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A Study of the Ontology of Evil in the Educational Philosophy of Martin Buber

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A STUDY OF THE ONTOLOGY OF EVIL IN THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN BUBER

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The victory won is greater because it is shared.

To My Wife, Jewell

who is all the name implies.

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ABSTRACT

Martin Buber preferred to be known as a philosophical anthropologist rather than a philosopher, theologian, or teacher. Any of these titles are properly used since the scope of his writings contribute significantly to each of these fields.

It is the purpose of this paper to show that what he had to say concerning the Ontology of Evil is significant in the study of educational theory and that his own educational philosophy was influenced by his presuppositions concerning the nature of evil.

Chapter II is devoted to the literature relating to the basic elements of this study: the problem of evil, evil and the individual, evil and the community, and educational theory. Only that literature touching the philosophy of Buber in the specified areas has been selected.

The study is developed in Chapter III by setting forth Buber's concept of the problem of evil as it relates to the individual and the community.

The goal of education for Buber was to bring the individual into a state of true humanity. This goal is to be reached by traveling

a path in which the nature of the goal is evident, the path of communion.

True human relationships transform evil because relationship takes place in the spirit, in the realm of the "between." When properly extended, such relationship leads one to the eternal Thou which is the proper aim of all education, for it is the proper goal of the lived life.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Man has always had his experiences as I, his experiences with others, and with himself; but it is as We, ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed a world out of his experiences.[1]

It is characteristic of man that he has always thought his thoughts as I. Unless, however, he goes beyond and transplants his ideas into the realm of "the between" where communication takes place, the cosmos never becomes real to him. It is through investing oneself in the realm of the spirit that one builds and shapes the world in which he lives.[2]

Statement of the Problem

Man does not always reach out in communion. He may fail to respond to the existential claim on his person; "he flees either into the general collective which takes from him his responsibility or into the

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[1] Martin Buber, "What is Common to All," The Knowledge of Man, trans. Maurice Friedman. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 107.

[2] Ibid., p. 107.

attitude of a self who has to account to no one but himself."[3] Martin Buber saw these two movements as detrimental to man in his existence as man, and as the primary sources of evil in the realm of existence. The clearest mark of this kind of man is that

> he cannot really listen to the voice of another; in all his hearing, as in all his seeing, he mixes observation. The other is not the man over against him whose claim stands over against his own in equal right; the other is only his object. But he who existentially knows no Thou will never succeed in knowing a We.[4]

"The child is a reality; education must become a reality."[5] What prevents the child from becoming? What aids this self-actualization? How can the educator assist an individual in becoming truly human?

To become aware is to become aware of the wholeness of man. In his philosophical anthropology, Buber deals with the problem of what is "peculiar to man as man." He presents a method which "deals with the concrete, existential characteristic of man's life in order to arrive at the wholeness and uniqueness of man."[6]

The problem of finding man in the complex world of individuals and cultures and avoid the "abyss of abstract unity" and "meaningless

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[3]Ibid., p. 108.

[4]Ibid., p. 108.

[5]Martin Buber, "Education," Between Man and Man, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965) p. 84.

[6]Maurice Friedman, "Introductory Essay," Knowledge of Man, p. 14.

relativity" in the process is a very real problem.

Evil is a reality and so is freedom. To understand the nature of these two concepts is to aid in the understanding of the nature of man. The scientific method is not sufficient for this search. One must turn to philosophy for the answer; Buber deals with these questions in a straight-forward and concrete manner. In order for the philosopher to deal with actuality he must have a lived relation with the problems with which he deals.

Martin Buber did not write concerning an abstract idea of evil. He suffered from the lack of personal relation when at the age of three his parents separated and he was forced to live with his grandparents. He relates his sadness as a result and describes in detail his feeling when he learned that his mother would not be returning to him.

His concept of man's relation to the animal world is understood better after reading the account of his experiences as an eleven year old. In stroking the neck of a dapple-gray horse Buber said he felt the life beneath his hand and described the encounter "as though the element of vitality itself bordered on my skin, something that was not I."

We are indebted to Aubrey Hodes for some of these more personal insights through his book Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait. He tells us also of Buber's contact with Hasidism where he was introduced to the idea of Community.

"When I saw the hasidim dance with the Torah, the Scroll of Law I knew what community was," Buber said.

He learned the evil of failure to communicate when a young man came to him for counsel and later took his own life. The evil of society out of control was very real for him during the persecution of Nazi Germany under Adolph Hitler.

The hope of Community became a concrete hope with the birth of Israel. His recognition of the problems of establishment of true community also became real when he realized that Israel could not establish her existence as a nation in peace.

This is not to suggest that these personal incidents in the life of Buber brought about his philosophy. Similiar incidents have been evident in multitudes. It is rather to point out that his philosophy dealt with in this paper had concrete experience from which to draw.

Hypothesis

Implicit in any philosophy of education are the presuppositions which have influenced it. It is proposed that the educational philosophy of Martin Buber was influenced by his concept of evil and that a proper understanding of evil, as viewed by Buber, is a precondition for the understanding of his educational philosophy.

Need for the Study

A proper understanding of the educational philosophy of Martin

Buber is dependent upon an understanding of his philosophy of evil. There has been no definitive work on this subject to date, in spite of the fact there is a growing body of literature concerning his philosophy in various other aspects.

Purpose of the Study

An unresolved problem in man's world is the presence of evil. Buber addressed himself to this problem and to the manner of dealing with it. It is the purpose of this study (1) to identify the problem of evil in the thought of Buber as it relates to the individual and the community, and (2) to show that Buber's concept of evil influenced his philosophy of education.

Delimitations

The problem of evil may be approached from a philosophical or from a theological position of inquiry. This work will exclude, for the purpose of principal research, those areas dealt with by Buber in a purely theological connotation.

Limitation

A large number of works by Buber have been translated into English from the German and Hebrew. Not all his work has been so translated. This paper will be based upon research from those works which are available in the English language.

Definition of Terms

Actual: The real association of the I and You.

Actualize: The gradual process of evolvement through the reciprocity of relationships by which that which is becomes present.

Between: That area where communication takes place. It is the realm of the earthly manifestation of the spirit.

Community: A group of people all of whom stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to one another and who stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to a single living center.

Confrontation: The reciprocal forces of nature which produce self-realization.

Decision: That act of man whereby with his total being he acts out of the freedom of the will.

Doom: The belief in a fate which is pre-determined and which belief is a deterrent to the act of turning. The only thing in itself which can doom man is the belief in doom.

Education: The selection by man of his effective world.

Ego: The individual who knows only himself as subject. This term is to be distinguished from the "ego" of the psychologist. It is the I of the basic word I-It. No man is pure ego but may be so ego-oriented that he may be so-called.

Encounter: The living experience of relation whereby that which confronts one enters into the world of things.

Evil: Evil in the individual is of two types, (1) evil from indecision, and (2) evil from choice. The first stage is a non-choice, a pseudo-decision. It includes not only a lack of direction but all that is done in this condition: grasping, compelling, seducing, exploiting, torturing, devouring and destroying. In the second stage man deliberately chooses those things which he once did out of indecision. At this point evil becomes radical; it is confirmed because it is willed.

Evil in the community arises from the lack of man's relation to his fellow man and his failure to recognize and embrace a living center.

Evil as used in this work is to be distinguished from moral evil which is generally conceived as the lack of conformity to a pre-arranged pattern.

Experience: Knowledge gained by going over the surface of things as opposed to that knowledge which grows out of a dialogical relation.

Formhood: A coinage by Buber suggesting the manner in which creation is revealed through encounter.

Freedom: That state or condition in which one finds within himself the power to turn; he who has the power to decide is free.

Hasidism: A movement founded in the eighteenth century by a Jewish sect opposed to excessive legalistic forms of Judaism. Martin Buber was influenced by the mysticism of this group in his youth.

Some of his earlier writings dealt with the philosophy of this movement.

Human: A person in whom the central You is received in the present.

I-Act: The first form of the basic word I-It.

I-Consciousness: The result of the process in which an individual confronts himself and ceases to see himself as only a part of his You; he views himself as a person capable of entering into relation as an I.

I-It: The basic word of separation used by Buber to indicate the sphere of goal directed activity. The world of It may include people as well as things. The It is used by the I for some end beyond itself, i. e. exploitation.

I-You: The basic word of relation used by Buber to indicate a timeless relationship between an individual and the world. In this relationship neither parties are objects but confront each other as persons, both of whom are subjects.

It: The second portion of the basic word I-It and the part capable of being ordered or arranged. The It may be identified by its separate qualities and is seen in a space-time-cause context.

Knowledge: Knowledge is of two kinds, (1) scientific or technical, and (2) knowledge resulting from relationship and experience. The former is conceptual and objective; the form in which all knowledge

must be stored. The later is revelation; it must become conceptual to be stored but is the means by which one participates in actuality.

Person: An individual who is capable of entering into a genuine relation with another. In the thought of Buber a person stands at the opposite pole from the ego.

Presuppositions: Those beliefs which one accepts as being true or valid without necessity for rational proof; the basis upon which one builds his arguments or establishes his claims.

Reciprocity: That exchange whereby the I is revealed to its You and the You is revealed to the I.

Relation: Buber viewed the longing for relation as a primary drive growing out of a craving for the You. In relation one becomes aware of the present world and its ability to communicate, and may include things as well as people.

Self-Realization: The becoming aware of the I in either the I-It experience or the I-Thou relationship. The self which is realized in either case is a different self from the other.

Spirit: In its human manifestation spirit is a product of man's relation with his Thou. It is through man's power to relate that he is able to live in the spirit. "It is man's totality that has become consciousness, the totality which comprises and integrates all his capacities, powers, qualities, and urges."

Soul: When Buber spoke of the soul, he spoke of the total man.

He did not regard soul as only the spiritual element within man.

Unification: That process whereby one becomes whole; the "pulling together" of the total self in such a way that one may choose the way with his total being. It is the making one of the two urges.

Urge: The passion in which all human action originates. When the urge is unified it is capable of goodness. A divided urge produces a two-fold urge, one of which is evil. It is not evil per se but becomes the action out of which evil becomes possible. When the two urges are again united they become whole and are only then capable of choosing goodness.

You: The second portion of the basic word I-You. The You is the timeless, causeless, spaceless being which causes the I to actualize through confrontation. The innate You is actualized with each relationship. Some translators use Thou rather than You but the connotation is the same.

World: Man's effective environment which exists only as he recognizes his independence from it and the independent opposites which are over against him in it.

Organization of the Study

The remainder of this study is organized in the following manner:

1. Chapter II contains a discussion of literature related to the subject of the Ontology of Evil and to the educational philosophy

of Martin Buber.

2. Chapter III describes (1) the nature of evil as it relates to the individual, (2) the nature of evil as it relates to the community, and (3) the educational philosophy of Martin Buber, with special attention to those areas most obviously influenced by his philosophy of evil.

3. Chapter IV is an analysis of the data in relation to his educational philosophy.

4. Chapter V consists of the conclusions resulting from the study and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER II

RELATED LITERATURE

Interpreters of Buber

In dealing with the related literature one characteristic became evident in the evaluation of Buber and his work. Most writers did not distinguish between the philosopher, the theologian, the teacher, or the man. Those who knew Buber best would probably have thought it inconsistent with his own philosophy to have made such a distinction.

Although it was not a major purpose of this paper to deal with the problem of evil as it related to Buber's theological position, it has been impossible to properly evaluate some of the related literature without touching upon this area. Many writers did not distinguish between the problem in such a way as to make the separation practical.

One of the foremost interpreters of Martin Buber was Malcom Diamond. In his book Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, Diamond declared that Buber was "neither an academic philosopher nor. . .a professional theologian."[1] For Buber, philosophical problems

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[1] Malcom Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 3.

emerged "only when men reflect upon the real questions, that is, on questions which engage the total person rather than the intellect alone."[2]

Jack Cohen wrote concerning Diamond's book, "For the first time we have a statement of Buber's position which eschews the obscurity of Buber's style and sets forth simply and with great insight the main outlines of his philosophy."[3]

Arthur A. Cohen's book[4] was described in America as "succinct but brilliant" and Cohen is called "the most gifted of our younger Jewish thinkers."[5]

The Saturday Review carried a statement concerning the place of Buber in philosophy and theology.

> Besides being one of the two or three most eminent Jewish philosophers, Buber can be ranked among the ten leading Protestant theologians in view of the influence his personalistic philosophy of dialogue has had.[6]

Ronald Gittelsohn points out that it is seldom easy to understand

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[2]Ibid., p. 15.

[3]Jack Cohen, review of Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, by Malcom Diamond, in Jewish Social Studies, 22 November 1964, p. 129.

[4]Arthur A. Cohen, Martin Buber (New York: Hillary House, 1957).

[5]William F. Lynch, S. J., review of Martin Buber, by Arthur A. Cohen, in America, 22 March 1958, p. 728.

[6]William Robert Miller, "A Personalistic Philosophy of Hope," Saturday Review 51 (February 10, 1968):33.

Buber. He pondered whether his following was a "response to his doctrine or a reaction to his personality." Even Maurice Friedman, he says, is constrained to admit that in Daniel there is much which is "beclouded with esthetic language."[7] In spite of this, he says of Daniel that there are enough enjoyable and profitable experiences "even for those who fail fully to understand it, or who, understanding, cannot altogether subscribe to its tenets," to make it worth the reading.[8]

Gabriel Schonfeld pointed out that Buber has probably been kept from the larger audiences because he "is often lacking in lucidity and requires interpretation."[9] In this same vein Isaac Singer says "Because Buber is so obscure, each new book (or new translation) inspires the hope that finally the master will elucidate his position."[10]

Maurice Friedman ranks as a leading interpreter of Buber, having translated a number of his works.

> In all of Martin Buber's works we find a spiritual tension and seriousness coupled with a breadth of scope which seeks constantly to relate this intensity to life itself and does not

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[7]Roland B. Gittelsohn, "A World to Make Real," Saturday Review 31 (August 1, 1964):26.

[8]Ibid., p. 27.

[9]Gabriel Schonfeld, "Those Who Keep Faith with the Covenant," Saturday Review 41 (June 7, 1958):19.

[10]Isaac B. Shevis Singer, "Rootless Mysticism," Commentary, January 1965, p. 77.

> tolerate its limitation to any one field of thought or to thought cut off from life.[11]

Friedman says that one may best understand the evolution of Buber's thought as a gradual development from an early period of mysticism, through a middle period of extentialism to a mature development of dialogical philosophy. This transition was complete by 1922.[12]

"Buber has demanded" says Friedman, "as no other modern thinker, the hallowing of the everyday--the redemption of evil through the creation of the human community in relation with God." He sees this as an answer to Sartre's evil which is unredeemable. In contrast to Sartre, Buber's philosophy is "essentially concrete, close to experience and realistic as only a life open to the reality of evil in the profoundest sense could produce."[13] His philosophy of dialogue has "proved to be one of the most original and significant contributions to modern theology and philosophy."[14]

Beek and Weiland point out in their book Martin Buber: Personalist & Prophet that:

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[11] Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (London: Routledge and Kenan Paul, Limited, 1955), p. 5.

[12] Ibid., p. 27.

[13] Ibid., p. 282.

[14] Maurice S. Friedman, "Symbol, Myth, and History in the Thought of Martin Buber," The Journal of Religion 34 (January 1954):1.

> In the history of European philosophy Buber was the first person to construct an anthropology consistently based on the motifs of dialogue and Mitmenschlichkeit (i. e. humanity-in-fellowship).[15]

Karl Barth wrote "If I were a liberal theologian, I should try the theology of Martin Buber."[16] Professor Emil Brunner said "This is the point on which I find myself closest of all to Karl Barth."[17]

Leslie Zeigler[18] held that what Buber regarded as truth is a matter not of appropriation as constitutive of one's own existence, but of participation or sharing in being." Appropriation, when happening within man, is a part of the I-It experience.[19]

Levin Meyer, in "The Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjold," points out that Buber was a Zionist from the beginning of the movement, but was a thorn in the side of the Israeli nationalists. He was profoundly religious but did not observe Jewish customs. Although a refugee from Nazi Germany he resumed cultural contact by accepting

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[15]M. A. Beek and J. Sperna Weiland, Martin Buber: Personalist & Prophet (Westminister: Newman Press, 1968), p. 64.

[16]Karl Barth, "Liberal Theology: Some Alternatives," Hibbert Journal 59 (April 1961):217.

[17]Emil Brunner, "Karl Barth's Alternatives for Liberal Theology: A Comment," Hibbert Journal 59 (July 1961):319.

[18]Instructor in Philosophy and Religion at Oregon State University.

[19]Leslie Zeigler, "Personal Existence: A Study of Buber and Kierkegaard," Journal of Religion 40 (April 1960):89.

the Goethe Prize in 1951.[20]

For Buber, man is not just a question. In the dialogical wholeness of his existence he is also the answer.[21] His emphasis is on the "meaning and hope that arises out of human existence, that develop out of the interhuman." For Buber, human nature is not fixed; it is constantly changing and growing through knowing and doing.[22]

Buber was not primarily a theologian but Paul Tillich saw him as making three important contributions to Protestanism:

> his existential interpretation of prophetic religion, his rediscovery of mysticism as an element within prophetic religion, and his understanding of the relation between prophetic religion and culture, especially in the social and political realms.[23]

Sister Helen James John regarded Buber's faith in the Bible as heretical "in the pristine etymological sense." It allowed him to "distinguish, and so to choose, in the Old Testament, between the human and the divine," between that which had been "manufactured"

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[20]Meyer Levin, "The Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjold," The New York Times Magazine, December 3, 1961, p. 42.

[21]John Steffney, "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philosophical Anthropology," Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):36.

[22]Ibid., pp. 38-9.

[23]Paul Tillich, "Martin Buber and Christian Thought," Commentary, June 1948, p. 516.

and that which was "received."[24]

"The real worth of Buber," a letter to the editor of The Commonweal confided, "lies in the fact that he can communicate what he has met, and he does find a way." He uses the language "as if he used it not" to express a knowledge which might not be understood without him.[25]

"Martin Buber," said Will Herberg, "is one of the great creative forces in contemporary religion."[26] In a day when Israel has remained on the front pages of world news "it is valuable to read what the Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University has had to say." In addition to his own writings he has had "immense influence upon such diverse thinkers as the late L. H. Myers, Denis de Rougement, Father d'Arcy, Eric Przywara, Arnold Zweig and Paul Tillich."[27]

Potok points out that the "Jews, however, have generally continued to look upon his efforts with suspicion and to regard them as

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[24]Helen James John, "Eichmann and Buber," The Commonweal, July 6, 1962, p. 375.

[25]Bernard E. Gilgun, The Commonweal, August 20, 1958, p. 546.

[26]Will Herberg, "Buber: Philosopher of the Dialogic Life," The New Republic, January 16, 1956, p. 26.

[27]Anne Fremantle, "Martin Buber," The Commonweal, August 6, 1948, p. 404.

outside the mainstream of Jewish thought."[28] He considered that Buber's understanding of Judaism was "colored" by his relation with Christianity. Although he did not embrace Christianity, he regarded Jesus as having realized the I-Thou relation. His choosing of Jesus rather than Moses as his example in this regard brought him under suspicion by the Jewish Community.[29] It is hardly surprising, Potok points out, that "neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians are among Buber's most ardent admirers."[30] In fact, he states without reservation that "Buber has been condemned or ignored by Orthodox Jews."[31]

One of the strong criticisms leveled against Buber was written by Potok.

> Given Buber's inability to comprehend the nature and meaning of Jewish law, his existentialist orientation, his attitude toward Jesus, and his view of Judaism as refracted through the prism of Christian mysticism, it is perfectly understandable that his work is regarded with suspicion by contemporary Jews. But there is nevertheless a bitter irony in the fact that the great philosopher of dialogue is today virtually incapable of entering into dialogue with his own people.[32]

Newsweek recognized Buber for his many honors including the Erasmus Award in 1963 and the Freedom of Jerusalem Award. He

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[28]Chaim Potok, "Martin Buber and the Jews," Commentary, March 1966, p. 43.

[29]Ibid., p. 46.

[30]Ibid., p. 48.

[31]Ibid., p. 48.

[32]Ibid., p. 49.

was nominated for the Nobel Prize by Hermann Hesse who called him "one of the few wise men" living at that time. T. S. Eliot said of his meeting with Buber that it was "the rare experience of being in the presence of greatness."[33]

Literature Related to the Problem of Evil and the Individual

"In I and Thou Buber's affinities with existentialism are obvious," wrote Malcom Diamond.[34]

> But his thought has interacted intimately with the world-affirming tradition of Judaism, which has always cautioned its adherents against over-anxious preoccupation with sin, so that it stands in sharp contrast to the anguished emphasis of most existentialists. Compared to their views, Buber's outlook, which might seem pessimistic from the standpoint of rationalism, is quite optimistic.[35]

This author comments on the evil of the I-It as used by Buber. "The It posture becomes evil when it oversteps its limits and claims to encompass the totality of truth." This action becomes evil because it tends to choke off "the possibility of response to the deeper levels of meaning that may emerge from I-Thou encounters."[36]

He defends Buber against critics who "accused him of employing anthropomorphic arguments" in an attempt to "shore up religious

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[33]Newsweek, June 28, 1965, p. 76.

[34]Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, p. 19.

[35]Ibid., p. 19.

[36]Ibid., p. 22.

dogma." Buber, he points out, "stands apart from apologetic theology, not only in his drive to eschew objective demonstration" and to confine himself to "existential evocation" but also in the "over-all consistency of his outlook."[37]

Diamond admits that Buber is vulnerable to one charge, that of irrationalism. "He has failed to elaborate the sense in which detached knowledge, gained in the I-It attitude, may enrich the meaning conveyed within the I-Thou relation."[38]

Beek supports Buber's concept of man and his relation to his world by suggesting it

> worth considering whether Buber is not right when he relates man and world to each other in such a way that only with man, who distances himself from his Merk-Welt (which he also has), does a world arise as something self-subsistent over against him.[39]

Beek and Weiland attempt to clarify Buber's contrasting of I-It and I-Thou by furnishing the following scheme:[40]

I-It	I-Thou
Experience	Relation
Object	Presence
Utilizing	Encounter
Provision for, or attention to	Love
Fate	Fortune, (appointed) destiny

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[37]Ibid., p. 44.

[38]Ibid., p. 35.

[39]Beek and Weiland, Martin Buber: Personalist & Prophet, p. 54.

[40]Ibid., p. 58.

Discretion, caprice	Freedom
Having	Being

Manfred Vogel in the Harvard Theological Review denies that Buber's concepts of good and evil are foundation stones for his ethical thought. He sees them as "secondary concepts" in that "they receive their meaning and significance from the primary concept, i. e., the concept of responsibility."[41] He adds, however, that "Buber's ethics is embedded in his ontology of relation, specifically of the I-Thou relation."[42] One wonders if Mr. Vogel was unable to understand that it is exactly here in relation (specifically, the lack of it) that the ontology of evil is discovered in the writings of Buber.

Gabriel Schonfeld, in his critique of Arthur Cohen's book, Martin Buber, missed the heart of Buber's concept of evil. "If man can overcome his selfish tendencies to relate exclusively to other 'things', and learn to relate harmoniously to his fellow human beings and to nature itself, he can achieve salvation."[43] It is not man's relation to things that is evil but the way man relates to things. Schonfeld's reference to "other things" reveals a basic lack of understanding of Buber's stance: Man is no thing, even as other men are

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[41]Manfred Vogel, "The Concept of Responsibility in the Thought of Martin Buber," Harvard Theological Review 63 (April 1970):162.

[42]Ibid., p. 165.

[43]Gabriel B. Schonfeld, "The Philosopher," Saturday Review 41 (June 7, 1958):19.

not things. When man learns to see others as subjects in the way man sees himself as a subject, he is capable of entering the I-Thou relation.

An almost unintelligible comment is made by Eli Burkow of the Jewish Institute of Religion when he says that "Martin Buber is forever acrobatic enough to leap over, or squeeze behind, the weighty intellectual formula."[44] One is made to wonder if Mr. Burkow is able to see Dr. Buber at all as he "dances" among the issues.

Joseph Blau comes to the heart of it when he comments on Mamre. Essays in Religion by Buber. Blau states "Between man and man the relationship should be bi-subjective; but another man can be, and often, in our daily life, is, transformed from a Thou to an it."[45] "There is no evil in itself," states Blau, "There is only a 'so-called evil', a 'directionless power' which can become real evil only if it is chosen by individual human beings."[46]

Gershom Scholem took to task the man Buber for what Scholem regarded as a misrepresentation of Hasidism. "Although a keen student of Hasidic literature. . . He combines quotations as suits his purpose." In this manner, Buber presents the Hasidic movement "as

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[44]Eli Burkow, "Buber and Hasidism," Commentary, February 1963, p. 161.

[45]Joseph L. Blau, review of Mamre. Essays in Religion, by Martin Buber, in Jewish Social Studies, 13 April 1956, p. 398.

[46]Ibid., p. 399.

a spiritual phenomenon and not as a historical one."[47] Scholem says he ignores the material which does not interest him and interprets what he does choose to his own liking.[48] Hasidim did not demand a joy in the "here and now," as Buber suggests. It was what was hidden in the here and now. The Hasidic dicta expresses quite a different mood.

> They do not teach us to enjoy life as it is; rather they do advise-nay enjoin-man to extract, I may even say distill, the perpetual life of God out of life as it is. It is not the fleeting Here and Now that is to be enjoyed but the everlasting unity and presence of Transcendence.[49]

In fact, Scholem says, "Too much is left out in his presentation of Hasidism, while what has been included is overloaded with highly personal speculations."[50]

In contrast, Louis Newman says that Buber "has proved the outstanding evangel of the mysticism and ethico-religious literature of the remarkable east European movement known as Hasidism."[51]

Aubrey Hodes provides what he chooses to call An Intimate Portrait of Martin Buber. Among the instances related by Hodes is

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[47]Gershom Scholem, "Martin Buber's Hasidism," Commentary, August 1961, p. 306.

[48]Ibid., p. 306.

[49]Ibid., p. 312.

[50]Ibid., p. 316.

[51]Louis I. Newman, "Book Reviews," Jewish Social Studies, 2 October 1962, p. 142.

a gathering in a house in Tel Aviv. Here Buber said "the basic evil of our time" is the "separation between our awareness that the eternal values were still valid and our desire to obtain a temporary advantage."[52]

An excellent contribution to the influence upon Buber is found in Claude Tresmontant's book entitled A Study of Hebrew Thought.

> It is characteristic of Hebrew thought, as opposed to Greek and Western thought, that it is not troubled by Negative ideas of nothingness and disorder. Hebrew thought is not haunted by the idea of an original void that should be there 'by rights' and that has to be overcome, or of a disorder, a chaos, that has to be mastered, because its threatening presence might undermine reality. In the beginning stands, not void, but Him whose name is: I am, YHVH. . . .[53]

Maurice Friedman discussed at length the problem of evil in Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. "Buber's system of valuing is so closely connected with the problem of evil that this problem can be used as a unifying centre for his work without doing injustice to the many different fields in which he has written."[54] He saw value for Buber as nothing more or less than the decision as to what is good and evil and the attitude one takes toward avoiding or transforming evil.[55]

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[52]Aubrey Hodes, Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait (New York: The Viking Press), p. 31.

[53]Claude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, trans. Michael Francis Gibson (New York: Desclee, 1960), p. 48.

[54]Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 12.

[55]Ibid., p. 11.

> Traditionally, the problem of evil has been limited to the fields of metaphysics and theology. In our use of it it must be broadened to include other important phases of human life--philosophical anthropology, ethics, psychology, social philosophy, and even politics. This does not mean a change in the problem itself so much as a shift of emphasis and a greater concern with its concrete applications in the modern world.[56]

Friedman identified four types of evil of which the modern age is particularily aware:

> The loneliness of modern man before an unfriendly universe and before men whom he associates with but does not meet; the increasing tendency for scientific instruments and techniques to outrun man's ability to integrate those techniques into his life in some meaningful and constructive way; the inner duality of which modern man has become aware through the writings of Dostoevsky and Freud and the development of psychoanalysis; and the deliberate and large-scale degradation of human life within the totalitarian state.[57]

Friedman traces the change in Buber's attitude toward evil from a tendency to regard evil in largely negative terms to ascribe to it "greater and greater emotional and ontological reality." It was always between unreality and the radical reality of evil that his position has been found; he never considered evil an absolute.[58]

> For Buber as for the Baal-Shem, evil is no essence but a lack-the throne of the good, the 'shell' which surrounds and disguises the essence of things. Though negative, evil is real and must be redeemed through the wholeness and purity of man's being.[59]

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[56] Ibid., p. 12.

[57] Ibid., p. 13.

[58] Ibid., p. 14.

[59] Ibid., p. 30.

Friedman sees the essence of evil in the thought of Buber as the failure to direct one's inner power.[60] This direction which one may choose in bringing evil into good must be chosen in the realization of "divine freedom and unconditionality." This act of decision in its intensive stage is called Teshuvah (turning).[61] Buber never changed his belief in a redemption "which accepts all the evil of real life and transforms it into the good."[62]

Abraham Edel[63] in his review of Professor Friedman's book praises it as "a comprehensive exposition." The book, Edel says, brings out fundamental ideas "clearly and in considerable detail." He charges Friedman with not including what he calls a "critical evaluation." He would like to have seen a more critical treatment of Buber's approach to the problem of evil.[64]

Literature Related to Buber's Concept of Community

Literature related to Buber's view of Community is considerably less than that related to the individual. Two possible

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[60] Ibid., p. 32.

[61] Ibid., p. 33.

[62] Ibid., p. 39.

[63] Department of Philosophy, City College, New York.

[64] Abraham Edel, "The Curtain Around Us," review of Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, by Maurice Friedman, in Review, 1 September 1956, p. 183.

explanations may be offered for this, (1) It is possible to write and teach in such a way as to change the concepts an individual may have toward himself, and (2) Man may have lost confidence in his ability to change the larger Community.

Buber lived to see the experiment which he thought to be the ideal[65] begin to fade. William Miller in his review On Judaism by Buber said:

> To Buber as a Zionist, the creation of the state of Israel had as its aim far more than providing a haven for the victims of Hitlerism or of the Slavic pogroms. The only way to eradicate anti-Semitism, said Buber, is for the Jew to demonstrate a better way. . . . Buber was dismayed by the diminution of faith, by the 'terrifying' assimilation of Jewish nationhood into the 'wolf-pack' of predatory nations, for he saw the spirit of Israel as 'the spirit of realization' capable of setting a powerful and holy example to the world.[66]

This is not to suggest that Buber gave up hope, rather the opposite. He was, according to Miller, "a bearded sage who confronted the world in all its complexity, neither with tragic resignation nor facile optimism but with a tough temerity of an imperishable and illusionless hope."[67]

William Lynch, in his review of Arthur Cohen's book, Martin Buber thought that at least "Buber's genius can be used to help

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[65]Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: Beacon Press 1949), p. 149.

[66]William Robert Miller, "A Personalistic Philosophy of Hope," Saturday Review 51 (February 10, 1968):34.

[67]Ibid., p. 34.

'supernaturalists' to realize that salvation cannot be achieved save in relation to the human community."[68]

Reinhold Niebuhr saw a limitation in the thought of Buber: "his inability to comprehend the moral mediocrities of collective loyalties of races and nations." The idea that a Jewish homeland could be established "without creating enmity with the circumambient Arab world" was to Niebuhr a misjudgement. He saw Buber's "only error was to underestimate the ethnic core of all parochial communities, including the old and new nations."[69]

Jack Cohen in his review of Malcom Diamond's book, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist said:

> While it is true that Buber himself sees his philosophy as an integrated whole, many of us who admire his analysis of the human situation and his appeal for genuine community among men cannot square this appeal with his flights into the theological stratosphere.[70]

In reviewing the same book by Diamond, Gabriel Vahanian emphasizes that "it is Buber's conviction, as Mr. Diamond sums it up, that 'the ideal of Zion must not be subordinated' or accommodated to 'the political exigencies of a Jewish state'."[71]

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[68]William F. Lynch, America, March 22, 1958, p. 729.

[69]Reinhold Niebuhr, "Martin Buber: In Memoriam," Saturday Review 48 (July 24, 1965):37.

[70]Jack J. Cohen, Jewish Social Studies 23 (June 1964):129.

[71]Gabriel Vahanian, The Nation, July 2, 1960, p. 16.

In Paul Tillich's mind Buber did not believe the ideal existed in the world system but that the world should be hallowed, nevertheless.

> Religion, for Hasidism as well as for Buber, is consecration of the world. It is neither acceptance of the world as it is, nor a by-passing the world in the direction of a transcendent divine, but it is consecration in the double sense of seeing the divine spark in everything created and acting to realize the divine in everything.[72]

Tillich pointed out that Buber was always in a special position to Zionism because "He affirmed it as a messianic attempt to create Gemeinschaft, while he negated it as a political attempt to create a state." Tillich added that history seems to show that without the shell of a state, a community cannot exist.[73]

Ronald Smith says that Buber calls for true political activity which is man's turning to man "in the context of creation." This is man's responsibility and "cannot be evaded."[74] It is here intimated that even if man should not achieve it, his responsibility is the same. And it is just this responsibility that Buber sets forth in his concept of community.

V. V. Ramana Murti calls attention to the fact that even when Buber was engaged in political activity for the Zionist cause, he did not

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[72] Paul Tillich, "Martin Buber in Christian Thought," Commentary, June 1948, p. 519.

[73] Ibid., p. 521.

[74] Ronald Gregor Smith, "The Religion of Martin Buber," Theology Today 12 (July 1955):215.

join any political party. "He felt strongly that parties might lose their concern with 'ideas' and sacrifice them for political ends."[75]

An editorial in Time magazine calls attention to the fact that Buber was often in conflict with Israel's policies, including greater attempts to make peace with the Arabs. In March 1962, Ben-Gurion visited Buber and listened to his arguments against the death of Eichmann. "Society is merely a group of persons," argued Buber, "and when it kills one man, it kills a part of itself."[76]

Buber was not opposed to systems as John Steffney points out in his excellent work "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philosophical Anthropology."[77] He saw system as having value "as long as the systematic thinker realizes his position as a mode of abstracting. . . as long as he realizes that his system is always the substitution of an 'It' for a 'Thou'."[78]

What Buber opposed was the tendency to allow systems to dominate man. For instance, he saw the purpose of religious ritual "to create in man that life-giving presence of God." When this did not take place Buber saw it as not only worthless but dangerous.[79]

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[75]V. V. Ramana Murti, "Buber's Dialogue and Gandhi's Satyagraha," Journal of Historic Ideas 34 (October 1968):612.

[76]Time, March 23, 1962.

[77]Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):33-41.

[78]Ibid., p. 41.

[79]R. Grant, "Dialogue," Commentary, September 1966, p. 20.

It was this danger which caused Buber to oppose both the collectivist and authoritarian state in his social philosophy; it depersonalizes the individual. This concept is delineated in Potok's work on "Martin Buber and the Jews."[80]

Norman Cousins, who edits the Saturday Review, tells of an interview with Buber. In this question-answer period, Buber says that "the world's statesmen and political leaders" cannot be counted on "to define the problem and then meet it." They are too involved in the "give-and-take of national rivalries that the larger question of human destiny is overlooked."[81] He expressed what seemed almost despair:

> There is one hope, Professor Buber observed. It is for people to become aware. Nothing can be done without awareness. With it, anything is possible. If people know and think and feel, they can talk and act and give leadership to their leaders. . . . You must never stop thinking about it, never stop working for it, he said. Talk, write, act.[82]

This concept of present action is underscored by Friedman in his interpretation of Buber's concept of history. True history "can only be understood through our participation in it--through its becoming alive for us as Thou." This, Friedman says is because subject-object history "cannot adequately understand events because the I of the

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[80]Commentary, March 1966, p. 47.

[81]Norman Cousins, "Talk, Write, Act," The Saturday Review 40 (March 23, 1957):20.

[82]Ibid., p. 20.

historian is that of the disinterested spectator" while the persons of whom he writes are "usually treated as It's rather than Thou's."[83]

In his "Personal Freedom and Community Responsibility" Charles McCarthy represents Buber's concept of community "not so much from the effort of individuals to meet one another as persons, as from their effort to enter into a meaningful relationship with the living, self-giving God."[84] As commendable as the effort is, Mr. McCarthy has placed a wrong balance on the matter of community. It is just through such human relationships that one follows the extended lines to where the eternal Thou intersects all human relationships. Buber emphasizes that the longing for relation is primary; true community, however, is built upon the dual concept of man's relation to each other member of the community plus all members' relationship to a living center. The relation of the center does not of itself produce community.

Friedman, in his Life of Dialogue, has set forth an interpretation of Buber's concept of community.

> Buber has defined evil as the predominance of the world of It to the exclusion of relation, and he has conceived of the redemption of evil as taking place in the primal movement

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[83]Maurice Friedman, "Symbol, Myth, and History in the Thought of Martin Buber," The Journal of Religion 34 (January 1954):9-10.

[84]The Catholic World, p. 167.

> of the turning which brings man back to God and back to solidarity of relation with man and the world.[85]

It is the entering into relationship "that makes man really man;" it is the failure to enter this relationship which constitutes evil. "Thus at the heart of Buber's philosophy the problem of evil and the problem of man merge into one."[86] Our belief in the external world comes from our relation to others.[87] It is only "when I step into elemental relationship with the other that the other becomes present for me. This Buber calls personale Vergegenwartigung or the "making present the person of the other."[88]

Friedman also distinguishes the divergence of thought between Buber's social and political principles. The former relates to the dialogical while the later means "the necessary and ordered realm of the world of It."[89]

In evaluating the work Society and Solitude by Nicholas Berdyaev, Friedman points out that Berdyaev has incorporated the I-Thou philosophy but without a clear understanding of Buber's concept of the "between." This lack of understanding leads to a lack of

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[85]Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 76.

[86]Ibid., p. 101.

[87]Ibid., p. 164.

[88]Ibid., p. 171.

[89]Ibid., p. 210.

emphasis on the relation of man to man in the true community.[90] He charges the same error to Gogarten in his work Ich Glaube an den dreieinigen Gott for he makes reality within individuals rather than between them.[91]

Other works which do not involve directly the total concepts of Buber in the idea of community but which would contribute to the readers' understanding of modern attempts to apply the community concepts include the following works.

Finding Community by W. Ron Jones[92] proposes (and carried the thesis forward in a commendable manner) to help the student understand how well existing institutions serve the needs of the people.

Strategies of Community Organization edited by Fred Cox and others[93] is a book of readings, some of which touch on the fringes of the true community concept. It's value rests in supplying the necessary organizational "shell" which Buber allows while at the same time affords helpful contrasts to the nature in which true community must arise.

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[90]Ibid., p. 271.

[91]Ibid., p. 273.

[92]A Guide to Community Research and Action, (Palo Alto California: James Freel and Associates, 1971).

[93]A Book of Readings, (Itasca, Ill.: Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1970).

Two other texts include The New Community Organization[94] and The Community in America.[95] Both provide insights into present ways in which community theory is being applied and furnish a back drop of activity for the social and political theory of Buber.

Literature Related to Buber's Educational Theory

"Education means a 'conscious and willed' selection by man of the effective world.'"[96] The most essential act for the teacher is that he "experience the pupil from the other side."

> If this experiencing is quite real and concrete, it removes the danger that the teacher's will to educate will degenerate into arbitrariness. This 'inclusiveness' is of the essence of the dialogical relation, for the teacher sees the position of the other in his concrete actuality yet does not lose sight of his own.[97]

Friedman points out that the old authoritarian theory of education "does not understand the need for freedom and spontaneity." However, the new "freedom-centered educational theory misunderstands the meaning of freedom." Freedom is indispensable to education but is "not in itself sufficient." One must understand that

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[94]Arthur Dunham, The New Community Organization (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970).

[95]Roland Leslie Warren, The Community in America, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963).

[96]Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 176.

[97]Ibid., p. 177.

the "opposite of compulsion is not freedom but communion."[98]

> Just what this attitude toward the education of character means in practice is best shown by Buber's own application of it to adult education. He conceives of adult education not as an extension of the professional training of the universities but as a means of creating a certain type of man demanded by a certain historical situation.[99]

Buber is rightly interpreted by Friedman when it is pointed out that a child must "find for himself his own world." It is not ready-made for him.

> The fact that he can realize what is over against him as Thou is based on the a priori of relation, that is, the potentiality of relation which exists between him and the world. Through this meeting with the Thou he gradually becomes I.[100]

Having discovered himself, the child then must begin the process of selecting his effective world. His inner powers must be guided toward the selection of the right path. It is "just this failure to direct one's inner power which is the inmost essence of evil."[101]

Zeigler says "Buber holds that truth is a matter not of appropriation. . . but of participation or sharing in being."[102] This concept of the between is seen by Zeigler as Buber's attempt to find

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[98]Ibid., p. 178.

[99]Ibid., p. 182.

[100]Ibid., p. 60.

[101]Ibid., p. 32.

[102]Leslie Zeigler, "Personal Existence: A Study of Buber and Kierkegaard," Journal of Religion 40 (April 1960):89.

a "genuine third alternative between individualism and collectivism."[103]

> There is no room in his view for personal knowledge, that is, knowledge attained in personal encounter or relation. Buber does not grant that one may know another person in direct relation to him without "possessing" him or making him into an object. His I-Thou relation upon which the philosophy of dialogue is built does not give us knowledge of that to which we become related. We can only meet that which remains undisclosed. Knowledge is reserved for the realm of I-It. Ironically, it is that for which Buber's philosophy is perhaps most widely acclaimed--the direct knowledge of persons attained by personal encounter--that his philosophy denies.[104]

Helen James John in "Eichmann and Buber: A message of responsibility" said:

> The message that truly human existence finds its roots only in responsibility in the deepest sense of that word--the response of man, in all the situations of his life, to the claim laid upon him by his fellow man, by the Truth which confronts him, and by God.[105]

Van Meter Ames calls attention to the Educational Philosophy of Buber by saying

> Buber learned wisdom from Hasidism. . . drawing strength from brotherly sharing, from the creative relation between leaders and others, in which each became his brother's keeper without relieving anyone of responsibility for himself or for others. The individual became authentically a person in dealing with his neighbor, the community, and the natural environment in the daily round.[106]

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[103] Ibid., p. 91.

[104] Ibid., p. 93.

[105] The Commonweal, July 6, 1962, p. 374.

[106] Van Meter Ames, "Buber and Mead," Antioch Review 27 (Summer 1967):183.

Carolyn Shaffer identified the goal of education in Buber's thought as "the achievement of an intimate relationship with God." This is the goal of life and although it is a religious one, it is reached by a secular path; that path is the affirmation of the whole of reality of earthly being. "But one is called upon not only to affirm the natural world but also to transform it and offer it up to God."[107]

Helen Wodehouse in her "Threefold Work of Martin Buber" said:

> Martin Buber has been pre-eminently a teacher. He has never set easy tasks to his unspecialized readers; he has required their full attention; but, without compromise, he has done his best to enable them to read with understanding. . . . When he returns repeatedly to the same subject, one can feel working the double motive of the teacher: 'Try looking at it this way' and 'I believe that now I have seen it better and can make it clearer.'[108]

Wodehouse calls attention to the statement of Dr. Greta Hort in her introduction to Mamre: "We have 'Professoren und Pastoren' but few 'Lehrer.'"[109]

Donald Moore called attention to the concept that "Buber believed that no path was unalterably defined." When in 1948 the fighting and its outcome blocked his plan for a solution, he accepted

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[107]Carolyn R. Shaffer, "A Jewish View of Redemption," The Commonweal, August 22, 1969, p. 513.

[108]Helen Wodehouse, "The Threefold Work of Martin Buber," The Fortnightly 173 (May 1950):331.

[109]Ibid., p. 331.

the new state as a fact of history and looked to other possibilities.[110] Perhaps no other incident could better illustrate the consistency of his educational philosophy.

Roland Gittelsohn, in his article "Hosannas from a Hallowed Few" summed up three tenents in Hasidism which drew Buber to it. In these, Gittelsohn sees the outline of Buber's philosophy including his philosophy of life and education.

> First, its experiential quality--the fact that it. . . 'is not a category of teaching, but one of life. . . .' Second, Buber likes the fact that the fait of the Hasidim encompassed the whole of life. . . . The third magnet attracting Buber to Hasidism is its approval of the simple man.[111]

Norman Mailer cites "The Story of the Cape"[112] and then points out that the "existential premise is that we learn only from situations in which the end is unknown." Said in another way: "man learns more about the nature of water by jumping into the surf than by riding a boat."[113]

John Steffney in "Heidegger and Buber: Ontology and Philosophical Anthropology" says

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[110]Donald J. Moore, "Martin Buber: Friend of the Court," America, February 27, 1971, p. 232.

[111]Roland B. Gittelsohn, "Hosannas from a Hallowed Few," Saturday Review 43 (June 4, 1960):16.

[112]Martin Buber, Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters, trans. Olga Marx (New York: Shocken Books, 1947), p. 268.

[113]Norman Mailer, "Response and Reactions," Commentary, June 1963, p. 518.

> Buber is forever reminding us of the risks of existence. . . but he also places emphasis on a reasonable amount of certitude that allows man to continue walking the narrow ridge. . .If there were no certitude at all, there would be no meaning to life. . .But because of meaning. . .we can exist in a state of hope for more of that which is meaningful. [114]

Buber's emphasis, Steffney says, is not on "fundamental ontology" (the structure of man's being) or on the broader sense of Ontology (The Structure of Being), "but rather on the meaning and hope that arises out of human existence, that develop out of the inter-human. "[115]

On the matter of responsibility Vogel poses the question "Responsibility for what?" Buber provides one and only one answer, "one has the responsibility for responding. "[116]

Summary

Much of the literature concerning Martin Buber deals with him as total man with few works concentrating upon his philosophy apart from other areas on which he has written or spoken. There is a strong emphasis on the matter of personal relationship, possibly influenced by the most acclaimed of his works I and Thou. For Buber,

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[114] John Steffney, Heidegger and Buber, "Ontology and Philosophical Anthropology, " Religion in Life 43 (Spring 1974):37.

[115] Ibid., p. 38.

[116] Manfred Vogel, "The Concept of Responsibility in the Thought of Martin Buber, " Harvard Theological Review 63 (April 1970):163-4.

the concept of community was of equal importance for this was the end toward which the matter of personal relation was to lead. One cannot understand the educational philosophy of the man unless it is realized that education was to have as its goal not only the development of the individual but through this medium also the development of true community.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY

The Problem of Evil

Jean-Paul Sartre polarized the world into good and evil, only to discover that those poles were slipperty to a degree that excluded stability.[1] He found it difficult to sort the world into the fixed categories of good and evil.[2] The search for a clear distinction between good and evil is not an easy one, even for the philosopher.

Martin Buber did not view good and evil as two structurally similar qualities located at opposite poles, but "two qualities of totally different structure."[3]

Frederick Von Schlegel, a German philosopher of the nineteenth century, wrote "Man is placed in this world on his trial and for a struggle with evil" and that if evil were to be destroyed, "the living

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[1]Joseph H. McMahon, Human Beings: The World of Jean-Paul Sartre (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 237.

[2]Ibid., p. 272.

[3]Martin Buber, Good and Evil (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 64.

development of nature" would be "cut short."[4] He saw evil as necessary in order to provide man a proving ground or arena in which he could develop. Buber saw evil in the world as being latent in the nature of things. Thus, the knowledge of good and evil is nothing more than the "cognizance of the opposites" which include "the fortune and misfortune or the order and the disorder which is experienced by a person, as well as that which he causes."[5]

The Russian philosopher, Nicolas Berdyaev, held that the positive meaning of evil lies "solely in the enrichment of life brought about by the heroic struggle against it and the victory over it."[6] Sigmund Freud saw the negative element by which "there are present in all men destructive. . . trends and in a great number of people these are strong enough to determine their behavior in human society."[7] Bertrand Russell said in "The Elements of Ethics," "I can discover no self-evident proposition as to the goodness or badness

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[4]Frederick Von Schlegel, The Philosophy of Life, trans. A. J. W. Morrison (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covenant Garden, 1847), p. 130.

[5]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 73.

[6]Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, quoted in The Nature of Man, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 282-3.

[7]Sigmund Freud, quoted in The Nature of Man, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 242.

of all that exists or has existed or will exist."[8] He continues by pointing out that "pain and hatred and envy and cruelty are surely things that exist, and are not merely the absence of their opposites."[9] Spinoza saw evil as only those things which hinder man from perfecting his reason and from enjoying a rational life.[10] Teilhard de Chardin thought it possible that "evil may go on growing alongside good, and it too may attain its paroxysm at the end in some specifically new form."[11]

Chardin identifies the hierarchy of evil in the following manner: "To begin with we find physical lack-of-arrangement on the material level; then suffering. . . then, on a still higher level, wickedness and torture of spirit as it analyses itself and makes choices."[12]

Buber saw that the recognition of opposites was a recognition of good and evil. Evil exists in the world only in so far as man knows about himself. That which is in the world which man gives the name evil is according to Buber, a "mirrored illusion."[13] Chardin pointed

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[8]Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 22.

[9]Ibid., p. 23.

[10]Joseph Ratner, ed. The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: The Modern Library, 1927), p. 287.

[11]Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 288.

[12]Ibid., p. 310.

[13]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 88.

out that there are no summits with abysses.[14]

Evil and The Individual

The Two-Fold Nature of Evil

There are two fundamental types of evil in the thought of Buber: (1) Evil from indecision, and (2) evil from decision. These two "apparently mutually exclusive aspects" show evil as an occurrence and evil as a deed. Together they reveal the constitution of evil because they are supplementary to one another rather than contradictory. However, they are not supplementary to each other as two sides of an object but as "two stages or steps of a process."[15]

Evil is not confined to action. Action is only the "type of evil happening which makes evil manifest." Such action does not stem primarily from decision but rather from indecision. Man can do good with his total being but evil cannot be done with the whole being. Evil is a lack of direction and that which is done in it and out of it "as the grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, exploiting, humiliating, torturing and destroying of what offers itself."[16]

Imagination and Evil

Evil as it reveals itself in man is the product of man's

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[14] Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 288.

[15] Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 119-20.

[16] Ibid., p. 130.

imagination. This is not the same as saying that imagination is evil, it is rather to emphasize that the product of man's imagination is evil. Man imagines that which is not and calls it real; he plays with possibility and this possibility provides the ground-work from which self-temptation and violence springs.[17]

It is not evil because it is imagined but, rather, it is evil because it takes the place of the real. The imagery does not spring from decision but is fabricated and devised. "Thus, from divine reality, which was allotted to him," Buber says "he is driven out into the boundless possible, which he fills with his imaging, that is evil because it is fictitious."[18]

However, it should not be supposed that imagination must be or is entirely evil. Man does have the power to imagine the real, to grasp the truth which is hidden behind the curtain or which is latent in a painting yet unpainted. Imagination may be both evil and good for out of indecision man does have the power to decide and from the midst of a boundless imagination one can imagine that which is real. "Straying and caprice are not innate in man" according to Buber, for in spite of the burdens of past generations man "always begins anew as a person."[19]

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[17]Ibid., p. 91.

[18]Ibid., pp. 91-2.

[19]Ibid., p. 93.

The Evil Urge

There are two urges in man: (1) goodness and (2) evil. These two urges are present from the nature of his creation and can accomplish their best service for man only through genuine collaboration. The evil urge is "no less necessary than its companion," for without it man would "beget no children, build no houses, engage in no economic activity."[20]

The evil urge finds its great value and strongest expression in the motivation of the individual. Man's rivalry with his neighbor produces economic activity which is necessary but it is not necessary that economic activity be evil. Only through man, who alone of all earthly beings has the power of imagination, did the urge (which is called the evil urge) become evil.

> It became so, and continually becomes so, because man separates it from its companion and in this condition of independence makes an idol of precisely that which was intended to serve him. Man's task, therefore, is not to extirpate the evil urge, but to reunite it with the good.[21]

Evil and the Separation of Urges

Buber sees evil as it arises in the individual a result of the separation of the two urges. This separation has created a fragmentation within the individual so that he tends to act in part, rather than

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[20]Ibid., p. 94.

[21]Ibid., p. 95.

as a whole. All evil done by man is accomplished with only a part of man's being.[22] Good can be done with the whole being because man does have the capacity to pull together both urges into a single urge and become whole. In this state he is capable of decision; he is capable of "great love and great service."[23]

It is important to bear in mind that Buber does not conceive of the evil and good urges as two diametrically opposite forces. The evil urge must be recognized as passion, "without which he can neither beget nor bring forth," but which, if left to itself, remains without direction and leads astray. The good urge should be regarded as "pure direction" which leads a man toward God. When these two are united, the passion is then given direction. In no other way can man become whole.[24]

Unification vs. Evil

When Buber spoke of the unification of the soul it must be understood that he spoke not of some spiritual element within man but of the total man. He emphasized this by the following statement: "What is meant by unification of the soul would be thoroughly misunderstood if 'soul' were taken to mean anything but the whole man, body and

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[22]Ibid., p. 130.

[23]Ibid., p. 97.

[24]Ibid., p. 97.

spirit together."[25]

What is the purpose of this unification? Certainly not for one's self alone. In the thought of Buber one may "begin with oneself but not to end with oneself; to start from oneself, but not to aim at oneself; to comprehend oneself, but not to be preoccupied with oneself."[26]

Evil and The Two Worlds of Man

The purpose of the unification of the individual is the unification of the world.[27] Man lives in two worlds, the world of relation and the world of experience. He experiences the It world and enters into relation with the Thou world. Evil does not rest in the fact that an It-World exists, but in that man tends to treat everything as an It. "Without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human."[28] The basic word I-It does not come from evil; it becomes evil when man "lets it have its way."[29]

Man cannot and should not attempt to dispense with the

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[25]Martin Buber, The Way of Man According to the Teaching of Hasidism (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1966), p. 25.

[26]Ibid., pp. 31-2.

[27]Ibid., p. 40.

[28]Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 85.

[29]Ibid., pp. 95-6.

It-World. His will to profit and power are legitimate and natural. The drive becomes evil only when it detaches itself from the "will to human relations." At that point such drive becomes evil.[30]

Man creates evil in the It-World by learning to treat himself as an It. He ceases to speak of himself as a person. Rather he speaks "on his own behalf." He is no longer an I. "The I spoken and written by him is the required subject of the sentences that convey his statements and orders--no more and no less."[31]

Evil as failure to Become

When man becomes completely identified with the It-World he fails to fulfill the purpose for which he was created. The task of every man, according to the hasidic teaching which influenced the life of Martin Buber, is to "affirm for God's sake the world and himself and by this very means to transform both."[32] It is seen that although Buber teaches that one should not "aim at himself" his teaching is certainly not one of self-negation.

> There is something that can only be found in one place. It is a great treasure, which may be called the fulfillment of existence. The place where this treasure can be found is the place on which one stands.[33]

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[30]Ibid., p. 97.

[31]Ibid., p. 118.

[32]Buber, Way of Man, p. 6.

[33]Ibid., p. 37.

Buber suggests that man should not deny either the world or himself; his mission is to fulfill both. The It-World is evil only to the man who is bound to and by it. The It-World is not evil to the man who is free to step out of it again and again.[34] Every man's task is "the actualization of his unique, unprescendented and never-recuring potentialities, and not the repetition of something that another. . . has achieved."[35]

Evil from Indecision

In order for man to accomplish this given task he must decide. Indecision is the basic evil; to half-decide is to not decide at all. "If there were a devil he would not be the one who decided against God but he that in all eternity did not decide."[36] Doubt is failure to choose, it is "unchoice, indecision. Out of it arises evil."[37]

It is not sufficient, however, to decide. One must decide for something, for reality. These urges are per definitionem "directed toward something; but lack of direction is characteristic of the vortex revolving within itself."[38] Fantasy is evil because it distracts from divinely given reality and "plays with potentialities" so as to impose

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[34]Buber, I and Thou, p. 100.

[35]Buber, Way of Man, p. 16.

[36]Buber, I and Thou, p. 101.

[37]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 104.

[38]Ibid., p. 126.

"the form of indefiniteness upon the definiteness of the moment." Thus, the substantial "threatens to be submerged in the potential."[39]

"To unite the two urges" Buber said, is "to equip the absolute potency of passion with the one direction that renders it capable of great love and of great service." In this uniting, and in no other way, can man become whole.[40]

Decision suggests the choosing of a path rather than a point. The act of deciding is the choosing of the direction "toward the point of being at which. . .I encounter the divine mystery of my created uniqueness."[41] Buber is constantly concerned with direction. With his whole being one may choose the path "for there is only one." The other is a "setting out upon no path, pseudo-decision which is indecision, flight into delusion and ultimately into mania."[42]

> Man repeatedly experiences the dimension of evil as indecision. The occurrences in which he experiences it, however, do not remain in his self-knowledge a series of isolated moments of non-decision. . .in self-knowledge these moments merge into a course of indecision, as it were a fixation in it.[43]

Failure to choose the right path is expressed as evil in the thought of Buber. Whereas a person can only truly choose the one

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[39]Ibid., pp. 125-6.

[40]Ibid., p. 97.

[41]Ibid., p. 142.

[42]Ibid., p. 128.

[43]Ibid., p. 134.

path, he may by a series of non-decisive moments develop a course of indecision to the extent that the choosing of "the path" becomes increasingly difficult. The selection of "the path" is not a choice between left and right but "the vortex of chaos and the spirit hovering above it."[44] If a man chooses the way of the spirit, he chooses the way of relationship which leads to the Thou who is the "wholly Other."[45] Conversely, indecision begins a chain or path which begins with action apart from deciding.

Evil from Choice

> In the first stage man does not choose, he merely acts; in the second he chooses himself, in the sense of his being-constituted-thus or having become-thus. The first stage does not yet contain a "radical evil;" whatever misdeeds are committed, their commission is not a doing of the deed but a sliding into it. In the second stage evil grows radical, because what man finds in himself is willed. . ."[46]

At this point man finds himself doing what is evil out of choice, albeit not with his whole soul. It is a path which leads into a confirmation of evil. "Intensification and confirmation of indecision is decision to evil."[47] It is not a process a man can break at any point he desires, but may find that at the critical moment the control has been

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[44]Ibid., p. 128.

[45]Buber, I and Thou, p. 79.

[46]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 140.

[47]Ibid., p. 88.

withdrawn from him.[48]

Discovering Evil

Buber distinguishes between a state of the soul in which it proposes good and one in which it does not. The contrast is not between a good and a bad disposition, but "between a disposition to do good and its absence."[49]

Good and evil (what Buber refers to as the yes and no positions) can never be coexistent in man although the knowledge of these positions may be within his cognizance.[50]

> He knows oppositeness only by his situation within it; and that means defacto (since the yes can present itself to the experience and perception of man in the no-position, but not the no in the yes-position).[51]

"At this point the process of the human soul becomes a process in the world;"[52] the opposites which are latent in the soul break out into reality and become existent.[53] A man knows factually what is evil only as he discovers himself, and about himself. "Self-perception

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[48]Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith: A Study of the Interpretation of Judaism and Christianity, trans. Norman Goldhawk (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 84.

[49]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 87.

[50]Ibid., p. 75.

[51]Ibid., p. 75.

[52]Ibid., p. 76.

[53]Ibid., p. 76.

and self-relationship are peculiarly human."[54]

"The lie is the specific evil which man has introduced into nature. . . the lie is our very own invention, different in kind from every deceit that the animals can produce."[55] The lie was possible only after man came on the world scene. Only when man became capable of conceiving the truth was a lie possible. Man alone is able to place what is false into the understanding of his fellow and convince him that it is truth. Man is able to recognize the lie only after he has come to perceive truth.

The Task of Self-Unification

How does one extract himself from the whirling chaos and begin to choose the path of relationship? Buber does not present a simple method by which one may select white or black, right or left. The soul has the option of "clutching at any object, past which the vortex happens to carry it, and cast its passion upon it" and so begin a path of no-choice. Or, the soul can "in response to a prompting that is still incomprehensible to itself" set out on the "audacious work" of self-unification.[56]

> In the former case, it exchanges an undirected possibility for an undirected reality, in which it does what it wills not

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[54]Ibid., p. 88.

[55]Ibid., p. 7.

[56]Ibid., p. 127.

> to do, what is preposterous to it, the alien, the "evil;" in the later, if the work meets with success the soul has given up undirected plenitude in favor of the one taut string, the one stretched beam of direction. If the work is not successful. . . it becomes aware of direction, becomes aware of itself as sent in quest of it.[57]

Summary

Evil arises in the individual primarily from indecision. This lack of decision results in imagining the unreal, causing man to aim at what is not. In his aiming for the unreal, man falls prey to error of many kinds for he reaches for that which is convenient rather than for a willed path. The primary task of man is to decide. In order to do this he must unite the evil urge with the good, for decision can be made only with the total being.

Evil and the Community

Martin Buber believed that society needed to undergo a drastic renewal. Like man, society also has purpose. "The people is not a sum of individuals addressed by God, it is something existent beyond that, something essential and irreplaceable, and answerable to Him as such. . ."[58]

Buber saw purpose in the human race as well as in the

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[57] Ibid., p. 127.

[58] Martin Buber, "The Dialogue Between Heaven and Earth," At the Turning: Three Addresses on Judaism (New York: Farr, Straus and Young, 1952), p. 196.

individual. This was not a purpose arrived at by educated construction but a purpose discovered. Society cannot determine a purpose or goal and thereby set out on the proper path. "There is a purpose to creation: there is a purpose to the human race, one we have not made up ourselves, or agreed to among ourselves. . ."[59] There is a strong sense of awareness in the thought of Buber that the individual cannot completely fulfill his goal apart from society. "Throw yourself into the surging waves, reach for and grasp hands, lift, help, lead, authenticate spirit and alliance" Buber wrote, and "make the crowd no longer a crowd."[60]

To become man, man must be man in relation to society. One of the basic evils in society is that man comes under the domination of the multitude. That society is degenerate that permits the individual to come into servitude to the many, no matter how or under what name that servitude is conceived.[61]

The Need for Social Reconstruction

Man often seeks the security of the crowd, thinking that this is the path of confirmation. The collective recognizes him as a member of a given society and gives him a place recognition. This way is as

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[59]Martin Buber, Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), p. 186.

[60]Martin Buber, Pointing the Way: Collected Essays, trans. Maurice S. Friedman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 111.

[61]Ibid., p. 57.

false as that of self-confirmation.[62]

This is not to say that socialism must, of necessity, be a failure: it is to say, that by and large, it has failed. It has blundered into a blind alley from which it can emerge only through genuine renewal of the spirit of community.[63] Man must be willing to investigate the possibility of a Utopia, to help unfold the possibilities latent in mankind's communal life.[64]

> We cannot and do not want to go back to primitive agrarian communism or to the corporate state of the Middle Ages. We must. . . out of the recalcitrant materials of our own day in history, fashion a true community.[65]

There is in Utopian Socialism, an organically constructive and purposive element which has as its aim the "restructuring of society" beginning here and now.[66] Buber had serious doubts whether the old "community-forms" could ever be capable of necessary renewal; he warned that any new forms must of necessity be marked by a "combination of freedom and order" if they are to become true communities.[67] He saw that when a culture was no longer experiencing a continually renewed relational process "it freezes into the It-world"

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[62]Ibid., p. 225.

[63]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 6.

[64]Ibid., p. 8.

[65]Ibid., p. 16.

[66]Ibid., p. 16.

[67]Ibid., p. 37.

and from that time on becomes oppressive to the individual, and moves steadily toward its own doom.[68]

Separation of Social Units as Evil

Buber endorsed a community built upon relationship but drew a contrast with this and the "amassing of human units" which have no relation to one another. He sees this evil of separation of social units as growing out of the basic problem of man's own failure to enter into relationship with his fellow man.[69] In fact, the ultimate renewal of society, if it should indeed occur, will have its beginning in the renewal of the relation of man with his fellow man and, ultimately, making a response to his You.[70]

It is this isolation of man which prevents the renewal of society. Man severs the I from the I-Thou relation and moves away from the realm of the spirit. Communication between man and man is broken; man finds himself "wallowing in the Capital letter" to his own shame and to the shame of the world spirit.[71]

Because man learns to walk as a severed I, he falls prey to the oppressions of society at every turn. Social leaders see individual members as consumers for produce, digits for service that are to be

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[68]Buber, I and Thou, p. 103.

[69]Ibid., p. 155.

[70]Ibid., p. 104.

[71]Ibid., p. 115.

calculated and used according to their assigned duties or estimated value.[72]

Evil of Institutionalization

Institutionalization of society is a symptom of its illness. Men form institutions to prove they are not, in fact, a mass of severed I's. What they form becomes the severed It of institution rather than a real community of relation.[73]

An institution may have its beginning in true community but, all too soon, the shell is hardened. Man is then identified as belonging. He is identified and controlled by the severed institution. What the institution says he is, he accepts, and society endorses. This imprisonment into institutions is a gross evil and a deterent to the building of true community.[74] The institution takes the controls and acts in the most despotic manner. But, man thinks he is in control. This deception is evil.[75]

Institutionalization of religion is seen by Buber as a barrier to true relation with the eternal Thou.

> Centralization and codification undertaken in the interest of religion, are a danger to the core of religion, unless there

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[72]Ibid., p. 96.

[73]Ibid., p. 93.

[74]Ibid., p. 109.

[75]Ibid., p. 97.

> is the strongest life of faith, embodied in the whole existence of the community, and not relaxing in its renewing activity.[76]

Buber saw Hasidism as "the one great attempt in the history of the Dispora to make a reality of the original choice and to found a true and just community."[77] Although he was influenced by the Hassidic Movement he acknowledged that it, too, had failed. Among the reasons for this failure was that "it did not aim for the independence, for the self-determination of the people."[78]

Society is also ill because it constantly endeavors to transfer the commands and prohibitions it considers important from the sphere of religion to morals. It seeks support for these items through public opinion and general consent; such things can be, to some degree, controlled and manipulated. These moral standards become laws and are thus translated into the language of It. What once began as a relation to the eternal Thou now becomes institutionalized and tends to prevent a return to the original relation.[79] The eternal You, which cannot in truth ever become an It, is nevertheless transferred "ever again from You to an It."[80]

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[76]Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1949), p. 170.

[77]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 159.

[78]Ibid., p. 159.

[79]Ibid., pp. 86-7.

[80]Buber, I and Thou, pp. 160-1.

Amalgamation of Social Units as Evil

Buber saw the tendency of the small communes to merge into a higher social order as a social evil.

> In the monstrous confusion of modern life. . . the individual clings desperately to the collectivity. The little society in which he was imbedded cannot help him; only the great collectivities, so he thinks can do that, and he is all too willing to let himself be deprived of personal responsibility: he only wants to obey. And the most valuable of all goods--the life between man and man--gets lost in the process.[81]

At this point the personal human being ceases to be a living member of a society and becomes a cog in the collective machine. The autonomous relationships no longer have meaning; "personal relationships wither, and the very spirit of man hires itself out as a functionary."[82] This, he thought, was demonstrated by the Russian style of village society. "Only by means of a general revolt can the isolation of the Russian Village Community be broken."[83] "What I complain of in Lenin," he wrote, "is rather his failure to understand that a fundamental centralism is incompatible" with the power and freedom of the people.[84]

Central Authority as Evil

The central question, as Buber saw it, was: who should be

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[81]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 132.

[82]Ibid., p. 132.

[83]Ibid., p. 93.

[84]Ibid., p. 110.

the owner of the social means of production? Is the essential authority to be the state? This, Buber thought to be contrary to the nature of a true community. He prefered the state to "discharge the functions of adjustment and administration only." This would reduce its power to its proper function, which, as he saw it, was to maintain unity.[85] The state must be prevented from becoming an evil, devouring thing if a society is to be established with the necessary elements of true community.

Nature of True Community

Capitalist society is no less deficient in structure than the Russian-style collective. The evidence of genuine community, and therefore of genuine humanity, is lacking. "And that is not some fortuitous and avoidable deviation, but is given with the system and is an inescapable consequence of it."[86]

Buber did not see economics as the primary element in a society. He applauded Hess for his support of a socialism "based not only on economic and technical state of development alone but also on that of the spirit."[87]

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[85]Ibid., p. 145.

[86]Beek and Weiland, Martin Buber: Personalist and Prophet, p. 100.

[87]Martin Buber, Israel and Palestine: The History of an Idea, trans. Stanley Godman (London: East and West Library, 1952), p. 112.

True socialism "can never be anything absolute." It is designed to be freedom itself and is to be

> the continual becoming of human community in mankind, adapted and proportioned to whatever can be willed and done in the conditions given. The rigidity of Russian Communism threatens all such realization and is a negation of real freedom.[88]

True nationalism should not be antagonistic to the community ideal. It becomes evil only if it makes the nation as end in itself.[89] The spirit of nationalism can be consistent with true community but nationalism "turned false" eats at the marrow of society.[90] Any group which isolates itself ceases to be fruitful and becomes socially evil.

Like nationalism, producer and consumer cooperatives fail in the attempt to become true community because they eventually isolate themselves and make themselves their own end.

The true society must be built up of little societies based on the principal of communal life with association extending not only to individuals within the community but to the association of communities. Buber envisioned "a network of settlements, territorially based and federatively constructed" which would be without dogmatic rigidity and which would allow the "most diverse social forms to exist side by

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[88]Ibid., p. 56.

[89]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 221.

[90]Ibid., p. 219.

side" and which would always have as its aim the new "organic whole."[91]

It is necessary that the mutual relationship of all these little societies be determined "to the greatest possible extent" by what Buber refers to as the "social principle," that is, the principle of "inner cohesion, collaboration and mutual stimulation."[92]

Buber saw the structurally rich society as one built up of local communes, "each one in vital association with the other." Such a society cannot be composed of separate but of "associative units."[93]

In the writings of both Marx and Lenin there is the socialist idea of a common society composed of little societies bound inwardly by common life and work. However, in the thinking of neither man is found the necessary reference for action. In both philosophies the decentralist element of re-structure is displaced by the centralist element of revolutionary politics.[94]

The type of community that Buber has in mind is actively engaged in common and active management. The more a group allows itself to be represented in the management of its common affairs the less there exists the communal life and the more

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[91]Buber, Israel and Palestine, p. 79.

[92]Ibid., p. 80.

[93]Ibid., p. 15.

[94]Ibid., p. 99.

impoverished it becomes as a community.[95]

True community should always satisfy a concrete situation rather than an abstraction. If it is translated into a principle the shell begins to form and the structure becomes hardened. When this process has been finalized the possibility of community is lost; a true community must remain flexible, always the "moments answer to the moments question."[96]

Community begins when its members recognize and act upon an acceptance of a common center. It need not be "founded" in the traditional sense of the term. Wherever history brings a group of people together there is the possibility of genuine community, but there is no guarantee that it will exist. When the members have a common relation to the centre, as well as a common relation to each other, true community exists.[97]

This is not to suggest that community is a gathering of like-mindedness; it is quite the opposite. It is, in fact, the "overcoming of otherness" in a living unity which is its essence.[98] In an ideal society each man would compensate by his knowledge for any lack of knowledge or understanding in his fellowman. In this way, men by

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[95]Ibid., p. 133.

[96]Ibid., p. 134.

[97]Ibid., p. 135.

[98]Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 102.

common thinking and knowing would constantly increase knowledge and understanding.[99]

> A real community need not consist of people who are perpetually together; but it must consist of people who, precisely because they are comrades, have mutual access to one another and are ready for one another. A real community is one which in every point of its being possesses potentially at least, the whole character of community.[100]

This whole character of community in Buber's thought does not refer to an "aggregate of essentially unrelated individuals" for such a group could be held together only by a coercive political structure. It must be built of little societies

> on the basis of communal life and of the association of these societies; and the mutual relations of the societies and their association must be determined to the greatest possible extent by the social principle--the principle of inner cohesion, collaboration and mutual stimulation.[101]

"The Melekh YHVH," Buber says "does not want to rule a crowd but a community."[102] Society by its very nature is not composed of disparate individuals but rather is composed of "associative units and the association between them."[103]

Real community does not exist because of the feelings that individuals have for each other although that, too, is a necessary

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[99]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 10.

[100]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 145.

[101]Ibid., p. 80.

[102]Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 55.

[103]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 14.

ingredient. Community rests on two counts: all members of that society must "stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to a single living center, and they have to stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to one another."[104]

Buber believed that society is structurally rich only to the extent that it is built up of genuine societies. For this reason he sees capitalism as "inherently poor in structure and growing visibly poorer every day."[105] For the same reason state socialism contributes little or nothing to the restructuring which Buber believes to be needed. "If something is to happen, then it must be achieved in small communities of people who are really and truly living together in association."[106] Such a living together of men can only thrive where people have the real things in common, where they can "experience, discuss and administer them together."[107]

To understand the nature of man is to understand the use of power in community. Buber does not see power in society as an intrinsic evil. It is, he says, a "precondition for the actions of man." In an ideal society a "will to power" will be less concerned with being

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[104] Buber, I and Thou, p. 94.

[105] Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 13.

[106] Beek and Weiland, Martin Buber: Personalist and Prophet, p. 103.

[107] Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 15.

"more powerful than" and more concerned with power for positive action. "Not power but power hysteria is evil."[108] Power is necessary to community life. "But we know that we have also to approach another power for information namely, community."[109] When this power is not invoked our knowledge remains fragmentary and inadequate.[110] What is at work here is the longing for that rightness which in religious or philosophical vision is experienced as revelation or idea, and which of its very nature cannot be realized in the individual, but only in human community.[111]

Does a pattern for true community exist? Buber says "yes." The Jewish Village Communes in Palestine owes its existence not to a doctrine but to a situation.[112] Here is community arising out of the need, stress, and the demand of the situation.

> As I see history and the present there is only one all-out effort to create a full co-operative which justifies our speaking of success in the socialistic sense, and that is the Jewish Village Commune in its various forms, as found in Palestine.[113]

Why are communes of Palestine different from those of Russia?

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[108]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 216.

[109]Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 156.

[110]Ibid., p. 156.

[111]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 7.

[112]Ibid., p. 142.

[113]Ibid., p. 141.

Russia, Buber says, has not undergone "an essential inner change."[114] The sickness of the age is that the It world has become a gigantic swamp because it is no longer "fertilized by the living currents of the You-world."[115] In Palestine the concrete conditions were present and true community existed. There was found this "League of Leagues"[116] which makes a society a community indeed.

This condition, according to Buber, did not exist in Russia. "We must designate one of the two poles of socialism between which our choice lies, by the formidable name of 'Moscow'. The other I would make bold to call 'Jerusalem'."[117]

Although the expectation of Buber was that Jerusalem would be the center for the renewal of society, he was aware that "Nations can be led to peace only by a people which has made peace a reality within itself."[118]

Summary

Evil in the community results from man's lack of communication. This isolation is evident in man's relation to man and in the

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[114]Ibid., p. 149.

[115]Buber, I and Thou, p. 102.

[116]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 148.

[117]Ibid., p. 149.

[118]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 110.

separation of social units. Attempts to amalgamate social units by central authority fails because true community is possible only where individuals relate one to another and to a living center. Social evil is remedied by the development of true community.

CHAPTER IV

THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN BUBER

Nature of Education

Buber desired to teach not a view but the way.[1] He realized that the trend of replacing direct experiences with indirect experience was evil because it dealt with the acquisition of information rather than with human becoming.[2] Ideal education leads man to a lived connection with his world, and enables him to ascend to faithfulness, standing the test, authenticating, responsibility, decision and realization.[3]

Buber rejected teaching which consisted only as a collection of knowable material. "Either the teachings live in the life of a responsible human being, or they are not alive at all."[4] It is never enough for man to merely be cognizant of certain facts. Rather he

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[1] Buber, I and Thou, p. 139.

[2] Ibid., p. 89.

[3] Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 108.

[4] Buber, Israel and the World, p. 140.

must be "seized by the teachings" in such a way that "his elemental totality must submit to the spirit as clay to the potter."[5]

Such a commitment to teaching leads away from the performing of "prescribed rites" toward the power to make the original choice. Thus one may choose out of will to act responsibly, and to "despise the inflexible self-assurance" of this age to the place where one may hear the message for his hour.[6]

True education is not a teaching of what is nor of what ought to be; it is a teaching of "how to live in the spirit, in the countenance of the You." At this point, the word becomes life; this life is teaching and "stands ready to become a You for them at any time, opening up the You world."[7]

Education is not the means toward a goal; it is the choosing of a path the nature of which terminates in the desired goal. "He who takes a road that in its nature does not already represent the nature of the goal will miss the goal." In true education, the goal will resemble the road by which one reaches it.[8]

Methodology in Education

To educate, in the thought of Buber, was to guide toward

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[5]Ibid., p. 89.

[6]Ibid., pp. 162-3.

[7]Buber, I and Thou, p. 92.

[8]Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 105.

reality and realization. "That man alone is qualified to teach who knows how to distinguish between appearance and reality."[9] It is not enough to proceed toward something, "one must also proceed from something."[10] One must have a point of beginning; an orientation from a beginning is as necessary as orientation toward a goal.

Man does not desire to recognize either an origin or a goal because he no longer wants to recognize the midpoint.[11] If man should acknowledge a midpoint, he would be forced to accept the responsibility for the lived moment, filled with possibility and with decision. He is content to allow history to ripple toward him "from some prehistorical cosmic age." Man does not want to acknowledge responsibility, and therefore dismisses both origin and goal as unknowables. To be responsible means to use "the capacity of that day to the full;" if he has accomplished this "he has done enough."[12] There can be no origin or goal without responsibility and "there is no responsibility unless there is One to whom one is responsible."[13]

This is not to suggest that scientific knowledge and aesthetic understanding is not desirable or even necessary. Buber suggests,

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[9]Ibid., p. 105.

[10]Ibid., p. 99.

[11]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 95.

[12]Ibid., p. 32.

[13]Ibid., p. 19.

however, that having done its work faithfully such understanding should "immerse itself and disappear in that truth of the relation which surpasses understanding and embraces what is understandable."[14]

Teaching must be closely allied with doing; doing apart from the teachings is no education.[15] The knowledge of the perfected man is "not in his thinking but in his action."[16] Education is primarily the development of the second element of the twofold principle of human life: the first Buber calls "the primal setting at a distance" and the second the "entering into relation."[17] Life is a living relationship; such relationship is possible only after there has been a setting at a distance, so that independent opposites exist. The animal world (Umwelt) knows no such setting-over-against. It is only in man that this separation from one's environment is recognized; only in the Umwelt of man is that relation possible. Only in man is being (Sein) detached, and recognized for itself. "Only when a structure of being is independently over against a living being (Seinde), an independent opposite, does a world exist."[18]

Only man gives distance to things so they may be studied in a

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[14]Buber, I and Thou, p. 91.

[15]Buber, Israel and the World, p. 95.

[16]Buber, Pointing the Way, p. 52.

[17]Buber, "Distance and Relation," The Knowledge of Man, p. 60.

[18]Ibid., pp. 60-1.

separate manner, and exist for a separate function. A monkey may use a branch or a stick and cast it aside; man only has the ability to set such a weapon aside to be used again and again for a specified purpose.[19]

This primal step of setting apart is only the first step in the education of man. To possess or use such tools must give way to the matter of man's relation to them. "Man sets things which he uses at a distance, he gives them into an independence in which function gains duration, he reduces and empowers them to be the bearers of the function."[20] Man's relationship with the things he uses in the It world is on a different plane than his personal relationships with creatures of like nature in the You world. Once the identification of an It has been made in such a way that it no longer denotes a relation between a human I and a tree You but the perception of the tree object by the human consciousness, it has erected the crucial barrier between subject and object; the basic word I-It, the word of separation, has been spoken.[21]

The relationship which produces the truly human is a gradual awareness which reveals its development through the "reciprocal

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[19] Ibid., p. 65.

[20] Ibid., p. 66.

[21] Buber, I and Thou, pp. 74-5.

forces of confrontation."[22] The world is built, not by a child's being aware of an object and then entering into relation with it; rather, the longing for relation is primary. The relation with the innate You is primary and is realized in the You of encounter.[23]

Man "becomes an I through a You."[24] When this basic consciousness of personal existence finally bursts forth from its interwoven consciousness with a You, man stands ready for the world of experience and the world of relationship. In the world of experience man says I-It and assumes a position of oppositeness but does not confront things "in the current of reciprocity." Only in the It world does man arrange and classify knowledge. "The You knows no system of coordinates."[25]

The It-World is necessary if man is to live; whoever lives only in it is not truly human. The It can become a You by entering into the event of relation and "the individual You must become an It when the event of relation has run its course."[26]

Education does not begin with the possession of a knowledge of things, but rather with a relationship "which surpasses understanding

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[22]Ibid., p. 72.

[23]Ibid., p. 78.

[24]Ibid., p. 80.

[25]Ibid., pp. 80-1.

[26]Ibid., pp. 84-5.

and embraces what is understandable."[27]

> Knowledge: as he beholds what confronts him, its being is disclosed to the knower. What he beheld as present he will have to comprehend as an object, compare with objects, assign a place in an order of objects, and describe and analyze objectively; only as an It can it be absorbed into the store of knowledge. But in the act of beholding it was no thing among things, no event among events; it was present exclusively.[28]

When knowledge becomes objective it is "locked into the It-form of conceptual knowledge. Whoever unlocks it and beholds it again as present, fulfills the meaning of that act of knowledge as something that is actual and active between man."[29]

Purpose of Education

Education must assist in breaking the imprisonment of "the person in history, and his speech in a library." It is not enough to be well-informed. True education teaches "not what is and not what ought to be, but how one lives in the spirit, in the countenance of the You."[30] True human life is created only when the central You is received in the present.[31]

Man needs to be taught the truth of relation because the

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[27]Ibid., p. 90.

[28]Ibid., p. 90.

[29]Ibid., p. 91.

[30]Ibid., p. 92.

[31]Ibid., p. 95.

It-World tends to grow over him "like weeds" so that his I loses its actuality.[32]

> The capricious man does not believe and encounter. He does not know association; he only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use it. . . In truth he has no destiny but is merely determined by things and drives, feels autocratic, and is capricious. He has no great will and tries to pass off caprice in its place.[33]

Man must learn to give up capriciousness and move toward belief in the actual; he must be taught to accept "the real association of the real duality, I and You." He needs to learn that destiny needs him, that it "does not lead him" but it waits for him.[34]

> But the free man does not have an end here and then fetch the means from there; he has only one thing; always only his resolve to proceed toward his destiny. . . he would sooner believe that he was not really alive then he would believe that the resolve of the great will was insufficient and required the support of means. He believes; he encounters.[35]

Man becomes what he potentially may become through relation, through the touching of the You. "Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part of him nor merely outside him."[36] If there is no participation, then there is no actuality.

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[32]Ibid., p. 96.

[33]Ibid., p. 109.

[34]Ibid., p. 108.

[35]Ibid., p. 110.

[36]Ibid., p. 113.

There are two poles of humanity, not two kinds of human beings. No human is pure person; no one pure ego. The person beholds himself; the ego occupies himself with his My. The more dominant the ego the more the human being falls prey to inactuality. The more person-oriented one becomes the more person he is. Between these two poles history takes place.[37]

One purpose of education is to help the I relate to its world, so that it may truly become. In the other, the evil course, the I turns inside and seeks to develop its potential within itself--

> which is to say that it unfolds where there is no room for it to unfold. Thus the confrontation within the self comes into being, and this cannot be relation, presence, the current of reciprocity, but only self-contradiction.[38]

This self-contradiction tends to pull man apart rather than to unite him. This dissection is the basic evil which prevents man from becoming whole. It is the wholeness of the human being toward which education should aim; "It is the whole being, closed in its wholeness, at rest in its wholeness, that is active here. . ."[39] Every true relation depends on one having become whole.

The ultimate in this relationship is to discover him whom one cannot seek, "the mysterium tremendum, that appears and overwhelms."

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[37]Ibid., pp. 114-5.

[38]Ibid., p. 119.

[39]Ibid., p. 125.

This discovery is not made by teaching in a prescription manner; that is, one cannot say thus and so is the way. Rather, one discovers the way as he learns to enter into "pure relationship." He does not renounce all other relationships in order to discover the eternal You. Instead, he brings with him all other relationships; here "unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one."[40] One finds here the eternal center containing all pure relations; every genuine encounter is a way station which grants one a view of fulfillment.[41] "Actually, the absolute relationship includes all relative relationships, and is, unlike them, no longer a part but the whole in which all of them are consummated and become one."[42]

> God embraces but is not the universe; just so, God embraces but is not myself. On account of this which cannot be spoken about, I can say in my language, as all can say in theirs: You. For the sake of this there are I and You, there is dialogue, there is language, and spirit whose primal deed language is, and there is, in eternity, the word.[43]

Is the ultimate goal of man to become whole, and encounter God so he may then forever mit Gott befasse? Buber says "no." Man would rather "henceforth attend to God" than he would to prove the meaning of such an encounter in action in the world. "All

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[40]Ibid., p. 122.

[41]Ibid., p. 128.

[42]Ibid., p. 129.

[43]Ibid., p. 143.

revelation is a calling and a mission. But again and again man shuns actualization and bends back toward the revealer: he would rather attend to God than to the world."[44]

Buber believed that "Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character." The concern of the educator is always the "person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you now and in his possibilities, what he can become."[45]

Role of the Teacher in Education

Buber warned against an over-estimation of what a teacher could do to develop character. To give instruction in ethics may result only in having "the worst habitual liar of the class produce a brilliant essay on the destructive power of lying."[46] Such instruction is fatal because it seems to produce results which are not really there. Nothing is transformed, only an excellent paper has been produced.

> Only in his whole being, in all his sponteneity can the educator truly affect the whole being of his pupil. For educating characters you do not need a moral genius, but you do need a man who is wholly alive and able to communicate himself directly to his fellow beings.[47]

The educator is only one of many influences exerted upon the

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[44]Ibid., p. 164.

[45]Buber, "The Education of Character," Between Man and Man, p. 104.

[46]Ibid., p. 105.

[47]Ibid., p. 105.

individual. Nature and society, language and custom, history and art, work and play, these and many other elements combine in formation of character. The educator must seek to interpenetrate all these multifarious influences. This he does by his "will to take part in the stamping of character" and the realization that he represents a certain selection of what should be.[48]

Generally it is not the business of the educator to "tell" what is right or wrong. Yet, when approached with a problem of ethics, he must lead beyond the alternatives of the question by showing a third possibility which he believes to be a right one. A concrete question deserves a concrete answer to a concrete situation. This, Buber emphasizes, "can only happen in an atmosphere of confidence."[49]

The teacher must not expect complete agreement on the part of the student. Conflicts serve to educate if they take place in a healthy atmosphere. A conflict with a pupil is a supreme test for the educator. "He must not blunt the piercing impact of his knowledge, but he must at the same time have in readiness the healing ointment for the heart pierced by it."[50]

> This is where the educator can begin and should begin. He can help the feeling that something is lacking to grow into

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[48]Ibid., p. 106.

[49]Ibid., p. 107.

[50]Ibid., p. 107.

> the clarity of consciousness and into the force of desire. He can awaken in young people the courage to shoulder life again. He can bring before his pupils the image of a great character who denies no answer to life and the world, but accepts responsibility for everything essential that he meets. . .Genuine education of character is genuine education for community.[51]

Role of the Pupil in Education

Dewey held that all social institutions revealed their value only as they set free and developed the capacities of human individuals.[52] Buber believed that individuals, not institutions, could perform this function. He thought the matter of developing human capacity did not deal with what is already existing in the individual. Rather, the potential lay in the fact that the child can have a share in his own becoming. What arises is not what was already there; in education something arises which was not there before. The desire to participate in its own becoming and to help in the creation of its own end, Buber contributes to an autonomous instinct, the "instinct of origination."[53]

This instinct is not one to "grab" or to "get." It is rather to create and give. It is directed toward "doing" rather than having. There are two indispensable activities involved in true human life to

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[51]Ibid., p. 116.

[52]John Dewey, "Moral Reconstruction," Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 186.

[53]Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 86.

which this instinct, if left to itself, does not lead. The first is the sharing in an undertaking and the second is the entering into mutuality.[54]

The development of this originator instinct is of concern to the educator.

> The finest demonstration I know, that I have just got to know, is this Children's Choir led by the marvellous Bakule of Prague. . . How under his leadership crippled creatures, seemingly condemned to life-long idleness, have been released to a life of freely moving person, rejoicing in their achievement, formable and forming, who know how to shape sights and sounds in multiform patterns and also how to sing out of their risen souls wildly and gloriously; more, how a community of achievement. . . has been welded together out of dull immured solitary creatures: all this seems to prove irrefutably not merely what fruitfulness but also what power, streaming through the whole constitution of man, the life of origination has.[55]

An education based only upon the training of the instinct of origination would prepare a new form of human solitariness. What teaches one to say Thou is "not the originative instinct but the instinct for communion." This instinct is the "longing for the world to become present to us as a person."[56] Only if someone grasps the hand as a comrade or friend does one have an awareness and a share of mutuality.[57]

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[54]Ibid., pp. 86-7.

[55]Ibid., p. 86.

[56]Ibid., p. 88.

[57]Ibid., p. 87.

Summary

To educate is to guide toward reality. This is done by communication and confrontation, rather than the amassing of technical data. Education begins with the individual and seeks to make him aware that there are other individuals, who are also subjects, living in his world.

Through communication and confrontation with others who are a part of his world and yet have a world of their own, he develops both a Self-consciousness and a We-consciousness. It is through communication with others in the area of the "between" that man becomes human and learns how to participate in humanity and in community. Man's failure to communicate is the basic evil in both the individual and the community.

Education must be concerned with the person as a whole. Only then can the pupil be caused to face the reality of the present moment as well as the potential of the lived life. The educated man is the man who has learned what it means to be human; he is capable of partaking in humanity and participating in community.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The problem of evil in the individual and the problem of evil in community is in reality a single problem: Man fails to reach out to his fellow man in communion and mutual understanding. He bends his spirit back into himself where it has no room to grow.

The spirit of man develops into a truly human spirit in what Buber calls the "realm of the between." In this realm, spirit meets spirit and both are "fertilized" by the association; both grow and develop into the potential of its own peculiar createdness.

The failure to move outside one's self is evil because it prevents the development of the individual into a person. Such development comes by the way of communion.

The communion between persons is not for an intellectually elite alone. This communion takes place at the level of ones existence; man may begin where he is. Man may enter into dialogue with his fellowman, but he is not forced to do so. The individual stands each moment "before concrete reality which wishes to reach out to

him and receive an answer from him."[1] Man decides whether he will reach out or whether he remains imprisoned within his shell. The moment of "breakthrough" is reached when man decides to respond.

The lack of response of a man to "concrete reality" prevents the development of true community; it, too, is dependent upon man's willingness to reach into the realm of the "between" and enter into association with his fellowman.

The basic solution to the problem of evil is a single solution: The unification of man. Only a man who has become whole can will to break out of his shell of self and reach out to the world of the between.

To become whole, in the terminology of Buber, is to "unite the two urges." The evil urge, which is passion is united with the good urge, which is direction. Man then becomes capable of deliberate choice.

The uniting of the two urges to become whole is a prerequisite for the establishment of community. Only as persons become able to enter into communion can community be established. The purpose of the unification of the individual is the unification of the world.

Man must live with things. To deny their existence is unrealistic; it is when man lives only in a world of things that he crowds out the reality which confronts him. To place confidence in the It-world for security and self-fulfillment is to miss reality; it is

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[1] Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 39.

to choose the impossible in the place of the actual. The more man relies on the It-world for the enrichment of life, the more damage is done to the world of relation.

> The sickness of our age is unlike that of any other and yet belongs with the sickness of all. The history of culture is not a stadium of eons in which one runner after another must cover the same circle of death, cheerfully and unconsciously.[2]

There is a solution to the sickness of this age; it is a remedy Buber calls Umkehr.[3] In the act of returning Buber sees the redemption of society and the individual.

By returning Buber does not suggest the going back to the place where one once was; it is rather a break-through from the world of things to the world of relation.

> It is a descent through the spirals of the spiritual underworld but could also be called an ascent to the innermost, subtlest, most intricate turn that knows no Beyond and even less any Backward but only the unheard of return--the breakthrough.[4]

This turning is the crucial act in education. Can one indeed teach how to turn? Buber says "yes," and this teaching must begin with the awareness that man is capable of turning: That is, man must be taught the true meaning of freedom. "Even as freedom and fate belong together, caprice belongs with doom. But freedom and fate

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[2]Buber, I and Thou, p. 104.

[3]Walter Kaufman, "Prologue," I and Thou, p. 35.

[4]Buber, I and Thou, pp. 104-5.

are promised to each other and embrace each other to constitute meaning;. . . ."[5]

Until one learns that he can turn he is not free. The bondage of caprice is sometimes in the sick world thought of as freedom. The capricious man does not believe and encounter. "He does not know association; he only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use it." To gain freedom, Buber says, from the belief in unfreedom "is to gain freedom."[6]

Man must learn more than that he is free to turn from the It-world to the world of relation. Man must become conscious of himself as participating in being. That is, as he becomes conscious of "being-with" he becomes conscious of being.

It is only as man acknowledges his being and recognizes his freedom that he is able to choose. It is this making the choice which is all-important to Buber's educational philosophy, for man can only truly choose with his total being. The power of decision presupposes unification of the total person. It is only when the being becomes whole that one goes forth deliberately in search of those extended lines of relation which make possible true being and true community.[7] "Extended, the lines of relationships intersect the eternal You. Every

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[5]Ibid., p. 108.

[6]Ibid., p. 109.

[7]Ibid., p. 124.

single You is a glimpse of that. Through every single You the basic word addresses the eternal You."[8]

How does man move to this realm of relationship from a world of It-dominance? By deciding. If one has become whole he may choose the path. If in deciding he recognizes that it is not with his whole being, he nevertheless becomes aware of direction, the freedom to choose, and potentiality.[9]

At this point man is ready to assume his responsibility in the community. He may have performed certain functions before but only as he freely chooses does he answer with responsibility the call to true community relation.

A community is not simply a group of people. Such amassing in political entities only compound problems unless the spirit which forms community is present. This spirit is active when each member of that society has a common relation to each other and all have a common relation to a living center. Until man learns to relate, true community is impossible.

Buber rejected capitalism as a means toward the establishment of community. Although it was capitalism which gave birth to socialism,[10] he saw it as "inherently poor in structure and growing

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[8]Ibid., p. 123.

[9]Buber, Good and Evil, p. 35.

[10]Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 13.

visibly poorer every day."[11]

He rejected the idea of primitive agrarian communism, saying "we cannot and do not want to go back."[12]

Buber agreed with Proudhoun that centralization of government offered advantages but was too costly. In such a society the individual no longer belongs to himself; he "cannot feel his worth, his life, and no account is taken of him at all."[13]

The experiments in co-operatives were condemned "by the nature of things to isolation."[14] The "zig-zag line" served as a "tragic misdevelopment of the Socialist Movement." What it had made propaganda--the evolution of new social form--"was neither the real object of its thought nor the real goal of its action."[15]

Buber saw the rebirth of the commune as the answer to the development of true community.

> A rebirth--not a bringing back. It cannot in fact be brought back. . .Yet whether a rebirth of the commune will ensue from the 'water and spirit' of the social transformation that is imminent--on this, it seems to me, hangs the whole fate of the human race.[16]

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[11]Ibid., p. 13.

[12]Ibid., p. 15.

[13]Ibid., p. 33.

[14]Ibid., p. 79.

[15]Ibid., p. 98.

[16]Ibid., p. 136.

There was in the mind of Buber "an experiment that did not fail." He saw the Jewish Village Commune of Palestine, in its various forms, an "all-out effort to create a full co-operative which justifies our speaking of success in the socialistic sense."[17] Here the "ideal motive remained loose and pliable in almost every respect."[18]

> More important, however, is that, behind the historical situation of a people visited by a great external crisis and responding to it with a great inner change. . . The Pioneer Spirit ("Chalvzivth") is, in every part of it, related to the growth of a new and transformed national community; the moment it grew self-sufficient it would have lost its soul.[19]

Buber saw this bold Jewish undertaking as a "signal non-failure." He did not attempt to call it a success. "To become that, much has still to be done."[20]

Where does one begin? Buber would say 'Begin where you are." When does one begin? His answer would be "now." How does one begin? "By beginning," Buber would answer, "there is no established formula."

CONCLUSIONS

1. Buber's educational philosophy emphasize the necessity for the individual to accept responsibility for his lived life. One can do

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[17]Ibid., p. 141.

[18]Ibid., p. 142.

[19]Ibid., p. 143.

[20]Ibid., p. 148.

this by willing direction, by choosing. Such choice can be made only by an individual who has become whole. This becoming whole is realized by acting upon the knowledge that evil is something to be transformed rather than something to be overcome. This concept is the core of his philosophy of evil and one of the presuppositions upon which his educational philosophy is constructed.

2. The educational philosophy of Martin Buber is a viable philosophy of education and should be brought to the attention of educators and prospective educators by the most effective means possible.

3. Buber's concept of education of the individual suggests that education should be goal-oriented. One must intend to teach how to become whole, how to be human. Capricious learning is not capable of producing the end product of true humanity. One must intend to teach how to become whole if it is expected that others will learn.

4. Education must be willed by the individual. Education worthy of the name must be a conscious selection of his effective environment by the person being educated.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. The philosophy of Buber concerning community should be further investigated as it relates to his prime example, i. e. the communes of Palestine. This study should investigate whether these communes have further developed his concept of community and investigate the causative factors related to any change which may

have taken place.

2. Buber saw knowledge as capable of being stored in the human consciousness only as an It. Each Thou-relation must be transformed to an It-experience before it can be brought into the store of knowledge. Further study is recommended to determine whether knowledge, in Buber's thought, is transferred in the I-Thou relation and if so, in what state or condition this knowledge presents itself prior to transformation and codification.

3. During the course of this study the author became aware of a strong relation between the teaching of Hasidism and the basic concepts of Buber concerning evil. A thorough study of this movement and its influence upon the presuppositions of Buber would further contribute to the understanding of the basis of Buber's educational philosophy.

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