sociopaths) and their inability to experience or lack of empathy. We see this in clinical diagnoses of antisocial personality

disorder and narcissistic personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).

Empathy serves the role in most individuals to guide our behavior to do good (e.g. helping others) while avoiding doing “evil” (e.g. committing crimes; Chowdhury & Fernando, 2014).

In reality, greater empathy may not have a direct, clear path to more altruistic and passive actions towards or views of others. Some evidence suggests that higher levels of empathy can decrease harsh judgments of others. For example, when individuals have empathy for perpetrators of negative behavior, less responsibility is typically attributed to them (Sulzer & Burglass, 1968). This relationship is even found in cases of simulated murder cases as suggested by Haegrich and Bottoms (2000) study which found that highly empathic jurors were more likely to consider mitigating factors for the crime leading to less guilt and responsibility of the perpetrator. This exemplifies one’s ability to perspective take to better understand the reasoning behinds one’s actions. This may negate a person’s belief that someone can be inherently evil or have stable, global evil traits as they consider more environmental and external factors. However, conflicting evidence has been presented recently that higher empathic tendencies can also increase hostile perceptions of others (Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2013). For example, an individual may endorse high empathic tendencies but respond harshly when viewed actions of others contradict another strongly held belief, such as harming another person (Morrison & Borgen, 2010). This may illustrate empathy’s moderate positive association with a belief in a just world in which they attempt to explain or rationalize away injustice (Furnham, 2003). Believing that evil exists and is an active agentic force may help to provide them a way to explain why an individual would break societal and/or personal rules of appropriate behavior. While little is known about how empathic tendencies relate to an overall belief that evil exists, there is a premise to include empathy in this discussion, especially as it relates to judgment making.

Hypotheses

This study was designed to address questions regarding both the information processing effects and developmental antecedents of an attribute referred to in the literature as belief in pure evil. First, the study examined the developmental antecedents to Belief in Pure Evil as a personality trait. Second, participants witnessed a wrongful act and then offered personal judgements about the perpetrator before and after exposure to information about his arrest history. A series of hypotheses were tested in the first (# 1-7) and second (# 8 -13) phases of data analysis.

Potential developmental antecedents.

1. Belief in pure good will covary with belief in pure evil;
2. Religiosity will predict stronger belief in pure evil;
3. Higher need for cognition will lead to greater attitudinal complexity and less belief in pure evil;
4. Five-factor personality trait domain scores will be associated both positively (Negative Affect) and negatively (Antagonism & Disinhibition) with beliefs in pure evil;
5. Childhood maltreatment will predict stronger belief in pure evil;
6. Political conservatism and/or greater right-wing authoritarianism will lead to stronger belief in pure evil;
7. Empathy will predict stronger belief in pure evil;

Experimental effects.

8. Men will express stronger beliefs in pure evil than women (sex main effect);
9. Beliefs in pure evil will be associated with harsher judgements of perpetrator (BPE main effect);

10. Perpetrators with criminal histories will generate harsher judgements in response to their criminal act (arrest history main effect);
11. BPE effects will be magnified among the men as compared to the women (sex x BPE interaction);
12. Arrest history effects will be magnified among the men as compared to the women (sex x arrest history interaction);
13. Past arrest history will have a relatively weaker impact on participants espousing extreme BPE given the anticipated ceiling effect on their pre-judgements (BPE x arrest history interaction).

METHOD

Participants

A national sample of 612 survey respondents were gathered through the use of Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) for financial compensation (\$1). Account-specific identification and verification using payment monitoring protects against multiple completions by the same respondents. MTurk workers have been found to be reliable responders and have shown to be attentive to experimental instructions (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In addition, MTurk workers have been shown to exhibit similar motivational characteristics and response variability to those in face-to-face sample (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Overall, MTurk has consistently been used as a crowdsourcing research resource described as valid and representative (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). The average completion time of the test was estimated at 45 minutes. Inclusion criteria consisted of United States nationality and older than 18 years of

age. Exclusion criteria consisted of failure to accurately respond to two validity indicators, which excluded 101 participants. The final sample consisted of 511 participants.

Procedure

The survey was administered through a Qualtrics file accessed via MTurk. This survey presented a counterbalanced sequence of developmental antecedent and judgmental indicators. The demographic and developmental antecedent scales were completed only once at the outset of the survey. The judgmental indicators were completed both before (pre-testing) and after (post-testing) viewing a brief video vignette of a hit and run car accident. During the interim of the pre- and post-testing respondents were informed whether or not the driver had an arrest history. The experimental sequence is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. *Experimental Manipulation Sequence*. Note. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the Arrest or No Prior Arrest condition.

Developmental Antecedent Measures

Demographic questionnaire. A customized demographic questionnaire was used to establish the age, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, religion and education level of each respondent (Appendix B).

The Belief in Pure Evil Scale. The BPE (Appendix C) measures the specified trait attribute using a 22-item, Likert-type scale (1-*disagree very strongly* to 7-*agree very strongly*)

assessing eight components of “evil” including: 1) a general belief in evil; 2) a belief that some people intentionally harm others; 3) a belief that some people enjoy harming others; 4) a belief that self-protection requires a real-world understanding that evil exists; 5) a belief that evil people have low self-control; 6) a belief that evil people are egotistical; 7) a belief that basic evil is eternal and disposed to change; and 8) a belief that basic evil represents the antithesis of peace. The BPE scale scores have been shown (Webster & Saucier, 2013) to be variable, normally distributed, internally consistent ($\alpha > .88$), and temporally stable ($r = .63$).

The Belief in Pure Good Scale. The Belief in Pure Good scale (BPG; Appendix D; Webster & Saucier, 2013) is a 28-item, 7-point Likert type scale assessing general belief in good, intention to help, facilitation of peace, impartial help, without reward, rare in world, avoidance of aggression, and defiance of corruption. BGE had excellent reliability (alphas greater than 0.91), approximated a normal distribution, and sufficient variation in scores.

Duke University Religion Index. The DUREL (Koenig & Bussing, 2010; Appendix E) is a brief, 5-item measure of frequency of engagement in religious activities by assessing organizational and non-organization religious activity using a 6-point Likert scale. The scale has adequate test-retest reliability (intra-class correlation = 0.91), high internal consistency (α coefficients ranging from 0.78-0.91), and high convergent validity with other measures of religiosity such as the Hoge Intrinsic Religiosity Scale.

Need for Cognition. The Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Appendix F) is an 18-item, 5-point Likert type scale (ranging from 1 = *extremely unlike me* to 5 = *extremely like me*) self-report measure assessing their engagement in thinking activities. This scale has adequate internal consistency (alpha typically greater than or equal to 0.85).

Personality Inventory for DSM-5 – Brief Form. The DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Appendix G) ushered in a moratorium on the measurement of personality disturbance with an objective to move forward with dimensional versus categorical metrics in future research. While traditional categorical criteria were retained in the DSM-5, the task force has called for accelerated research on dimensional measurement indices. Exemplars of dimensional measures included the Personality Inventory for the DSM-5 (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2012; Quilty, Ayearst, Chmielewski, Pollock, & Bagby, 2013). Both the PID-5 and its 25-item brief version (PID-5-BF; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2013) can be accessed directly from the APA website. Both inventories measure the five trait domains of Antagonism, Disinhibition, Negative Affect, Detachment, and Psychoticism. All items are scaled using the same 4-point metric (0 = *very false or often false*; 1 = *sometimes or somewhat false*; 2 = *sometimes or somewhat true*; and 3 = *very true or often true*). Trait domain scores range from 0 to 15 and are not calculated if more than 25% of the contributing items were left blank. Missing scores within this exclusion criterion were prorated as specified by the test developers (Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2013). The psychometric properties of these PID-5-BF trait domain scores have been established in various sources (Anderson, Sellbom, & Salekin, 2018; Debast, Rossi, & Van Alphen, 2017; Góngora & Solano, 2017; Hopwood, Schade, Krueger, Wright, & Markon, 2013).

Sexual Abuse & Assault Self-Report. This study relied on the 10-item CSA inventory (Barnett, Manly, & Cicchetti, 1993; Appendix H) made available by the Consortium of Longitudinal Studies on Child Abuse and Neglect (LONGSCAN) project coordinated at the University of North Carolina (www.unc.edu/5epts./sph/longscan/). This index was developed for use with sexually victimized children and adolescents. Respondents recalled sexual incidents

perpetrated against him or her prior to age 13, and then in a follow-up panel, between the ages of 13 and 16. Minor wording modifications were made for adult sampling purposes (i.e., “genitalia” instead of “sexual parts”; “rape” in place of “put a part of his body inside your private parts”). An aggregate CSA score ranging from 0 to 24 was used for all dimensional analyses as the sum of affirmative responses over the two retrospective periods. The LONGSCAN site provided concurrent validation data for their original scale.

Violent Experiences Questionnaire-Revised. The VEQ-R (King & Russell, 2017; Appendix I) is a brief retrospective self-report inventory assessing the annual frequencies of childhood abuse, sibling physical abuse, exposure to parental violence, peer bullying, and corporal punishment between ages 5 to 16. Scores range from a frequency of 0 to a high of 104. Subscales can be generated to estimate the frequency of victimization during childhood, the pre-teen years, and adolescence, and identify perpetrator sources (parent, sibling, peer, or domestic). Thresholds were also established for risk classifications. VEQ-R psychometric properties were derived from college ($n = 1,220$) and national ($n = 1,270$) normative samples (King & Russell, 2017). Test-retest (one week) reliability estimates, including kappa coefficients for the four-group risk classification models, were generated from the college sample (CORP, $\alpha = .79$, $r = .74$, $\kappa = 0.62$; CPA, $\alpha = .87$, $r = .81$, $\kappa = 0.77$; SPA, $\alpha = .87$, $r = .63$, $\kappa = 0.58$; OPV, $\alpha = .90$, $r = .64$, $\kappa = 0.66$; & BULL, $\alpha = .82$, $r = .67$, $\kappa = 0.68$). Ten VEQ-R concurrent validation studies were cited in the recent psychometric analysis.

Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism Scale. The ASC (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016; Appendix J) is an 18-item self-report measure of right-wing authoritarianism. The ASC item content loads on a number of components believed to be central (Altemeyer, 1996) to right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., authoritarian aggression, intentional harm toward another if they believe

that an authority would approve, authoritarian submission, acceptance of statements and actions of authority; conventionalism, and strong acceptance and commitment to social norms). The ASC has been shown to be internally consistent ($\alpha > .80$) and concurrently valid with other authoritarianism scales such as the Child-Rearing Values (CRV; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), Social Conformity-Autonomy Beliefs Scale (SCA; Feldman, 2003), and Authoritarianism-Conservation-Traditionalism (ACT; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010).

Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The IRI (Davis, 1980; Appendix K) is a 28-item, 5-point Likert scale assessing four facets of empathy. Davis (1983) defines empathy as the one's reactions to observing the experiences of another. The scale is delineated into four unique subscales: perspective taking (adopting another's psychological perspective), fantasy (identifying with fictitious characters), empathic concern (experiencing feelings of warmth, sympathy, and concern towards others), and personal distress (having feelings of discomfort and concern when witnessing others' negative experiences). A number of studies indicate that the IRI is a reliable and valid measure of people's empathy via self-report (Davis, 1994; De Corte, Buysse et al., 2007).

Judgmental Indicators

The judgmental indicators in the experimental phase of this study provided estimates of how respondents viewed the character and motives of the offender, his recidivism potential, the legal penalty warranted by the crime, and the extent to which the respondent would socially distance himself or herself from the perpetrator.

Social Comparison Scale. The Social Comparison Scale (SCS; Allan & Gilbert, 1995; Appendix L) was customized to create a 12-item self-report inventory assessing the judgments of social rank, relative attractiveness, and group fit. The scale presents participants with incomplete

sentences followed by a series of bipolar constructs in which they must rate themselves using a 6-point Likert scale. The reliability of the scale was 0.88 and test-retest reliability at four months at 0.84.

Negative Personality Traits. Tendencies to devalue and dehumanize others were assessed using a customized form of the 10-item Animalistic Dehumanization Scale (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Appendix M) and the Mechanistic Dehumanization Scale (Vasturia, Webster, & Saucier, 2017). These constructs were derived from Haslam's (2006) theoretical model of dehumanization. Responses were averaged to compute a composite animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization score that was internally consistent ($\alpha > .90$).

Customized Indices. The remaining measures were customized scales (see Appendix N). Respondents were asked how severely the individual should be punished using modalities of punishment (Harlow, Darley, & Robinson, 1995) that include probation, community service, imprisonment, home detention, weekend sentencing, and/or monetary fines. An estimate will be derived regarding the desired social distance (Szcurek, Monin, & Gross, 2012) the respondent would like to maintain from the perpetrator. Respondents will also estimate the recidivism potential of the perpetrator along with the extent to which he experienced pleasure during the act. Respondent willingness to forgive the transgression will be assessed using a question devised by DeShea (2003): "How willing would you be to forgive this person?"

Analytic Strategy

Belief in pure evil was dichotomized into three groups: low, average, and high. The low group consisted on 81 participants who encompassed the lowest two standard deviations of BPE scores. The high group consisted of 98 participants who encompassed the top two standard deviations of BPE scores. The average group consisted of the remaining 328 participants.

Antecedent correlates. Hypotheses 1 through 7 were tested using bivariate correlations and regression analysis models. Bivariate correlation coefficients were generated to estimate the strengths of relationship between the Belief in Pure Evil scale and developmental predictors. Six regression analysis models (personality, religiosity, history of maltreatment, cognition, right-wing authoritarianism, and empathy) were completed to assess the extent to which level of belief of pure evil could be predicted by those grouped developmental factors. Developmental predictors found to be significant in each model were then included in the final model. The final model identified the significant developmental predictors that predicted unaccounted variance.

Experimental effects. The last five hypotheses were tested using a 2 (Sex) x 3 (low, average, and high BPE) x 2 (Pre-Post Testing) x 2 (Arrest History) MANCOVA which controlled for respondent age. One within group factor was provided through pre- and post-testing on the judgmental indicators. Post-hoc ANOVAs were used to isolate effects contributing to omnibus findings.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The sample consisted of 48.5% male, 51.5% female. The average age of the participant was thirty-six years old ($SD = 12.93$) with an age range of 18-75. Representation varied in the sample with the majority of the sample endorsing being Caucasian, Married/Living Together, Christian, Heterosexual, and having a 4-year degree. See Table 1 for more demographics. The Belief in Pure Evil scale was found to be highly reliable (22 items; $\alpha = 0.97$). Belief in evil scores largely varied in the sample ($M = 95.21$; $SD = 31.48$) with women ($M = 97.51$; $SD = 31.32$) scoring higher than men ($M = 92.75$; $SD = 31.52$). The Belief in Pure Good scale was found to be highly reliable (28 items; $\alpha = 0.93$). There was a weak positive linear relationship

between BPE and religiosity ($r(504) = +.11, p < 0.01$). Belief in good scores largely varied in the sample ($M = 139.82; SD = 27.05$) with women ($M = 145.43; SD = 25.86$) scoring higher than men ($M = 133.59; SD = 27.04$).

Table 1. *Sample Demographics*

	<u>Males ($n = 248$)</u>		<u>Females ($n = 263$)</u>	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
<u>Sexual Orientation</u>				
Heterosexual	219	88.3	227	86.3
Homosexual	7	2.8	7	2.7
Bisexual	21	8.5	28	10.6
Other	1	0.4	1	0.4
 <u>Race</u>				
White	180	72.6	197	74.9
African American	23	9.3	22	8.4
American Indian	5	2.0	2	0.8
Asian	16	6.5	12	4.6
Native Hawaiian	0	0	1	0.4
Hispanic/Latino	5	2.0	8	3.0
Multiracial	17	6.9	21	8.0
 <u>Education</u>				
Less than H.S.	0	0	0	0
H.S. Graduate	23	9.3	31	11.8
Some College	53	21.5	69	26.3
2-Year Degree	23	9.3	37	14.1
4-Year Degree	106	43.1	95	36.3
Masters	35	14.2	29	11.1
PhD/MD/LD	6	2.4	1	0.4
 <u>Relationship Status</u>				
Married/Living Together	134	54.7	162	61.6
Divorced	16	6.5	22	8.4
Separated	4	1.6	7	2.7
Single	91	36.7	72	27.4
 <u>Religion</u>				
Christianity	112	47.3	132	51.8
Islam	1	0.4	4	1.6
Hinduism	8	3.4	5	2.0
Buddhism	4	1.7	2	0.8
Judaism	3	1.3	2	0.8

Catholicism	19	7.7	28	11.0
Agnostic/Atheism	71	30.0	56	21.9
Mormonism	1	0.4	1	0.4
Other-Not Listed	18	7.6	25	9.8

Note. Male ($n = 243$). Female ($n = 268$)

Antecedent Correlates

Developmental antecedents of belief in pure evil were examined using correlation analyses. Table 2 illustrates the means of the development antecedents and correlation coefficients.

Table 2. *Descriptive Statistics and Correlates with Belief in Pure Evil*

Antecedents	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	S.D.	<i>r</i>
<u>Personality Domains</u>						
Negative Affect	506	.00	3.00	1.08	.77	0.10*
Detachment	507	.00	3.00	0.89	.74	0.08
Antagonism	505	.00	3.00	0.65	.72	0.15**
Disinhibition	507	.00	3.00	0.67	.73	0.13**
Psychoticism	507	.00	2.80	0.74	.76	0.12**
<u>Cognition Flexibility</u>						
Need for Cognition	504	18.00	90.00	59.00	13.63	-0.21**
<u>Right-Wing Authoritarianism</u>						
Authoritarian Submission	504	6.00	30.00	14.43	4.29	0.20**
Conventionalism	504	6.00	30.00	17.80	4.74	0.23**
Authoritarian Aggression	505	6.00	30.00	16.40	4.72	0.38**
<u>Empathy</u>						
Empathic Concern	504	.00	28.00	18.75	5.94	-0.07
Perspective Taking	504	1.00	28.00	18.20	5.26	-0.10*
Personal Distress	504	.00	28.00	11.40	5.65	0.15**
<u>History of Maltreatment</u>						
Sexual Abuse	507	.00	21.00	2.70	4.04	0.10*
Sibling Physical Abuse	485	.00	104.00	7.29	18.74	0.12**
Observed Parental Violence	490	.00	104.00	5.66	17.54	0.17**
Peer Bullying	491	.00	104.00	11.72	24.38	0.04
Peer Teasing	490	.00	104.00	15.96	27.66	0.02

Religiosity

Intrinsic Religiosity	509	3.00	15.00	8.93	4.10	0.23**
Private Religious Attendance	508	1.00	6.00	2.61	1.69	0.09*
Public Religious Attendance	508	1.00	6.00	2.66	1.55	0.11**

Note. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$

All regression models grouping developmental predictors were significant; however, only five of the six models consisted of at least one predictor variable. The personality model was statistically significant, $R^2 = 0.02$, $F(5, 498) = 2.57$, $p < 0.05$, but did not produce any significant predictor variables. The right-wing authoritarianism ($R^2 = 0.15$, $F(3, 500) = 30.32$, $p < 0.01$), empathy ($R^2 = 0.02$, $F(3, 499) = 4.86$, $p < 0.01$), history of maltreatment ($R^2 = 0.04$, $F(5, 461) = 22.39$, $p < 0.01$), cognitive flexibility ($R^2 = 0.04$, $F(1, 502) = 22.39$, $p < 0.01$), and religiosity ($R^2 = 0.05$, $F(3, 495) = 9.66$, $p < 0.01$) models produced one significant predictor variable (see Table 3).

Table 3. *Linear Regression Models of Developmental Antecedents on Belief in Pure Evil*

Variables	B	β	t	df	F	adj. R^2
<u>Personality</u>				5, 498	2.57*	0.02
Negative Affect	2.08	0.05	0.78			
Antagonism	5.57	0.12	1.67			
Disinhibition	2.24	0.05	0.64			
Psychoticism	0.15	0.00	-.11			
<u>Right Wing Authoritarianism</u>				3, 500	30.32**	0.15
Authoritarianism Submission	0.44	0.06	1.32			
Conventionalism	0.40	0.06	1.27			
Authoritarian Aggression	2.23	0.33	7.05**			
<u>Empathy</u>				3, 499	4.86**	0.02
Perspective Taking	-0.48	-0.08	-1.32			
Personal Distress	0.76	0.13	3.08**			
Empathic Concern	0.00	0.00	0.01			
<u>History of Maltreatment</u>				5, 461	22.39**	0.04
Sexual Abuse	0.44	0.05	1.16			
Sibling Physical Abuse	0.12	0.07	1.32			
Observed Parental Abuse	0.26	0.14	2.64**			
Peer Bullying	0.07	0.006	0.76			
Peer Teasing	-0.16	-0.14	-1.87			

<u>Cognitive Flexibility</u>				1, 502	22.39**	0.04
Need for Cognition	-0.47	-0.20	-4.73**			
<u>Religiosity</u>				3, 495	9.66**	0.05
Intrinsic Religiosity	2.31	0.30	4.67**			
Private Religious Attendance	-1.93	-0.10	-1.73			
Public Religious Attendance	-0.38	-0.01	-0.32			

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Belief in Pure Evil is treated as a continuous variable

The final model consisted of five developmental predictors, $R^2 = 0.21$, $F(5, 474) = 25.248$, $p = .000$. Four of the five variables had positive regression weights, indicating higher scores of intrinsic religiosity, observed parental violence, personal distress, and authoritarian aggression produce higher scores on the Belief in Pure Evil scale. Need for cognition, however, had a negative regression weight, suggesting higher scores on this scale produce lower scores of belief in pure evil (see Table 4).

Table 4. *Linear Regression Model for Significant Developmental Antecedents on Belief in Pure Evil*

Variables	B	β	t	df	F	adj. R^2
				5, 498	2.57*	0.02
Need for Cognition	-0.23	-0.10	-2.33*			
Authoritarian Aggression	2.12	0.31	7.41**			
Personal Distress	0.52	0.09	2.24*			
Observed Parental Violence	0.21	0.11	2.84**			
Intrinsic Religiosity	1.12	0.14	3.49**			

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Belief in Pure Evil is treated as a continuous variable

Experimental Effects

Participants were asked to offer their opinions on a variety of different factors (recidivism probability, punishment, etc.) about a perpetrator who committed a hit and run crime. They were then randomly assigned to one of two groups (no prior arrest history and arrest history) in which they were given additional information about the perpetrator and asked to rate the perpetrator again on the same factors. Table 5 illustrates the average rating on each of the factors pre- and post-test and by arrest history condition and belief in evil.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Pre- and Post-Test Judgmental Indicators

	No Prior Arrests				Past Arrests			
	Pre		Post		Pre		Post	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Low Belief in Pure Evil (-2 SDs)</i>								
Social Distance	17.36 (4.38)	17.45 (4.56)	19.00 (4.89)	19.02 (6.01)	17.86 (4.56)	18.02 (4.69)	16.08 (5.98)	16.86 (5.04)
Social Comparison	50.09 (9.60)	51.48 (8.41)	50.30 (13.37)	52.20 (13.37)	49.20 (11.09)	50.89 (9.82)	46.72 (13.79)	49.20 (12.14)
Retribution	3.95 (.85)	3.96 (.81)	3.96 (1.30)	4.46 (.76)	4.06 (.83)	3.87 (.84)	3.42 (1.31)	3.41 (1.04)
Forgiveness	3.90 (1.63)	4.24 (1.73)	3.269 (1.71)	3.26 (1.88)	4.19 (1.60)	4.17 (1.72)	4.44 (1.50)	4.52 (1.73)
Recidivism	2.89 (1.28)	2.76 (1.16)	2.24 (1.21)	1.85 (1.14)	2.95 (1.45)	2.82 (1.13)	3.79 (1.65)	3.76 (1.37)
Pleasure	3.33 (1.20)	3.14 (1.22)	3.78 (1.35)	3.90 (1.40)	3.25 (1.36)	3.26 (1.35)	2.75 (1.38)	2.92 (1.34)
Personality Traits	4.71 (2.75)	5.60 (2.49)	6.22 (3.57)	7.39 (3.02)	5.30 (3.11)	5.77 (3.13)	4.95 (3.19)	5.28 (3.20)
<i>Average Belief in Pure Evil (-2 < and < +2 SDs)</i>								
Social Distance	15.73 (5.95)	15.88 (4.24)	18.26 (5.53)	17.50 (6.73)	16.85 (5.56)	17.65 (4.70)	16.55 (5.77)	17.05 (4.55)
Social Comparison	48.72 (11.39)	48.50 (9.34)	49.08 (16.03)	52.38 (12.44)	48.45 (13.18)	52.05 (6.40)	49.30 (10.76)	49.75 (14.07)
Retribution	3.78 (.99)	3.59 (.71)	4.17 (1.26)	4.28 (.82)	3.68 (.82)	4.25 (.71)	3.45 (.88)	3.95 (.82)
Forgiveness	4.30 (1.86)	5.33 (1.45)	3.70 (2.22)	4.50 (1.82)	5.25 (1.77)	4.70 (1.38)	5.25 (1.71)	5.25 (1.33)
Recidivism	3.52 (1.41)	3.33 (1.23)	1.83 (.77)	1.67 (.76)	3.35 (1.69)	3.15 (1.34)	4.45 (1.79)	4.30 (1.75)
Pleasure	2.83 (1.26)	2.39 (1.46)	3.65 (1.52)	3.06 (1.05)	2.50 (1.14)	2.75 (1.25)	2.35 (1.34)	2.25 (1.20)
Personality Traits	5.56 (2.42)	4.11 (1.74)	6.86 (2.84)	6.00 (2.00)	4.45 (2.50)	5.55 (2.21)	4.95 (3.05)	5.75 (2.17)
<i>High Belief in Pure Evil (+2 SDs)</i>								
Social Distance	20.15 (5.78)	21.09 (4.78)	21.61 (4.92)	21.56 (6.24)	19.20 (4.86)	20.88 (4.12)	18.15 (5.86)	18.66 (5.48)
Social Comparison	54.25 (13.54)	57.71 (6.11)	57.30 (12.73)	59.65 (5.78)	55.03 (10.72)	54.88 (12.08)	53.84 (11.05)	50.88 (17.85)
Retribution	4.23 (.72)	4.13 (.93)	3.92 (1.80)	4.63 (.83)	4.08 (.74)	4.35 (.79)	3.81 (.84)	3.81 (1.11)
Forgiveness	4.15 (2.19)	3.53 (2.07)	3.69 (2.52)	2.72 (1.95)	4.54 (2.00)	2.81 (1.66)	4.92 (2.15)	3.41 (1.84)
Recidivism	2.54 (1.33)	1.91 (1.08)	2.15 (1.34)	1.47 (.84)	2.46 (1.33)	2.19 (1.54)	3.19 (2.09)	3.11 (1.47)
Pleasure	4.23 (2.16)	4.31 (1.46)	5.46 (1.76)	5.03 (1.73)	3.42 (2.08)	4.11 (1.42)	3.38 (1.92)	4.15 (1.51)
Personality Traits	6.30 (4.47)	6.96 (3.04)	6.38 (4.50)	8.43 (3.32)	5.15 (3.94)	5.62 (3.58)	5.38 (3.90)	5.81 (3.67)

Note. BPE = Belief in Pure Evil (Low ($n = 81$); Average ($n = 328$); & High ($n = 98$)). Arrest History = No Prior Arrests ($n = 240$) and Prior Arrests ($n = 235$).

Bivariate correlations between BPE and combined pre- and post-test scores using z scores were calculated to test the strength of the relationship. All correlation coefficients except one were statistically significant (see Table 6).

Table 6. *Pre- and Post-Test Combined Scores Correlation Matrix*

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. BPE	.221**	.132**	.366**	.150**	-.237**	.197**	.294**
2. Forgiveness		.277**	.228**	.275**	-.368**	.112*	.426**
3. Personality Traits			.180**	.350**	-.395**	.396**	.342**
4. Pleasure				.216**	-.352**	.053	.256**
5. Retribution					-.376**	.221**	.402**
6. Recidivism						-.196**	-.424**
7. Social Comparison							.277**
8. Social Distance							

Note. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Pre and Post Test Combined scores above diagonal. Belief in Pure Evil (Low ($n = 81$); Average ($n = 328$); & High ($n = 98$))

A 2(Pre-Post) x 2(Sex) x 2(Arrest History) x 3(BPE group) multivariate analysis controlling for respondent age was conducted to investigate the relationship between these factors and seven dependent variables. There was no significant difference in BPE scores between those assigned to the arrest history ($M = 94.52$; $SD = 31.58$) or no arrest history ($M = 95.90$; $SD = 31.42$) condition $t(505) = 0.491$, $p = 0.624$). Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the MANCOVA results.

Table 7. *MANCOVA Main Effects and Interactions*

Main and Interaction Effects	Λ	F	df	p	h_p^2
Sex	0.98	1.27	7		0.02
BPE	0.80	6.97	14	**	0.10
Pre-Post	0.99	0.30	7		0.00
Arrest History	0.88	8.16	7	**	0.11
Sex x BPE	0.95	1.37	14		0.02
Sex x Pre-Post	0.97	1.50	7		0.02
Sex x Arrest History	0.97	1.62	7		0.02
BPE x Pre-Post	0.94	1.91	14	*	0.03
BPE x Arrest History	0.96	1.04	14		0.01

Pre-Post x Arrest History	0.66	31.49	7	**	0.33
Sex x BPE x Pre-Post	0.97	0.92	14		0.01
Sex x Pre-Post x Arrest History	0.96	2.29	7	*	0.03
Sex x BPE x Arrest History	0.96	1.05	14		0.01
BPE x Pre-Post x Arrest History	0.93	2.06	14	*	0.03
Sex x BPE x Pre-Post x Arrest History	0.97	0.72	14		0.01

Note. BPE = Belief in Pure Evil (Low ($n = 81$); Average ($n = 328$); & High ($n = 98$)). Arrest History = No Prior Arrests ($n = 240$) and Prior Arrests ($n = 235$). Pre-Post constitutes a difference score. Age controlled as a covariate. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 8. *Univariate F-Ratios for Significant MANCOVA Main and Interactive Effects*

Predictor	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	Partial h_p^2
<u>Belief in Pure Evil (BPE)</u>					
Social Distance	2	389.51	8.66	.00	.038
Social Comparison	2	1714.55	8.00	.00	.035
Retribution	2	2.64	1.98	.13	.009
Forgiveness	2	57.55	10.09	.00	.044
Recidivism	2	30.33	11.32	.00	.049
Pleasure of Act	2	92.64	29.15	.00	.117
Negative Personality Traits	2	22.43	1.24	.29	.006
<u>Arrest History</u>					
Social Distance	1	171.86	3.82	.05	.009
Social Comparison	1	510.99	2.38	.12	.005
Retribution	1	8.83	6.61	.01	.015
Forgiveness	1	45.25	7.94	.00	.018
Recidivism	1	125.45	46.86	.00	.096
Pleasure of Act	1	61.79	19.44	.00	.042
Negative Personality Traits	1	74.87	4.13	.04	.009
<u>Pre-Post x BPE</u>					
Social Distance	2	23.00	2.56	.07	.011
Social Comparison	2	32.74	0.73	.48	.003
Retribution	2	1.10	2.17	.11	.010
Forgiveness	2	0.49	0.96	.38	.004
Recidivism	2	5.21	5.85	.00	.026
Pleasure of Act	2	2.90	3.47	.03	.015
Negative Personality Traits	2	2.97	1.62	.19	.007
<u>Pre-Post x Arrest History</u>					
Social Distance	1	345.65	38.60	.00	.080
Social Comparison	1	464.97	10.40	.00	.023
Retribution	1	18.37	36.21	.00	.076
Forgiveness	1	47.45	93.40	.00	.174

Recidivism	1	133.18	149.55	.00	.253
Pleasure of Act	1	42.16	50.46	.00	.102
Negative Personality Traits	1	66.23	36.11	.00	.076
<u>Pre-Post x BPE x Arrest History</u>					
Social Distance	2	2.32	.25	.77	.001
Social Comparison	2	18.48	.41	.66	.002
Retribution	2	.70	1.39	.25	.006
Forgiveness	2	.02	.05	.94	.000
Recidivism	2	5.26	5.91	.00	.026
Pleasure of Act	2	.11	.13	.87	.001
Negative Personality Traits	2	10.74	5.85	.00	.026
<u>Post x Sex x Arrest History</u>					
Social Distance	1	.00	.00	.99	.000
Social Comparison	1	106.03	2.37	.12	.005
Retribution	1	2.65	5.24	.02	.012
Forgiveness	1	3.26	6.43	.01	.014
Recidivism	1	1.78	2.00	.15	.005
Pleasure of Act	1	.05	.05	.80	.000
Negative Personality Traits	1	10.44	5.69	.01	.013

Note. BPE = Belief in Pure Evil (Low ($n = 81$); Average ($n = 328$); & High ($n = 98$)). Arrest History = No Prior Arrests ($n = 240$) and Prior Arrests ($n = 235$). Pre-Post constitutes a difference score. Age controlled as a covariate

There was a main effect of Arrest History ($\Lambda = 0.88$, $F(7) = 8.16$, $p < .001$) and BPE ($\Lambda = 0.80$, $F(14) = 6.97$, $p < .001$). A prior arrest history and higher belief in evil led to harsher judgments of the perpetrator, including perpetrator forgiveness, recidivism probability, and perpetrator's pleasure of committing the act. There were two significant two-way interactions between Pre-Post and BPE ($\Lambda = 0.94$, $F(14) = 1.91$, $p < .05$) and Pre-Post and Arrest History ($\Lambda = 0.66$, $F(7) = 31.49$, $p < .001$). There were significant differences for all judgmental indicators for the Pre-Post and Arrest History interaction. The effects are depicted in Figure 2 ($p < 0.05$). The Pre-Post and BPE interaction produced significant differences for recidivism and pleasure of committing the act. The effects are depicted in Figures 3 and 4 ($p < 0.05$). There were two significant three-way interactions between Pre-Post, BPE, and Arrest History ($\Lambda = 0.93$, $F(14) = 2.06$, $p < 0.05$) and Pre-Post, Sex, and Arrest History ($\Lambda = 0.96$, $F(7) = 2.29$, $p < 0.05$).




Figure 2. *Average Pre-Post Test Change as a Function of Arrest History*. Note. Higher (Pre-Post) difference scores for all variables reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 3. *Recidivism Difference Scores as a Function of Belief in Pure Evil*. Note. Higher Recidivism (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 4. *Pleasure of Act Difference Scores as a Function of Belief in Pure Evil*. Note. Higher pleasure of act (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.

The Pre-Post by Sex by Arrest History interaction produced significant differences for retribution, forgiveness, and negatively associated personality traits of the perpetrator. The effects are depicted in Figures 5-7 ($p < 0.05$). The Pre-Post by BPE by Arrest History interaction produced significant differences for recidivism and negatively associated personality traits. The effects are depicted in Figures 8 and 9 ($p < 0.05$). Table 8 illustrates all additional univariate analyses conducted.




Figure 5. *Retribution Difference Scores as a Function of Sex and Arrest History*. Note. Higher Retribution (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 6. *Forgiveness Difference Scores as a Function of Sex and Arrest History*. Note. Lower Forgiveness (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 7. *Negative Personality Trait Difference Scores as a Function of Sex and Arrest History.* Note. Higher Personality Trait (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 8. *Recidivism Difference Scores as a Function of BPE and Arrest History.* Note. Higher recidivism (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.




Figure 9. *Negative Personality Trait Difference Scores as a Function of BPE and Arrest History.* Note. Higher Personality Trait (Pre-Post) difference scores reflect a more favorable opinion of the target in the baseline (pre-assessment) than the experimental (post-assessment) condition.

DISCUSSION

The study sought to better understand factors that influence one's belief in evil and, in turn, how this belief affects one's judgment of criminal wrongdoing. A belief that there is evil in the world may provide both a pseudo-explanation as to why bad things happen and flame retaliatory efforts to eradicate sources of evil as a method of enhancing justice, safety, and security in a dangerous world. Webster and Saucier's (2013) Belief in Pure Evil scale was utilized to measure various facets of evil such as infliction of intentional harm and antithesis of peace and order. The study investigated how a handful of potential developmental antecedents (e.g., personality domains, religiosity, etc.) influence the strength of belief in evil and the impact of belief in evil on the judgments of a perpetrator who was a first time or repeat offender. The belief in evil was found to have significant variation in the sample. There was a mixture of

supporting and conflicting evidence for the study's hypotheses. Nonetheless, the results support a complex and intricate relationship surrounding one's belief in evil.

Potential Developmental Antecedents

Hypothesis 1. Women endorsed greater belief in evil than men, which did not support the hypothesis that men would express stronger beliefs in evil. Despite women traditionally being more attributionally complex which would suggest a weaker belief that a stable trait such as evil exists, they may endorse greater beliefs in evil because they tend to be more concerned with the safety and security of others. Believing there is evil in the world may help women justify and offer some refuge to explain why bad things happen and provide a target group for which they can predictably protect their loved ones from. We also found that high scores of beliefs in evil related positively to believing in good; therefore, it makes sense to see that women also had higher scores of beliefs in good. If women believe that there are evil people in this world, then perhaps they are more apt to believe that there are good people who can combat the evil.

Hypothesis 2. Religiosity, specifically intrinsic religiosity, which is believing in one's own religion for its own sake and attempting to live one's life as their religion teaches, was found to predict higher beliefs in evil. This supported the original hypothesis. Women endorsed significantly greater intrinsic religiosity than men and were found to have greater beliefs in evil. Individuals, who were Christian, Hindu, and Catholic, endorsed the highest belief in evil, while Agnostics and Atheists had the lowest scores in the belief in evil. This discrepancy is most likely due to differing numbers and emphasis in scriptures illustrating evil and the fight against evil. The positive relationship between intrinsic religiosity and belief in evil further exemplifies the intuitive belief that religion informs our belief systems and our utilization of these beliefs to drive human behavior and evaluation of human conduct. However, it is important to highlight

that even though religiosity accounted for a significant portion of the belief in evil, the regression model emphasized four other facets that significantly contributed to predicting belief in evil.

Therefore, more than just exposure to religion can lead an individual to believe in evil.

Hypothesis 3. Cognitive flexibility was the only facet to be negatively associated with belief in evil, suggesting that individuals inclined towards effortful cognitive activities tend to believe in evil less than their counterparts. This supported the original hypothesis. This may be due to the tendency of these individuals to seek, reflect, and think about information to make sense of things in order to make more thoughtful judgments of others. Those who engage in less effortful cognitive processing, on the other hand, revert to stereotyping and other heuristics to explain responses. Therefore, this facet may take into consideration whether an individual is more inclined to find alternative reasons for someone doing something wrong rather than assuming it is due to an internal and stable trait the person possesses. Therefore, these individuals may be less pre-disposed to believe in evil. In the sample, there were no significant gender, age, or education differences for cognitive flexibility.

Hypothesis 4. Personality domains did not significantly predict a belief in evil, which did not support the original hypothesis. While past research associated Big Five personality domains and the Dark Triad with moral reasoning, believing in evil may be a distinct area of moral reasoning that could be better explained by other facets of development.

Hypothesis 5. Observed parental violence during childhood was a significant positive predictor of a higher belief in evil. This supported the original hypothesis. This suggests that individuals who witnessed physical acts of violence with or without physical injury (e.g. pushing, shoving, kicking, punching) between their parents during childhood endorsed greater belief that evil exists. Believing in evil may offer a retrospective explanation as to why they were

victims to an atrocity like childhood maltreatment. In addition, past research suggests that abuse victims tend to want more predictability and control in their environments. This may lead to a greater propensity or desire to believe in something that can explain and predict someone committing a wrongful act. In other words, if you believe evil exists and label someone as evil, you can predictably expect them to act in an evil manner and can prepare and plan for that. There were no significant gender differences in observing parental violence.

Hypothesis 6. Authoritarian aggression, which is an aspect of social ideology (specifically, right-wing authoritarianism), was found to be a significant predictor with higher scores leading to greater belief in evil. This supported the original hypothesis. These individuals tend to turn to authorities to identify deviants and outgroups that pose potential harm to their values and belief systems. As a result, they typically endorse greater levels of accepted aggression towards these target groups. Believing in evil may be a way to justify the target groups' exclusion from society and the aggression exacted against them. Therefore, developing a belief in evil may serve a self-serving purpose to explain why these individuals take harsh measures against others despite societal backlash or criticism. There were no significant gender differences.

Hypothesis 7. Personal distress, an aspect of empathy, was found to be a significant positive predictor with higher scores leading to greater belief in evil. This supported the original hypothesis. Individuals endorsing higher personal distress tend to experience more feelings of discomfort and concern when witnessing others' negative experiences. They may endorse greater belief in evil as a way to explain why the negative experiences happened. Believing that evil exists and is an active agentic force may help to maintain one's belief in a just world and

rationalize why someone would break societal and/or personal rules of appropriate behavior. There were no significant gender differences.

Overall, the final model suggested that a low level of cognitive flexibility and high levels of authoritarian aggression, personal distress, intrinsic religiosity, and observation of parental violence were significant predictors of a strong belief in pure evil. The inclusion of other significant predictors other than religion suggests that the belief in evil is a construct separate from its prototypical religious origins.

Experimental Effects

Participants had a pre- and post- test score (before and after supplemental information was given) to understand the effect of belief in evil on first impressions of wrongdoers and whether additional information about the perpetrator would dampen the effects of belief in evil on judgments. The pre-post test variable constitutes or essentially constitutes a difference score. The pre-post test effect is uninterpretable unless considered/interpreted with an interaction with one of the other variables (e.g. arrest history, belief in evil, and/or sex).

Hypothesis 8. There was no significant sex main effect, which did not support the original hypothesis. This suggests that men and women at baseline may have similar judgments of perpetrators. Differences in judgements therefore may be superseded by other factors, which we found to be the case when including arrest history.

Hypothesis 9. There was a significant BPE main effect, which supported the original hypothesis. Belief in evil was predictive of differences in how close an individual felt comfortable being with the perpetrator, feelings of superiority to the perpetrator, likelihood of forgiving the perpetrator, recidivism rate, and perceived pleasure the perpetrator got from the act. Higher belief in evil scorers endorsed significantly harsher judgments than those who did not or

minimally believed in evil. In contrast, low scorers tended to be more forgiving and hopeful that the perpetrator would not re-offend and did not believe the perpetrator got pleasure from committing the crime. This suggests that one's pre-conception to believe in evil may significantly change how someone judges people and/or events.

Hypothesis 10. There was a significant arrest history main effect, which supported the original hypothesis. Arrest History was predictive of difference in retribution, likelihood of forgiving the perpetrator, recidivism rate, perceived pleasure the perpetrator got from the act, and number of negative personality traits associated with the perpetrator's character. Participants given additional information that this was the person's first offense were less condemning than those told this was one of many similar criminal acts. This suggests that individuals' initial judgments may be assuaged or intensified with additional information given to them post-judgment.

Hypothesis 11. There was no significant sex by belief in evil interaction, which did not support the original hypothesis. While women tended to have greater belief in evil scores, the effect was not strong enough to significantly change their pre- to post-assessment of a wrongdoer by itself.

Hypothesis 12. There was a significant sex by arrest history interaction, which supported the original hypothesis. While there was a significant interaction, the strength was relatively weak. The trend suggests women are generally harsher in their judgments regardless of arrest history. For example, women endorsed greater retribution scores than men for the prior arrest condition, but did not differ for no prior arrest condition. Males in the no prior arrest condition were less forgiving than women, but females in the prior arrest condition were less forgiving than men. Females in the no prior arrest condition associated less negative personality traits to

the perpetrator than men, while they associated more negative traits in the prior arrest condition. Arrest history appears to be a relatively strong factor in determining perpetrator judgments with sex accounting for some additional deviation in scores.

Hypothesis 13. There was a significant BPE by arrest history interaction, which supported the original hypothesis. High belief in evil scorers had initially harsher judgments which produced smaller changes in their opinions after receiving more information about the perpetrator's arrest history. Low scorers on the other hand saw more variation and change depending on arrest history. This suggests that high BPE scorers' pre-conceptions of the perpetrator were very impactful and other information failed to dampen its effect. For example, while high belief scorers also had high scores on recidivism and perceived pleasure for the no prior arrests condition, high belief scorers were particularly harsher in the prior arrest condition. This was also seen in the number of negative personality traits associated with the perpetrator's character for repeat offenders, such as lacking self-control, undisciplined, irrational, impulsive, and immature. Even in the prior arrest condition, low scorers had more hope that they would not re-offend. These differences suggest that individuals at extreme ends of the belief in evil spectrum may view individuals who commit a crime significantly different.

These results suggest that some individuals depending on their belief in evil may be quicker to condemn and less likely to believe that someone is able to be rehabilitated. This has profound implications in the area of forensic psychology. The strength in which jury members, police officers, judges, attorneys, lawyers, and probation workers (just to name a few) endorse a belief in evil may influence how they interact with those indicted and charged with various crimes. This has the strong possibility of altering the quality of care and services provided to

them depending on whether those representing the criminal justice system have unconsciously “given up” on them.

Study Limitations

This sample was comprised of MTurk “workers” who complete surveys to earn money. While past research has illustrated the external validity of MTurk findings (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Gosling, Vazire, & Srivastava, 2004), the generalization of these results still needs to be regarded with some consideration. Within survey research, random responding and error variance due to invalid responses poses a concern and can be possible despite the use of exclusion criterion when determining a final sample. The illustrated crime was relatively minor in relation to potential of harm and long-lasting consequences. Therefore, the present findings may not generalize to other crimes, such as sexual assault or murder, warranting the severity of the crime may be a mediating factor to consider. In addition, the effect of racial and gender differences of the perpetrator were not manipulated or considered in getting a more nuanced understanding of how demographic factors influence judgments.

Future Directions

Future research should continue to assess how people’s levels of belief in pure evil affects judgments depending on various situational contexts—this study only investigated one such situation. Including explicit evil symbols in the scenario may make one’s belief in evil more salient affecting levels of aggression and judgmental attitudes. Altering severity of crime and investigating racial and gender differences are a much-needed avenue of research especially given the current societal climate. A sample consisting of participants who work in the forensic field may also highlight interesting patterns of beliefs in evil within a population that is exposed to a variety of individuals who may meet criteria for traditional ideas of “evil.”

APPENDICES

Appendix A Experimental Narratives

Introduction: You are about to witness a hit and run accident where a perpetrator ran from the scene and required eight hours for the police to find him. He denied driving the car despite clear evidence that he owned and crashed the car. Look carefully and you'll see the red car speeding and running the red light. This led to some serious injuries, including whiplash, a concussion for the victim driver, and some cuts and bruises.

No Arrest History Condition: The police review the perpetrator's criminal record and discover he has no previous driving offenses. As far as the police can tell, this is the first encounter the perpetrator has had with the police. He has never even received a driving ticket. Given this new information, please respond to the questions below to reflect any changes (if any) you have towards the perpetrator.

Past Arrest History Condition: The police review the perpetrator's criminal record and discover he has a criminal driving history. They find he has past driving offenses including at least one other hit and run accident that led to injuries. He also has been pulled over for speeding and running lights resulting in monetary fines. Given this new information, please respond to the questions below to reflect any changes (if any) you have towards the perpetrator.

Appendix B
Demographics Survey

Please answer the following questions honestly and to the best of your abilities. Check the appropriate box or fill in the given space. Thank you.

Please indicate your sex.

- Male
- Female
- Trans male/trans man
- Trans female/trans woman
- Gender queer/gender non-conforming
- Not listed/Other. Please Specify

How old are you? _____

How do you sexually identify?

- Heterosexual or straight
- Homosexual (gay or lesbian)
- Bisexual
- Asexual
- Pansexual
- Demisexual
- Questioning
- Not listed/Other. Please Specify

Indicate your current relationship status.

- Married/Living together
- Divorced
- Separated
- Single (Never Married)

Indicate how you identify. Click all that apply.

- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- Hispanic/Latino(a)
- Multiracial
- Other

Indicate your highest level of education.

- Less than high school
- High school graduate
- Some college

- 2-year degree
- 4-year degree
- Professional degree/Masters or Equivalent
- Doctorate/PhD/MD/LD

What religion do you adhere to?

- Christianity
- Islam
- Hinduism
- Buddhism
- Judaism
- Catholicism
- Agnosticism or Atheism
- Mormonism
- Other/Not Listed

Appendix C
Belief in Pure Evil (BPE)
Webster and Saucier (2013)

1. Some people are just pure evil. (**General**)
2. People who commit evil acts often dedicate their entire lives plotting ways to intentionally hurt good people. (**Intentional harm**)
3. People who commit evil acts always mean to harm innocent people. (**Intentional harm**)
4. Evil people take every opportunity to make other people's live a living hell. (**Intentional harm**)
5. The evildoer's goal is simple to harm other people. (**Intentional harm**)
6. Evil people hurt others because they enjoy inflicting pain and suffering. (**Joy of harm**)
7. Evil people harm others for the joy of it. (**Joy of harm**)
8. Evil people make me sick because they get such pleasure out of harming other people. (**Joy of harm**)
9. We should stop trying to understand evil people and spend more time getting rid of them from this world. (**Understanding evil**)
10. Evil people "get off" by being violent and abusive to other human beings. (**Joy of harm**)
11. Evil people are just compelled to harm others. (**Low self-control**)
12. Evildoers are actually proud and smug about having harmed other human beings. (**Egotism**)
13. Evil people are selfish and only think about themselves. (**Egotism**)
14. Evil people have an evil essence, like a stain on their souls, which is almost impossible to get rid of. (**Eternal/Disposition**)
15. We could obtain a more peaceful society by simply wiping out all the evildoers. (**Antithesis of peace**)
16. Evildoers want to destroy all that is good in this world. (**Antithesis of peace**)
17. If we catch an evildoer, we should just lock them up and ensure they never get out. (**Eternal/Disposition**)
18. Even the forces of good cannot change an evildoer's heart. (**Eternal/Disposition**)
19. If we could just get rid of the evildoers—those "bad apples"—we would have a much more peaceful society. (**Antithesis of peace**)
20. There is no point in trying to reform evil people. (**Eternal/Disposition**)
21. Evil people intend to disrupt our peaceful society with their harmful acts. (**Antithesis of peace**)
22. Evil people are so narcissistic and full of themselves. (**Egotism**)

1 (*disagree very strongly*) to 7 (*agree very strongly*)

Appendix D
Belief in Pure Good (BPG)
Webster and Saucier (2013)

*Reverse-coded items

1. There is such a thing as a truly selfless/altruistic person. (**General**)
2. I do believe in “pure good.” (**General**)
3. In essence, “pure good” is selflessly helping other people in need. (**Intentional help**)
4. People have to believe in “pure good” to have a peaceful and orderly society. (**Facilitates peace**)
5. Purely good people are so selfless that they would endanger themselves to help their enemies. (**Impartial help**)
6. More selfless helping would produce a more orderly and peaceful society. (**Facilitates peace**)
7. Selfless people help anyone in need, even their rivals. (**Impartial help**)
8. People who commit noble, selfless acts often dedicate their entire lives pondering ways to help people. (**Intentional help**)
9. People only help others because they expect to be rewarded.* (**Without reward**)
10. We DO NOT need more “purely good” people in this world.* (**Rare in world**)
11. Purely good people always try to avoid hurting others, even when it means helping those in need. (**Avoids aggression**)
12. People only help those in need because they want to look good to themselves and impress others.* (**Without reward**)
13. “Pure good” only exists in fictional stories.* (**General**)
14. There are some people who selflessly help others and expect nothing in return. (**Without reward**)
15. Purely good people do not matter in this world because human societies will always have conflict and chaos.* (**Facilitates peace**)
16. Purely good people can resist the temptation to do evil things. (**Defies corruption**)
17. Even selfless people hate helping enemies.* (**Impartial help**)
18. Purely good people do what is right and good for others without expecting anything in return. (**Without reward**)
19. “Pure good” is all about doing what is good and right in this world just for the betterment of others. (**Without reward**)
20. The forces of evil will fail when they try to corrupt pure-hearted people. (**Defies corruption**)
21. The forces of good will always prevail in the end. (**Facilitates peace**)
22. Pure good does not extend to helping wounded enemies.* (**Impartial help**)
23. Purely good people are too foolish to realize that the world will always be a violent place, and they will eventually loose in the end.* (**Facilitates peace**)
24. “Pure good” is doing unselfish, heroic things for others in need. (**Intentional help**)
25. Even selfless people enjoy using violence sometimes.* (**Avoids aggression**)
26. People *never* intentionally and selflessly help people.* (**Intentional help**)

27. Pure-hearted people respect all life and therefore believe anyone is worthy of being helped and cared for. (**Impartial help**)
28. There are selfless people in this world that help others without any expectation of being rewarded for their heroic actions. (**Without reward**)

1 (*disagree very strongly*) to 7 (*agree very strongly*)

Appendix E
Duke University Religion Index (DUREL)

- (1) How often do you attend church or other religious meetings?
1-Never; 2 – Once a year or less; 3 – A few times a year; 4 – A few times a month; 5 – Once a week; 6 – More than once/week
- (2) How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such as prayer, mediation, or Bible study?
1 – Rarely or never; 2 – A few times a month; 3 – Once a week; 4 – Two or more times/week; 5 – Daily; 6 – More than once a day

The following section contain three statements about religious belief or experience. Please mark the extent to which each statement is true or not true for you.

- (3) In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., God)
1 – Definitely *not* true; 2 – Tends *not* to be true; 3 – Unsure; 4 – Tends to be true; 5 – Definitely true of me
- (4) My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
1 – Definitely *not* true; 2 – Tends *not* to be true; 3 – Unsure; 4 – Tends to be true; 5 – Definitely true of me
- (5) I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life.
1 – Definitely *not* true; 2 – Tends *not* to be true; 3 – Unsure; 4 – Tends to be true; 5 – Definitely true of me

Appendix F
Need for Cognition Scale
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao (2013)

For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you or of what you believe. For example, if the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (not at all like you) please place a “1” on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is extremely characteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (very much like you) please place a “5” on the line to the left of the statement. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements below.

(1) Extremely characteristic of me – (2) somewhat uncharacteristic of me – (3) uncertain – (4) somewhat characteristic of me – (5) extremely characteristic of me

1. I prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. **
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. **
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about something. **
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to. **
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. **
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. **
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. **
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort. **
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. **
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

Appendix G
The Personality Inventory for DSM-5—Brief Form (PID-5-BF)-Adult
American Psychiatric Association (APA)

Instructions: This is a list of things different people might say about themselves. We are interested in how you would describe yourself. There are no right or wrong answers. So you can describe yourself as honestly as possible, we will keep your responses confidential. We'd like you to take your time and read each statement carefully, selecting the response that best describes you.

1. People would describe me as reckless.
2. I feel like I act totally on impulse.
3. Even though I know better, I can't stop making rash decisions.
4. I often feel like nothing I do really matters.
5. Others see me as irresponsible.
6. I'm not good at planning ahead.
7. My thoughts often don't make sense to others.
8. I worry about almost everything.
9. I get emotional easily, often for very little reason.
10. I fear being alone in life more than anything else.
11. I get stuck on one way of doing things, even when it's clear it won't work.
12. I have seen things that weren't really there.
13. I steer clear of romantic relationships.
14. I'm not interested in making friends.
15. I get irritated easily by all sorts of things.
16. I don't like to get too close to people.
17. It's no big deal if I hurt other peoples' feelings.
18. I rarely get enthusiastic about anything.
19. I crave attention.
20. I often have to deal with people who are less important than me.
21. I often have thoughts that make sense to me but that other people say are strange.
22. I use people to get what I want.
23. I often "zone out" and then suddenly come to realize that a lot of time has passed.
24. Things around me often feel unreal, or more real than usual.
25. It is easy for me to take advantage of others.

Appendix H Sexual Abuse and Assault Self Report

					When did this occur?			
	Never Occurred	Mild Abuse or Assault	Moderate Abuse or Assault	Severe Abuse or Assault	Prior to Age 13	Between Ages 13-16	After Age 16	Never Occurred
Someone made you look at something sexual, like pictures or a movie?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone forced you to look at their genitalia?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone spied on you or tried to look at you without your clothes on when you didn't want them to?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone touched your genitalia in some way?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone got you to touch their genitalia in some way?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone tried to get you to touch their genitalia in some way, but they weren't able to do it?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone put their mouth on your genitalia or made you put your mouth on their genitalia?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone put their mouth on your genitalia or made you put your mouth on their genitalia, but weren't able to do it?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A family member raped you?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Someone familiar (outside of the family) raped you?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A romantic partner raped you?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A stranger raped you?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Appendix I
Violent Experiences Questionnaire (VEQ-R)
King (2014)

Please use the letters A through I to indicate the extent to which you experienced or observed each of the following events between the ages of 5 and 16. Blank spaces will be scored as “A” (never happened). Add clarifying comments on the back if you like.

<i>Frequency Index of Incident:</i> A) never happened B) happened only once C) happened only twice D) happened less than four times E) happened about once a year F) happened about twice a year G) happened about once a month H) happened about once a week I) happened more than once a week	ACTS TOWARD YOU BY A PARENT or STEP-PARENT			ACTS TOWARD YOU BY A SIBLING or STEP-SIBLING			ACTS OBSERVED BETWEEN PARENTS or STEP-PARENTS		
	during each of these age ranges			during each of these age ranges			during each of these age ranges		
TARGET ACT	5-8	9-12	13-16	5-8	9-12	13-16	5-8	9-12	13-16
<i>Parental Discipline:</i> spanking or other forms of reasonable <i>physical</i> discipline producing mild to moderate pain <i>without physical injury</i>									
<i>Verbal Conflict:</i> yelling, cursing, damaging property, and other expressions of anger <i>without any physical injury</i>									
<i>Threats of Physical Violence:</i> statements or gestures expressing a <i>threat</i> to inflict physical injury									
<i>Physical Acts with or without Physical Injury:</i> pushing, shoving, shaking, striking, kicking, punching, beating, burning or use of a weapon to inflict pain or injury									
				ACTS BY BULLIES					
<i>Peer Bullying Experiences:</i> <i>How often were you physically taunted or bullied by peers during or after school?</i>									
<i>How often were you called names or verbally teased by peers during or after school?</i>									

Appendix J
Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism Scale
Dunwoody & Funke (2016)

Authoritarian Submission

1. We should believe what our leaders tell us.
2. Our leaders know what is best for us.
3. People should be critical of statements made by those in positions of authority. *
4. People in positions of authority generally tell the truth.
5. People should be skeptical of all statements made by those in positions of authority. *
6. Questioning the motives of those in power is healthy for society. *

Conventionalism

7. People emphasize tradition too much. *
8. Traditions are the foundation of a health society and should be respect.
9. It would be better for society if more people followed social norms.
10. Traditions interfere with progress. *
11. People should challenge social traditions in order to advance society. *
12. People should respect social norms.

Authoritarian Aggression

13. Strong force is necessary against threatening groups.
14. It is necessary to use force against people who are a threat to authority.
15. Police should avoid using violence against suspects. *
16. People should avoid using violence against others even when ordered to do so by the proper authorities. *
17. Using force against people is wrong even if done so by those in authority. *
18. Strong punishments are necessary in order to send a message.

Appendix K
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Davis (1980)

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate response. Read each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you can.

0 (*Does not describe me well*) to 5 (*Describes me very well*)

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.
Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other people’s arguments.
Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them.
I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
I tend to lose control during emergencies.
When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while.
When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Appendix L
Social Comparison Scale
Allan & Gilbert (1995)

Indicate the number at a point which best described the way you see your own character and value system in comparison to the hit and run driver in the video

Inferior	1 2 3 4 5 6	Superior
Irresponsible	1 2 3 4 5 6	More responsible
Shameless	1 2 3 4 5 6	Often Repentant
Weaker	1 2 3 4 5 6	Stronger
Different	1 2 3 4 5 6	Same
Loser	1 2 3 4 5 6	Winner
Weaker	1 2 3 4 5 6	Stronger
Socially unpopular	1 2 3 4 5 6	Socially popular
Lower Self-Esteem	1 2 3 4 5 6	Higher Self-Esteem
Unattractive	1 2 3 4 5 6	More attractive
Insecure	1 2 3 4 5 6	Confident
Sinner	1 2 3 4 5 6	Godly

Appendix M Dehumanization

Please indicate the traits you would associate with this perpetrator that committed this criminal act based on the information you have been given. Click all that apply. (Lammers & Stapel, 2011)

- Childish
- Undisciplined
- Impulsive
- Uncivilized
- Indecent
- Dumb
- Immature
- Lacking self-control
- Unmannered
- Irrational
- Emotional

Appendix N

On the following scale, how harsh would your punishment be for this hit and run driver:
(Harlow, Darley, & Robinson, 1995)

1	2	3	4	5
Minimal		Moderate		Harsh
(e.g. a warning, suspended sentence)		(e.g. monetary fine, loss of driving privilege)		(e.g. jail time)

Would you feel comfortable if this hit and run driver (Szcurek et al., 2012; 1 = *Probably* to 5 = *Absolutely not* with 3 = *Depend on person* as the midpoint):

Took a job working with you in some capacity

Joined your church or social group

Moved next door to you

Moved down the street

Started dating your daughter

What is the likelihood that this individual will do this act again? (Gromet, Goodwin, & Goodman, 2016; -4 = *Extremely unlikely* to 4 = *Extremely likely*)

What pleasure do you think the individual had from this act? (Gromet, Goodwin, & Goodman, 2016; -4 = *extreme displeasure* to 4 = *extreme pleasure* with 0 as the midpoint = *neither displeasure nor pleasure*)

How willing would you be to forgive this person? (DeShea, 2003; 0 = *not at all willing* to 6 = *willing*)

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