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A Content Analysis of the 1964 Presidential Campaign Speeches

Clifford V. Donnelly

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

by

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This thesis submitted by Clifford V. Donnelly in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Committee under whom the work has been done.

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The thesis here abstracted was written under the direction of Henry J. Tomasek and approved by Walter E. Kaloupek and Bernt L. Wills as members of the examining committee, of which Dr. Tomasek was Chairman.

This study is an analysis of the 1964 campaign speeches of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Its purpose is to determine the difference in the appeal that the candidates made to the voters. A representative sample of the candidate's major campaign speeches was chosen for analysis. Three types of content analysis were performed to determine what issues were discussed, how much time the candidates devoted to different topics, and how they associated the issues together. Three judges were used to code the material, and inter-agreement percentages calculated for each coder. The results of the contingency analysis are presented in cluster and pattern diagrams to illustrate which issues the candidates associated together. This study indicates that there were significant differences in the appeal that the two parties presented to the electorate.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is an examination of the candidate's statements during the 1964 presidential campaign. It concerns what they discussed and how they expressed themselves throughout the campaign. This analysis attempts to demonstrate through an objective procedure that there were major differences in the way each candidate presented his appeal to the American audience. No attempt is made to correlate empirically any events related to the candidate's statements; therefore any conclusions that involve the effects of campaign behavior upon the electorate are based strictly on inference.

In many ways the 1964 presidential campaign was one of little interest to the American public. Already it tends to be forgotten by many, and even political analysts seem reluctant to revive the events which led to an almost unprecedented defeat for a presidential candidate. From the outset the results of the election never seemed to be seriously in doubt.[1] The question to be answered was not, "Who will be President?", but "By what margin will the Democratic Party win the election?" In such a campaign where the outcome

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[1]Robert D. Novak, The Agony of the G.O.P. (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1965), p. 10.

seems certain, emphasis is likely to be placed upon the candidates themselves rather than on the issues or other factors.[1]

The campaign was recognized as being one of the most unethical political races for the presidency in history.[2] According to Merton this situation may have had some effect on the election.

> In a context in which political ethics are assumed to be rather low, there is a necessity to disidentify the aspirant with prevailing practices and hence the purely personal qualifications ("character") of political figures tend to be stressed.[3]

It is very likely that some shift of emphasis toward the candidates themselves took place in the 1964 election. Prior to the election the Republican candidate let his interest in personal issues be known when he chose as his running mate, William E. Miller, a politician skilled in personal invective, and who according to Goldwater, "drive Lyndon Johnson nuts."[4] Presumably his role would be to attack the political image of Lyndon Johnson.

Goldwater was less well known than Johnson as the campaign began. Polls at this time indicate that sixty-seven percent of the population were aware of his political identity.[5] Prior to the

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[1]Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. McPhee Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 213.

[2]The National Observer, November 15, 1964, p. 12.

[3]R. K. Merton, Mass Persuasion (New York: Harper and Co., 1946), p. 142.

[4]The National Observer, September 6, 1964, p. 1.

[5]Richard Rovere, The Goldwater Caper (New York: McFadden, 1965), p. 163.

campaign he had gained notoriety as an outspoken critic of the Democratic coalition, and as an uninhibited individual who did not always conform to the tried and tested rules of American politics. His statements had often been direct, radical, and lacking in the necessary tact some observers thought essential in one of prospective presidential aspirations.[1] Much of the publicity related to his bid for the nomination pictured him as a dynamic political figure, free of those inhibitions and facades which many associate with American politicians.

But there was uncertainty in the minds of many about Barry Goldwater as the campaign began. Was he really suited to be President of the United States? Was he psychologically fit to undertake such a responsibility? These and other questions were in the minds of the voters as the campaign progressed. Most probably his statements during the course of the campaign helped answer some of these questions.

Lyndon Johnson, in contrast to the Republican candidate, was quite well known on the American political scene. He was perhaps best known for his political role as opposed to his personal characteristics. He had been a "political operator" and "master politician" in the Senate where he achieved notable success. He had always refrained from public statements which were controversial. His own political testament professed no specific committment to that other than God, country, and brotherhood.[2] His image with the

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[1]Stephen Shadegg, Freedom is His Flight Plan (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965), p. 26.

[2]Mooney Booth, The Lyndon Johnson Story (New York: Farrar and Straus, 1964), p. 25.

American people could best be summed up as that of a "master politician", a man whose personal life and characteristics were known second to his political performance.

During the campaign the personal attributes of the candidates developed into one of the major issues. Goldwater was attacked as psychologically unfit for the presidency, a man of uneven temperament who was prone to irrational and hasty action. The Democrats contended that such a man should not be given the responsibility to allocate the use of nuclear weapons. They stressed the need for an individual in the presidency who was rational, deliberate, and prone to act with prudence in all situations. These characteristics described their candidate precisely and served as a basis to attack Goldwater.

As a result of these charges Goldwater found himself labeled as "reckless", "dangerous", and a man who might plunge the world into a nuclear war. Johnson, on the other hand, was able to assume the role of guardian of the peace, a man whose judgment could be depended upon in time of crisis. Goldwater himself has recognized this as one of the more important issues of the campaign, and one that was most detrimental to his image with the voters.[1]

This study seeks to answer the question, "Did the candidate's statements, in form and content, tend to reinforce their political image?" On this basis one would expect that Goldwater's campaign speeches would differ considerably from those of Johnson. There

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[1]U.S. News and World Report, November 15, 1964, p. 36.

should be more references to conflict situations, aggressive tendencies, and change of the political status quo. Whereas Johnson could be expected to use fewer political volatile verbal symbols, and to discuss the issues with less reference to radical action.

What were the topics discussed? What percentage of the time did Goldwater devote to a discussion of nuclear war, the area in which the Democratic attack was most concentrated? Did Goldwater perceive the world political situation differently than Johnson? How did Johnson favor changing the status quo in contrast to Goldwater? These and other questions, if objectively pursued, should provide a basis for an answer to the central hypothesis.

Other specific hypotheses to be tested by this analysis are stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Goldwater used more threatening political symbols, i.e. war, Communism, nuclear, than did Johnson.

Hypothesis 2: Goldwater devoted more time to the discussion of war, Communism, political conflict, and international aggression than did Johnson.

Hypothesis 3: Goldwater favored change of the political status quo more than did Johnson.

Hypothesis 4: Goldwater favored the use of military power over political action in international conflict situations, in contrast to Johnson.

Hypothesis 5: Goldwater perceived the world political environment as more hostile and threatening than did Johnson.

Hypothesis 6: Goldwater perceived the individual as central to the political process whereas Johnson professed a preference for the group.

Vice-Presidential Candidates

Traditionally the office of Vice-President of the United States has not been of great interest to the voting public. The vice-presidential candidates are nominated primarily because of political considerations, and their personal characteristics and overall fitness for the office of President have often been taken for granted.[1] Recent events, such as the assassination of a president, have tended to focus attention on the vice-presidency. The result is an increased consciousness of the responsibilities of this office by the American voter, and an awareness that the man elected may become president suddenly through unforseen circumstances.

The 1964 Presidential election was unusually suited to campaign tactics by vice-presidential aspirants because of this added interest. Many people gave their attention to what the vice-presidential candidates said because they were seeking an answer to the question, "What qualifications does this man have to be President?" The Democratic Party under the leadership of President Johnson undoubtedly wished to take advantage of this situation. They chose a popular figure, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, as their candidate. He was comparatively well known

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[1]Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 92.

on the national political scene, and was extremely capable of making his views known and understood.

The Republicans selected as their candidate Representative William E. Miller of New York. His primary qualifications seemed to be more suited to the candidacy than to the office itself. He had gained a reputation as a "gut fighter", and as a strong exponent of the conservative cause. However, he was not widely known even within his own party.[1]

What did the vice-presidential candidates talk about during the campaign? To what extent did Miller attack President Johnson on the basis of his supposed participation in political scandal? And what was the role of Hubert Humphrey? How did he assist Johnson in convincing the electorate to give them an overwhelming victory? An analysis of their campaign speeches will help to answer such questions as these and to evaluate the role played by each candidate in the campaign.

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[1]James M. Perry, Barry Goldwater, A New Look at a Presidential Candidate (Silver Spring, Maryland: The Dow Jones Co., 1964), p. 129.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Content Analysis

The conventional approach to the study of verbal materials usually involves the historical technique of gathering a myriad of facts about the subject, organizing the facts into some systematic pattern, and writing a readable account. Most studies in the social sciences utilize this type of investigation with notable results in many cases. In recent decades this approach has been brought into question by social scientists who demand a greater degree of objectivity than is inherent in this procedure. They contend that the historian of necessity must be subjective in the selection of facts, and consequently conclusions are biased. "Lasswell, Lazarfeld, and others have pioneered the thought that objective points of reference must, whenever possible, be employed. All relevant data must then be tested against these points of reference."[1] Not all studies will permit the use of such rigorous techniques, but whenever variables will admit to measurement, then the study should proceed on these principles.

One of the methods currently used in the social sciences which aims at such objectivity is content analysis. As a

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[1]David E. Weingast, "Walter Lippmann: A Content Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1956, p. 314.

research tool it has wide application where communications data is involved. Berelson, whose book is recognized as the most comprehensive presentation in the field, defines content analysis as "... a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."[1] It is a primary requirement that content analysis be objective. Usually tests of reliability are applied to assure objectivity. The requirement of systemization is also necessary to prevent personal bias from entering into the picture. All relevant content must be utilized for the problem considered and for the categories chosen. If only certain segments of the data are used, then the results are subject to error due to sampling bias. The third requirement, quantification, is the characteristic which most differentiates content analysis from ordinary reading. This does not imply that one must always use numerical designations, but some measure of quantity is necessary. Whether percentages or rough approximations like "more" or "less" are used depends on the degree of precision required for a particular study.

Berelson's definition is generally satisfactory but is widened somewhat by Cartwright who defines content analysis as "... the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of any symbolic behavior."[2] Recent research reported by the 1955

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[1]Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 16.

[2]Dorwin P. Cartwright, "An Analysis of Qualitative Material," Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences ed. by Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), p. 275.

conference on content analysis supports this expanded view.[1] The instrumental approach proposed by participants at this workshop includes as subject matter for content analysis all behavior which might conceivably affect the meaning of any communication. It is assumed that more may be contained in a communication than that represented by just the lexical items present in it. The instrumental viewpoint holds that manifest content must be analyzed with reference to a given context and set of circumstances. Unless this approach is taken, content analysis is often little more than an affirmation of the obvious.

"The fundamental objective of all content analysis is to convert phenomena (i.e., symbolic behavior of people) into scientific data."[2] However, the validity of such data rests on several assumptions. It is assumed that a common meaning exists for a given content between all parties involved in a communications sequence. Unless this is the case no basis can be found for analysis. Another assumption is that inference can be made to events related to the communication. It should be equally possible to infer to both the source and the effects of a communication. Content analysis must also rest on the assumption that the quantitative description of communications content is meaningful. The frequency of occurrence is taken to be an important part of the communications process.[3]

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[1]Ithiel de Sola Pool et al., Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 38.

[2]Cartwright, op. cit., p. 282.

[3]William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), p. 186.

The problem of inference is central to any discussion of content analysis. Generally speaking two kinds of inferences can be made, to the source of a communication or to its effects. Critics of content analysis point out that few studies have empirically related content data to associated events. Most authors simply generalize from their results.[1] It is, of course, preferable to have relationships between variables empirically verified whenever possible, but in many instances this is not feasible. In such cases it is necessary to make inference from the data at hand. The validity of such inference in content analysis depends primarily on the scientific rigor of the analysis itself. If the study is procedurally correct and strict measures of reliability are applied, then objective statements can be made relating the data to its antecedent or consequent conditions.[2]

Analysis may be made of any type of communications material emanating from individuals or groups. Most of the work in content analysis is carried out in the fields of journalism, psychology, and political science. In the area of politics Lasswell has pioneered research utilizing content analysis. In fact, he and his associates[3] account for almost all of the work in this area with their publications beginning around 1930 and continuing until after the Second World War.

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[1]Cartwright, op. cit., p. 284.

[2]Bruce Smith et al., Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 113.

[3]Harold D. Lasswell. Nathan Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics (New York: George W. Stewart Publishers, 1949).

Content analysis has yet to gain wide acceptance as a research method in political science, and it is being used infrequently in contemporary research. Its limited approach with emphasis on single unit frequency counts have not proved fruitful except for certain specific problems in the areas of public opinion and propaganda. Recent developments, primarily statistical sophistication, and the emphasis on contingency, assertion, and distance analyses have made the method more versatile and adaptable to political problems.[1]

This study attempts to apply these newer procedures to an analysis of presidential campaign speeches. There are few studies of a single communicator in a political context. One such article by Prothro[2] points out a major problem when dealing with prepared speeches. Campaign speeches are almost never the exclusive product of any one individual, much less the candidate himself. Usually they are the combined efforts of many people representing differing opinions. Therefore the final statement can hardly be considered to have originated from the candidate alone. Inferences concerning the candidate cannot be completely valid when made on the basis of a political speech. The focus of attention in this study is on the candidates as candidates, and not as individuals. No inferences are made about the candidates as individuals.

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[1]Pool, op. cit., pp. 33-52.

[2]James W. Prothro, "Verbal Shifts in the American Presidency", American Political Science Review, 1956, p. 726.

Validity and Reliability

The validity of any content analysis must be demonstrated in some acceptable fashion or the conclusions obtained from such analysis will be of questionable worth. Validation in content analysis is evidence that the instruments and procedures are measuring what they purport to measure.[1]

> The validity of a measuring device is usually studied by comparing the results or measures obtained from it with those obtained by another device, the validity of which is already established for measuring the same characteristic. If such a measuring device of established validity is not available - and this is often the case - the problem of establishing validity becomes difficult. In cases of direct measures validity is self-evident. In fact, we call those measures direct which unquestionably measure precisely what we intend them to.[2]

In the case of simple symbol counting procedures the validity is direct and can be accepted at face value. As Janis[3] points out, the coder is involved with perceptual discriminations which do not require the exercise of judgment. In this study the validity of frequency symbol operations can be accepted on this basis.

When dealing with contingency and assertion analysis the problem of validity is more involved. The contingency method is based upon the general assumption that there is a relationship between message, their source and receivers. If a contingency

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[1]Richard W. Budd and Robert K. Thorp, An Introduction to Content Analysis (Iowa City: State University of Iowa, 1963), p. 27.

[2]Margaret J. Haygood, Statistics for Sociologists (New York: Reynal and Hitchcok, Inc., 1941), p. 219.

[3]I. L. Janis, "Meaning and the Study of Symbolic Behavior" Psychiarity, Vol. 6, November 1, 1943, p. 219.

exists between events in a communication, it is indicative of an association structure resulting in the receiver. But as Osgood points out, one must not assume this relationship to hold true in all instances.[1] The total context in which the message appears must be considered.

To a certain degree validity depends upon reliability. If the study cannot be duplicated by others with comparable results, then the analysis cannot be said to be valid. Reliability refers to the degree of correlation between two or more coders working independently following identical procedures and analyzing the same content.[2] There are various ways to estimate the reliability of an analysis. A generally accepted view is that, "Reliability in content analysis seems to be a problem that the individual researcher must solve to his own satisfaction within the limits of his study design and resources."[3]

Reliability measures for this study will be modeled after the method developed by Stempel.[4] This technique appears to be superior in several ways to other tests of reliability used in content analysis. Stempel discusses one of the disadvantages of the most frequently used method.

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[1]Charles E. Osgood, "The Representative Model", Trends in Content Analysis ed. by Ithiel de Sola Pool, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 73.

[2]I. L. Janis, R. H. Fadner, and M. Janowitz, "The Reliability of a Content Analysis Technique", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1943, p. 293.

[3]Guido Stempel, "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis", Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1955, p. 450.

[4]Ibid., pp. 449-455.

> The fact that two coders have identical frequency tabulations does not indicate that they agree one-hundred percent. It is possible that they disagree on rather sizable number of items, but their disagreements cancel each other out. Evidence shows that these errors may excede ten percent of the codeable items.[1]

Stempel's method uses a percentage agreement score which is the percentage of time the individual coder agrees with the majority on a given item. In this study three coders are used, so two forms a majority. If all three disagree on an item, then all coders are counted as disagreeing with the majority. This item analysis offers a more detailed picture of coding errors, and should provide a more accurate estimate of reliability.

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[1]Guido Stempel, "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis", Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1955, p. 452.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE

Sample

There were many statements, press conferences, and speeches by the candidates in the 1964 presidential campaign. In order to get a representative sample of what the candidates said, major speeches were chosen from different phases of the campaign. These were matched between the presidential candidates as nearly as possible to the time of presentation and general subject of discussion. The acceptance speech at the nominating convention was taken as the first sample. The second sample was the opening speech of each candidate's campaign. The third was a foreign policy speech, and the fourth the closing address of the campaign. These statements should be representative of each candidate's views and provide enough material for a valid analysis. The four speeches with their date and place of presentation are listed below for each candidate.

Goldwater[1]

1.	Convention Acceptance Speech San Francisco, California	July 17, 1964
2.	Opening Campaign Speech Prescott, Arizona	September 4, 1964

[1] New York Times, (For all dates listed.)

3.	Foreign Policy Speech Dallas, Texas	September 24, 1964
4.	Closing Campaign Speech New York, New York	October 27, 1964

Johnson[1]

1.	Convention Acceptance Speech Atlantic City, N.J.	August 28, 1964
2.	Opening Campaign Speech Detroit, Michigan	September 8, 1964
3.	Foreign Policy Speech New York, New York	October 15, 1964
4.	Closing Campaign Speech New York, New York	November 1, 1964

Five major addresses for each vice-presidential candidate were chosen as a representative sample of their campaign statements. Their speeches could not be matched according to subject matter because both candidates discussed practically every issue in every speech. Therefore some method of sampling other than subject matching was necessary. The method used was based upon where the speech was delivered. If the speeches were matched as closely as possible to the region where they were given, it could be assumed that the topics discussed would not vary greatly. Since both candidates tended to include many campaign subjects in each speech the matter of sampling is not critical in any case. The speeches chosen for analysis are as follows:

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[1] Ibid., (For all dates listed.)

Miller[1]

1.	Convention Acceptance Speech Daly City, California	July 16, 1964
2.	Campaign Speech Portland, Oregon	September 23, 1964
3.	Campaign Speech Oklahoma City, Okalhoma	September 28, 1964
4.	Campaign Speech Jacksonville, Florida	October 7, 1964
5.	Campaign Speech Grand Forks, North Dakota	October 28, 1964

Humphrey[2]

1.	Convention Acceptance Speech Atlantic City, N.J.	August 28, 1964
2.	National Plowing Contest Address Plowville, North Dakota	September 19, 1964
3.	Address Before The Liberal Party New York, New York	September 24, 1964
4.	Speech At The University of Georgia Athens, Georgia	September 29, 1964
5.	Speech At The University of Washington Seattle, Washington	October 30, 1964

Categories

In order to determine what the candidates talked about, two methods were used. The first was a frequency symbol analysis. A political symbol is defined as a key word in a political context

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[1]News Release, The Republican National Committee, Washington, D.C., (For dates listed.)

[2]News Release, The Democratic National Committee, Washington, D.C., (For dates listed.)

which elicits definite attitudes and meanings for that political society.[1] Words like "war", "peace", and "freedom" are classified as key symbols in our society. A frequency tabulation of their occurrence in a political speech can serve as one measure of attention on the part of the speaker. The ten prominent symbols chosen for this study are listed below.

Key Symbols

War	Democrat
Peace	American
Nuclear	Freedom
Communism	Military
Republican	Government

The second measure of attention was a breakdown of each candidate's speeches into thirteen subject matter categories. This was accomplished by a column inch tabulation since all of the speeches were reported in their full text in the New York Times. The results were converted into percentages for each category. The categories are listed below and are self explanatory with the exception of the one labeled "miscellaneous". This category includes all introductions, personal references, and general statements not applicable to any of the other categories.

List of Subject Categories

Freedom	Economics
Communism	Nuclear conflict
Peace	International affairs
Government	Partisan activity
Morality	War
Social welfare	Miscellaneous
Law enforcement	

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[1]Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 29.

The contingency analysis was based on twelve categories. They are defined as follows:

1. Individuality - any reference to the individual as such, or to a small group as a primary factor in the political process.

2. Freedom - any reference to freedom, national or international.

3. Americanism - refers to Americans individually and as a group, or the United States.

4. Government - reference to the mechanics and process of government. References to Congress, State and local governments.

5. War - conflict between nations in which the use of military force is anticipated.

6. Peace - refers to peace internationally.

7. Change of Status Quo - an assertion that the state of affairs as they currently exist should be changed. This category is coded + if the change advocated is a new policy, for example the Medicare Plan. It is coded - if the recommended change is to a prior status. An example would be a return of political rights to the states.

8. Nuclear - reference to nuclear conflict, or the use of nuclear weapons.

9. Military Power - reference to the military itself, or the use of force in the solution of international conflict.

10. Group - reference to the group as the primary unit in the political process.

11. Communism - reference to world Communism, or representatives of the Communist governments.

12. Political Action - reference to change taking place through the political process as opposed to force.

Contingency Analysis

Contingency analysis was used to provide a measure of cognitive association in the source of communication. The method selected to analyze the data was developed by Osgood.[1] This method utilizes a raw data matrix where each category is coded according to frequency. Median values were computed for each category, and plus or minus signs entered according to whether the unit frequency was above or below the median for that category.

A contingency matrix was constructed to illustrate expected category co-occurrences, and those actually obtained through the analysis. The expected percentages indicate what contingency would occur by change alone. If the obtained is in excess of the corresponding expected figure, then the two categories are occurring together more often than chance would allow. Significance of deviations from the expected value were estimated by use of the standard error of a percentage which is obtained from the formula:

$$p = \sqrt{\frac{pq}{N}}$$

Where: p= expected value
q= 1-p
N= total number of units sampled

For those categories having obtained scores greater than chance the significance was computed. As indicated by Osgood,

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[1]Osgood, op. cit., p. 40.

this method of estimating significance is not altogether satisfactory.[1] When a large number of estimations are made, five percent level by chance alone. Therefore a cluster analysis is based partially upon inspection as well as tests of significance. Another question relates to the independence of the categories themselves. There is no assurance that the contingency of category A and B is independent of that between A and C. Nevertheless, it appears reasonable to assume that significance at the five percent level between categories is evidence for association in the source of the communication.

All variables are presented in a cluster analysis.[2] Those variables with either significant plus or minus relations are depicted in clusters with varying degrees of association. A more precise way of representing categories which are related is by pattern analysis. In order to determine the relationship that exists between two variables so that they may be compared with other pairs, the generalized distance formula is used.[3]

$$D=\sqrt{\Sigma\ d^2}$$

where:

d = the difference in each unit between plus and minus values.

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[1]Osgood, op. cit., p. 65.

[2]Robert C. North et al., Content Analysis (Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 106.

[3]Charles C. Osgood and C. J. Suci, "A Measure of Relation Determined by Both Mean Difference and Profile Information", Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 49, 1952, p. 251.

Generalized distance figures were computed for five prominent variables. The variables were then arranged in a pattern analysis to graphically display the relationships between them.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Presidential Analysis

Two methods were used to determine what the candidates discussed during the campaign. The first was a frequency tabulation of key symbols used in the speeches. The frequency of occurrence of these symbols may serve as one measure of what subjects were most discussed. Symbol analysis also provides an insight into the political doctrine of a candidate. They represent the collective attitudes of a society and act as focal points of meaning in the expression of ideology.[1] Figure 1 illustrates frequency comparisons for each candidate for the ten symbols.

Almost all of the symbols show marked differences in frequency. One exception is the symbol "nuclear", a term avoided by both candidates. In view of its prominence as a campaign issue, it is more conspicious by its absence than its presence in their statements. They tend to be very similar in their use of "government" and "peace". These symbols were used approximately the same number of times by each candidate in each speech.

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[1]Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 17.



Figure 1. Symbol Tabulation.



Key

1- Acceptance speech.

2- Opening campaign speech.

3- Foreign policy speech.

4- Closing campaign speech.

- - - - - = Goldwater

——— = Johnson

Figure 1. (cont.)

There were differences between the candidates on all of the remaining seven terms. Goldwater used symbols with an aggressive quality such as "war", "military", and "Communism" more than did Johnson. The concept of freedom received more attention by Goldwater during the first part of the campaign than it did by Johnson. Johnson used the symbol "America" more frequently than any other term, and it is interesting to note a comparison in the acceptance speech of both candidates. Johnson used "America" thirty-two times and "Democrat" three times, whereas his opponent used "America" nine times and the name of his party, "Republican", thirty-four times. Another revealing comparison can be made between the symbols "war" and "peace". Johnson emphasized "peace" but failed to give much notice to "war", mentioning it but twice in the four speeches. Goldwater, on the other hand, mentioned both symbols with approximately equal frequency.

Symbol analysis can also provide some general idea as to what topics received most attention throughout the campaign. The subjects of war, peace, and Communism were emphasized during the course of the campaign, but were not prominent as subjects for the opening or closing speeches for either candidate. In direct contrast, topics such as freedom and Americanism received most attention in the first and last speeches of both candidates.

Another way of assessing the candidate's differences in the use of symbols is to compare totals for the four speeches. Figure 2 lists the symbols and their frequency. This table reveals the prominence given each symbol. Johnson's use of the word "America" seventy-nine times was more than either candidate used

SYMBOL	GOLDWATER	JOHNSON
War	29	2
Peace	44	28
Freedom	78	36
Nuclear	4	7
America	37	79
Communism	35	5
Republican	47	2
Democrat	13	11
Government	28	25
Military	22	8
Totals:	337	203

Figure 2. Symbol Totals for Four Speeches

any other symbol. Goldwater referred to "freedom" almost as frequently, but Johnson's use of "America" was more evenly distributed throughout the campaign. He consistently mentioned the term "America" more than the others in every speech.

If the symbols "Communism", "war", and "military" are added for each candidate the result is eighty-six for Goldwater and fifteen for Johnson. This is the most promounced difference between the two and indicates Goldwater's very marked use of aggressive symbols in comparison to Johnson. References to partisanship also differ, with Goldwater leading Johnson sixty to thirteen. Almost all of Goldwater's references were to the Republican party while Johnson was reluctant to call either party by name.

This symbol analysis indicates frequency only, and not how the symbols were related to each other. How the different concepts are associated is shown in the contingency analysis. However, frequency of occurrence may be assumed to indicate emphasis and in some cases a measure of intensity.

Another method of determining what was said and how much time was devoted to each subject by each candidate is based on the topical categories previously defined. Figure 3 gives the percentage of time devoted to each topic for the four speeches.

The candidates tended to concentrate on different subjects. A major portion of Goldwater's time was spent discussing international issues dealing with freedom, peace, and the threat of Communism. In contrast to his opponent Johnson concentrated on the domestic issues of social welfare and government. Although

	GOLDWATER		JOHNSON	
	Subject	Percentage	Subject	Percentage
1.	Freedom	18	Partisan Activity	19
2.	Partisan Activity	15	Miscellaneous	15
3.	Communism	13	Social Welfare	14
4.	Peace	11	Government	10
5.	Government	11	Peace	10
6.	War	8	Freedom	9
7.	Miscellaneous	7	International Affairs	7
8.	International Affairs	7	Nuclear Conflict	6
9.	Morality	3	Economics	4
10.	Social Welfare	2	Morality	4
11.	Law Enforcement	2	Communism	3
12.	Economics	2	War	3
13.	Nuclear Conflict	1	Law Enforcement	1

Figure 3. Percentage of Time Devoted to Different Topics

he rarely mentioned his party by name Johnson spent considerable time discussing political activity in which the participation of the Democratic Party was implied. He also devoted more time than Goldwater to introductions, references to important political figures, and the relating of personal experiences. Goldwater stayed closer to specific issues, spent less time on miscellaneous topics, and spoke in less general terms than did Johnson.

When Johnson discussed war he did so with reference to the nuclear aspect of international conflict without mentioning war itself. It may be that he did so to give added support to the Democratic supposition that Goldwater was not competent to assume the responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons. Goldwater avoided the subject of nuclear conflict almost completely. He talked a great deal about war, Communist aggression, and the military forces, but he very seldom associated any of these subjects with nuclear weapons.

Contingency Analysis

The contingency matrix illustrates the degree of association between the given categories. They are presented in figures 4 and 5 for Goldwater and Johnson, respectively. Those categories which occur together more often than chance alone would allow are listed in figures 6 and 7 along with their significance levels. For purposes of this study the .05 level was chosen to indicate statistical significance.

The variables are presented in a cluster diagram for each candidate in figures 8 and 9. The cluster presentation attempts

Expected Values

	Iv	Fm	Am	Go	Wr	Pe	CSQ	Nu	Ml	Gp	Cm	Pl
Individuality		.21	.09	.15	.05	.08	.11	.01	.11	.06	.10	.14
Freedom	.24*		.10	.15	.06	.08	.11	.01	.11	.06	.10	.14
American	.15*	.07		.08	.03	.04	.06	.01	.06	.03	.06	.07
Government	.21*	.17*	.03		.04	.06	.08	.01	.08	.04	.08	.10
War	.03	.01	.03	.00		.02	.03	.01	.02	.02	.03	.04
Peace	.04	.05	.03	.01	.01		.04	.01	.05	.02	.04	.05
CSQ	.13*	.16*	.02	.11	.06	.04		.01	.06	.04	.06	.08
Nuclear Conflict	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01	.00	.01		.01	.01	.01	.01
Military Power	.04	.11	.10	.05	.05	.09*	.10*	.01		.03	.06	.08
Group	.02	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.03	.00	.02		.03	.02
Communism	.03	.05	.06	.00	.04	.08	.11*	.00	.12	.01		.09
Political Action	.15	.17	.06	.14	.03	.04	.08	.00	.04	.01	.04	

Obtained Values

Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.

Figure 4. Contingency Matrix For Goldwater.

Expected Values

	Iv	Fm	Am	Go	Wr	Pe	CSQ	Nu	Ml	Gp	Cm	Pl
Individuality		.05	.12	.09	.01	.05	.12	.02	.03	.19	.02	.14
Freedom	.03		.07	.09	.01	.05	.06	.01	.03	.10	.01	.07
American	.10	.02		.12	.01	.08	.16	.02	.04	.24	.03	.06
Government	.09	.03	.06		.01	.06	.07	.03	.03	.18	.02	.15
War	.00	.00	.00	.00		.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.01	.02
Peace	.02	.05	.06	.05	.01		.08	.01	.02	.13	.02	.10
CSQ	.12	.01	.15	.19*	.00	.02		.01	.04	.24	.03	.16
Nuclear Conflict	.03	.00	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00		.01	.04	.01	.04
Military Power	.02	.03	.02	.00	.01	.03	.01	.00		.06	.01	.05
Group	.15	.10	.30*	.26*	.01	.09	.32*	.01	.06		.02	.32
Communism	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.03	.00	.01	.02		.02
Political Action	.14	.04	.21*	.19*	.00	.03	.28*	.02	.03	.37*	.02	

Obtained Values

Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.

Figure 5. Contingency Matrix For Johnson.

	Variables	Expected Values	Obtained Values	Sigma	Significance
1.	Freedom- Individuality	.21	.24	.041	-
2.	American- Individuality	.09	.15	.022	.05
3.	Government- Individuality	.15	.21	.029	.05
4.	Government- Freedom	.15	.17	.029	-
5.	CSQ- Individuality	.11	.14	.025	-
6.	CSQ- Freedom	.11	.16	.025	.05
7.	Military Power- Peace	.05	.09	.019	.05
8.	Military Power- CSQ	.06	.10	.020	.05
9.	Political Action- CSQ	.06	.11	.020	.05

Figure 6. Significance Values For Contingency Variables For Goldwater.

Variables	Expected Values	Obtained Values	Sigma	Significance
1. CSQ- Government	.07	.19	.025	.01
2. Group- American	.24	.30	.041	-
3. Group- Government	.18	.26	.035	.05
4. Group- CSQ	.24	.32	.041	.05
5. Political Action- American	.16	.21	.034	-
6. Political Action - Govt.	.15	.19	.032	-
7. Political Action- CSQ	.16	.28	.034	.01
8. Political Action-Group	.32	.37	.046	-

Figure 7. Significance Values For Contingency Variables For Johnson.



Figure 8. Cluster Diagram
For Johnson.



Figure 9. Cluster Diagram For Goldwater.

to demonstrate graphically the relationship indicated by the contingency analysis.

Goldwater appears to have a closer grouping among all the variables than Johnson. Six variables are significant at the .05 level of confidence as compared to four for Johnson. Two pairs of variables are related at the .01 level for Johnson indicating a strong relation between CSQ-Go and CSQ-Pl.

The variables which are more closely related form the core area of the cluster diagram. Other variables which are less related are placed in adjacent clusters, and those having no relationship, or a minus relation, are placed in separate clusters. All categories within a region have plus relations. There are, of course, alternative explanations as to why any cluster of symbols shows a positive or negative contingency. However, any inference that is made is based on demonstrable verbal behavior. Associations may be present which are not explicit in the statements of relation by the source. It is in this way that contingency analysis may bring out associations which are not readily discernable in average reading.

The cluster presentation for Johnson reveals one core area centering around cluster C. Other variables are very loosely related, or have no relationship at all. A distinctive feature of Johnson's diagram is the number of unrelated categories. These separate categories are war, communism, military power, and nuclear conflict. He tended to divorce these concepts with aggressive qualities from the categories of government and political action.

When he favored a change in the political situation he rarely referred to military force, but quite often referred to the group, government, and political action.

Goldwater's cluster diagram is cohesive and contains many variables that are closely related. In fact, the only variable that is not positively related to another is the group. He tends to associate the governmental process with individuality, rather than with the group. Freedom, government, and individuality are closely related together as are communism, war, and military force. Each of these groups form a cluster along with change of the status quo. Johnson always associated change of the political environment with government, the group, and political action. Goldwater associates different concepts with different kinds of change. If the proposed change is toward a new policy he perceives it as involving political action, the individual, freedom, and government. On the other hand, if the change favors previously held policies, he sees the change being aided by military force.

Other comparisons can be made between the candidates. The concept of peace is more integrated into Goldwater's associative pattern than is the case with Johnson. When Goldwater speaks of peace he also urges a change in the status quo using political action and to a lesser degree military force. Johnson refers to peace in quite a different conceptual context. He associates it with communism, but not with military power as does Goldwater. In fact, peace is almost an isolated concept for Johnson. He avoids relating it to any variable other than communism. He evidently prefers to picture peace as threatened by communism, but to

avoid the association of military force to defend it against this threat. This is in sharp contrast to Goldwater who perceives military force as related to communism, peace, and change of the status quo. If one were to construct Goldwater's position from these associations alone it would be this; peace is a result of the change that takes place when military force is brought to bear against communism.

Another subject of considerable importance in the campaign was that of war. The cluster analysis shows the two candidates to differ widely in their use of this term. It is isolated by Johnson and only occassionally associated with peace, communism, and military power. In contrast to Johnson, Goldwater integrates war closely with other concepts as cluster G illustrates. When Goldwater speaks of war he directly associates it with the use of military power to change the political situation.

Pattern Analysis

In order to more precisely determine the interrelationship of variables, a pattern analysis was made using five of the previously defined categories. These categories are change of the status quo, political action, group, individual, and military power. These variables were chosen to provide a comparison between the candidates as to how each perceives change taking place in the political environment. In the campaign Goldwater was assumed to have been more in favor of the use of military force than was Johnson. His political philosophy also placed emphasis upon the individual as an important and vital element of our governmental

process. These relationships are depicted graphically for both candidates by the pattern analysis.

Each of the categories is related to the other and the degree of relation measured by the generalized distance method. The generalized distance values for each pair of categories are listed in figures 10 and 11. These tables show that Goldwater has greater variability in the degree of relation between the variables.

The pattern analysis is illustrated in figure 12. Both diagrams are drawn with respect to the variable CSQ so that a comparison can be made on this basis. A preliminary inspection of the patterns reveals a general similiarity between Johnson and Goldwater with respect to all of the variables with one exception. The variables Iv and Gp tend to be reversed, and the group is closer related to the other variables for Johnson than for Goldwater. A closer examination of the models reveals quantitative differences between the candidates with respect to each pair of variables.

Reliability

Reliability of the symbol analysis was not computed as the counting procedure is not subject to a large margin of error. The method discussed previously in the chapter on methodology was used to compute the reliability of the contingency analysis. The results of each of the three coders were compared for each item. The percentage of agreement score was computed for each judge with the following results: first coder 87%, second coder 68%, and third coder 76%. These individual reliability percentages give an

	Variables	Distance
1.	CSQ- Political Action	1.91
2.	CSQ- Military Power	1.96
3.	Individuality- Political Action	2.09
4.	CSQ- Individuality	2.59
5.	Military Power- Individuality	3.02
6.	Group- Political Action	3.18
7.	Group- Indivic ality	3.25
8.	CSQ- Group	3.51
9.	Military Power- Group	3.56
10.	Military Power- Political Action	3.74

Figure 10. List of Generalized Distance Values For Goldwater.

Variables	Distance
1. CSQ- Group	2.28
2. Political Action- Group	2.31
3. CSQ- Political Action	2.50
4. Individuality- Group	2.72
5. CSQ- Individuality	3.01
6. Individuality- Political Action	3.04
7. Group- Military Power	3.07
8. CSQ- Military Power	3.33
9. Military Power- Political Action	3.36
10. Individuality- Military Power	3.56

Figure 11. List of Generalized Distance Values For Johnson.

Figure 12

Pattern Comparison of Variables For

Johnson and Goldwater



Key to Symbols:

GP = Group
IV = Individual
MIL = Military Power
POL = Political Action
CSQ = Change of the Status Quo

——— = Johnson

– – – – = Goldwater

average percentage of agreement score of 77%. Generally speaking, content analysis scores are to be interpreted in view of the individual study, the method of category construction, and the degree of precision desired. For the purposes of most content studies, a reliability figure between 70% and 90% is acceptable.[1] Few studies report reliability scores in excess of 90% when categories are sufficiently complex to involve some independent judgment on the part of the coder. The reliability figure of 77% achieved in this analysis is considered adequate.

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[1]Lee M. Brown, "A Content Analysis of Anti-Catholic Documents Circulated Through the Mails in the 1960 Presidential Campaign", (M.A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1961), p. 32.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Vice-Presidential Candidates

The candidates differed considerably in the emphasis they gave to the various issues of the campaign. Figure 13 gives the percentage of time each candidate devoted to different topics. Miller tended to distribute his time more evenly among the subjects than did Humphrey. The Democratic candidate talked about his party, their role in government, and their social welfare programs. He spent a great deal of time replying to introductions, mentioning the names of prominent politicans, and making ad-lib remarks about the area in which he was speaking. He gave little attention to the other issues of the campaign.

The Republican candidate talked about almost every issue in each one of his speeches. He discussed war, international affairs, and Communism more than did Humphrey. He also talked about the subject of nuclear conflict more than twice as often as his opponent. Like Humphrey, however, most of his time was spent talking about his party and its approach to the solution of current political problems.

The vice-presidential candidates spent considerable time making charges against the opposing party and its candidates. For purposes of analysis the charges were divided into five subject

	MILLER		HUMPHREY	
	Subject	Percentage	Subject	Percentage
1.	Partisan Activity	26	Partisan Activity	30
2.	Government	13	Government	19
3.	War	9	Social Welfare	18
4.	International Affairs	8	Miscellaneous	10
5.	Social Welfare	8	International Affairs	5
6.	Nuclear Conflict	7	Freedom	4
7.	Economics	6	Nuclear Conflict	3
8.	Miscellaneous	6	Communism	3
9.	Communism	6	Peace	3
10.	Freedom	4	War	2
11.	Peace	3	Morality	1
12.	Morality	3	Law Enforcement	1
13.	Law Enforcement	1	Economics	1

Figure 13. Percentage of Time Devoted to Different Topics.

areas, foreign policy, domestic policy, political philosophy, political activities, and the personal characteristics of the candidates themselves. The percentage of time they spent attacking their opponents by name on the specific areas listed are given in Figure 14.

Miller attacked Johnson primarily on his foreign policy. Most of his charges concerned the war in Viet Nam, and the posture of the United States in relation to the threat of Communist aggression. Secondly, he scored Johnson on his social programs such as Medicare and the war on poverty. It is interesting to note that Johnson's political activities and alleged association in the Bobby Baker affair received less attention by Miller than the other topics. However, when Miller referred to Humphrey by name, he was most critical of his political activities. In every speech he made mention of Humphrey's association with such liberal organizations as the Americans for Democratic Action. He denounced his liberal political ideas and domestic social programs, but otherwise had little to say about his opponent.

Humphrey launched a balanced attack against Goldwater. He associated Goldwater primarily with his conservative political philosophy. He maintained that Goldwater's philosophy was out of date and did not even represent the majority view of his own party. He charged that if Goldwater was elected he would do away with the social security system and put an end to many of the social programs of the federal government. Closely integrated with his attack on Goldwater's policies was his treatment of Goldwater

Miller Charges Against
Democratic Candidates

Subject	Percentage	
	Johnson	Humphrey
Foreign Policy	37	8
Domestic Policy	23	18
Political Philosophy	23	28
Political Activities	5	42
Personal Characteristics	12	4

Humphrey Charges Against
Republican Candidates

Subject	Percentage	
	Goldwater	Miller
Foreign Policy	9	-
Domestic Policy	21	-
Political Philosophy	32	-
Political Activities	14	-
Personal Characteristics	24	-

Figure 14. Percentage of Time Devoted
To Charges Against The Opposing Candidates.

himself. He spent considerable time implying that Goldwater was a reckless individual who was prone to act first and think second. He characterized Goldwater as unstable and psychologically unsuited for the office of president where he would have the responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons. Humphrey made the strong implication that if Goldwater was elected, he would involve the country in a nuclear war with the communists. It is unusual that Humphrey did not mention his vice-presidential opponent by name. Perhaps he did not want to publicize Miller who was not well known prior to the campaign.

Another interesting fact about the vice-presidential candidates was the total amount of time they devoted to attacking the opposition and defending their own stand on the issues. Humphrey spent eighteen percent of his time making specific charges against his opponents. He directed all of his criticism against the person and policies of Barry Goldwater, and not to the Republican Party. He even had words of praise for Republicans in general and especially those who publicly rejected Goldwater. He had many good things to say about Johnson, but he was careful not to defend him against charges made by Goldwater and Miller.

Miller approached the problem quite differently. His running mate was under heavy attack from the beginning of the campaign. An analysis of his speeches shows that he spent more time defending Goldwater against Democratic charges than he did attacking the other party. In his attempt to answer the Democratic charges, Miller devoted thirty-eight percent of his time to a defense of Goldwater on the issues of war, social security, and agricultural

policy. A lesser amount of time, twenty-nine percent, was spent on criticizing Johnson and Humphrey.

Contingency Analysis

The methodology of the contingency analysis is identical to that of the presidential candidates. The contingency matrix for Miller is given in Figure 15, for Humphrey in Figure 16, and their significance values in Figures 17 and 18, respectively.

Miller tended to associate more of the variables and had thirteen pairs occurring together more frequently than chance alone would allow. This was considerably more than the eight for Humphrey. Nine of Miller's pairs were statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence. Only four were significant for Humphrey.

The cluster diagrams presented in Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the association between variables for both candidates. Miller pictures Goldwater as the instrument of political change, and when he mentions Goldwater in this context he tends to talk about communism and nuclear warfare. Miller did not discuss freedom a great deal as did his running mate, but when he did, he also spoke of war, peace, and Goldwater. He associates Goldwater and his accomplishments with the Republican Party, and pictures Goldwater as the means whereby the party carries out its program. But he does not associate the Republican Party with policies about peace, war, and international issues directly. His only significant association when he talked about Johnson was with government. Humphrey also identified Johnson with government.

Expected Values

	Gl	Jh	Wr	Pe	Fr	Nu	Re	De	Am	Go	CSQ	Cm
Goldwater		.14	.12	.08	.16	.10	.08	.08	.06	.11	.14	.04
Johnson	.03		.09	.12	.06	.03	.04	.08	.03	.10	.12	.03
War	.24*	.06		.04	.03	.04	.07	.06	.04	.04	.06	.08
Peace	.16*	.08	.02		.02	.03	.06	.06	.03	.04	.06	.07
Freedom	.14	.02	.08*	.01		.04	.03	.04	.08	.09	.06	.04
Nuclear Conflict	.12*	.01	.04	.01	.02		.01	.02	.03	.03	.01	.03
Republican	.19*	.02	.03	.07*	.01	.00		.01	.02	.06	.14	.07
Democrat	.09	.02	.05	.02	.01	.01	.00		.08	.05	.08	.03
American	.03	.01	.01	.00	.03	.01	.00	.00		.03	.10	.04
Government	.10	.13*	.01	.01	.06	.01	.04	.01	.02		.12	.03
CSQ	.23*	.10	.02	.04	.01	.00	.21*	.06	.08	.09		.03
Communism	.01	.01	.03	.09*	.10*	.09*	.00	.01	.03	.01	.09*	

Obtained Values

Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.

Figure 15. Contingency Values For Miller.

Expected Values

	Gl	Jh	Wr	Pe	Fr	Nu	Re	De	Am	Go	CSQ	Cm
Goldwater		.05	.05	.06	.11	.09	.08	.03	.04	.09	.11	.08
Johnson	.04		.02	.02	.09	.06	.00	.02	.08	.09	.12	.00
War	.12*	.02		.04	.02	.04	.08	.03	.01	.06	.06	.08
Peace	.06	.03	.10		.11	.03	.04	.06	.03	.08	.02	.02
Freedom	.06	.06	.02	.04		.02	.06	.06	.07	.01	.05	.01
Nuclear Conflict	.19*	.00	.01	.01	.00		.02	.01	.01	.01	.04	.03
Republican	.07	.01	.04	.01	.02	.01		.12	.09	.06	.06	.10
Democrat	.04	.07	.01	.08	.03	.00	.09		.14	.16	.18	.02
American	.03	.07	.01	.02	.04	.00	.04	.12*		.06	.06	.09
Government	.08	.23*	.05	.02	.00	.05	.00	.20*	.c		.12	.04
CSQ	.13*	.10	.03	.01	.03	.02	.05	.26*	.05	.22*		.08
Communism	.10	.00	.05	.01	.00	.02	.08	.00	.00	.02	.06	

Obtained Values

Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.

Figure 16. Contingency Matrix For Humphrey.

Variables	Expected Values	Obtained Values	Sigma	Significance
1. Goldwater- War	.12	.24	.030	.05
2. Goldwater- Peace	.08	.16	.028	.05
3. Goldwater- Nuclear	.10	.12	.029	-
4. Goldwater- Republican	.08	.19	.027	.05
5. Goldwater- CSQ	.14	.23	.033	.05
6. Johnson- Government	.10	.13	.029	-
7. War- Freedom	.06	.11	.024	.05
8. Peace- Republican	.06	.07	.024	-
9. Peace- Communism	.07	.09	.025	-
10. Freedom- Communism	.06	.10	.024	.05
11. Nuclear Communism	.04	.09	.019	.05
12. Republican- CSQ	.10	.21	.029	.01
13. Communism- CSQ	.03	.09	.019	.01

Figure 17. Significance Values For Contingency Variables For Miller.

Variables	Expected Values	Obtained Values	Sigma	Significance
1. Goldwater- War	.06	.12	.024	.05
2. Goldwater- Nuclear	.08	.09	.026	-
3. Goldwater- CSQ	.11	.13	.030	-
4. Johnson- Government	.10	.23	.029	.05
5. Democrat- American	.09	.12	.027	-
6. CSQ- Democrat	.16	.20	.035	-
7. Government- Democrat	.18	.26	.036	.01
8. Government- CSQ	.12	.22	.031	.01

Figure 18. Significance Values For Contingency Variables For Humphrey.



Figure 19. Cluster Diagram
For Miller.



Figure 20. Cluster Diagram
For Humphrey.

Miller disassociated the terms Democrat and American from any of the other categories.

Humphrey's cluster analysis shows two major groups. Group 1 is composed of clusters B, C, and D, and group 2 is composed of clusters F, G, and H. The first group contains variables all of which are related to Johnson. Humphrey associates him with the government, the political process, his party, and America. He does not mention Johnson in conjunction with war, communism, peace, or freedom. He linked Goldwater with war, nuclear conflict, and the changing of the status quo. Usually this was in the form of a charge that Goldwater would defend freedom by plunging the country into nuclear war with the Communists. He divorced Goldwater from the RepublicanParty and did not associate the party itself with controversial issues.

Reliability

The reliability of the vice-presidential analysis was computed in the same manner as for the presidential analysis. The same judges were used and their percentage of agreement scores were all slightly higher than for the previous analysis. The first coder's score was 91%, the second 72%, and the third 84%. The increase in agreement among the coders is in all probability due to practice effect since this coding was completed after the presidential analysis. The overall reliability score for the vice-presidential analysis was 82.5%, and is within acceptable limits.

CHAPTER VI

Conclusions

Normally the difference in policy positions taken by the two parties are moderate. V. O. Key expresses this idea and draws its implications for American politics:

> Each party leadership must maintain the loyalty of its own standpatters; it must also concern itself with the great blocks of voters uncommitted to either party as well as with those who may be weaned away from the opposition. These influences tend to pull the party leaderships from their contrasting anchorages toward the center. In that process, perhaps most visable in presidential campaigns, the party appeals often sound much alike and thereby contribute to the bewilderment of observers of American politics.[1]

Another moderating factor in party politics are the issues involved in the campaign. In the absence of major national issues the two parties tend to decentralize and express only the vaguest of party ideology.[2] Issues of major importance such as that of nationalism versus states' rights in 1832, the maintenance of the Union in 1860, and the economic problems of 1932 occur infrequently. There were important issues in the 1964 campaign, but none impressed the voters as being vital enough to cause a realignment among the parties.

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[1]V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 1958), p. 241.

[2]Stanley Kelly, Jr., Political Campaigning (Menasha, Wisconsin: The George Banta Company, Inc., 1960), p. 148.

The Republican Party seems to have abandoned the traditional tendency toward moderation in the 1964 campaign. Their national campaign slogan was a pledge to give the country "a choice, not an echo."[1] The Republican candidates attempted to present their program as a sharp contrast to the Democrats, and thus provide the voter with a distinct choice at election time. It is probable that they succeeded in accomplishing their aim. The results of this study indicate that the Republican candidates differed significantly from their Democratic opponents in their appeal to the electorate.

The Republicans were decidedly more partisan in their campaigning. Their promises were always associated with the Republican Party and Barry Goldwater as the means whereby the changes would take place. Candidate Goldwater also emphasized the individual as the most important element in the American political process. This was in sharp contrast to the Democratic candidates whose appeal for unity was one of their primary campaign themes. President Johnson rarely mentioned the Democratic Party, but he referred many times to "most Americans" and "the majority in our country". The Democratic appeal was directed to the American people in general. Johnson perceived a majority of the people to be the primary political unit in our society. Both vice-presidential candidates were highly partisan in their speeches, but Humphrey associated his statements with larger segments of the population than did Miller.

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[1]James M. Perry, Barry Goldwater: A New Look at a Presidential Candidate (Silver Spring, Maryland: The Dow Jones Company, 1964), p. 95.

The program advocated by the Republicans provided a distinct alternative to Democratic policy, and in almost every case the distinction was based on Goldwater's promise to reduce the functions of the federal government. Although he seemed to modify his view somewhat, he still maintained that the proper duty of elected officials is to "divest themselves of the power they have been given".[1] Therefore the Republican proposal for change was negative in character, and really no change at all. All it amounted to was a curtailment of the programs that were initiated with the Democratic New Deal legislation in the 1930's. As this analysis has pointed out, much of the Republican appeal was reduced to an apology for this negative approach, with Miller devoting himself to a defense of Goldwater's domestic policy.

If Republican replies are any measure of the effectiveness of Democratic charges, then it appears that the Democrats were successful. Both Republican candidates placed themselves on the defensive from the beginning of the campaign. In particular, they made lengthy replies to Democratic charges about war and the use of nuclear weapons. Goldwater almost completely avoided the subject of nuclear weapons and left the difficult task of defending him on this issue to his running mate, William Miller. This proved to be extremely difficult in view of the fact that Goldwater kept making speeches about the necessity of war in the defense of freedom. Goldwater may have been correct in his thesis,

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[1]Barry M. Goldwater, The Concience of a Conservative, (Shepherdsville, Kentucky: The Victor Publishing Company, 1960).

that the willingness to go to war is an essential element in the deterrence to Communist aggression, but was it wise for him to interject this as a prominent campaign issue? Probably not, since the continued reference to war tended to reinforce his already unfavorable image as a reckless individual who favored war as a solution to political conflict. The Democratic candidates, both of whom were considerably more sophisticated in their approach to politics than Goldwater and Miller, were most reluctant to discuss issues which even implied the necessity for hostilities. And when they did discuss the subject of war, they did so with unfavorable references to Goldwater. This study shows that Goldwater made considerable, efforts in the campaign to change his image with the voters. Most political analysts have marked this as one of the major factors in voter rejection of Goldwater, and Goldwater himself has agreed.[1]

The Democrats tended to avoid controversial issues, and when they did discuss them they attempted to associate the subject with the names or policies of their opponents. The more controversial the subject, such as the issue of war, the more general and vague were the statements of the Democratic candidates. This is in accord with traditional political campaign methods as reported by Berelson.[2] Goldwater and Miller were generally more definite and specific on all the issues than the Democrats. President Johnson

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[1] U.S. News and World Report, December 21, 1964.

[2] Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 174.

made a great many statements about subjects that no one would take issue with, such as "this is the time of peace on earth and good-will among men."[1] This statement, characteristic of Johnson's speeches, can be contrasted with a typical and now famous statement from Goldwater's acceptance speech. "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue".[2] The Republican candidate spoke throughout the campaign with a candor not usually found in American politicans. Goldwater often made statements that Hubert Humphrey used in his indictment of Goldwater as a political personality. Even Goldwater's own close associate and political advisor, Denison Kitchel, admitted that Goldwater was not always diplomatic.

> So many people have said he's a bomb-lobber and a shoot-from-the-hip kind of guy. He's not that way at all. But, in all areas, personal or political, he is so candid and forthright that it surprises everyone. Politicians just don't talk that way; they try to be more diplomatic.[3]

It was William Miller, Goldwater's running mate, who was supposed to be a "tiger on the attack in an attacking year".[4] However, his campaign statements were less radical than those of Goldwater. His attack on Johnson's political activities was supposed to be one of the major Republican campaign efforts. Instead

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[1]News Release, The Democratic National Convention, Washington, D.C., October 27, 1964.

[2]New York Times, July 17, 1964.

[3]Perry, op. cit., p. 92.

[4]Perry, op. cit., p. 129.

of being a "tiger on the attack", he appears to have ended up defending his running mate against Democratic charges. Miller did not fulfill the role that was apparently chosen for him at the beginning of the campaign.

This study supports the hypothesis that Goldwater's speeches were consistent with his pre-campaign statements. He continued to speak out on the issue, making statements that were too extreme and partisan to gain him wide support. The American political system functions on the basis of a governing consensus which is always composed of diverse elements.

> For it is the essential character of our major parties that they are the great common denominator of the American people, embracing within their hospitable folds men and women of all classes, faiths, interests and sentiments. And it is the historical function of parties, in normal times at least, to be all things to all men. It is this, indeed, which enables our two-party system to function at all.[1]

The Republican candidates did not appeal to a broad spectrum of American political thought, and it is improbable that they obtained the support of many who were not already devoted to their cause at the start of the campaign.

There have been few attempts to develop a systematic theory of campaigning in the American political system. Kelley has summed up present day knowledge with some general observations, and one of his axioms states that the expectations of the electorate determine in part the success of campaign communications.[2] The

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[1]Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Elections- U.S.A. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), p. 103.

[2]Kelley, op. cit., pp. 146-157.

American voter tends to reject extremes in politics except in times of national crisis. This study indicates that the campaign statements of the Republican candidates tended to identify them as symbols of extremism. In the absence of a campaign issue of critical importance, it would seem probable that Goldwater's campaign tactics increased the Republican margin of defeat.

SUMMARY

This study is an analysis of the 1964 campaign speeches of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Its purpose is to determine the difference in the appeal that the candidates made to the voters. A representative sample of the candidate's major campaign speeches was chosen for analysis. Three types of content analysis were performed to determine what issues were discussed, how much time the candidates devoted to different topics, and how they associated the issues together. Three judges were used to code the material, and inter-agreement percentages calculated for each coder. The results of the contingency analysis are presented in cluster and pattern diagrams to illustrate which issues the candidates associated together. This study indicates that there were significant differences in the appeal that the two parties presented to the electorate.

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