



1929

Bar Expenditures

North Dakota Law Review

[How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!](#)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://commons.und.edu/ndlr>

Recommended Citation

North Dakota Law Review (1929) "Bar Expenditures," *North Dakota Law Review*. Vol. 6: No. 7, Article 7.
Available at: <https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol6/iss7/7>

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.common@library.und.edu.

date; it confines itself to an effort to secure the election of those persons whom the members believe to be best fitted.

Persons unacquainted with the motives of the association have said that the association is trying to dictate to the public how it should vote; that it is attempting to take from the public its right to select its judges; that the opinion obtained in the association's plebiscite is not worth anything because not all the members participate in the vote; that the association is attempting to secure control of the courts, more particularly, of the judges; that the association's activity is an attempt to build up a "lawyer's trust" for the purpose of controlling the administration of justice, etc.

To any one familiar with the work of the association and its object, the absurdity and falsity of each of these charges is at once apparent.

The association has no desire to dictate to the public; it is merely trying to help the voters to vote intelligently when they approach the problem of selecting a few out of a large number of candidates for these very important offices. It hopes to leave the selection of judges truly in the hands of the public and not in the hands of a few politicians who have ulterior motives in promoting the election of certain candidates.

The association does not practice before the courts and, therefore, cannot possibly have anything to gain by controlling the courts. It should be observed that it is not the association, as such, which passes upon the qualifications of candidates, but that it is the members of the association, and that the association merely acts as the machinery for communicating this expert opinion to the public. The plebiscite ballot is entirely secret and no opportunity is given to any candidate to ascertain how any member voted as to his qualifications; there is therefore no room for fear or favoritism to enter into the expression of the individual's opinion in the plebiscite. Of what importance is it that not all the members participate in the plebiscite, if a number sufficient to give authenticity to the opinion expressed, have voted? There have rarely been less than 1,100 votes cast in an association plebiscite. Is not the overwhelming majority opinion of a committee of 1,100 lawyers more dependable than that of the partisan supporters of the respective candidates?

BAR EXPENDITURES

Commenting upon the expenditures of the Bar Associations of California (\$82,222.00), South Dakota (\$995.39), and North Dakota (\$3,085.62—and Bar Board disbarment expenses \$3,965.48), the Journal of the American Judicature Society makes comment as follows in a recent issue:

"Now it is inconceivable that the needs in respect to discipline are seriously different in the two states, (North Dakota and South Dakota), yet in one state four times as much money was expended directly in the prosecutions calculated to maintain the reputation of the Bar as was used for all purposes in the other.

"Revenue is not the most important factor in Bar functioning, perhaps, but it is certainly not the least. In North Dakota a sum was used for disciplinary proceedings greater than that expended in some of the largest states in the country. It points not to a lower grade of professional conduct in that state, but to a duty well performed."