

University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons

Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

12-1-1978

A Study of Jacques Maritain's Concept of the Habitus and its Relationship to Musical Performance

Loren Jechort

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses

Recommended Citation

Jechort, Loren, "A Study of Jacques Maritain's Concept of the Habitus and its Relationship to Musical Performance" (1978). *Theses and Dissertations*. 2652. https://commons.und.edu/theses/2652

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

A STUDY OF JACQUES MARITAIN'S CONCEPT OF THE HABITUS

AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MUSICAL PERFORMANCE

by Loren Jechort

Bachelor of Science, Mayville State College, 1963 Master of Education, University of North Dakota, 1970

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of North Dakota


in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Education

Grand Forks, North Dakota

December 1978



Copyright by Loren Jechort 1978

This dissertation submitted by Loren Jechort in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.

(Chairman)

Dean of the Graduate School

Permission

A STUDY OF JACQUES MARITAIN'S CONCEPT OF THE <u>HABITUS</u> Title AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MUSICAL PERFORMANCE

Department Center for Teaching and Learning

Degree Doctor of Education

In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my dissertation work or, in his absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this dissertation or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my dissertation.

Signature____

Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to thank Dr. Russell Peterson for his invaluable assistance and encouragement in the organization and completion of this study.

The writer wishes to thank Dr. Barrie Wells, Dr. Ivan Dahl, Dr. Richard Landry, and Dr. Roger Bloomquist for advice and assistance of many varieties.

A special thanks goes to Jan for her unwavering confidence in-and patience with--this scholar and his scholarly effort.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem (1)Statement of the Problem (7)Approach to the Problem (7)Purpose of the Study (7)Need for the Study (7)Delimitations (8)Limita- tions (8)Definition of Terms (9)
CHAPTER II. THE <u>HABITUS</u> OF FINE ART 13
The <u>Habitus</u> and the Intellect (13)The <u>Habitus</u> and the Practical Order of Art (15)The <u>Habitus</u> and the Rules of Art (21)
CHAPTER III. THE AIM OF PERFORMANCE
The Fine Arts and Performance (31)Beauty and Perform- ance (32)Technique and Performance (38)Communication and Performance (46)
CHAPTER IV. THE ACTION OF PERFORMANCE
Artistic Judgment and Performance (53)The Creative Idea and Performance (62)Imitation and Performance (73)
CHAPTER V. THE USE OF PERFORMANCE
Morality and Performance (80)
CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion (92)Summary (120)Conclusions (128)
CHAPTER VII. APPLICATIONS TO THE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM IN MUSIC EDUCATION
The Aim of Education and the Aim of Performance (132) The <u>Habitus</u> and the Release of Learner Intuition (151)
CHAPTER VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 160
The Art of Performance and the Classroom Art (161) The Use of Performance and the Performance Program (172)

APPENDIX	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	179
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY	•		•			•		•	•			•				•	•				182

ABSTRACT

The research problem was--to study the relationship between Maritain's concept of the <u>habitus</u> and the fine art of musical performance.

The purpose of the study was (1) to identify philosophical truths concerning the role of the <u>habitus</u> in musical performance; and (2) to apply these truths to the performance program in music education.

The research procedure was a philosophical analysis of Maritain's treatises on the fine arts and on education. Source material also included additional related writings by Maritain and pertinent studies on Maritain's philosophy, as prepared by other researchers.

The main body of the study was designed in terms of four broad components. The <u>habitus</u> was related to (1) the fine arts in general; (2) the aim of performance; (3) the action of performance; and (4) the use of performance.

As the study design evolved (through development), each component focused upon a particular selection of Maritain concepts for study and analysis. The <u>habitus</u> of fine art was discussed in terms of the intellect, the practical order of art, and the rules of art. The aim of performance was examined by relating "the disinterested work" to beauty, technique, and communication. The action of performance was considered in terms of artistic judgment, imitation, and the creative idea. The use of performance was studied by relating morality to performance.

viii

From the foregoing analysis, the relationship of the <u>habitus</u> to the three broad components of performance was discussed and summarized.

The conclusions were as follows:

1. The <u>habitus</u> of performance is an intuitive and operative disposition which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without a logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action.

2. The performer is only vaguely (preconsciously) aware of his <u>habitus</u> until its operative power is freed by intellectual connaturality with an object, the sound of a musical work.

3. The <u>habitus</u> relates to musical performance in the spiritual or internal sense; therefore, the material or external aspect of performance is subordinated to the spiritual aspect.

4. The operation of the <u>habitus</u> flows through the sound of a work, as the sound pleases or displeases the intellect.

5. The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music is defined as the placing of his self into the work.

6. The <u>habitus</u> operates through its object comprehensively, thereby causing the artistic components (aim and action) of performance to be interrelated and overlapped in their contribution to the final product.

7. The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concurrently; however, the use (of the product) must be subordinated to the art (from which it was conceived).

8. It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of the <u>habitus</u> will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and,

ix

to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art.

9. A reciprocal relationship exists (within the intellect) between the operation and development of the habitus.

10. The relationship of the <u>habitus</u> to musical performance explains why musicians, possessing a <u>habitus</u> of great depth, are able to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and without dependence upon conceptual terminology.

Applications to the performance program in music education were made by (1) comparing the aim of performance to Maritain's definition of the aim of education; and (2) relating the <u>habitus</u> to learner intuition. The results of these comparisons had the following implications for the performance program:

1. The performance program must direct its attention toward the natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be to teach for the meaning of music rather than toward the <u>habitus</u> of performance.

2. The teaching of musical skills and concepts should not define the performance program. These material aims are contributory aims, necessary but secondary to the classroom art.

3. Since the meaning of music prepares the intellect for the development of the <u>habitus</u>, an immeasurable degree of the <u>habitus</u> is developed as a natural result of the student performer's connaturality with his aural object.

4. The <u>habitus</u>, because of its internal depth, is the least accessible result of the performance program but one which has farreaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue.

X

5. The material means of performance, because of their external nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program, but these are measurable only in the immediate sense.

6. The instructor encourages student intellectual adherence to an aural object by adapting his educative approach to the spontaneous curiosity of the student.

7. Intellectual adhesion to an object of sound relates to connaturality; and the freeing of intuition, through connaturality, encourages the student to place his self into his aural object. Consequently, the enjoyment of music is given a renewed priority in the performance program.

Pursuant to the applications discussed, the following recommendations were made:

 The student performer should be designated as the primary agent in the classroom (in place of instructional and institutional primacy).

 Classroom performance should focus its attention upon works rather than students because, as previously determined, such an emphasis (on artistic endeavors) best serves the primary agent.

3. The use of classroom works should be subordinated to the productive action of classroom art; accordingly, the pursuit of nonmusical and extramusical objectives should be subordinated to the classroom production of musical works.

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

Broadly defined, the <u>habitus</u> refers to ". . . qualities which are essentially stable dispositions perfecting in the line of its own nature the subject in which they exist."¹ The intellectual virtues are special energies which grow in intelligence through exercise in a given object as added perfections of native capacity or natural intelligence.² The intellectual virtues are an operative <u>habitus</u> because these faculties or powers tend to action by their very nature. The operative <u>habitus</u> is an acquired <u>habitus</u>, acquired through exercise and use and a dependence upon human effort.³ This kind of <u>habitus</u> is a natural <u>habitus</u> of the soul because the intellect resides in the soul of man.⁴

²Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," in <u>The Education of Man</u>, ed. Donald and Idella Gallagher (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962; paperback edition, 1967), pp. 48-49.

³Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10. The acquired habitus is antonymous to the infused habitus because the latter is imparted to the soul by God independently of human effort. The infused habitus is a supernatural habitus which pertains primarily to theological virtues. See Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8; and Flannery, Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 111.

⁴Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8.

¹Jacques Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," in <u>Art and</u> <u>Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry</u>, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962; also in paperback edition by University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 10; also see Edward H. Flannery, trans., Glossary to <u>An Essay on Christian Philosophy</u>, by Jacques Maritain (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 110.

The <u>habitus</u> of the performing musician is a virtue of the practical intellect which grows through performance as an added perfection of native musical capacity.¹ The virtue of art, an operative <u>habitus</u>, is acquired through the art of performance and through a dependence upon the personal effort of the performing musician. The virtuoso is a "man of <u>habitus</u>," that is, a musician who has perfected his virtue to a fine point of distinction.² At the other end of the continuum are the student musicians who are developing the <u>habitus</u> of music through the art of performance. Student musicians are the substance of the school performance program, a facet of music education in which student performers, through the use of an instrument or the instrumentality of the voice, experience the art of music by re-creating (performing) musical works.³

Recent criticism of the school performance program and the amount of technical mastery required of student performers has raised questions about the <u>habitus</u> of the musician and the role of technical training in the development of this habitus.

Can a performing group move in the direction of a laboratory for music exploration while retaining a high level of technical skill? Will time devoted to teaching add to or detract from the effectiveness of time available for rehearsing? Should the performance program be allowed to do its special thing, or should everything possible be done to help performance experience become a powerful influence on the musical understandings of the participants?⁴

¹"Art is a <u>habitus</u> of the practical intellect. . . . This <u>habitus</u> is a <u>virtue</u>. . ." (Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 12).

²For Maritain's discussion of "the man of <u>habitus</u>" see ibid., pp. 11-12.

³See Bennett Reimer's discussion of the school performance program in <u>A Philosophy of Education</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), chap. 9 passim.

⁴Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," <u>Music Educators Journal</u> 63 (December 1976), p. 24.

The "specialism" of performance has been identified as the culprit responsible for the forcing of goals other than those characteristic of the art itself.¹ A paradox of musical performance is that a degree of technical proficiency is necessary to control an instrument or the voice, and yet "mastery of technique cannot by itself justify the enormous effort expended by so many children in learning to play or sing."²

When the major focus of teaching is on technique then the major effort of the student is expended on skill development, a practice inevitably doomed to diminishing returns. "Novelty turns into routine, excitement into boredom, the pleasures of progress diminish as limitations are realized."³ Can the goals of fine performances, along with the increase of student musicianship through technical skill, be met without sacrificing incentives for students to explore music independently or to expand their personal musical horizons?⁴

The specialization of performance brings to light the matter of extramusical objectives, that is, the use of musical technique for motives outside of the art itself. "Music in the schools has come to be recognized by the general educator as synonymous with entertainment and is evaluated and consequently financed as utilitarian bases of entertainment,

IReimer, <u>A Philosophy of Music Education</u>, p. 127; also see Abraham A. Schwadron, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," in <u>Per-</u><u>spectives in Music Education: Source Book III</u>, ed. Bonnie C. Kowall (Washington, D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), p. 188.

²Reimer, <u>A Philosophy of Music Education</u>, p. 131.

³Ibid.

⁴Warren F. Prince, "Music Education's Split Personality," <u>Music</u> <u>Educators Journal</u> 61 (November 1974), pp. 30-31.

'background music' for school affairs, public relations, and school prestige."¹ When administrators or other school authorities view extramusical objectives as the prime purpose of music education, the prospect of meeting musical objectives seems dismal indeed.²

The validity of nonmusical objectives in the school performance program is also in question. "Can music be regarded as an academic (or artistic) study when it is justified extrinsically because of its contribution to health, citizenship, morality, and when it is conceived of as an instrument for the realization of non-musical [sic] values ['A' ratings and the like]?"³

The entire matter of specialization, and its derivatives, has created a controversial issue in the performance field.

The music education profession is in a state of confusion apparently unprecedented in its history. I doubt that there has ever been the disagreement, the lack of consistent orientation, the anxiety, or the willingness to jump onto any bandwagon that is mirrored in the pages of our recent publications.⁴

The move for changes in the performance program has caused much debate, a high level of discomfort for many performance directors, and a rethinking by the entire profession of its expectations for the children involved.⁵

¹Schwadron, <u>Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education</u> (Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1967), p. 70; also see Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 135.

²Harry S. Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum," in <u>Perspectives in Music Education</u>, p. 180.

³Schwadron, <u>Aesthetics</u>, p. 72; also see Reimer, <u>A Philosophy of</u> <u>Music Education</u>, p. 29; and Phillip H. Phenix, <u>Realms of Meaning</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 348.

⁴Charles H. Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," in <u>Toward an Aesthetic Education</u>, ed. Bennett Reimer and associates (Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1971), p. 57.

⁵Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," p. 24.

Proposed theories which suggest alternatives to the skill of performance have focused upon the intellectualization of performance. The object of this focus is to replace technical emphasis with an emphasis upon musical knowledge, a knowledge refined enough to enable students to become "critically intelligent" about the art of music.¹ The instrument of this musical understanding is professed to be superior or high quality literature carefully selected for use by the performance instructor.²

There is evidence of concern with student musical taste and discrimination in professional publications.³ This concern has, however, paralleled a reduced professional concern with the amount and importance of enjoyment or personal meaning which students find in the aural experience of music. For example:

To describe a succession of musical sounds in such terms as beautiful, . . ugly, or warm exemplifies a purely sensuous approach to aesthetic perception and, consequently, calls for little if any need for formal education. . . To educate for pure pleasure or for sheer sensuous enjoyment there is little need for . . . formal music studies. . . the business of merely providing moments of sensuous pleasure is surely not the erudite task of the music educator.⁴

The criticism of "sensuous music," however, raises serious questions about the experience of music as music. How can the aural art of

²The use of performance literature as an instrument of musical knowledge is given theoretical support in Reimer, <u>A Philosophy of Music</u> <u>Education</u>, p. 133; Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum," p. 179; and Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," p. 61.

³For examples of such concern see Schwadron, <u>Aesthetics</u>, p. 75; and idem, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," p. 192.

⁴Schwadron, <u>Aesthetics</u>, pp. 81-82; also see Reimer, <u>A Philosophy</u> of <u>Music Education</u>, pp. 95-97; and Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum," p. 177.

¹The intellectualization of performance is given theoretical support in Schwadron, <u>Aesthetics</u>, p. 76; and idem, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," p. 187. Schwadron's use of the term "critically intelligent" is analogous to Reimer's discussion of "musical understanding" in A Philosophy of Music Education, pp. 132-139.

music be separated from sensory experience and remain an aural art? How can the fine art of music be separated from the pleasing experience of musical sounds and remain a fine art? Is not all human encounter with musical sounds fleeting in nature? Is it possible, then, that what is primary to music is being relegated to secondary status in music education?

The implications of the opening discussion and the above questions infer that the <u>habitus</u> of the musician is more than technique and a select knowledge of musical concepts; furthermore, the development of the <u>habitus</u> is evidently more than technical training and a prescription of selective knowledge. What remains is the sensory nature of the creative act itself and the ensuing question: what is the role of the <u>habitus</u> in the creative art of musical performance, and how is it developed through the act of creation?

The answer to the foregoing philosophical question lies not in the unknown but in what is already known about creativity in the fine arts; and that is precisely why this researcher chose the philosophical writings of Jacques Maritain as a springboard and source for this study. In his treatises on the fine arts and on education, Maritain has confronted the problem of the <u>habitus</u> and, although these writings have far-reaching implications, this valuable source has rarely been consulted by researchers in the field of music education. Maritain's concern with the object of creation and the impact of this object upon the creative process establishes an approach to the fine arts essential to an understanding of the habitus.¹

¹For an overview of his approach to art and its object see Maritain, "Making and Doing," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 9; and

Statement of the Problem

The research problem is to study the relationship between Maritain's concept of the habitus and music as a performing art.

Approach to the Problem

The research procedure is a philosophical analysis of Maritain's treatises on the fine arts and on education. Relevant related writings by Maritain and studies pertaining to Maritain's philosophy, as prepared by other researchers, are included as source material as they focus upon the research problem.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to seek out and identify philosophical truths concerning the role of the <u>habitus</u> in musical performance, which can form the foundation of a philosophical aim or direction resistant to the obsolescence of passing trends, and to apply these truths to the performance program in music education.

Need for the Study

The need for this study is established through evidence of disorientation and misdirection among educators in defining a valid purpose of the performance program.¹

idem, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," in <u>Creative Intuition</u> in <u>Art and Poetry</u> (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953; also in paperback edition by Meridian Books, 1955), pp. 48-50.

¹See p. 4 above.

Delimitations

This study will not enter into Jacques Maritain's extensive treatment of theology, nor will it enter the Maritain realms of metaphysics, politics, and the philosophy of history. Research into the Maritain sphere of ethics will be confined to the ethics of fine art; similarly, research into the Maritain sphere of epistemology will be confined to the poetic knowledge of fine art. Within Maritain's philosophy of fine art, the concepts of poetic knowledge, creative intuition, poetic experience, poetic sense, and beauty will be considered only in the context of their relationship to the <u>habitus</u> and will not be pursued as independent areas of research.

In limiting the study to the fine art of musical performance, the related subject areas: music analysis (visual and aural), music theory (composition), and music history (style periods) are delimited from consideration in this study. In limiting the study to the performance program in music education, the school general music program is delimited from consideration in this study.

Limitations

Maritain writings in untranslated French text are not included as source material; consequently, the scope of this study is limited to the English translations of Maritain's works.

The works of Maritain have a theological bias; accordingly, his treatises on the fine arts and on education must be considered in light of what permeates and transcends these discussions: man's relationship to God.

Maritain's discussions of fine art pertain primarily to the fine arts in general; consequently, his philosophy of fine art must be translated to the fine art of music and applied to musical performance. Similarly, Maritain's philosophy of education is generalized and must be translated to the field of music education and applied to the performance program.

Definition of Terms

Art is the realm of "making" or productive action. It relates to the good or perfection of a work to be produced and not of the man making the work. The action of art is in conformity with rules governing the good of the work and the end of the work. In its formal sense, art is ruled by the intellect of man, a practical intellect whose sole object is to produce a work.¹ The fine arts are arts which have beauty for their object.² The productive action of the fine arts tends to the creation of a beautiful work, an end in itself.³

Morality is the realm of "doing."⁴ This sphere is concerned with the practical activity of reason as directed toward the good of human life through the expression of free will.⁵ ". . . its distinctive object is

²Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," in <u>An Introduction</u> to Philosophy, newly des. ed., trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962), p. 196.

> ³Maritain, "Art and Beauty," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 33. ⁴Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 8.

⁵Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> Artist (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 26-27.

¹Maritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," p. 9.

not the perfection of the works produced and fashioned by man but the good and perfection of the agent himself, or the use he freely makes of his faculties. . . ."¹

Intuition is the immediate or direct intellectual perception which takes place each time the intellect grasps an object which is connatural to it or most like itself.² Beauty is that which delights or pleases the intellect through the senses of sight or hearing and their intuition.³ The intuitive perception of beauty, then, takes place when the intellect is delighted or pleased in that which is most like itself.

The creative idea is not an elaborate plan but rather a simple view or artistic vision of a work-to-be-made.⁴ The operative or creative idea is simply formative of things and is not formed by them because the activity of art is one of creating rather than knowing.⁵

Imitation is the process by which the instrumentality of natural appearances is first presented to the mind of man and then recast or transposed by intuition to a productive end. Imitation uses sensible signs to intuitively express that which has been presented to the intellect through the senses.⁶ ". . . the sign is that which makes present for

¹Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.

²Maritain, "Intuition and Duration," in <u>Bergsonian Philosophy and</u> <u>Thomism</u>, trans. Mabelle L. Andison in collaboration with J. Gordon Andison (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 150-152.

³Maritain, "Art and Beauty," pp. 23-24; St. Thomas Aquinas <u>Summa</u> Theologica, I, 5. 4. ad 1; and ibid., I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.

⁴Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.

⁵John W. Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art</u> (The Hague, Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 43.

⁶Maritain, "The Purity of Art," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 55; idem, "Beauty and Modern Painting," in <u>Creative Intuition</u>, p. 225; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, pp. 46-47.

knowledge something which is other than itself."¹ A sign takes the place of that which is signified and is infravalent to it.

Education, in its broadest sense, refers to any process by which the child of man is shaped and led toward fulfillment. In a narrower sense, education refers to the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake in regard to youth and, in its strictest sense, to the special task of the school in helping a student attain completeness as a human person.² The essential aim of education is to equip, form, and liberate the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellectual virtues or <u>habitus</u>.³ The essential aim of music education, then, is to equip, form, and liberate the creativity of the spirit or creative intelligence to prepare for the development of music.⁴

Educational ends refers to the possible outcomes of the educational process as reflected from the direction which learning experiences are taking.⁵

¹Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," in <u>Redeeming the Time</u>, trans. Harry Lorin Binsse (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1943), pp. 191-192; also see idem, "Language and the Theory of Sign," in <u>Language: An</u> <u>Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function</u>, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 86; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, pp. 52-53.

²Maritain, "The Aims of Education," in <u>Education at the Crossroads</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943; also in paperback ed. by the same publisher, A Yale Paperbound, 1960), pp. 1-2, 10; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 50.

³Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 49.

⁴The term: creativity of the spirit, or the creative intelligence, pertains to intuition or the intuitive power of the mind, in its operative functions, to seek and find beauty in an object. See Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 54-56; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," in Education at the Crossroads, pp. 42-45.

⁵Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 2-4.

Pragmatism is defined as the observable, measurable verification of truth through the use of experimental methods. Pragmatism tends to define human thought as an organ of response to actual stimuli and situations of the environment.¹

Sociologism views the student as a potential citizen to be adapted to the conditions and interactions of social life.²

Intellectualism holds supreme two distinct achievements of human intelligence: dialectical or rhetorical skill and scientific or technical specialization.³

Voluntarism consists of making the intellect of man subserviant to the will of man. The will is either disciplined according to a predetermined pattern as fashioned by the will of others, or left to the free expansion of nature and the inclinations of self-will.⁴

The inclusive approach to learning maintains that everything can be learned through prepared learning experiences.⁵

Definitions of terms other than those presented in this section will be made explicit as they appear in the text of the study itself.

> ¹Ibid., pp. 12-13. ²Ibid., p. 15. ³Ibid., p. 18. ⁴Ibid., p. 20. ⁵Ibid., pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER II

THE HABITUS OF FINE ART

The Habitus and the Intellect

The Habitus and Natural Gift

The term "virtue" is used in a philosophical sense in this study. The ancient philosophers referred to this type of virtue as a <u>habitus</u> or state of possession, an inner strength possessed by man.¹ The operative <u>habitus</u> is a stable disposition or inner force which is developed in the soul and which perfects its operative powers in a certain direction.² Being operative in nature, this kind of <u>habitus</u> is acquired through human effort or use.³ "Operative <u>habitus</u>, which attests the activity of the spirit, resides principally in an immaterial faculty, in the intelligence or will."⁴ Since reason takes place in the intellect, and since the intellect resides in the soul, the operative <u>habitus</u> is defined as intellectual virtue.⁵

¹Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and Clare Joseph Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u> (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1958; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 58-5769, n.d.), p. 47.

²Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and idem, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 38.

³Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10.

⁴Ibid., p. 11.

⁵Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 48-49. See chapter 1 above for the initial discussion of the operative <u>habitus</u> as intellectual virtue. Throughout the remainder of this study, the operative <u>habitus</u> The acquisition of the <u>habitus</u> is, in essence, a development of an inborn disposition or natural gift of the mind.¹ The natural gift or native capacity varies from man to man but in all men it is only a prelude to the intellectual virtue. Although indispensable to the acquired disposition, the inborn disposition must be cultivated and disciplined in a manner which reflects the spontaneous nature of the mind. Since the natural gift possesses a spontaneous nature, it is best developed through the spontaneous effort or personal activity of the one in possession of a given capacity.²

The Habitus and Habit

Maritain makes a distinction between the <u>habitus</u> and habit, a distinction which further defines the <u>habitus</u> as intellectual virtue. The <u>habitus</u>, in contrast to habit, is an exercise or use of intellectual powers which surpasses simple mechanical routine. This is the case because the <u>habitus</u> resides in the intellect of man and is subject to reason, not routine.³ Only living intellectual beings can acquire a habitus because they have the capability or reasoning power

will be referred to as the <u>habitus</u>. The adjective is unnecessary because this concept will consistently be used in the operative sense.

> ¹Maritain, "The Rules of Art," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 41. ²Ibid.

³Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 10-11; and Gerald C. Hay, Jr., <u>Maritain's Theory of Poetic Knowledge: A Critical Study</u> (Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1964; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 64-11,084, n.d.), p. 9. Hay refers to the <u>habitus</u> as operative habits; he refers to instinctual habits as customary habits. The variance in terminology is the choice of the researcher and does not change the essential meaning of the concepts as defined by Maritain. to elevate the level of their being through personal activity.1

Habit resides in the nerve centers and is attained through repetition or conditioning, which means that habit can be defined in terms of animal knowledge, that is, thinking without reason.² Cogitative reason, or animal reason, takes place in the memory and is observable through the empirical activity of habit.³ The <u>habitus</u> of man, which resides in the intellect, includes habit but goes beyond habit by retaining a sovereign power to make or break a habit through the movement of human will. The will is an integral part of the intellect, a capacity entirely lacking in animal intelligence.⁴ The activity of the <u>habitus</u>, which takes place in the intellect, goes beyond empiricism because the intellect is spiritual in nature and because it is moved by the will.⁵

The Habitus and the Practical Order of Art

The Practical Order and the Speculative Order

The <u>habitus</u>, or intellectual virtue, is divided into two categories or orders based upon the ends intended by man's use of his virtue. Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "knowing" belong to the speculative order, the best examples of which are science, knowledge through demonstration; and wisdom, knowledge through contemplation.⁶

Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "action" belong to the practical order which, in turn, has two parts: "making" and "doing."

¹Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 11. ²Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 12-13. ³Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 20. ⁴Ibid., p. 11. ⁵Ibid., p. 20. ⁶Maritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order,"

p. 5.

"Doing" is the exercise of man's free will for his personal "good" as a man, the sphere of morality, the primary virtue of which is prudence.¹ "Making" is man's productive action for the "good" of his work-to-bemade, the sphere of art.² Art is the determination of works-to-bemade while prudence is the determination of acts-to-be-done.³

Art is a <u>habitus</u>, an inner quality or deep-rooted disposition that raises the natural powers of the artist to a higher degree and gives him a possession of a certain strength entirely his own. Since the <u>habitus</u> resides in the soul, art also resides in the soul; since art is a virtue of the practical intellect, art and reason are related.⁴ The <u>habitus</u> of art is a virtue which sharpens an object to a point of perfection or operative efficiency. Conversely, while the object is being perfected, the artistic virtue within the intellect is also being perfected through the activity of art.⁵ The <u>habitus</u>, then, is both

¹Ibid., p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," pp. 7-8. The term "good" used in this sense refers to that which is desirable to man himself. See idem, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> <u>Artist</u>, pp. 26-27.

²Maritain, "Making and Doing," pp. 8-9; also see Samuel John Hazo, <u>An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain</u> (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1957; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 24,744, n.d.), pp. 10-11. The term "good" used in this sense refers to that which is desirable for the work-to-be-made. See Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 23-24.

³Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 9; and idem, <u>Art and Scholas-</u> <u>ticism</u>, p. 154, n. 5. This study is concerned with the practical order of virtues and the sphere of art within the practical order. The sphere of morality is discussed only in the context of its relationship to the art of performance. See chapter 5 below for this discussion.

⁴Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 48-49; also see Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 47.

⁵Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 12-13; and idem, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 194.

acquired <u>from</u> the creativity of art and applied <u>to</u> the creativity of art. The <u>habitus</u> of art is of the practical order because art is concerned with the productive activity of the practical intellect.

Generic Art and Fine Art

The realm of art is divided into the useful arts and the fine arts as determined by the intended end of the work.¹ The useful arts are subserviant or servile arts, ordered to the service of man; the fine arts are free or self-sufficient arts, each product of which is an end in itself.² The phrase "an end in itself" infers that a work of fine art is allowed to stand by itself with no particular use intended. This characteristic leads the fine arts to their most important end: beauty. Beauty gives the fine arts their aesthetic nature as opposed to the utilitarian nature of the useful arts.

Art in general tends to make a work. But certain arts tend to make a <u>beautiful</u> work, and in this they differ essentially from all the others. The work to which all the other [useful] arts tend is itself ordered to the service of man. . . The work to which the fine arts tend is ordered to beauty; as beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it suffices of itself. . . .

A difficulty of fine art is that beauty, while being an end in itself, cannot be <u>produced</u> as an intended end of a work. Art in general, as well as the fine arts in particular, intends to produce a good work

¹Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; idem, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 61, n. 13; idem, "Poetry and Beauty," in <u>Creative Intuition</u>, p. 175; and Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, pp. 14-15. Maritain's use of the phrase "end of the work" refers to the personal end towards which the artist is striving.

²Ibid.

³Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; also see Hanke, <u>Maritain's</u> <u>Ontology</u>, pp. 33-34. rather than a beautiful work.¹ Beauty is an end beyond the end and transcends the created object; beauty is not produced but is mirrored in the work.²

How, then, can the artist create a beautiful work when his personal intention is to make a good work? The answer to this question lies in the relationship between beauty and the intellect. The intellect has a natural desire to produce an object of beauty because of its spiritual nature. The intellect finds its delight in beauty and, left to the freedom of its nature, the intellect will strive for beauty. This means that when an artist creates an object, beauty will accompany the creative act because of the natural inclination of the artist's intellect. The creativity of the spirit is at the core of the fine arts and lies beyond the realm of the useful arts. Beauty, of itself, has no use, only the joy of the intellect in finding its delight in beauty <u>through</u> the making of an object it has willed to make.³

In the fine arts the general end of art is beauty. But in their case the work-to-be-made is not a simple matter to be ordered to this end, like a clock one makes for telling time or a boat one builds for the purpose of traveling on water.⁴

A paradox of fine art, then, is that the work tends toward beauty but beauty is not the intended objective. To achieve the transcendental end of his work, the artist must <u>love</u> what he is making and refuse to deviate from this conscious end. In this light, beauty becomes connatural to him and becomes a natural part of the product. If the artist

¹Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 173, n. 22
²Ibid., pp. 174-175.
³Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 55.
⁴Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 46.

is delighted, personally delighted, with what he is making, the intellect is moved by his will and is guided straightly to the making of the work.¹

Two crucial points concerning beauty and the fine arts need to be emphasized. First, the fine arts, because of their relationship to beauty--and the intellectual inclination toward beauty,² are free and must remain free in order to attain their transcendental end: beauty. Secondly, reason plays an essential but secondary role in the fine arts, secondary because the intellect inclines toward beauty but cannot produce it.³ Any attempt to produce beauty inevitably recedes into academicism because the latter fails to perceive beauty as a transcendental.⁴

A common error among aestheticians is to attribute the characteristics of the fine arts to the arts in general. This, in effect, makes the fine arts sacred and ignores the true relationship between the arts: making.⁵ Art is not confined to fine art alone, and the term "aesthetic" is not appropriate for art in general.⁶ The useful arts depend upon

¹Ibid., p. 47.

²Maritain also refers to this intellectual inclination as the "creativity of the spirit." See chapter 1 above, p. 11.

³Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.

⁴Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174. Maritain further asserts (ibid.) that academicism is a perversion of the fine arts. Chapter 3 below contains a more complete discussion of this concept.

⁵Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 46. In this study, the noun "making" is used synonymously with "producing" or "creating"; similarly, the "making of an object" is equated with "creating a work" or "producing a product." The interchange of these terms does not change the essential meaning of Maritain's philosophy of the arts.

⁶Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 195, n. 1.

being good for something else, that is, a particular service to man.¹

A common misconception at the other extreme is to make an overly rigid distinction between the fine arts and the useful arts. The division of the arts into such categories is taken from the ends pursued; however, the same art can achieve beauty and utility at the same time in spite of one end being primary to the work.² For example, architecture is at the service of man; nevertheless, a degree of structural beauty is an inevitable part of the final product. Music stands by itself as a fine art; however, the beauty of music inevitably attracts listeners and gives rise to the performance of music in the presence of a listening audience. ". . . it is not a question of whether <u>in fact</u> a work of useful art is beautiful or a work of fine art is useful, but rather of what is intended by the art--to what it is that a given art essentially tends."³

The <u>habitus</u> of art applies to the useful arts and the fine arts in a common fashion.⁴ Art in general tends to make a good work and the ways of making this work are instrumental to the work, the instrument of the <u>habitus</u>, and an integral part of the <u>habitus</u> of art.⁵ The <u>habitus</u> of fine art takes the essential step beyond the arts in general by

¹Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 175.

²Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 158, n. 40; idem, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 61-62; idem, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174; and idem, "Apropos an Article by Montgomery Belgion," in <u>Art and</u> <u>Scholasticism</u>, app. 4, p. 114.

³Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 34; also see Hay, <u>Maritain's</u> Theory, p. 18.

⁴Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.

⁵Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.

allowing its product to stand as unique in itself and, consequently, tending toward beauty. The <u>habitus</u> of fine art cannot produce beauty conceptually; rather, it captures beauty in an object it has willed to make. "The object of making is a trap to catch a transcendental."¹

The Habitus and the Rules of Art

The Rules of Art and the Rules of Fine Art

Maritain defines the rules of art as ways of making or the tools or means of art.² The rules are fixed rules, but they are not externally imposed on the artist and his art. The rules of art, then, are fixed within the artistic action, which means that the artist uses rules to suit needs peculiar to the ends of his work.

The rules of art, of which Maritain speaks, are spiritual in nature because they are a possession of the <u>habitus</u> of art.³ This explains the very personal nature of these rules, something more than a written list of directives. The spiritual rules exist only in the philosophical sense and in the roots of the virtue of art.⁴ These spiritual rules, which form the foundations of intellectual virtue, exist in the artist's intellect prior to the practical and technical manifestations of these rules.⁵ Since the spiritual rules exist in

¹Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174, n. 24.

²Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.

³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.

⁴Maritain also refers to these rules as "perennial rules" or "eternal laws" of art in his "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 57.

5_{Ibid}.

the artist's intellect, they are a personal possession of the artist to be applied to the artistic ends he has envisioned.

Properly speaking, he possesses them and is not possessed by them; he is not <u>held</u> by them, it is he who <u>holds</u>--through them--matter and the real; . . . he will act, not against the rules, but outside of and above them, in conformity with a higher rule and a more hidden order.¹

The higher rule, of which Maritain writes, is the primary rule of art, that is, a freeing of the creativity of the spirit to satisfy the need to create a work (a work toward which the will tends). Left to its inclination, the will tends to the good of the work, a work brought into existence by rules discovered by the intellect. In this way, the will and the intellect work together in observance of the primary rule. The rules discovered in the process of creation become a way or ways of making a particular object; and as these ways of making are applied, more discoveries are made and a constant birth and rebirth of ways or methods to improve or refine the final product takes place.²

The rules of fine art are the rules of art transfigured by beauty. The creativity of the spirit naturally tends toward beauty in the form of a work-to-be-made. The primary rule of the fine arts is to free the creativity of the spirit to pursue a desirable object, one which it wills to make through natural inclination.

Thus for the apprentice . . . composer the primary rule is to follow purely the pleasure of his . . . ears in the . . . sounds he will be responsible for; to respect the pleasure, and pay total attention to it; at every instant to produce nothing but what the senses are fully pleased with. For the creativity of the spirit, in its longing for beauty, passes through the senses.³

¹Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 39. ²Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 53-54. ³Ibid., p. 59. Reason alone is not enough to create an object which captures beauty. The will must be left free to its natural inclination; in other words, the artist must love, or be delighted in, what he is making. This is beyond reason but connatural with it.¹

Through the inclination toward beauty, a work of fine art is an end in itself, a unique product; therefore, each work demands a new or unique way of striving after the intended end. The rules are fixed or determined at the time of creation rather than in advance, and they are subject to perpetual renewal because the ways of capturing beauty are infinite.²

In comparison to the useful arts, the rules of the fine arts are more spiritual in nature because of their deeper relationship to the realm of the transcendental. The primary rule of fine art depends on the will to guide the reason; the rules are determined at the moment of creation through discovery, a unique approach to the uniqueness of the final product. Because beauty is infinite, the rules of fine art are subject to a renewal more exacting than the rules of useful art.³

The Rules of Art and Technique

Maritain insists that the spiritual rules of art exert control over the material rules or "conventional imperatives" of art,⁴ a position which is consistent with his view of the <u>habitus</u> as a controlling force over habit. The spiritual rules are the essence of the <u>habitus</u> and they elevate the meaning of "technique," a term which refers to

¹Ibid., p. 58. ²Ibid., pp. 56-57. ³Ibid., p. 56. ⁴Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 38.

the rules of art. Maritain's use of this term includes the material processes and manual skill of art but, above all, refers to the ways of operation of the intellectual sphere which the artist employs to attain the object of his art.¹ These intellectual ways of operation, then, are the spiritual rules of art, the essence of the <u>habitus</u>; the manual skill of art is equated with habit, a part of technique but subject to a higher rule, the primary rule of art; the material processes include the traditional rules of art which exist extrinsically and function as a resource for the primary rule.²

The <u>habitus</u> of art possesses certain fixed rules of operation; but they must be discovered along the way or at the moment of creation, as they are applied to the work, as they perfect it, and as they are adapted to the final product. The effort of discovery, or the <u>via</u> <u>inventionis</u>, requires solitude and is not learned from others.³ The

¹Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.

²Maritain does not refer to the spiritual rules and material rules as the constituents of two separate kinds of habitus; rather, he views them as two aspects of the same habitus. His concern is with the predomination of the primary rule, which is spiritual, and the subordination of the material rules, which are external, within the context of the habitus, the totality of which serves the object of art, the intended work. ". . . the practical science of the work to be made and (practical) art are not two distinct habitus [sic] but rather two formal aspects of the same habitus [sic]. However, one of these aspects may be more marked than the other in different particular cases; the art aspect predominates, e.g., in a Moussorgsky, or in some physician who frequently cures his patients and seems to work by rule of thumb; the science aspect predominates in a da Vinci, or in a physician who is more learned but effects fewer cures" ("'Speculative' and 'Practical,'" in Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959], app. 7, p. 464).

³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42; and Martini, <u>Maritain and</u> <u>Music</u>, p. 50. rules become discernible to the artist alone and are applied or adapted as <u>he</u> sees them and as the needs of <u>his</u> work spontaneously confront his intellect.¹

The discovered rules reach fulfillment through discipline, an intellectual discipline which strives for a personal balance between the internal effort of discovery and the external presence of traditional rules of art. The effort of discipline, or the <u>via disciplinae</u>, involves manual skill and the vast reservoir of material means from which the artist can draw to refine his product.² These rules, external to the product, must be adapted to the work as the artist sees it and applied in a way unique or new to the artist.³ If certain traditional rules do not meet the needs of the work at hand, they are not applied and remain external to the product.

There is no "proper proportion" between the <u>via inventionis</u> and the <u>via disciplinae</u> because the balance between the two will vary with the artist's ability and the requirements of the work pursued. There is overlap in the sense that the discovery of traditional rules renders them new to the artist and new to the product because they are applied in a unique way. There is also an important distinction:

The <u>via inventionis</u> is more intimately bound up with the primary rule. While the <u>via disciplinae</u> concerns itself more with the secondary rules of making.⁴

¹Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43.

²Ibid.; and Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 50.

³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45; and idem, <u>Art and Scholas-</u> <u>ticism</u>, p. 180, n. 91.

⁴Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 50.

The <u>via inventionis</u> is necessary for the inclinations of the creative intellect; the <u>via disciplinae</u> teaches the artist to be the master of his virtue and reduces the tendency toward artistic anarchy.¹

The elevated use of the term "technique" applies to all rules of art but gives priority to the internal, spiritual rules which are concerned with the primary rule and the end of the work. The external, material rules (including manual dexterity) are <u>used</u> to serve the work and the needs of the primary rule.

Technique, in its lower sense, subordinates the primary rule to the external rules and inverts the priorities. A facet of this inversion occurs through the temptation for technical display which is, in essence, a display of the artist's skills. Manual skill or dexterity is external to art in the formal sense; it exists to execute and externalize the spiritual rules of the work as discovered by the intellect.² If the primary intent of the artist is execution then the primary rule is surely neglected because of the inverted priorities; consequently, the perfection is directed at the artist's skill rather than the workto-be-made. Conversely, technique, in its higher sense, includes and requires a certain refinement of skill when the needs of a work demand that a particular skill be accomplished for the good of the work.

A second facet of technique, in its lower sense, occurs as discovered rules, by nature, tend to become recipes or formulas for the

¹Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43; and idem, <u>Art and Scholas-</u> ticism, pp. 179-180, n. 88.

²Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14. The term "formal sense" refers to the spiritual or intellectual nature of art.

future practice of art.¹ Packaged rules are aids to the further practice of art, but they are also obstacles to art, and to fine art in particular, because the artist's work demands to be good in itself rather than a copy of the previous work. The traditional rules of art are discovered rules which have become recipes or methods of making a work. These rules are important to the <u>via disciplinae</u>; however, a preoccupation with method veers toward academicism or rules for the sake of rules. Method, of itself, only provides relief from thinking, especially for those artists who wish to create but lack the desire to pursue the laborious demands of creativity.² In this sense, academicism inhibits art because academic rules are too limited, restricted, and narrow in scope to serve the primary rule of art. Reason is essential to art but mechanistic calculation is extrinsic to the spiritual nature of the habitus.³

Academicism and the Habitus

Academicism also inhibits the <u>habitus</u> in its development from the inborn capacity or natural gift of art.⁴ A reliance upon external rules to develop the <u>habitus</u> is contrary to the internal nature of the <u>habitus</u>. This is because the <u>habitus</u> is a living rule based upon

²Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40.

³Hay, <u>Maritain's Theory</u>, pp. 19-20.

⁴Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 41-42.

¹Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 54. ". . even in the useful arts, the rules are not ready-made recipes, taught by professors in schools and museums, but vital ways of operating discovered by the creative eyes of the intellect in its very labor of invention" (ibid., pp. 53-54).

living, personal experiences and is formed as such within the mind.¹ Apart from the <u>habitus</u>, rules are extrinsic to the mind and to the work. An instructor might fill a student's mind with academic rules of art, and the student may work hard to apply them; nevertheless, the student may also never become an artist because a knowledge of rules does not imply actual <u>possession</u> of such rules internally.² In other words, a mere knowledge of rules does not insure that an artist is able to apply them to the internal needs of a work. Carefully devised formulas for art remove the burden of thought, the originality of creation and, ultimately the experience of art itself.³

The problem is posed for the modern artist in an insane manner, as a choice between the senility of academic rules and the primitiveness of natural gift; with the latter, art does not yet exist, except in potentiality; with the former, it has ceased to exist at all. Art exists only in the living intellectuality of the <u>habitus</u>.

The acquisition of the <u>habitus</u> is a deepening of the mind, an indirect result of the practice of art or the relationship of the artist to his object. The natural gift of art, which is also intellectual or spiritual, serves and enhances the development of the <u>habitus</u>, together giving the artist a unique intellectual power to make works.⁵

²Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40. ³Ibid. ⁴Ibid., p. 41.

⁵Ibid. The natural gift, to which Maritain refers, is a gift of the mind, a possession of the intellect. The physical

¹Ibid., p. 40. Hay appears to contradict Maritain on this matter, as exemplified in the following quotation: "The rules of art exist for the purpose of establishing the artistic <u>habitus</u> in the artist" (<u>Maritain's Theory</u>, p. 21). By itself, the above quotation is ambiguous. The statement is true <u>if</u> the artist discovers the rules in question through his making of an object. If, however, the rules exist prior to the creative attempt, the threat of academicism is present because of the external nature of academic rules.

The acquisition of the <u>habitus</u>, then, is synonymous with the development of the habitus.

In contradistinction to the case of Giotto or Moussorgsky, the case of Mozart provides us with the classic example of how fruitful can be the union of natural gift (and what a gift!) and <u>education</u>--the earliest, most perfect and most intense rational cultivation of the habitus.¹

The above quotation reveals something more of Maritain's view of the <u>habitus</u> and its development. Giotto and Moussorgsky acquired the <u>habitus</u> of art through the solitude and personal effort of the <u>via</u> <u>inventionis</u>. By contrast, Mozart combined his natural gift with the <u>via disciplinae</u> of tradition taught him by a master musician. This sort of education is the education of apprenticeship which contrasts with the academy and the type of academic training which teaches certain rules of--or approaches to--art as a prerequisite to the practice of art. Mozart, through the <u>via inventionis</u> of his mind, began with works and not with rules. In this way, the <u>via disciplinae</u>, in conjunction with a great gift, immediately served the practice of art, coinciding in the cultivation of a <u>habitus</u> of great strength and depth.²

This is precisely the reason why Maritain concluded that the artists who expend the most effort to accumulate academic rules of art are often the least capable of applying them to a work, that is, creating a work of art.³

ability of the artist to competently execute a work pertains to the material externalization of an internal structure willed by the <u>habitus</u>. Physical ability, then, serves the intellectual gift; but, in its own realm, it is of equal importance to art.

> ¹Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 179, n. 86. ²Ibid.; and idem, "The Rules of Art," pp. 42-43. ³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42.

From this point of view one must deplore the substitution . . . of the academic teaching of the schools for corporate apprenticeship. By the very fact that art is a virtue of the practical intellect, the mode of teaching that by nature belongs to it is apprenticeship-education, the working-novitiate under a master and in the presence of the real, not lessons distributed by professors; and, to tell the truth, the very notion of a <u>School of Fine Arts</u>, especially in the sense in which the modern body politic understands this phrase, conceals as deep a misunderstanding of things as the notion, for instance, of an Advanced Course in Virtue.¹

Maritain's conception of the academic professor can be defined in terms of one who teaches certain rules of--or approaches to--art and expects his students to create works using these rules, thus indirectly dictating the results. Maritain views the master teacher as one who first respects the will of his students in their intent to make a certain work and then assists and supervises the achievement of the desired result. The student provides the bulk of the <u>via inventionis</u>--because it is <u>his</u> work--and the instructor provides the bulk of the <u>via dis-</u> <u>ciplinae</u>, the result being an actual product and not a fabrication. The instructor teaches a discipline by showing and correcting, through his personal example of artistic practice; the student learns his discipline by imitating the example and practicing or perfecting it for application to his work.²

1_{Ibid}.

²Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 177-179, n. 85.

CHAPTER III

THE AIM OF PERFORMANCE

The Fine Arts and Performance

Musical performance is a fine art and the aim of performance is defined in terms of the fine arts. Performance, as an art, is primarily concerned with making an object, a musical work created through the aural production and perception of music. Performance, as a fine art, is intent upon creating a musical work and aiming at an aural end which stands by itself, "disinterested," to delight the performers who are the makers of the work.¹

The beauty of a musical work, as an end beyond the end, delights the intellect through the sense of hearing;² therefore, the aural nature of music defines performance as an aural art within the realm of the fine arts. Crucial to the aim of performance is the performer's satisfaction with the sound of the work he is performing. His work reflects beauty when he is delighted with it, an experience attributable to the fine arts in general.³

²Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 13. The senses of taste, touch, and scent also provide pleasure to man but do not delight the intellect. Only the senses of sight and hearing delight the intellect of man and, consequently, are the windows through which beauty can be experienced. The former are a kind of good but not a kind of beauty. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.

³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 47.

¹Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontol-ogy</u>, p. 12. A "disinterested" musical work is desired for itself by the performer and is not a work created to please others or with a concern for others (in the primary sense).

The aim of performance, then, is to create a good work through the sound of music, a pleasing sound being the primary end of performance and the object from which beauty transcends.¹

Beauty and Performance

Transcendental Beauty and Aesthetic Beauty Transcendental beauty is the presence of beauty in all things; it permeates everything and is found everywhere. All things contain a degree of goodness and all things are beautiful in their own way.²

At this point it may be added that in the eyes of God all that exists is beautiful, to the very extent to which it participates in being. For the beauty that God beholds is transcendental beauty, which permeates every existent, to one degree or another.³

God alone sees the perfection and infinity of beauty, beauty as an absolute. Man is limited to the beauty his senses perceive and through which, as a result, not all things are beautiful. "The beauty which is connatural to man must, then, be grasped by the activity of the senses in union with intelligence."⁴ This kind of beauty is aesthetic beauty.⁵

¹A good work is one which is pleasing to the performer.

²Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; and idem, "Art and Beauty," pp. 30-31. A metaphysical discussion of beauty is beyond the scope of this study; however, a brief comparison of transcendental beauty to aesthetic beauty is necessary to help clarify the relationship of beauty to performance.

³Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; also see idem, "The Ways of the Practical Intellect," in <u>Approaches to God</u>, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 84-86.

⁴Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 28.

⁵Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," pp. 163-164. The definition of beauty given in chapter 1 is based upon the intuitive perception of beauty which is analogous to aesthetic beauty.

Aesthetic beauty is transcendental beauty confronting the intellect of man through sense perception; consequently, things are divided into the beautiful or ugly depending upon whether they please or displease the intellect-permeated sense.¹ This is the aesthetic experience. The limitation of the aesthetic experience is that man may not recognize the beauty of an object because his senses may completely miss the presence of beauty in the object confronting him. "Not every person sees beauty in the same object or under different conditions or even at different times."² Aesthetic beauty is limited to a particular participation in the infinity of transcendental beauty.

The fine arts attempt to absorb transcendental beauty into the realm of aesthetic beauty, not by creating a concept but by creating an object. Since only God can see absolute perfection, the object of fine art is limited to the imperfection of the artist; consequently, no work of art can achieve absolute perfection.

The above paragraph is a synthesis of three important points. First, the spiritual nature of transcendental beauty cannot be produced as conceptual beauty, an entity in itself. Beauty, as a concept, is beyond man's understanding and is revealed to him only through the aesthetic experience, a minute glimpse of a universe and an experience which is nonconceptual in nature.³

¹Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 164; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's</u> <u>Ontology</u>, p. 28.

²Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 27; also see Hay, <u>Maritain's</u> <u>Theory</u>, pp. 13-14. According to Hazo (<u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 29), the ability to experience beauty is directly proportionate to the sensitivity of the beholder.

³Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 27.

Secondly, a work of art cannot be purely or totally disinterested because the artist cannot work in a void to attain his object. He must draw upon the world through sensory experience to practice his art, to make his object which <u>becomes</u> disinterested to him as it progresses to a unique end.¹ An artist cannot create a disinterested object conceptually because he cannot create beauty conceptually. The relationship between the two lies within the realm of the transcendentals; a disinterested object reflects beauty.

Thirdly, since aesthetic beauty is never totally perfect, an object of art always leaves something more to be desired. An artist strives for perfection but never quite reaches the absolute summit of his work. This lack of perfection functions as an incentive to reach beyond reason toward disinterestedness and adds a certain mysterious element to the creative process. Obviously, absolute perfection would leave nothing more to be desired and no mystery to be solved.²

The foregoing discussion makes implicit several important considerations for musical performance. The relationship of beauty to performance depends upon the aural experience of music because the aesthetic beauty of music is revealed to the performer through the aural experience, the sound being the object from which beauty is mirrored.

The object of performance is not a concept of created beauty but, rather, a certain sound of music from which beauty is reflected. A performed work can never achieve absolute perfection because it is limited

¹Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 73.
²Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 167.

to the aesthetic inclinations of the performer. On one hand, it is possible to perform a work without the delight or intellectual joy associated with aesthetic beauty; and, on the other hand, the performer must follow his personal delight with the sound of his performed music if the spontaneous or unpredictable inclination toward uniqueness and disinterestedness is to be achieved in the work. Without intellectual joy, the transcendental beauty of a work will remain muted to the performer's ear.

In pursuit of the intellectual joy of making, the performer expects to be delighted in the sound of his performed work-in-progress; however, sounds may occur which actually offend his aural sense.¹ For example, modern or contemporary music may offend the aural sense at first hearing because of the unusual complexity of such music, especially if the ear is unaccustomed to the sound of such music. Conversely, the same music may delight the aural sense of another performer, a proof of the very personal nature of sensory perception. Furthermore, that particular sound which may at first shock the aural sense may become acceptable and pleasing later as the ear-permeated intellect becomes accustomed to the sound of such music.² The aesthetic experience, then, is unpredictable from performer to performer as well as within the intellect of the performer himself.

Each creative act of performance moves toward disinterestedness but never becomes totally disinterested. A performer can never be certain of what new heights of aural experience each performance may bring; each new glimpse of transcendental beauty provides incentive to pursue

> ¹Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 43. ²Ibid., p. 44.

the next glimpse, which lies somewhere beyond the performer's intuitive grasp of beauty.¹

Academicism and Beauty

Artistic attempts to make beauty positive rather than intuitive veer toward academicism, which relies on method or formula to produce beauty.² Academicism in performance strives to remove the elusive nature of sound as an object of creation and the mysterious relationship of sound to the beauty if reflects. Accordingly, this kind of positivism tries to make positive what is not positive and belies an ignorance of the nature of transcendental beauty. If the artist could produce his own beauty, it would no longer be a transcendental; if beauty is not a transcendental, it could be reliably produced by artists who "understand" the mystery of beauty.

The truth of the matter is derived from a limitation; man is limited to aesthetic beauty, the beauty of sensory experience. Sensory experience is a limitation because man can perceive beauty only as a reflection of a created object. Music, then, has a certain sound as its object and beauty is reflected from the sound heard by the musician.

The academicism of performance focuses upon the printed score as an object of beauty and attempts to produce beauty through a proficient reproduction of the score. Consequently, such preoccupation with a written score shifts the artistic emphasis from aural experience to visual experience. If visual mechanics become the object of performance, a

²Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174.

¹Sense intuition is intellectualized sense perception; it is not logical and not something to be planned or solved. Hazo, <u>Maritain's</u> <u>Aesthetic</u>, pp. 35-37.

performer may proficiently execute a musical sequence while completely missing the beauty reflected by the sound of the exercise. Conversely, if a certain sound is the object of performance, the score will serve as the vehicle or instrument of that sound; hence, a visual certainty is subordinated to an aural uncertainty.

The academicist attempts to define what is beautiful in conceptual terms while, in effect, denying that the aesthetic experience is nonconceptual in nature. Such a practice also denies the personal nature of the aesthetic by attempting to provide beauty for a performer as if it could be a simple matter of reproducing the score. A degree of transcendental beauty is present in every musical work, but the question of whether this beauty will reveal itself to the musician can be answered only through the obscure, personal actuality of the aesthetic experience. The true academicist must deny the mystery of transcendental beauty and the unpredictability of aesthetic beauty to preserve his academic method; the true artist must deny the positivism of conceptual beauty to preserve the spontaneous, intellectual joy of the aesthetic experience.

Because the aesthetic experience of music is rooted in aural perception, the performer's experience of beauty is subjective in nature. A performer may capture beauty in the sound of a work, but he cannot simply produce it by mere reproduction of a score, a way of focusing upon beauty as a conceptual object of music. The aim of performance is a created object, the sound of a musical work which reflects beauty for the performer to perceive aesthetically. In this respect, beauty is an end beyond the end, an end captured intuitively or non-

conceptually as the sound of the musical work is being perfected. Beauty, as a concept, is not a direct aim of performance.

Technique and Performance

Manual Skill and Performance

The technique of performance is inextricably tied to the art of performance. This is especially true in the case of technical dexterity or the execution of the performance product. The skill of performance removes a physical obstruction to art and enables the performer to externalize his product or produce the sound of his work, the sound being the intended object.

The labor through which the zither player acquires nimbleness of finger does not increase his art as such nor does it engender any special art; it simply removes a physical impediment to the exercise of art: . . . art stands entirely on the side of the mind.¹

The performer's skill is necessary to carry out the primary rule which is in the intellect.² The execution of performance, then, is a means to an end, the end being a particular sound which has evolved from the primary rule of art and which must be externalized to become the aural experience of music.

If the aim of performance is execution, the means become the object and display for the sake of display is inevitable. The display of performance skill is a constant temptation to the virtuoso or refined performance group.³ Display tends toward trickery and athleticism to

¹Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; also see Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 52; and Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 10.

²Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 52.

³Ibid., p. 186.

capture the admiration of an audience, a practice which betrays a concern with pleasing others rather than a concern with producing a pleasing work.¹ Musical display can also mask a lack of connaturality with the beauty of a musical work because the performer's concern is with the sound of his skill rather than the sound of the work.² Consequently, an impressive display can mask an unimpressive artistic intent.

Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to say that a refined skill is unnecessary. A well developed performance skill greatly enhances the sound of a work, but it must be at the service of the work itself. The point is that a good technician is not necessarily a good artist. A physical command of an instrument lends itself well to pleasing others; therefore, it must remain at the service of the primary rule and under the control of the <u>habitus</u>, which seeks to make a good work rather than a good performer. The physical dexterity of the artist is simply an external and material requirement of art.³

How does the skilled instrumentalist or vocalist serve the needs of a musical work? First, he must heed the creativity of the spirit in determining what the work demands and be undeviating with the direction his performance activity must take to meet these demands.

Secondly, the performing musician must be prepared to subordinate himself to the creation of a musical work. For example, a powerful soprano must be able to sing softly and without prominence when the work demands it; a high-register trumpeter may need to develop a complimentary low register to meet the needs of a work; the instrumentalist who dazzles

¹Ibid., pp. 191-192. ²Ibid., p. 186.

³Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; and Hay, <u>Mari-</u> tain's Theory, p. 10.

his admirers with his fingering facility may find long tones with a corresponding quality necessary to a certain work.

Thirdly, the performer must recognize the difference between a work performed to display an instrument or voice and a work performed for itself, but with an emphasis on an instrument or voice. In the latter case, the instrument <u>is</u> an instrument serving the performed work while, in the former case, the work serves the instrument and falls into the emptiness of means.

A skilled performer is highly qualified to carry out his service to a work of art; however, if this service becomes self-serving, the creativity of the spirit is confined and reduced by the enhancement of the ego.

Academic Rules and Performance

The academic rules of performance--the traditional rules of performance are included within the academic framework--are a technique related to the physical skill of performance. These rules may, in fact, use skill as a means to its ends, ends which are also a means of art. The difference is that academic rules are more intellectual, but the similarity is that they are also material rules, external to the primary rule of art.

Academic rules are packaged rules which confront the performer with such traditional approaches to art as: the correct way to express a phrase; the proper interpretation of a style; or the right concept of tone quality. The problem associated with academic rules appears when a possible way to create in a given situation becomes <u>the right</u> way to create in all situations. This is academicism or rules for the sake of rules.¹

Academicism threatens the <u>via inventionis</u> of performance because the rules tend to be applied in a stringent fashion to all musical works. The prototypal application of rules is natural to art because the sensory experience of art cannot draw upon a void to attain its object. But when the <u>via inventionis</u> is dominated by the <u>via disciplinae</u>, the product of performance becomes more of a stereotyped preconception than a unique object of art. "To the extent that the rules of the Academy prevail, the fine arts revert to the generic type of art and to its lower species, the mechanical arts."²

Rules for the sake of rules can be expressed as "art for the knowledge of rules." Art for conceptual knowledge is of the speculative order and is contrary to the nonconceptual, practical order of making.³ The activity of art is one of creation rather than procurement of conceptual knowledge, a knowledge of academic rules.⁴ Art utilizes knowledge to create; knowledge is an instrument of art.⁵

¹See chapter 2 above, p. 27.
²Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 48.
³See chapter 2 above, p. 15.

⁴Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," in <u>The Situation of</u> <u>Poetry</u>, in collaboration with Raissa Maritain, trans. Marshall Suther (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 49.

⁵Ibid. This brief consideration of conceptual knowledge is concerned with the <u>habitus</u> of art and does not enter the Maritain treatment of poetic knowledge, a subject beyond the scope of this study. "The habitus [<u>sic</u>] of art produces its fruit in the practical <u>judgment</u> on the work to be made; poetic knowledge, in the <u>work done</u>" (ibid., p. 64, n. 14). Conceptual knowledge may be presupposed to art but it is extrinsic to it.¹ Art does not intend to form a mind by an object-to-be-known; instead, the mind intends to form an object and, through the practice of art, form itself as well.² Rules, or the knowledge of rules, are an instrument of art and extrinsic to the activity of art.

Performance for the knowledge of performance is a simple accumulation of ways to perform. The conscious concern is with how to apply conceptual rules to the performance of a work, the obvious lack being the artistic vision necessary to visualize intellectually the work-tobe-performed. In other words, vision ensures that the art of performance begins with an object-to-be-made and not a means-to-be-applied. The means of performance are fixed at the time work on the musical selection begins because they become known as the sound of the selection makes itself known to the performer.

Accumulating conceptual rules of art is dissimilar to acquiring the <u>habitus</u> of art.³ An artist who knows the most about art may be the

¹Ibid., p. 50. It is not intended to infer that conceptual knowledge is a prerequisite to art. A knowledge of a certain aspect of art is gained through the artistic experience and is available for further use, as a part of the expanding habitus of art. Nevertheless, a product of art is made nonconceptually and without dependence upon conceptual knowledge.

²Ibid.; and idem, "On Human Knowledge," in <u>The Range of Reason</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952; paperback ed., [1961]), p. 17.

³Following the completion of a performed work, the performer can extract his material methods of execution from the score for conceptual use. In other words, after the work is established or "'situated,' the author can employ without disadvantage the special charm to be found in the barbarism of technical terms" (Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 188, n. 116). The material analysis of a score belongs to the speculative order of knowledge and should not be confused with the initial material application of rules to a work. The rules become an internal part of the work at the service of the habitus, in its operative intent to

least able to apply his knowledge to a work being pursued.¹ In musical performance, this occurs because the performer, while able to create various musical sounds, is reluctant to deviate from his known sound creations to find that <u>unique</u> sound which applies to the work being performed.

To become an internal part of the performance product, external rules must be a discovered necessity of the work at hand, a discovery made by the performer as he himself performs the work. What follows is a new adaptation of certain fundamental or perennial rules to the work which becomes an internal part of a unique product.² In this way, old rules learned from past performances become new again.

The material rules of performance serve the spiritual rules, and the primary (spiritual) rule serves the object of performance, the sound of the musical work. This is because the release of the creativity of the spirit is closely tied to artistic vision, and the artist envisions the work as a whole, not a set of rules-to-be-followed.³ Technique is the ensemble of both material and spiritual rules;⁴ therefore, it cannot be a primary aim of performance.

Academic Rules and the Conductor

Academic rules present a special problem for the conductor of a performance group because, besides being the primary maker of the work,

make a work, to practice art. The abstraction of material rules from the work brings them back to their external position; at this point, they are rules and nothing more than rules.

¹See chapter 2 above, p. 28.
²Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45.
³Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, pp. 181-182, n. 95.
⁴Ibid., p. 176, n. 79.

he is responsible for the artistic experiences of the group members. It is the conductor who is responsible, for the <u>via inventionis</u> and the <u>via</u> <u>disciplinae</u> of the work the group is creating; necessities of the work are determined and applications of rules are made as he sees them. This is a special situation. <u>If</u> the design of the work were to move in the various directions desired by each group member, artistic anarchy would result. The needs of the work itself could be entirely missed in the conductor's efforts to please his group membership.

The responsibility of the conductor, then, is the same as that of a performer, but in a higher sense. He is primarily responsible to the creation and perfection of a musical work and secondarily responsible for the artistic experiences of the performers involved.

The latter responsibility is important because the performers are artists and not slaves. The conductor must constantly consider the performers' involvement in the making of the product. Are they able follow the artistic innovations the conductor is applying to the work? If the performers can sense that the conductor's artistic innovation and discipline--through the instrumentality of the group--is perfecting the work, they become a personal part of the practice of art.

On the other hand, if the conductor's expectations are selfserving, or serve another master (academic rules), the performers become removed from making and lose the connaturality with beauty so vital to the fine arts. In this case, the conductor's personal connaturality with his product must also be questioned. Without the primary responsibility to the work, the secondary responsibility to the performing group is obstructed by expectations external to art.

Since performance is a re-creation as well as a creation of music, composed works are generally presented to the conductor through a written score. A written score requires a visual interpretation, that is, an assessment through a knowledge of means as a prerequisite to the aural experience. The object of performance, however, cannot be attained apart from the aural experience; therefore, a score is only a potential work for performance and contains only the potentiality of beauty for the performer. It is an instrument of the conductor which he uses to create the object, the sound of the work.

A knowledge of re-creation lends itself to the oversimplification of exact reproduction and thwarts the aim of art through the copymaking of an established work.¹ If the conductor's aim stops at this point, the performance will fall short of the ends necessary to the creativity of art. A conductor's aim to create a good work depends upon the delight or enjoyment he derives from the sound of the work as he conducts it. Beauty cannot delight the artist's intellect unless he puts something of himself into the work and, as a result, allows the re-creative activity to become intertwined with creative activity.²

When the concern of the conductor is the object of performance, re-creation and creation occur simultaneously; if his primary concern is with the means of score interpretation, re-creation is isolated from creation and is doomed to the sterility of impersonality, the motions of performance. Furthermore, the contemplation of a musical score is secondary to performance because the aural experience of music exists

¹Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 54-57.

²Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u> in <u>Art and Scholasticism and</u> the Frontiers of Poetry, p. 126.

therein as a potentiality and not as an object. The comtemplative activity of the mind belongs to the speculative of knowledge rather than the practical order of art.¹

A problem of academicism is that the artist who possesses rules, through a knowledge of rules, may be unable to apply them to the individuality of a work of art.² The artist's preoccupation with method is a hindrance to his art because rules are held in a higher esteem than the composition itself. A dogmatic loyalty to fixed traditional rules is unyielding or inflexible in the face of the spontaneous demands of creation. The demands of a musical work are unpredictable due to the aural nature of performance. The artist's concern with method considerably narrows the scope of the work and attempts to narrow the infinity of beauty as a result.³

The dilemma of the conductor, then, is serving the needs of a work through the primary rule of art while, at the same time, considering the artistic needs of the performers who are making the work through the externalization of the conductor's directives.

Communication and Performance

Communication in a work of art occurs when the artist "says something" to a perceiver of the work. It involves a communication of effect, nonconceptual in nature.⁴ The problem of communication is whether the artist intends such communication or whether communication is inherent

> ¹Maritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order, pp. 5-6. ²See pp. 42-43 above.

³Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 44.

⁴Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.

in a work of art.

The Maritain position on communication in art is consistent with his general position toward foreign elements or external threats to art.¹

. . . the activity of art is not related in itself to a need of communicating to others (this need is real and in fact intervenes inevitably in artistic activity, but it does not <u>define</u> it); it is related essentially to the need of speaking and manifesting in a work-to-be-made--by virtue of spiritual superabundance and even though there were no one to see or hear. . . .²

The quoted passage reinforces what has been said concerning the artist's first priority in his work, that is, his self-satisfaction with what he is making.³ In this sense, a work may present an obscure significance but resists any claims to a definite internal meaning.⁴ The externalization of the product involves communication but not necessarily a direct desire to communicate anything beyond the physical substance of the work itself.⁵ Furthermore, the physical presence of the work brings the artist's vision to the consciousness of the artist himself, also obscurely.⁶ This is because the meaning of the work surpasses the physical product and presents a certain difficulty for the artist in his attempts to conceptualize what he has intended. It becomes evident that a perceiver is confronted with a certain obscurity, more or less, which should not be misrepresented as any sort of definite meaning for perceivers in general.

An artist's concern with being understood or misunderstood is beside the point. He creates first for himself, and his product must be

²Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.
³See chapter 2 above, pp. 18 and 23.
⁴Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 92.
⁵Ibid., p. 99.

¹See ibid.

left to stand by itself as a work of art.¹ Whether the work is accepted or rejected by others is an external concern and involves a question of the use of a product rather than the making of the product.²

The communication of effect involves emotion, either the emotional expression of the artist or the emotional perception of the listener. There are two kinds of emotion in music: the intellectual joy or delight of perception; and a subjective emotion, a result of the first kind.³ This means that the expression and apprehension of beauty involves subjective emotion or personal feelings, a result of the joy or delight of the intellect in the perception of beauty in a work.⁴

¹Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.

²Martini (Maritain and Music, p. 67) criticizes popular music for its intent to communicate certain sensual qualities to listeners. This seems to be a weak criticism of such music because it is based upon the assumption that (1) all popular music has such intent; and (2) only popular music depends upon the sensory experience for a connaturality of sound to the intellect of the listener. In respect to the latter assumption, it is true that much popular music is simple in content and repetitious by nature; but this, in itself, cannot be equated with the communication of sensuality. The simplicity of music is more connatural to the average listener, and the repetition of music makes it easier for the intellect to "find itself" and be delighted by the musical sounds. By contrast, complex musical sounds are apt to be less connatural to the average listener, at least until his aural-permeated intellect grows accustomed to the sound of such music. Obviously, such music tends to be less popular. In respect to the former assumption, a phase of popular music does appear to aim at intentional communication: commercial music. Commercial music is written primarily to please others; that is, the makers of such music intend to make a work which "sells" rather than a work which stands by itself as an object of art. Popular music, however, is not necessarily commercial music because works created for themselves can become popular without such intent--again, the question of use as opposed to creative intent applies here. If music created for itself becomes popular, it matters little that it pleases others in addition to the artist.

³Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 147.

⁴Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 50.

Maritain terms the body of a work as the culmination of all the technique which produced the externalized product; the soul of a work is the operative idea, spiritual in nature, the realm of the <u>habitus</u> of art; the spirit of a work is the internal expression not under the conscious control of the artist.¹ Normally, the body (technique) is the instrument of the soul (<u>habitus</u>), and the spirit (personal expression) is a component part of the soul.²

"Magic" enters a work when the spirit separates from the soul and controls both the body and the soul of the work.³ "Magic" in a work is the superabundance of internal expression, emotion, passion, or affect in a work which deepens the subjectivity of its content and provides emotive power to a perceiver.⁴

It is important to note that magic, in this sense, is not a conscious component of the artist's intent. Magic may or may not enter a work and is variable from work to work and from artist to artist. The problem of magic occurs when an artist seeks it in his work and diverts his attention from the concerns of the <u>habitus</u> of art. To strive after magic in music is to strive toward an effect, an effect rooted in affect and external to the created product.⁵ To seek after magic forces a fabrication of the product of art.⁶

¹Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," in <u>Art and Poetry</u>, trans. E. de P. Matthews (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 99.

²Ibid. ³Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁴Maritain, "The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," in Creative Intuition, pp. 402-403.

⁵Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 163.

⁶Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 101.

If the artist's first concern is with the good of the work, the emotive content is not entirely subjective. In other words, when the aim is toward making a good work, the intellect works with emotion in structuring the work and, as a result, the emotional content is neither entirely objective (depicted) or entirely subjective (expressed).¹ The fine arts purify passion by developing it within the limits of beauty and in harmony with the intellect.² Thus, the magic in a work is obscurely intertwined with the intellectual soul of the work.

Whatever magic is conjured up the man's imagination, passions and emotions will be subject to the light of the intellect. Whatever is <u>vital</u> in magical thought will remain--what is magical will disappear.³

A work of art, then, can communicate an emotional effect without aiming at such an effect.⁴

It is perfectly true that art has the <u>effect</u> of inducing in us affective states, but this is not its <u>end</u> or its <u>object</u>: a fine distinction, if you will, but still an extremely important one. Everything gets out of hand if one takes as the end that which is simply a <u>conjoined</u> effect or a repercussion, and if one makes of the <u>end</u> itself . . . a simple means. . . .

Communication has a natural part in the creative experience but it is not the specified object of art, either for one who creates for effect or one who perceives for effect.⁶

¹Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, pp. 75-77.
²Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
³Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 192.
⁴Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
⁵Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 204, n. 138.
⁶Ibid., p. 205.

The aural experience of musical performance lends itself well to the communication of effect.¹ A performer can bring a tear to the eye through the beauty of his music; he can shock a listener with dissonance; or he can leave an audience awestruck with the power of his music. These kinds of experiences can occur without such intent and as a <u>result</u> of the sound of the work, created for itself. To avoid aiming at such effect, the performer must perform as if no one were listening to his music except he, the artist. The music will communicate something of the performer, obscurely, and may leave its effect upon the listener spontaneously and unintentionally.

. . . the magic in performance is quite indispensable since the nature of music demands its execution in time. Therefore, is there any performance without some magic, no matter how meager? Is not the personality of the performing artist or lack of it thus displayed?²

The nature of performance is such that the presence of magic is inevitable and unavoidable, but to aim at such effect is to aim away from the product of performance. The communication of performance, then, is a component of, but not an object of, musical performance.³

1". . . the possibility of magic exists in music to a higher degree than in the other arts: since music, taken in its nature, even before any consideration of magic, has the peculiar privilege . . . of expressing--beyond any possible meaning of words--the most deeply subjective, singular and affective stirs of creative subjectivity, too deep-seated to be possibly expressed by any other art" (Maritain, "The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," p. 404).

²Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 186.

³A product of sound, pleasing to the performer, is the aim or formal object of performance. The formal object of performance is in contrast with the material object which simply intends to execute the written score. The aim of performance, then, transcends material execution and, in fact, submits the material object to the exigencies of the formal object. Consequently, the rules of execution are right or correct because they externalize sounds which please the performer and guide him in the direction of his formal object. In other words, the aim of performance is achieved by the submission of the art of performance to a work, the movement being in a direction which aurally satisfies or delights the performer.

"To say that art must be submissive to the object is therefore to say that it must be submissive to the object to be made as such or to the right rules of operation thanks to which this object will truly be what it ought to be. (Academicism with its recipes, pseudo-classicism with its clichés and its mythology, Wagnerism with its worship of effect, all fail in this submissiveness)" (Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 225, n. 185).

CHAPTER IV

THE ACTION OF PERFORMANCE

Artistic Judgment and Performance

The performer is a creator of music; moreover, he is a re-creator of music as well. The performer is a re-creator when he begins his art with a work created by another artist, that is, a composition or arrangement written by a composer and printed on a score. The performer becomes the window--perhaps a stained glass window--through which a composition shines.¹ The intent of the work, and the composer, is commingled with the self-expression of the performer, another way of saying that the creation and re-creation of performance are inextricable.²

The re-creation of a work for performance begins with a judgment of what the composer intended when he created the work. Artistic judgment is never absolute because the performer cannot be entirely positive about a composer's intent, a degree of obscurity being a part of every created work.³ However, to be legitimate, a performer's intentions in re-creating a work must be faithful to the composer's intentions, so far as they are known and perceived by the performer.⁴ Obviously, several interpretations are possible and even the best interpretation is only a probability.⁵

¹Martini, <u>Maritain and Music</u>, p. 129.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁴Hay, <u>Maritain's Theory</u>, p. 64.
⁵Ibid.

The judgment of a composed work occurs in two dimensions (separate yet related). A visual contemplation of the score is the beginning of a judgment and a reflection upon, or assessment of, symbolic language through which something of the composer's intent is grasped.¹ Score contemplation involves conceptual knowledge and concerns the material means by which the work was composed. Such an assessment of means, by itself, inclines toward academicism because the compositional mechanics can be accurately identified and readily applied to a conceptual vision of the work. If, however, artistic judgment ceases at this point, the inner, spiritual mystery of the work is muted and less likely to be revealed to the performer.

The second and primary phase of artistic judgment is the aural perception of the work by the performer. In this dimension, the performer is a perceiver, a listener as well as a maker. The aural perception of a work generally begins when the act of performance, the making of the work, begins.² To judge by perception, the performer must be open to what the work conveys through sound; that is, judgment by perception requires a prior consent to the sound of the work before the inner work, the composer's intentions, reveals itself to the performer.³ Judgment by perception is intuitive and less positive

¹Vision, in this sense, refers to score contemplation through the sense of sight.

²Judgment by aural perception is possible apart from the action of performance; however, listening, by itself, cannot approach the depth of aural perception required by the performing (artistic) experience. In judging a composed work, perceptive listening goes beyond conceptual contemplation but falls short of creative perception.

³"We must listen to the interiority of the work . . . [and] be open to what it conveys. . . And this requires a sort of previous, tentative consent. . . to the work and to the [artist's] intentions. . ." (Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," in <u>Creative Intuition</u>, p. 308).

than judgment by conception. The inner intent, or spiritual mystery, of the work reveals itself to the performer through the act of performance, obscurely, spontaneously, and in depth when he has "lived with" the composition for a time.

Judgment by conception can assess the material intent of a work; but, if the material judgment is equated with the primary judgment, the spiritual intent, the sphere of beauty and the fine arts, can be missed or misinterpreted. Conceptual or material judgment is a judgment of preconception because it is made prior to the act of performance. This is in contrast to spiritual judgment which occurs at the moment of perception and without preconception. Judgment through aural perception requires that the intellect be permeated with the sound of the work before a judgment is completed, a practice which transcends material observation and involves the aesthetic experience of beauty.¹ Since judgment by perception involves the aesthetic experience, it is properly an aesthetic judgment, a kind of judgment which moves to the deep, spiritual roots of a work by means of the material, surface mechanics.

Aesthetic judgment confronts a double mystery: the secret of the work (the composer's intent) and the personality of the composer.² In this sense, the performer, as a listener, must be obedient to the music and what it may teach him.³ Prior consent neutralizes preconception and allows the work to reveal itself to the performer as he expresses the work, while, at the same time, uncovering something of the composer

> ¹Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 28. ²Hay, <u>Maritain's Theory</u>, p. 61. ³Ibid.

himself through his compositional idea.

Unless the performer gives consent to the work, as it stands, the composition will be inhibited in its potential to teach him its inner secrets. In other words, if he asks that a composition conform to his personal view of what a musical work should contain, the work, already created, is judged by concepts previously formed in the intellect.¹ Under such circumstances, there can be no accurate judgment of the work as a unique object of fine art.

Giving consent to the work is allowing the double mystery of the composer's personality and the objective reality of sound he has captured to be received, perceived, and judged by the performer.² The work teaches through revealment; consequently, whatever the performer perceives is dependent upon his ability to perceive that which is concealed to the eye.³

Through the receptive intuition of aural perception,⁴ the performer can judge whether the composer really has something to say, within the context of his creative idea, and to give of himself

¹"We shall judge the work of art as an article subject to our whim, an article the measure of which is our own bent of mind" (Maritain, "On Artistic Judgment," in The Range of Reason, p. 19).

²Receiving a work is hearing the sound of the work; perceiving a work is allowing the sound to permeate the intellect through the aural sense. Reception requires our presence; perception requires our full attention. The work reveals itself when we learn something about the work apart from the score, an inner secret not evident in print but obscurely present in the sounds we hear. We judge by intuition while we experience the aesthetic beauty reflected from the sound of the work.

³"We shall judge the work of art as the living vehicle of a hidden truth to which both the work and we ourselves are together subject, and which is the measure at once of the work and of our mind" (ibid.).

⁴Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," p. 307.

personally; or whether he is content to offer a purely technical display of his skills.¹ Still, it is necessary to respect an artist's effort, even if the effort falls short of intent or if the intent itself is found to be meager.² A certain respect for the work, which involves the prospect of unraveling an inner mystery, is the receptive attitude necessary for, or prerequisite to, the artistic judgment.

Artistic Judgment and Artistic Criticism

Artistic or aesthetic judgment records or remembers an aesthetic experience after it has occurred;³ accordingly, the performer applies his perceptive judgment of a composed work, as well as the initial score evaluation, to his re-creation of the work through performance.

The judgment of art, however, is distinct from the judgment of taste.⁴ Taste relates to the perceptive powers of the performer rather than the expressive powers of the work. The judgment of taste uses the work to measure these perceptive powers, which is analogous to measuring the work through preconceptions. Taste is more concerned with a general knowledge of art than with the specific perception of a work; and it is, consequently, a facet of the speculative order of knowledge rather than the operative or practical order or art.⁵ The judgment of

¹Maritain, "On Artistic Judgment," p. 20.

²Ibid. "The only artist who does not deserve respect is the one who works to please the public, for commercial success or official success" (ibid., pp. 20-21).

³Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 28.
⁴Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 202, n. 137.
⁵Ibid.

taste exists apart from the artistic <u>habitus</u> while the judgment of art is an integral part of this habitus.¹

The judgment of taste pertains to the powers of contemplation and "depends, not on <u>habitus</u> properly so-called, but on habitual <u>disposition</u> and cleverness, as does also the taste of the wine-taster."² The preconceptions of taste are at the mercy of a work unique to the intellect because taste is threatened by that which it does not know. The judgment of taste inevitably becomes resistant to works it "does not understand" and more comfortable in the presence of knowledge, however unstable, than in the presence of a composed work, unique to the intellect but stable in itself.³

The criticism of works and the judgment of works are generally synonymous in intent.⁴ The difference between criticism and judgment is in the re-creation which follows the judgment. The critic judges a composed work and the performer through it; his criticism or judgment is used by the performer in his (the performer's) personal re-creation of the work. The performer judges a composed work for his personal re-creation of the work, but the judgment is made through personal perception and is applied to his <u>own</u> performance of the work. The judgment of the critic, then, is external to re-creation while the

¹Ibid., pp. 202-203. "Many great artists had very poor taste. And many men with perfect taste were mediocre creators. . ." (ibid., p. 203).

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Knowledge is unstable apart from a composed work; it becomes stable when discovered to be a component part of a completed work.

⁴Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," p. 324.

process. Moreover, the judgment of the critic is typically a single judgment while the performer's judgment is an ongoing process, terminated along with the termination of the performed product.

Criticism, . . . while drawing its inspiration from philosophical principles--which is always good, but dangerous--remains on the level of the work and of the particular, without however being itself operative or making any creative judgment, but rather judging from without and after the event.¹

The criticism of performance is distinct from the criticism of taste. The criticism of taste is a "bent of mind" which asks that a composed work conform to the conceptual views of the critic and that the performer's powers of perception be measured by the same set of views. In other words, the performer's "concept" of the work is measured by the critic's "concept" of the same work, the "concept" having its roots in a general knowledge of art. Inevitably, the performer is criticized for his failure to perceive certain elements in a composed work, conceptually defined by the critic.

The criticism of taste judges one work to be more beautiful than another according to preconceived standards of art and, in this sense, judges the composer's taste as well. The criticism of art allows performed works to reveal themselves as more or less beautiful according to personal perception. The beauty of a work is hidden in the interiority of the work and cannot be prejudged by taste. The preconceptions of

Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 223. n. 173. The quotation further clarifies the difference between the judgment of the critic and the performer. The performer's judgment is operative or creative because it applies to the making of <u>his</u> work. The critic's judgment is similarly artistic or aesthetic but dissimilarly external to the creative action; that is, the criticism occurs following the action of performance rather than as a part of the action itself.

taste suppresses the beauty in a work with material concerns validated by material rules.

The gift of critique is not necessarily synonymous with the gift of art.¹ The gift of critique pertains to the contemplative or reflective faculties of the mind while the gift of art pertains to the operative or practical faculties of the <u>habitus</u>.² Aesthetic criticism, defined by the gift of critique, combines a knowledge of art with the skills of critique, thereby encouraging the critic to become a dilettante. A true critic of art defines aesthetic criticism as the judgment of art, and not of taste, and uses the skills of critique to communicate his judgment to the performing musician.

In reference to the critic, Maritain states: "Before judging of the work as to its ways of execution, he must discover the creative intentions from which it proceeds and the more secret things which stirred the soul of its author."³

Artistic Judgment and the Sign

A created work is an object and a sign; that is, it has a physical presence in matter or notation and a significance, apart from the object, which is perceivable through a sensory experience of the work.⁴ The intentional being, or sign aspect of the work, has a significance which lies deeper than the entitative being or material existent.⁵

'Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," pp. 324-325.

²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 324.

⁴Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128.

⁵Maritain, <u>The Degrees of Knowledge</u>, p. 114; also see Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, pp. 55-65.

The work is the material substance or physical surface of the artist's intent. His intentional being, or creative intent, passes through the entitative being into the intellectual, spiritual realm of the object. This realm contains the intentional sign of the created work.¹

The created work, then, is a direct sign of the artist's intent.² The direct sign pertains to the spiritual intent of the work, and the perception of this sign is a perception of the secret significance contained within the entitative structure.³ At the same time, the created work is a reversed sign of the artist's personality (as he had placed himself into the work in pursuit of his creative intent).⁴ The entitative work, then, signifies the creative intent of its being and the subjectivity of the artist, both obscurely related and revealed in the unity of the work.⁵

The performer's judgment of a composed work is, in essence, a perception of the direct-reversed sign relationship in the total significance of the work. The entitative work is the printed score; the significance lies in the intentional being of the work, the spiritual

²Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 223; and idem, "Language and the Theory of Sign," p. 98.

³Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128; idem, <u>The Degrees of Knowledge</u>, p. 114; and idem, "The Experience of the Poet," in <u>The Situation of Poetry</u>, p. 84.

⁴Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 223; idem, "The Experience of the Poet," p. 84; and idem, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128. The reversed sign is also termed: the inverted sign. See idem, "Language and the Theory of Sign," p. 98.

⁵Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 129.

¹The intentional sign is analogous to the creative intent. The aural presence of sound is the vehicle by which the entitative being (score) is permeated and the intentional being (sign) is revealed.

interiority of the scored composition. As with the artistic judgment (and its access to a work's interiority), access to the sign quality of a composition is facilitated by means of aural perception. In other words, the secret significance of the printed work is contained within the sound, or combination of sounds, perceived aurally by the performer. Artistic judgment, then, perceives and judges the sign quality of a musical work.

The Creative Idea and Performance

The Creative Idea and the Conceptual Idea

The creative idea is not an elaborate plan; rather, it is a simple view or artistic vision of the work-to-be-made.¹ The creative idea is an operative or practical idea because it moves the intellect toward the production of an object, a work of art.² In a work of fine art, the will intervenes in the artist's vision of his work because the intellect is naturally inclined to go beyond itself, toward the transcendental realm of beauty.³

The creative idea is dissimilar to the conceptual idea; that is, it is not an abstract idea or an intellectual theme or thesis from which creation takes place.⁴ Furthermore, the artist does not envision an ideal model to be copied by his art; rather, he envisions the

¹Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.

²Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 48; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 43.

³Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 48. The creative idea is also termed: the artist's vision, or artistic vision.

⁴Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 81; idem, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 136; and idem, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 181, n. 95.

intellectual or spiritual form of an object, in a complex unity, within which few of the details of the object are consciously known.¹ The work must be externalized before the details of the work are "worked out," thereby becoming the material structure of the original spiritual form. In contrast to the conceptual idea, the creative idea and the externalized work reveal themselves simultaneously and both become known when the work is completed. The conceptual idea precedes its object in conscious detail; the creative idea precedes its object in a detailed unity but with obscure or imperfect knowledge of specific details. The operational concept, or conceptual idea, forms and completes an object prior to its externalization as a work of art (object copies idea). The creative idea is formed but not completed while in its spiritual form; therefore, the object-to-be-made is only a potentiality and not yet a reality.² The creative idea is revealed through its object, and the details are fixed or "worked out" at the moment of externalization.³ A work completed is a creative idea achieved.⁴

The creative idea is an intuitive flash . . . in which the whole work is potentially contained and which will unfold

¹Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 135-137; and idem, "The Concept," in <u>The Degrees of Knowledge</u>, app. 1, p. 397.

²Maritain, "The Concept," pp. 396-398.

³Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 99.

4". . . it is only when the symphony is made and finished that, in the mind of the composer, its creative idea is itself achieved" (Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 80). The externalized product of the artist's vision cannot, however, be an exact copy of the original idea because the externalization of an idea is tempered by human limitation, thereby rendering the final achievement an imperfect product of a more complex original intent. See pp. 64-65 below for a further discussion of this point. and explain itself in the work, and which will make of the work itself an original and a model; incomparably more immaterial than is believed by academicism. \dots ¹

The academicist believes that the creative idea is a model of a work which the artist carries in his head to be copied into the final product.² The work, already made, is given a presence, an externalization by preconception.

Maritain confronts the academicist with the subjective nature of sensory experience. When the artist, as any man, attempts to copy an ideal, the product inevitably leads to an original work, not a copy.³ ". . . there is no tracing in the world of God."⁴ The creative idea is the artist's subjectivity intertwined with the objectivity of things from which forms are drawn through sensory perception.⁵ Subsequently, a completely subjective creative idea is also unattainable by the intellect of man. God's ideas precede things; man draws upon things for his ideas.⁶

The Creative Idea and the Means of Art

The creative idea is envisioned in a flash of intuition which contains the essentials of a work in a united whole.⁷ The flash of intuition, although complete, is obscure and the work must be completed before the details of the work, or the structure of the idea, become

> ¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 78. ³Ibid., p. 79. ⁴Ibid. ⁵Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 77. ⁶Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, pp. 120-121. ⁷Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 55.

more fully known. The externalized details of the work reveal to the artist something of the internal structure of his vision. As creation occurs, the artist, through certain additions and adjustments along the way, probes for details of his initial intuitive flash. In this way, details of the work are, consciously and unconsciously, validated by intuition.¹ In other words, the artist knows when the work is "right" but he may not be able to explain how he knows.

The external work is an imperfect imitation of the creative idea because the idea discloses detail in the context of a complex unity, all in an instant and much of which is lost through actual production.² The idea is an uncreated form; therefore, the details must be worked out through creation. Due to the limitations of memory, the created work can only approach the original intuitive flash in moving from the uncreated, spiritual form to the created, material form.³ In addition to memory block, the creative intent may be further obstructed by faulty craftsmanship, or poor technique in its lower sense, and external influences which threaten the practice of art.⁴

The premature calculation of means is an academic plan which denies the mystery of the artistic vision. The academicist is skeptical of the necessity of "working out" such a vision; he is inclined to doubt that the completed work will teach him anything not contained in his prepared plan.

¹Ibid.

²Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398. ³Ibid.

⁴Hay, <u>Maritain's Theory</u>, p. 56. Foreign elements of art, that is, external threats to the practice of art, in the pure sense, are manual dexterity, taste, slavish imitation, emotional effect, and art seeking to please others. See Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.

Maritain, to the contrary, believes that the artistic vision is obscure by nature and that the means of art exist to serve and probe the mystery inherent in the creative idea. The gap between the vision and the accomplished work is "filled by an interplay of deliberate combinations" which serve the work envisioned.¹ This sort of deliberate calculation is useful and acceptable at various points of creation because it is fixed at the moment of making and is an exploratory process. In this sense, the manipulation of means is a search for a certain fulfillment of the creative idea, spontaneously done and with both the conscious and unconscious depths of the intellect involved.

The means are the proper domain of the artistic <u>habitus</u>... But means exist only in relation to an end, and the means which "are everything" would be <u>nothing</u> themselves without the conception or the vision which they tend to realize and on which the whole activity of the artist hinges.²

The Creative Idea and Inspiration

The artist's ability to view a work-to-be-made depends initially upon imagination, an inborn disposition or natural gift served by the external senses.³

. . imagination proceeds or flows from the essence of the soul through the intellect, and the external senses proceed from the essence of the soul through imagination. For they exist in man to serve imagination, and through imagination, intelligence.⁴

¹Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 199, n. 131.

²Ibid., p. 182, n. 95. Conception, in this context, refers to the creative idea rather than to the conceptual idea.

³Ibid., p. 181; and idem, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.

⁴Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 107.

A point for amplification is that the imagination serves the intellect, the creative intellect of art. The imagination is difficult to distinguish from the creative intellect because it is intimately related to it, a part of the intellect itself.¹ The creative intellect, however, deepens with each improvement of the mind or as the development of the intellect takes place.² The creative idea has its roots in the creative intellect and grows beyond the reach of imagination alone.

Similarly, the working out or externalization of an artist's vision does not occur in the imagination alone because such a view cannot come out of a void.³ The use of materials to externalize a work involves the imagination, but the means of making are validated by the creative intellect through its connaturality with the intended object. The connaturality of the intellect with its object defines the intuitive procedure by which creation takes place.⁴ The connaturality of intuition is a kind of conformity in the manner of action between the artist and the intended work.⁵

¹Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.

2_{Ibid}.

³Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 98.

4"A virtuous man may possibly be utterly ignorant in moral philosophy, and know as well (probably better) everything about virtues--through connaturality" (Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 117). Similarly, a musician may possess little or no knowledge of music; and yet, he may perform works entirely through his connaturality with the sound of music.

⁵Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 12.

In the fine arts, the creative idea depends on a second inborn disposition: sensitivity, which is the artist's ability to perceive beauty.¹ Sensitivity is served by the external senses and, in turn, it serves the creative intellect because connatural beauty delights the intellect through the senses.² Since the creative idea envisions an object which reflects beauty, imagination and sensitivity are interrelated.

The intuitive flash of a creative idea is not a mystical experience. The momentary, sudden appearance of an artistic vision is an inspirational experience. Inspiration is the moment that latent poetic knowledge is released to the conscious mind for expression, in the form of a working idea.³

¹Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.

²Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 24. Connatural beauty is aesthetic beauty which pleases, rather than displeases, the sense-permeated intellect.

³Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, pp. 74 and 84. In defining poetic knowledge Maritain states:

"This is a very different knowledge from what is generally called knowledge; a knowledge which cannot be expressed in notions and judgments, but which is experience rather than knowledge, and creative experience, because it wants to be expressed, and it can only be expressed in a work. This knowledge is not previous or presupposed to creative activity, but integrated in it, consubstantial with the movement toward the work, and this is precisely what I call poetic knowledge" ("On Human Knowledge," p. 18).

In a comparison to conceptual knowledge Maritain states:

". . in such a knowledge it is the object created, . . . the symphony, in its own existence as a world of its own, which plays the part played in ordinary knowledge by the concepts and judgments produced within the mind" ("Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 118).

Latent poetic knowledge contains the seeds of the creative idea. Inspiration provides the initial conscious experience of this knowledge, and the intellect becomes more fully conscious of the idea through the completed work. Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, pp. 48-49. Inspiration is not a continuous experience, nor is it a frequent experience; inspiration is natural to art but its occurrence is spontaneous and unpredictable.¹ The sudden brightness of the vision, however, fades and changes as it is developed.² In other words, as making begins, inspiration declines.

Inspiration may result from the hard labor of creation and, on the other hand, its sudden presence may lead to the hard labor of creation.³ In the latter case, the inspirational experience provides incentive because the artist becomes eager to pursue the details of his new idea. The depth and frequency of inspiration depends primarily on the creative intellect and secondarily on individual temperament and natural inclinations.⁴

The Performer and the Composed Work

The performer's vision of his work occurs as a result of, and in connection with, his judgment of the composed work. In this respect, vision and judgment are commingled since a judgment can hardly occur without some vision of the work's potential in relation to the performer's ability as a musician. The judgment of a composed work, then, can spawn the creative idea. In other words, as the composer's intent is judged, the potential sound of the work in performance is envisioned through the judgment. As the performer seeks the inner, spiritual intent of the work, he may also "see" the work as it should be

¹Maritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," in <u>Creative</u> <u>Intuition</u>, p. 244.

²Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398.
³Maritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," p. 244.
⁴Ibid.

performed, considering also his own potential as a performing musician. In this way, the objective intent of the work is commingled with the subjective perception of the performer.

The unexpected appearance of a working idea through inspiration is an experience available to the novice as well as the virtuoso. The difference is one of degree but not of intensity. The variance of inspiration relates to the depth of the creative intellect and native capacity; nevertheless, inspiration can remain unperceived by even the most gifted musician.

A prerequisite to inspiration in the fine arts is a certain attitude, a willingness to follow the creativity of the spirit in its inclinations toward beauty. Methodical approaches to performance are less conducive to inspiration because the concern is with more immediate, controlled progress. Conversely, performers guided by the creative intellect are subject to spontaneous, abrupt, far-reaching intellectual movements of the mind toward its work.

The methodical performer has less confidence in the uncertainty of inspiration and the elusive idea that appears clearly but momentarily and nonconceptually. He is reluctant to pursue a spiritual idea which threatens the order of his material plans.

The creative performer is eager to pursue his vision while retaining an awareness that he may never completely achieve it. The excitement of performance lies in the pursuit of a personal vision of a work. The momentary brilliance of the idea spurs the creative performer on to depths unattainable by the planned experience and ever closer to transcendental beauty.

The performer's vision of a composed work must be heard in performance (externalized) to be fulfilled. A musician envisions the potential sound of the work but only upon hearing it can he gain some certainty of his intended idea. The performer probes and experiments with details until he discovers in sound the idea envisioned in the mind. The discovery is nonconceptual; the performer intuitively recognizes the "right" sound but he is only vaguely aware of how or why a particular sound is a necessary component of the intended work. The necessity of the discovered sound to the work is confirmed at the moment it is heard. Following externalization, the performer can better analyze conceptually the details of the work in retrospect or by reflection.

When is the performance complete? A musical work, as time, can flow without limitation or cessation.¹ The transcendental beauty of music does not stop; it surpasses its object. The performed work has a practical end and is subject to human limitation in its confinement to certain parameters. The practical end of a work is a mere pause in the ceaseless potential of music and the transcendental realm it reflects.

The performance idea, in its original form, is never absolutely fulfilled; therefore, each performance of a composed work may move progressively deeper into its spiritual intent. On the other hand, a repeated work, performed at its human limits, may simply run its course and no longer be in fulfillment of any creative idea. In this case, the work expends itself on repetition rather than intent.

¹Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 82.

The Creative Idea and the Sign

The performer's judgment or perception of the intentional sign within a composed work begins his view of the potential sound of the work in performance. Since the performance potential of a work is tempered by personal capacity and unique musical abilities, the performer views the work only as <u>he</u> can perform it. The performer's intention, or performance idea, is the new direct sign of the work; it becomes commingled with the reversed sign of the performer, his subjective expression which inevitably and unintentionally enters the performed work. As a result, the intentional sign of the composed work is transformed into the intentional sign of the performed work.

The conductor, as a performance leader, uses the practical sign to communicate his creative idea, along with conceptual score notation, to the musicians of a performing group.¹ Since the conductor's vision of the work is of primary importance, the practical signs make manifest his intent in producing the work, the practical sign being an instrument of his will.² The conductor's practical signs are gestures of command, facial expressions and glances, and spoken words.³ These signs, both natural and conventional, express an intention or direction of the practical intellect.⁴ The practical signs used by the conductor are also

¹Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197; and idem, "The Concept," p. 395.

²Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197. ³Ibid.

⁴Ibid. The natural sign expresses a natural or real relationship between the sign and that which is signified. An example of the natural sign is an expression, gesture, or appearance of quietude. The conventional sign is an artificial or arbitrary sign which must be learned as a sign before that which is signified becomes apparent. Examples of the conventional sign are gesticulative patterns, symbolic language, and denotative expressions. See ibid., p. 192. sensory signs.1

Conceptual ideas, transmitted by musical notation, are infravalent to the creative idea and are of secondary importance to the performed work; nevertheless, they are also communicated to a performing group by practical signs. What is communicated to performers is, in essence, the conductor's definition of the particular notation or his understanding of these operational concepts inasmuch as they can be signified.²

The conductor begins with score notation but moves beyond such means in pursuit of his creative idea of the work, an intent which is spontaneously signified by practical signs during the act of performance. The conductor's responsibility to the intentional sign of a composed work, and its transformation to a sign of the performed work, is similar to that of a performing musician; nevertheless, his responsibility to the performing musician is unique. The conductor must communicate his creative idea to the performer through practical signs, signs spontaneously expressed as discovered details piece together the puzzle of his artistic vision.

Imitation and Performance

Artistic imitation is the intuitive manifestation of natural appearances or sounds. The instrumentality of natural forms is first presented to the mind of the artist through the senses and then recast

¹Ibid., pp. 194-195, n. 2.

²Maritain, "The Concept," p. 395.

or transposed by intuition to a productive end, a work of art. I Imita-

tion renders,

through certain sensible signs, something other than these signs spontaneously present to the spirit. Painting <u>imi-</u> <u>tates</u> with colors and plane forms things given outside of us. Music <u>imitates</u> with sounds and rhythms . . . the invisible world which stirs within us.²

Imitation, in its formal or higher sense, involves the representation of a form, an artistic intent.³ It uses material elements or sensible signs to externalize the creative idea and, through imitation, the work expresses in matter what began in the intellect.⁴ Sensible signs are objects in themselves; however, imitation requires these signs to signify something more than themselves: the creative idea or spiritual intent of a work.⁵

Imitation, in its lower sense, pertains to the duplicative process of servile art and to the strict originality of pure art.⁶ Normally, the essence of imitation is a tension between the need to create for itself and the dependence upon the existing world for the forms of art.⁷ The extremes of precise representation and

²Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 55.

³Ibid., p. 57. ⁴Ibid., p. 56. ⁵Ibid., p. 55.

⁶Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, pp. 122-126; also see idem, "The Experience of the Poet," p. 85.

⁷Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 45.

¹Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 46. The artist's intuition, which pilots artistic imitation, is a creative intuition. Maritain defines creative intuition in this way:

[&]quot;His [the artist's] intuition, the creative intuition or emotion, is an obscure grasping of himself and things together in a knowledge [poetic knowledge] by union or connaturality, which only . . finds expression in the work, and which, in all its vital weight, seeks to create and produce" ("On Human Knowledge," p. 18).

nonrepresentation, however, refuse to recognize that imitation is a "spiritual marriage" of a given reality to the artist's intellect.¹ A "human stamp" is present in every representation.² In other words, the artist puts himself into an art work and, at the same time, he is affected by that which he has received into his mind through sensory experience.³

Imitation, in its lower sense, occurs when the artist mistakenly looks for freedom <u>from</u> something--freedom from originality through servile imitation or copy-making, or freedom from the existential world through making without any sort of representation, the intent being absolute originality.⁴ The former freedom relies on technical accuracy while the latter freedom dissociates art from existing material forms. Both practices overlook a primary freedom: a freedom <u>of</u> the creativity of the spirit to guide the intellect in the creation of that which it wills to create.⁵

An artistic surrender or resignation to existence by precise representation is termed as a "sin of materialism."⁶ This is because slavish imitation is materially oriented, an artistic means which goes

¹Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 60.
²Ibid.
³Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, pp. 45-46.
⁴Maritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 223.
⁵Ibid.

⁶Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, pp. 124-126; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 45. Maritain's use of the term "sin of materialism" is analogous to precise representation, servile or slavish imitation, strict or exact reproduction, copy-making, and duplication.

hand in hand with manual dexterity in its preoccupation with means as ends. Sensible signs, such as notated sounds and rhythms, are the "remote matter" of art.¹ To regard these material elements as ends in themselves promotes the practice of imitation, in its lower sense.

If there were no element of the creative subject in the work, it would not be a creation or a work of fine art but would simply mimic in some way that which already exists independently of the artist. The human artist is always dependent upon his surroundings for his materials; but if he is truly to create, he cannot be wholly dependent with respect to the form of the work.²

The isolation of art from all things except its own rules of operation, and a concern with uniqueness, is termed "angelist suicide."³ Such strict originality sacrifices the representation of imitation to a void and rejects traditional rules and existing forms in favor of its pure aesthetic.⁴

The imitative arts aim neither at copying the appearance of nature, nor at depicting the "ideal," but at making an object beautiful by manifesting a form with the help of sensible signs.⁵

The paradox of imitation, in its lower sense, is that neither servile art nor pure art can actually reach their proposed extremes. First, to copy an object may seem simple, but since the object is presented to the subjectivity of the intellect, the result is a

¹Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 55-56.

²Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 77.

³Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, pp. 122-123; and Hanke, <u>Maritain's Ontology</u>, p. 44. Maritain's use of the term "angelist suicide" is analogous to nonrepresentative art, strict or absolute originality, pure art or aesthetically pure art, and sin of idealism.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59.

commingling that transfigures the objective reality of the object.¹ Subjective reality is reality as the artist sees or hears it.

Secondly, to make an object by drawing upon the conscious mind alone is an <u>attempt</u> to deny the internal presence of latent poetic knowledge in the spiritual unconscious, and to ignore the spontaneous frequency of sensory experience which persistently permeates the intellect with objective reality.² The attempted severance of the material world turns the mind in on itself and forces an enclosed intellect into a void for its materials. Pure art imitates but it is imitative of what the conscious mind knows. This kind of imitation is in contrast to the formal definition of imitation because only God can draw upon His creative intellect or proceed from His own essence; man is limited to the perception of things created by God.³

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the aesthetic joy of intellectual perception is experienced through an object. An obscure object can be more fulfilling than a clear, "perfect" object; nevertheless, something too obscure loses sensory signification, due to a lack of connaturality, and is repulsed by the intellect.⁴

^LMaritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 193, n. 127; and Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 18.

²The spiritual unconscious, or preconscious of the intellect, is "a deep nonconscious world of activity, for the intellect and the will, from which the acts and fruits of human consciousness and the clear perceptions of the mind emerge . .." (Maritain, "The Preconscious Life of the Intellect," in <u>Creative Intuition</u>, p. 94). The spiritual unconscious lies deeper than memory. The memory is concerned with what the conscious mind remembers; the preconscious mind releases perceptions and insights into the conscious mind through connaturality, and it does this unpredictably and illogically. See ibid., pp. 90-95.

³Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59 ⁴Ibid., p. 58.

The action of imitation in performance begins with a given reality, the written score and the various combinations of sounds symbolized by the score. The materiality of the object, however, is soon transposed, transfigured, or recasted to suit the creative vision of the artist.¹ The composed work, then, is the entitative reality from which the performer derives his material to be imitated into the performed work.

The performer does not merely copy the score but, rather, he grasps from the score something not notated which is revealed through the performance experience. The performer may be unexpectedly delighted by the beauty of a particular passage as he hears the passage performed. He then structures a new sound by imitating the notated sound. The performed passage of music, as restructured, is an expression of the notated sound, transformed by the performer as he puts himself into the passage.

To imitate, the artist transforms a given reality but is, ordinarily, unaware of his deformation.² He is, after all, expressing his personal vision of a work. Transformation occurs as a spontaneous expression of the artist's vision and not as a planned distortion by deliberate calculation.³ The expression of the vision proceeds from the work itself;⁴ accordingly, the performer expresses the composed work, his vision through the work, and himself through his vision.

¹Maritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 225.
²Maritain, <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 197, n. 131.
³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 198, n.

Imitation, in its higher sense, is the way a performer transforms <u>the</u> reality of a composed work into <u>his</u> reality of a performed work. To him, the performed work becomes more real than the composed work first presented to his intellect in the form of sounds symbolized by visual notation.¹ What he performs more closely resembles a spiritual form in his mind than the material appearance of the score.² Imitation, then, is an imitation of inner form, the sound of the work as the performer hears it, and not simple score duplication.³

The variance between performing musicians, in their imitative action, is caused by personal tendencies and not dogma. An artist may <u>tend</u> towards the <u>via disciplinae</u> of precise representation, or he may <u>tend</u> toward the <u>via inventionis</u> of originality; however, neither tendency can exist by itself, as a personal dogma, and remain within the parameters of imitative action, in a higher sense.⁴

¹"For each work, he recomposes. . . a world more real than the real offered to the sense" (Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, p. 127).

²Ibid., pp. 127-128.

³Hazo, <u>Maritain's Aesthetic</u>, p. 19. ". . . imitation for Maritain is essentially the imitation of the spirit of the object as the artist sees it" (ibid., p. 17).

⁴Maritain, <u>The Frontiers of Poetry</u>, pp. 125-126. In the case of improvisation, the musician begins with sounds previously <u>heard</u> and imitates these sound figures into new combinations of sound. Improvisation is more dependent upon the element of discovery and tends more toward the <u>via inventionis</u> of creativity than does score reading. Consequently, originality is the dominant component of improvisation while the <u>via</u> <u>disciplinae</u> of art is more predominant in creation based on the written score. The latter circumstance is true because of the responsibility of re-creation confronting the performer. Improvisation is more subjective, by comparison, and the performer, as an improviser, performs intuitively while allowing complete freedom to his creativity of the spirit in envisioning and externalizing an object or particular sound. The action of improvisation occurs in a single, sweeping, simultaneous event.

CHAPTER V

THE USE OF PERFORMANCE

Morality and Performance

The aim of art is outside of the sphere of human good. Art is concerned with making a product well and not with using the product, the realm of morality.¹

Morality is concerned with the practical activity of reason as directed toward the good of human life, through the expression of free will.² ". . . its distinctive object is not the perfection of the work produced and fashioned by man but the good and perfection of the agent himself, or the use he freely makes of his faculties. . . ."³

The primary moral virtue is prudence because it commands man's actions as a man. Like art, prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect; consequently, art and prudence are related and yet distinct in respect to their ends.⁴ The artist, as an artist, relies on the <u>habitus</u> of art but the artist, as a man, relies on the virtue of prudence. In

¹Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. "The artist may choose not to use his art, or he may use it badly, . . . and yet the virtue of art in him is not for all that any the less perfect" (ibid.).

²Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> <u>Artist</u>, pp. 26-27.

³Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.

⁴Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> <u>Artist</u>, p. 38. reference to its object, art <u>is not</u> subordinate to morality; but, in reference to the artist, art <u>is</u> subordinate to morality.¹

The above comparisons underline the inevitable conflict between art and morality (autonomous yet related).

Morality has nothing to say when it comes to the good of the work, or to Beauty. Art has nothing to say when it comes to the good of human life. . . In other words it is true that Art and Morality are two autonomous worlds, each sovereign in its own sphere, but they cannot ignore or disregard one another, for man belongs in these two worlds, both as intellectual maker and as moral agent, doer of actions which engage his own destiny. And because an artist is a man before being an artist, the autonomous world of morality is simply superior to . . . the autonomous world of art.²

[Art] . . . depends by its object neither on wisdom nor on prudence; all its dependence on them is on the side of the human subject who practises [sic] art. . . It can be mad and remain art; it is the man who will pay the cost. If in the end the work must suffer, it is by a repercussion owed to material causality. . . 3

Art has for its end the object and it despotically dominates matter in pursuit of this object. The purity of art, then, is not synonymous with the purity of man, regulated by prudence.⁴

Morality and Gratuitous Performance

The <u>habitus</u> of performance is intent upon the work-to-be-performed because fine art has for its end the created work and the

¹Ibid., p. 40; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 15.

²Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> <u>Artist</u>, p. 41.

⁵Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," in <u>Art and Faith</u>, in collaboration with Jean Cocteau, trans. John Coleman (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 117. According to Maritain (ibid.), art and wisdom are also autonomous or independent of each other. Science is subordinated to wisdom because of its object: knowledge; art is not subordinated to wisdom because of its object: making.

⁴Ibid., pp. 92-93.

beauty it reflects.¹ The art of performance, then, is defined by the element of gratuity, or disinterestedness, which means that the artist, as an artist, must be true to his <u>habitus</u>, thereby allowing no foreign element to enter his work.² Maritain concludes that the first responsibility of the artist, as an artist, is to his work.³

The performer, as a man, however, cannot perform his art to the exclusion of everything else in life. The musician, as a man, is subject to the realm of morality and this, in essence, subordinates his art to God. It follows that the first responsibility of the artist, as a man, is to the proper good of his person.⁴

Art causes an artist to act in the right way in regard to making a work but not in respect to the rightness of human will for the good of his person.⁵ Art, however, exists in the person and, if the person

¹Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 70.

²Ibid. Maritain defines these foreign elements as empirical attempts to establish principles of practice (or tear down such principles); shock the public (or avoid shocking the public); and establish a reputation or position as an artist. "An Essay on Art," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, app. 1, p. 89. These foreign elements relate to, and expand upon, his previously defined foreign elements listed in chapter 4 above, p. 65, n. 4. The matter of disinterestedness in relation to beauty was taken up in chapter 3 above, pp. 31-36.

³Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> Artist, p. 40.

⁴Ibid.; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. Prudence perfects the intellect only through the presupposition that the will is as straight in its own alignment with the proper good of man. It is possible that the movement of the will, in its desire for good, may corrupt the judgment of prudence by displacing spiritual pleasure in favor of carnal pleasure. The judgment of prudence also depends on the right intention and not on the event. The observable results of an act may be properly good but immorally conceived. Idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 16-18.

⁵Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 50.

deteriorates, so must the art. In other words, the artist is a man before becoming an artist; if he fails as a man, his art will eventually decline.¹ The fact of an artist being a drug addict may have no immediate bearing on his artistic virtue; however, in the long run, if the person suffers ill effects from the drug use, it will eventually be harmful, and perhaps devastating, to his art.²

Gratuitous performance, misunderstood, aims not only at the perfection of a composed work but at an absolute independence of the performer as a man. This misconception is caused by the belief that the artist is an artist, and more than a "mere" man.³ "Art for art's sake" is art abstractly cut off from man, the artist.⁴

The motto <u>Art for Art's sake</u> simply disregards the world of morality, and the values and rights of human life. <u>Art for</u> <u>Art's sake</u> does not mean Art for the work, which is the right formula. It means an absurdity, that is, a supposed necessity for the artist to be only an artist, not a man, and for art to cut itself off from its own supplies, and from all the food, fuel and energy it receives from human life.⁵

The severance of art from humanity eliminates, or attempts to eliminate, human ends in art; the artist must be totally or purely delighted in his artistic activity to the exclusion of any other "human" emotion, which is considered a sacrilege against art.⁶ Delight, in this sense, is in contrast to the delight or intellectual

¹Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 95.

²Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 51.
³Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 89-90.

⁴Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> <u>Artist</u>, p. 48.

5_{Ibid}.

⁶Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 92.

joy experienced by a performer in his performance of a particular work, a joy which results in an emotion, not abstract but subjective and very human indeed.

To dehumanize art is to sterilize art because self-expression is inhibited. The substance of the artist is extrinsic to art, but it influences the artist in his art and cannot simply be cut off from artistic practice without simultaneously repressing self-expression.¹

The expression of the self is distinct from the expression of the work, which is directed by the <u>habitus</u> of art. Self-expression is analogous to the reversed sign of the artist as he puts himself into a work, his subjectivity being subordinated to his creative intent.²

The personality of the artist is rooted in his spiritual self, the soul of man.³ The interiority of the spirit requires, by nature, communication with others or a giving of the self, the definition of self-expression.⁴ In contrast to personality, the individuality of the artist refers to the narrowness of the ego, which does not give of itself but rather grasps for itself.⁵ "The creative self of the artist is his person as person, in the act of spiritual communication,

¹Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 58.

²See chapter 4 above, pp. 61 and 78.

³Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 141-142.

⁴Ibid. The spiritual communication of self-expression is a natural part of art but it is not the primary intent of art. In its proper sense, a certain communication with others occurs unintentionally through the reversed sign, but this kind of communication contrasts with communication as a conscious intent of the artist, as an artist.

5_{Ibid}.

not his person as material individual or as self-centered ego."1

Gratuitous performance engages the self but not the ego because the self reveals itself in the work and sacrifices itself to the work.² In contrast to self-sacrifice, the ego is self-centered and thrives on material individuality. It seeks, not communication, but glory; the sacrifice is to the world but not to the work.³

The above distinction is important because expression of the artist's self sacrifices his ego to the primacy of the work.⁵ This cannot occur if the ego is dominant because, through his ego, the artist unloads his complexes into the work, thereby poisoning it through the self-centered expression of the ego.⁵ The creative self reveals itself because it is given in disinterestedness; the ego cannot subordinate itself to a work because it is "interested" in self-enhancement. The normality of art ensures that an artist's personality be at play in his art, unconsciously and unintentionally, because his inner substance will enhance the work, rather than warp it, when the concern is with the work and not the self.⁶

The purporters of "art for art's sake" fail to make a distinction between the self and the ego. While such an approach may be successful

²Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 51-52.

³Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 145.

⁴Ibid., pp. 143-144.

⁵Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 54.

⁶Ibid., p. 55.

¹Ibid., p. 142; also see idem, "Individuality and Personality," in <u>The Person and the Common Good</u>, paperback ed., trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 31 passim.

in suppressing the ego, it simultaneously represses the creative self. This sort of repression is an extreme reaction to the "anathema" of human ends in art. In other words, "art for art's sake" distorts the meaning of gratuitousness by forgetting that, while art has a primary end (the good of the work), the artist, as a man, can have as many ends as he pleases.¹ If the artist pursues a human end in his work, apart from the artistic end--and resulting from it, the danger of ruining the work is present, but not insurmountable.² In this case, the performer must retain an awareness of the perpetual temptation to ignore the <u>habitus</u> of performance in favor of self-enhancement, that is, increased status as a performing musician.

The suppression of human ends in art, then, is not a valid reason to purport "art for art's sake." The artist, dehumanized, develops personal standards to serve his art; he feeds himself to it and sacrifices his being to an ideal.³ Art is equated with life itself. Inevitably, the art becomes warped because self- sacrifice to the work, which engages the <u>habitus</u>, is subordinated to self-sacrifice to an ideal,

". . . the workman should work for his wages, but the work should be ruled and shaped and brought into being only with regard to its own good and in nowise with regard to the wages. Then the artist may work for any and every human intention he likes, but the work taken in itself must be made and constructed only for its own beauty" ("Art and Morality," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 73; also see idem, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 56).

²Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 96.

³Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 51-52.

¹Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 93-94. The purporters of "art for art's sake" view with disdain the commercial musicians who are paid wages for their art. Maritain, however, insists that there must be a differentiation between the aim of the artist, as an artist, and the aim of the artist, as a man.

which engages the artist's entire being as a man.¹

"Art for art's sake" is often a reaction to the more worldly art: "art for the people." "Art for art's sake" disregards the values of human life and the artist as a man; "art for the people" disregards the virtues of the creative intellect and the artist as an artist.²

"Art for the people," sometimes termed "art for the social group," ignores the autonomy of art; that is, the social value of a work precludes the aesthetic value.³ Through preclusion, the good of a work is subordinated to the good of human life and the work is shaped, not with creative intuition, but with social requirements.⁴ It matters little whether the artist is pleased with his work; it matters much whether others are pleased with it. Consequently, "art for the people" becomes warped or bent as it attempts to meet the needs, purposes, or interests of a particular social group or community.⁵ Performed works are used for ideological purpose or to capture attention, to entertain, or to provide background music for a social occasion. Performance bent in any direction to "sell" monetarily or indoctrinate ideologically is an art which

1 Ibid.

²Maritain, "Art for the People," in <u>The Responsibility of the</u> Artist, p. 69.

³Ibid., p. 72.

4Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 73. Conceivably, this is the reason why Maritain makes a distinction between church or sacred art, an art of religious purpose, and Christian art, an art of religious inspiration. See Maritain, "Christian Art," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 64 passim; idem, "Some Reflections on Religious Art," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, app. 2, p. 100 passim; and idem, "Reflections on Sacred Art," <u>Liturgical Arts</u> 4 (Third Quarter 1935): 131 passim.

subordinates aesthetic experience to social values.¹

If "art for the people" refers to art for future generations, or mankind as a whole, the meaning of the term is significantly different from art for the social group or community, the art of immediate social value.² Art can be developed for mankind only if the aesthetic values outweigh the community interest, purpose, or use of art. The primary duty of the community is to respect the spiritual dignity of a work of art and to give it the same prior consent granted by an artistic judge or critic.³

If the anarchistic nature of "art for art's sake" undermines certain community values, "art for the people" can be a totalitarian reaction to such a threat, as perceived by the community.⁴ The duty of the artist, then, is to separate himself from the anarchistic nature of "art for art's sake" which disregards human values and the entire issue of morality in art.⁵ The duty of the critic is, primarily, to judge the work for its aesthetic value; and secondarily, to judge the moral implications of the work for the sake of the community.⁶

¹The purporters of "art for the people," ignore or deflate the formal purpose of art, the spiritual value of art to humanity. Man, by nature, seeks pleasurable feeling. The spiritual nature of art can be of utmost pleasure to man; however, deprived of such pleasure, man is subjected to an increased magnitude of carnal pleasure or material pleasure because he cannot exist without pleasurable feeling. See Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 94; idem, "Art and Morality," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, pp. 75-76; and St. Thomas Aquinas, <u>Summa</u> <u>Theologica</u>, II-II, 35. 4. ad 2.

> ²Maritain, Art for the People," p. 69. ³Ibid., pp. 89-90. ⁵Ibid., p. 69. ⁶Ibid., p. 84.

The responsibility of the artist to the community, and the community to the artist, is reciprocal in terms of gratuitousness. The work, and the beauty it reflects is of paramount importance. The extremes of "art for art's sake" and "art for the people" are equally threatening to the gratuitousness of art; art left to itself is God's because all beauty, aesthetically perceived, is part of the transcendental realm of beauty.¹

The artist has great trouble in making use, without hurting himself, of a creative virtue that is too hard for him as a man. But art itself goes spontaneously to God.^2

Art has trouble defending itself against an impure angel that slaps it in the face, that wants to <u>make use</u> of everything for self-love, of the very gift the heart makes of itself, of its weakness; even of God.³

The performer's use of the <u>habitus</u>, or creative virtue, depends upon gratuitousness; gratuitous performance is God's because of the presence of God in the soul of man.⁴

Since the primary responsibility of the performer is to his <u>habitus</u> and the performance action it directs, a complete exclusion of human values (in relation to the self) exposes his <u>habitus</u> to external forces which may weaken or reduce the primacy so vital to the practice of art. In fact, the possession of certain moral virtues serve the <u>habitus</u> by protecting it from nonartistic forces. These virtues of the performer, as a man, exist apart from the artistic virtue, except to protect it.⁵ The presence of such moral virtue, if the

¹Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 97.

²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 86. ⁴Ibid., p. 105.

⁵Maritain, "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," in <u>The Respon</u>sibility of the Artist, pp. 99-100. Maritain lists the following moral

performer pays heed to it, causes the performer to be ascetic and undeviating in regard to his <u>habitus</u> and perpetually on guard against the attraction of easy execution, instant success, or the immediate goals prompted by external concerns (and the consequent relaxation of creative intent or spiritual effort).¹ The <u>habitus</u> of art diminishes as the interior effort is relaxed.²

The highest moral virtue, however, cannot replace a lack of artistic virtue.³ The morality of art exists to (1) influence or enhance

virtues as being essential to protecting the habitus of art from external temptation: humility, magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude, temperance, simplicity, and ingeniousness. "Art and Morality," in <u>Art</u> and <u>Scholasticism</u>, p. 78; also see idem, "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," pp. 99-100; and idem, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 125.

> ¹Maritain, "Art and Morality," in <u>Art and Scholasticism</u>, p. 78. ²Ibid.

³Maritain, "Art for the People," p. 92. An artistic dilemma occurs when a work is artistically good but morally bad. Maritain offers no positive solution because the artist is bound by his primary responsibility; and yet, his moral responsibility demands that he change the work. A possible solution is that the artist change himself and allow his conscience to change the work or to pursue another kind of work of art. A beautiful work is a work that the artist loves; however, if the work contains an element which distorts truth or causes a deterioration of spiritual values, the work may come to displease the artist in spite of its beauty. A work which repulses or insults others loses its radiance in the same way. If the artist, as a man, serves a divine end, through Christianity, he spiritualizes his inner self to an extent which can rise above the human narrowness which limits art. This is not a practice of a particular religious style or philosophy, but rather, art left to itself and the inner influence of Christian inspiration. It is also important to note that, since art and morality have separate ends, a Christian conversion may also reduce the artistic virtue by changing the agent, the man. The subjectivity of man's personality influences his art but in a way not consciously known to the artist. Art, by itself, depends on the habitus of art, and the question of subjective influence upon this habitus is answerable only through the externalized work itself. See idem, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 60-64; idem, "An Essay on Art," pp. 96-97; and idem, "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," pp. 97-98.

the <u>habitus</u> through self-expression, and (2) protect the <u>habitus</u> through self-discipline. The extrinsic or indirect role of morality leaves the <u>habitus</u> free to pursue its object, the making of a work.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion

The <u>habitus</u> of performance, an artistic virtue, is an inner, intellectual, and spiritual disposition which enables the performing musician to perform or aurally "make" a musical work. The very personal nature of the <u>habitus</u> gives it a unique content because it is the possession of a unique intellect. The inborn or innate disposition, from which the <u>habitus</u> proceeds, is a certain musical ability, a gift of capacity which is also a possession of the intellect. Since the acquiring of <u>habitus</u> is synonymous with the development of <u>habitus</u>, the virtue of art is an intellectual virtue or formation of the mind in a given direction.

The relationship between the inborn disposition and the acquired disposition appears to be a complex one. This is because it is possible for a musician to rely primarily on the former with little regard for the latter. Maritain states that the natural gift is a prerequisite to the practice of art, the implication being that an artist cannot reach his full potential (as an artist) without developing his ability (and extending some personal effort). It is also apparent that, through the effort expended in the practice of his art, a performer acquires <u>habitus</u> without the conscious intent or effort to do so. The <u>habitus</u> of performance, then, is acquired or developed through the practice of the art

of performance (the production of a good performed work or one which is pleasing to the performer).

The acquiring of <u>habitus</u> involves the deepening of the intellect rather than expanding the capacity itself. The natural gifts of imagination and sensitivity are served by the external senses and, in turn, they serve the intellect in its operative practice of art. From this it can be gathered that native capacity is essential to development, but it is the mind which acquires the <u>habitus</u> and which uses native capacity to serve and cultivate this development.

While saying that an inborn disposition must be developed. Maritain also refers to the difficulty in making a clear distinction between the habitus and its prerequisite. All musicians, highly gifted and less gifted alike, will acquire habitus through performance, but the depth of the habitus does not necessarily reflect the depth of the gift. A musician of average ability may perform a work well because his interior effort is intense and because his effort meets or exceeds his potential. The gifted musician may perform a work well with less effort; however, he may also inhibit his development of the habitus through a greater concern with the display of his gift than with the production of his work. The musical gift is a potentiality but the development of this potentiality, or the acquiring of a habitus, depends on the creative relationship between the performer and the work being performed. Since musical ability serves the musical habitus, the two become commingled in the practice of performance. As a result, the distinction between the habitus and its prerequisite is not easily perceived, nor is it clearly apparent to the performer himself. The essential point is that the habitus is a deepened or changed intellect.

The contrasting characteristics of <u>habitus</u> and habit are pertinent to this study because the contrast, by itself, defines the <u>habitus</u> of performance as an intellectual virtue. Briefly, the <u>habitus</u> pertains to reason; habit relies on memory. The <u>habitus</u> is spiritual in nature; habit is empirical. The <u>habitus</u> is spontaneous; habit is repetitive. The <u>habitus</u> is ruled by the will; habit is subject to routine.

Ultimately, the <u>habitus</u> controls habit because the power of reason, which proceeds from the spiritual self, transcends memory (which is subject to the limitation of the conscious mind). The <u>habitus</u> wills its end through the exercise of reason and is spontaneously inclined as a result. Habit operates instinctively and consistently when reinforced with repetition or routine.

Maritain's discussion of the rules of art, or the technique of art, contains the essential characteristics of the <u>habitus</u>-habit relationship. The spiritual rules of art are equivalent to technique in its higher or formal sense; the material rules of art are equivalent to technique in its lower sense. The spiritual rules are a possession of the <u>habitus</u> while the material rules are concerned with the execution of habit. The primary rule of fine art is a spiritual rule which governs technique, in its higher and lower sense, in the direction of a product; that is, the primary rule guides the <u>habitus</u> in its intellectual inclinations toward beauty and its desire to create a good work. In this sense, the material rules are subordinate to the spiritual rules because the material rules, by themselves, are concerned with method, physical skill, or any external means of art (which also make a work but without concern for the primary rule). In other words, the means of execution are primary to the material rules of art.

The technique of performance, in its lower sense, is identified with its preoccupation with fingering facility, tone production, and rapid or efficient reading skill (or any good habits of performance execution which focus upon the performer's physical and mental dexterity).

Still another facet of technique, in its lower sense, is the preoccupation with a knowledge of performance methods or conceptual ways to perform. While the performer's skill is physical or manual, or mental--both closely tied to innate ability, the performer's method is conceptual and is attained by conscious abstraction of terminology and broad academic principles. Skill is concerned with execution while method is concerned with contemplation. The method must also be executed but, in contrast to the <u>habitus</u>, the execution of method serves the method rather than the work. Performance for knowledge, then, uses knowledge to enhance or advance itself and equates the efficient use of method to be good for the work whether, in its aural reality, it serves the work or does nothing for it.

The <u>habitus</u> of performance views knowledge as external to the work it wishes to create and perfect. If a certain method is required to create and enhance this work, the particular approach becomes an internalized part of the product, subordinated to it and abstractive after the performance has been completed. The <u>habitus</u> does not internalize a method unless it serves the work in performance. Since the necessary means of performance are determined and fixed during the momentary aural experience of the work, the starting point is an intuitive, general view of the work as suggested by the symbolic

notation of the score. As aural production begins, however, the means are altered as the envisioned end of the work is more clearly (and aurally) defined.

The <u>habitus</u> executes its determined method because it has been discovered to be necessary to the goodness of the work in performance. Similarly, the performer must refine the necessary skill to execute the creative intent willed by his intellect. Obviously, both method and execution are instruments of the <u>habitus</u> of performance, a habitus which serves the product of performance by observing the primary rule of fine art.

Technique, in its lower sense, is impatient with the personal inclinations and spontaneity of the <u>habitus</u> because the product is intended to be the result of predetermined rules. Deviation from the material rules is regarded as inefficient and impositive either because the structure of a prepared plan is threatened with revision or because the display of a particular skill is threatened with refinement. Moreover, the positivistic level of performance disregards, or is skeptical of, the intellectual power of the <u>habitus</u> (in its operative ability) to create a good work intuitively.

Whether the performer senses beauty in a work is not important to the positivist because beauty is (erroneously) believed to be an automatic result of the "right" conception of rules. Consequently, the operation of performance is confined to motions or the objectivity of execution. Moreover, little or no effort is made by the performer to put himself into his work, to follow the primary rule, or to freely adapt or alter his means in the direction of a good or pleasing product of sound, the work as he hears it.

The aural result of a work, limited by material rules, may be satisfactory conceptually but unsatisfactory aurally and nonconceptually. In other words, the performer is forced to operate against the inclinations of his <u>habitus</u> if the aural product is lifeless or repulsive to his intellect. He may, in fact, elect to maintain the objective presence of the sound without probing the work to discuss why it causes displeasure or tedium. The <u>habitus</u> of performance guides the intellect in its search for the "right" sound or a sound that brings pleasure through the aural sense. To repress the will of the <u>habitus</u> is to limit or confine performance to its lower or material level.

The habitus of performance is also undeviating, but in a different manner. The habitus is strictly adherent to the primary rule and the inclinations of the intellect to produce a good work. The performer performs his work with an intuitive idea of what he should do to perfect it; the habitus, however, cannot provide a precise plan in advance because the details must be discovered and validated by intuition. It is possible that much detail may be known in advance; nevertheless all detail is subject to change as the sound of the work is reflected upon the intellect. In its desire to make a pleasing work, the habitus discovers requisite performing habits by altering, recasting, or discarding old habits and uncovering new ones. These material means are chosen along the way, or during the process of performance, as they are heard to be necessary to the work. The identification of detail causes the material structure to evolve spontaneously, a definition of creativity in contrast with external, material structures which impose themselves upon a work and dictate the results to be sought.

After the performance is completed and the working idea externalized, the newly discovered material framework can be abstracted, from the produced sound it serves, for conceptual use. Material analysis notwithstanding, the spiritual rules, which framed the material rules, remain an intangible, nonconceptual part of the aural product.

The guidance of the <u>habitus</u> is anything but a "safe" and uneventful routine for the performer. The <u>habitus</u> demands that the performer follow his creativity of spirit in judging the role of detail and execution in the end to be sought. A personal detachment from intent is alien to the primacy of the habitus in situating the performed work.

Consistent with his view of the external nature of technique, in its lower sense, Maritain deplores the intent of academicism, or rules for the sake of rules, to develop the <u>habitus</u> of art. The academicist, through the transmission of rules (and their execution), disciplines the student with a process of making which is equated with the development of the <u>habitus</u>. Maritain disputes this conception of art by stating that what the artist actually possesses, through academicism, is knowledge and good habits but not necessarily the <u>habitus</u>. This is because material rules are external to a work and are useless to the production of an intended work unless they are discovered to be necessary to the internal intent.

It is important to emphasize that the <u>habitus</u> begins with an intended or envisioned work while academicism begins with material rules. The acquiring of the <u>habitus</u> is a natural result of a direct intent to make a specific work. The term "acquiring" refers to a development or deepening of the intellect pursuant to the relationship of the performer

to his work-to-be-made. This is in contrast to the conscious, deliberate attempts by the academicist to develop the <u>habitus</u>. The fact that a student performer's mind be literally filled with methods gives little or no indication of whether he is able to apply them to a work. Consequently, academicism inhibits, rather than facilitates, the acquiring of the <u>habitus</u>.

The acquiring of the <u>habitus</u> is a careful, though variable, balance of the <u>via inventionis</u> and the <u>via disciplinae</u> of art. The <u>via</u> <u>inventionis</u> reflects the personal relationship of the artist to his work-to-be-made while the <u>via disciplinae</u> is the application of traditional, material rules to the same work. By itself, the <u>via inventionis</u> may tend to artistic anarchy, or total disregard of traditional artistic practices, and a total reliance upon the discovery of rules. The <u>via</u> <u>inventionis</u> is vital to artistic practice but, by itself, is a gift without guidance. The <u>via disciplinae</u> provides the <u>via inventionis</u> with an order upon which to fixate or a discipline with which to unite.

Similarly, the <u>via disciplinae</u>, by itself, disregards the personal nature of art by operating primarily or solely through the external application of rules, a practice which is synonymous to academicism. The <u>via inventionis</u> provides the <u>via disciplinae</u> with inventiveness or the freedom to adapt material rules in a spontaneous manner and in subserviance to the work-in-progress (to perfect the work as the artist sees it).

The presence of both the <u>via inventionis</u> and the <u>via disciplinae</u> within the <u>habitus</u> of art is presumably the reason Maritain advocates apprenticeship education for the student artist. In this way, the

student apprentice is confronted with the "real"; that is, he wills or intends to create works, not rules, and he begins his art with intended works. The <u>via inventionis</u> of the student is combined with the <u>via</u> <u>disciplinae</u> of the master teacher to create and refine an actual product of art. The master teacher instructs through correction and example; the student apprentice imitates through practice and application.

Above all, the apprentice musician is subject to the primary rule of fine art: to produce only that with which the aural sense is fully pleased. Through the primary rule, the <u>via inventionis</u> is more intimately involved with the spiritual interiority of the <u>habitus</u>; consequently, the <u>via disciplinae</u> is subject to the will of the <u>via inventionis</u> in the production of a good work. This is the reason that the master teacher must respect the will of the student in the production of a work connatural to his (the student's) intellect. Moreover, this principle of making is consistent with the control of the spiritual intent of art over the material intent of art, as discussed in terms of the technique of art.

In Maritain's careful distinction between the practical order of art and the speculative order of wisdom, the thrust of his argument becomes evident. Academicism is pseudoscientific in its worship of conceptual art, the rational art of wisdom. Maritain, however, argues that the <u>habitus</u> is not fertile in such a seedbed and cannot be subjected to an external structure if it is to retain the necessary freedom to pursue a good work. The observance of the primary rule, then, assures that the <u>via inventionis</u> will exercise its inventive nature

through operational freedom and exert intuitive control over the <u>via</u> <u>disciplinae</u>, the material aspect of the same habitus.

The aim of performance is a performed work, a product of sound created for itself. The aim of performance depends on the principle of disinterestedness or gratuitousness because the performance of music is a fine art. This principle has two contributing parts: first, a product of fine art has no necessary use other than its own existence as a good work; secondly, a good work is created to please its creator.

A pleasing sound conveys beauty to the performer; therefore, a product of sound is created for itself when the performer produces a sound which satisfies or delights his intellect through the aural sense. The sound is the object of performance, an object which reflects beauty when it is good or pleasing to the performer. The beauty of a performed work, then, transcends the object, the sound of the work; nevertheless, sound and beauty are inseparable when the former is a product of disinterested performance.

Since the aim of performance is an internal one, the use of performance for external aims--such as concerts, entertainment or background music, or wages--is outside of the internal realm. If the external use or aim of performance is the primary object, the principle of disinterestedness is violated and the internal aim of performance is threatened.

A product of useful art is created primarily for use by man; conversely, musical performance is a fine art and its product is created primarily for itself, thus having no necessary use other than its own existence. This is because beauty can delight the intellect but has no use, only an essence. It reflects from the sound of a work and cannot be produced directly through specifications (as is the case with a product of useful art). If the product of performance is produced for use by man, the presence of beauty in the work may be ignored or regarded as a "by-product" of the use intended.

The use of a performance product, however, is a probable occurrence because of the overlap of art in general: the making of a good work. Because of this overlap, a performance product can be used for any external purpose desired by the performer; however, to remain fine art, a musical work must <u>first</u> delight the intellect of the performer through his aim to make a good work for itself. This is the essential difference between the internal and external aims of performance. A good work created to please the performer inclines toward beauty by nature. When the internal, spiritual aim is met, the external aims can be undertaken without harm to the primary aim of performance.

A performer's personal delight in the sound of a work ensures that the creativity of the spirit, or the creative intellect, is free to find itself in the work and to do its will in producing a pleasing work. If the performer refuses to deviate from pleasing ends--if he performs only that which pleases him--he binds himself to the work through a love of the particular sound being produced. Beauty is connatural to him because the will of the creative intellect has guided him to beauty. The creativity of the spirit inclines toward beauty by nature and it wills to make a good work because such a work reflects beauty back to its maker. The prerequisite to this inclination is the freedom to operate through the aural sense by reflecting musical sounds upon the intellect and allowing the will to pursue sounds which delight the intellect. Resultingly, the creative intellect is led by

the will to a completed work, unique to the intellect and disinterested in external aims. Since the primary rule intends to free the intellectual inclination toward beauty, the conjoined spiritual rules of discovery, adaptation, and transformation--and material rules of execution-are bound to the primary rule.

The habitus of performance operates through the intellectual inclination toward beauty. To perceive beauty through the aural sense involves a simplicity of perception but a complexity of essence in respect to beauty. First, transcendental beauty is beauty in all things, a beauty known to God but not to man--except through the conduit of sensory experience. Secondly, the aural experience of beauty in music is beauty perceived aurally; and it either pleases or displeases the intellect as a result of this perception. The aural experience of beauty is defined as the aesthetic experience of music, or the perception of aesthetic beauty in music. Thirdly, the beauty which becomes connatural to the intellect of the performing musician is an aurally pleasing experience of aesthetic beauty. Connatural beauty, then, is aesthetic beauty which conveys intellectual joy through the sound of music. The habitus pursues the beauty of connaturality as it intuitively seeks itself and the pleasure of satisfying music. In its pursuit, the habitus uses the sound to find itself and apply itself to the object being produced. The habitus becomes connatural to its object through the beauty of personal aural experience.

The academicist, who attempts to produce beauty conceptually and positively, has little patience with the subjective nature of connaturality because the unpredictability of connaturality cannot be ruled by the positivism of pure objectivity. To avoid connaturality, the academicist

must rule sound conceptually, that is, to regard sound as an object from which nothing transcends. The academicist exercises little concern over the pleasurable aspects of sound; he begins and ends with the external content of the music; he defines sound as an aural copy of the written score, thus logically filtering out any possibility of an inner mystery transcending the score.

The academicist's position becomes polarized in respect to contemporary music because of the external complexity of this music. A personal connaturality with such surface complexity is regarded as improbable, unnecessary, and pointless while personal detachment is regarded as essential.

Obviously, the academicist lacks confidence in the intuitive perception of contemporary music. As a result, a contemporary work, which lacks the beauty it purports to represent visually and conceptually, may be judged as conceptually good while being aesthetically weak. In other words, the external quality of the work is equated with the aesthetic value, the inner sterility notwithstanding.

Maritain argues that all artistic products contain a degree of transcendence, but apart from sensory perception, aesthetic beauty is muted. The aural perception of complex and unusual music may be repulsive to the intellect at first; nevertheless, if the performer allows the sound of this music to permeate his intellect, he may grow to be connatural to the sounds that were initially repulsive. The complexity of contemporary music appears to present a challenge but not an insurmountable task for the performer because all music, traditional as well as contemporary, must reveal its inner content through

aural perception; otherwise, the beauty reflected from the composer's intent, however meager, may remain isolated from the intellect. Furthermore, contemporary music having much aesthetic value in its aural potentiality is also sterilized by artistic striving for pure objectivity.

Because of the intellectual inclination toward beauty, the <u>habitus</u> operates through the intellectual will to create a good work. The <u>habitus</u>, in its spirituality, perfects a work by the intuition of the will; it intuitively "knows" the proper direction of operation through connaturality. The principle of disinterestedness ensures that a work is performed to delight, initially, the intellect of the performer and to produce, resultingly, a good sound, one that aurally enhances the performed work. In this way, the <u>habitus</u> is prompted to search, probe, and exhaust itself in pursuit of its object: a pleasing sound.

To the above end, the virtue of performance draws upon knowledge and uses or applies this knowledge to enhance the work being performed. The skill of performance, physical and mental, is used to externalize the intended work or give it an aural presence. The <u>habitus</u> relies on knowledge and skill but only in the context of an undeviating service to the aural product. A knowledge of music is speculative; the skill of execution is empirical. The <u>habitus</u> of performance is neither as rational as wisdom nor as observable as externalization.

A purely technical display of skill, or of performing habits, is a substitute for the formality of performance which begins in the intellect. A proficient technician may be observably impressive in his

motions of performance but his mind may also be intellectually detached from the aural product. If the proficiency of performance is primary, the ego grasps this intent for itself. The ego makes the work a servant of the performer's skill, a skill which seeks to enhance itself, thus making performance a shallow art, an art of proficient reading and execution. If society places great value on observable performance results, a performer's "motions" might be misinterpreted as an art of depth when it is quite the opposite, that is, a display of good performing habits. The performer himself knows the truth of his intent; others can judge his intent only through his works.

The <u>habitus</u> adheres to the primacy of a work, an intent not easily observable; however, such an intent can be judged for its spiritual content through the aesthetic experience of music. The <u>habitus</u> requires means to externalize its product; therefore, the proficiency of execution may be equal to that of display for the sake of display. The essential difference is that the <u>habitus</u> requires execution to serve the work being produced, a work first envisioned by the intellect.

Conceptual methods of performance pertain to the content of a written score. The score, and its notation, belong to the speculative order of knowledge because it is entirely possible to analyze, plan, and execute performance through the contemplation of notation, the intent being abstracted from the material content of the score. In this sense, the externalization of the product serves the abstracted material intent.

The problem with conceptual performance lies in the essence of the habitus; that is, the habitus is illogical and nonconceptual.

Moreover, a written score is the musical work but only as much of the work as can be visually represented to a performer. The inner secret, the aesthetic beauty, is hidden within the aural experience of the work.

Score contemplation, by itself, falls short of aesthetic intent because performance is of the practical order and must produce its product through the sound of music, an experience which transcends the score. The beauty of music is hidden within the sounds symbolized by notation but accessible through aural perception. Score notation is certainly a more positive vehicle for analysis but the essence of beauty cannot be scored in a positive sense. In scoring his work, the composer attempts to retain the beauty he had discovered in sound, a difficult task since only the objectivity of sound can be notated accurately. The performer must hear the aural reality of the work before he can perceive the beauty hidden within the objectivity of score notation. This is why the <u>habitus</u> of performance is, by nature, illogical and nonconceptual.

Those performers most adept at score interpretation may be the least adept at perfecting a work in performance because the beauty of the work must be spontaneously perceived in sound. They may know the material intent of the work but fail to perceive the application of the material elements to the elusive aural product. The <u>habitus</u> does not require impressive terminology to pursue its object; it does require intuitive perception.

The re-creation of the composer's intent falls under the auspices of artistic or aesthetic judgment. Re-creation requires a careful balance between the via inventionis and the via disciplinae of

performance. If the <u>via inventionis</u> predominates, the work is subjected to the personal whim of the performer, an example of artistic anarchy, and an emphasis on performer's intent over composer's intent. Conversely, the predominance of the <u>via disciplinae</u> encourages conceptual score analysis which, by itself, neglects the performer's intuitive aural perception of the work--a point which parallels conceptual aims in performance.

Re-creation begins with the composed work in its printed or external form and, in this, the <u>via disciplinae</u> is necessary for score analysis. The totality of the judgment, however, cannot dwell at the material level. Score contemplation is a beginning of artistic judgment but, as re-creation, it is limited to the external work and not to the work, in the internal sense. Aural perception is an essential component of the performer's judgment because the work reveals itself in sound. Aesthetic perception requires a prior consent, by the performer, to the aural reality of the work and what it may teach him. Prior consent is the full attention given to the sound of the work as conveyed through performer to judge through his connaturality with the sound of the work.

The re-creation of a composed work is the initial step toward the performer's view of the totality of the work in performance. The performed work is the potentiality of the composed work in relation to the performer's intellectual uniqueness and performing ability. The totality of the performer's view is the creative idea, a comprehensive vision containing details in spiritual form, that is, details not worked

out or externalized. As externalization or execution begins, the performer's intuition guides him in pursuit of the envisioned details, initially obscure, and which become "fixed" as they are discovered, aurally, to fit the original view of the work. In this respect, the performer finds it difficult to calculate his progress in advance because the fixation of detail occurs at the moment of discovery. The sound of a performed work is "right" when he hears the fulfillment of his idea, that is, when his intellect becomes connatural to the aural product.

The <u>habitus</u> guides the performer to his preferred particular sound; the intuition of the <u>habitus</u> probes the composed work for its beauty and wills the intellect to pursue it and externalize it. The desired sound is validated, then, by connaturality. Apart from his <u>habitus</u>, the performer could not know in which direction to proceed, the alternative being an academic plan, conceptually designed, and derived from the printed score through contemplation. Such a prepared plan is efficient, positive, and, very likely, acceptable; however, it may divert the performer away from the beauty of the work, thereby limiting the aural product to a level below its initial potentiality.

Inspiration, or the lack of it, is directly related to the depth and intensity of the performer's idea. The flash of inspiration is equated with the sudden and unexpected appearance of a creative idea--the composer's intent united with the performer's intent as the latter suddenly "sees" the potentiality of the work in performance. Inspiration spurs the performer on to further action, in

pursuit of detail, and with the hope of externalizing the generality of the vision before the limitation of memory fades the initial brilliance of the idea. For a moment, the performer knew what he wanted; he envisioned the full potential of the work in performance within an instantaneous framework. It remains for the <u>habitus</u> to guide the intellect in search of detail and to validate detail by intuition. The conscious mind, or the memory, cannot hold the complex unity of the envisioned work. The details are revealed through externalization and the externalized details, in turn, provide an aural presence to the envisioned work, in its totality. The aural product is an imperfect fulfillment of inspiration, the material imperfection of the luminous perfection of the performer's idea.

The sign quality of a musical work supports Maritain's contention that there is an immateriality to the work which transcends the physical presence of a printed score. The direct sign is analogous to the creative idea whether it be the compositional idea of the composer or the performance idea of the performer. The latter idea is the compositional idea transformed by the action of performance. The reversed sign is the substance or personality of the performer which enters the aural product unintentionally through the action of performance. The reversed sign of the composer is a nonconceptual part of the composed work which entered the work through the action of composition.

The <u>habitus</u> of performance operates through the direct or intentional sign but because the performer is a man, as well as an artist, the reversed or unintentional sign is inevitably commingled with creative intent. The spiritual nature of the direct and reversed signs

permeates the material or entitative presence of the printed score. Moreover, the sign of the work is nonconceptual, in contrast to the conceptual nature of symbolic notation within the materiality of the work. The <u>habitus</u> of performance permeates the surface mechanics by aural action and, in this way, becomes connatural to the inner sign hidden within the score. The inner sign of the work is analogous to the creative idea but not to the symbolism of notation, external to the work.

The action of imitation in performance relates to the sign aspect of a musical work and also defines the Maritain concept of creative intuition. A musician's imitative action occurs through the simultaneous reading and execution of the score and the expression of a creative intent subjectively commingled with the personality of the performer. The imitative action of performance is a marriage of the entitative work to the intentional and unintentional creative intent of the performer. He begins with the score but permeates it with his creative idea, the latter being affected or influenced by the subjectivity of his personality. This is analogous to the direct-reversed sign relationship in musical performance and to the relationship of the entitative work (score) to the intentional work (aural product).

Imitative performance occurs when the performer executes the score while simultaneously putting himself into the work through aural perception. Consequently, the visual work is transformed into an aural product; a composed work becomes a performed work. In other words, the composed work is inadvertently transfigured by the action of performance; the aural product is the composed work as the performer hears it, a transcendence of musical sounds symbolized materially.

Technically reproducing the score through the primacy of execution is not imitation, in the formal sense, because strict reproduction lacks the self-expression and the personal creative intent of the performer. Conversely, slighting or ignoring the entitative work in favor of total performer freedom is not imitative because the entitative work must be re-created through the action of artistic judgment.

The musical work is a prerequisite to self-expression because the performer expresses his self through the work; that is, he expresses the work and not himself, in a direct sense. Self-expression, or the reversed sign, is a giving of the self, a self-sacrifice to the work being made. The self-expression of the personality is in direct contrast to the self-centered possessiveness of the ego and its concern for individuality. Self-expression is self-sacrifice, a subordination of the personality to the work being performed. Self-expression is tied to the <u>habitus</u> of performance because the performer focuses upon expressing the work, his creative intent through the work, and himself through the performance idea. The expression of the self, then, is analogous to the unintentional impact of the reversed sign on the action of performance.

Technical display enhances the ego because it focuses upon the performer and not the work. Technique, in its lower sense, enhances the work when it serves the work, an alien practice to the ego which grasps and cannot serve. The <u>habitus</u> seeks to produce a good work and operates through the self rather than the ego.

A musical work aurally communicates its intentional sign to a perceiver of the work. In this way, the interiority of a composition

is communicated to the performer (and the interiority of a performed work is communicated to listeners in general). To perceive the creative intent of an artist is to perceive something of his self along with the creative idea. This kind of communication is nonconceptual and depends upon aural perception; communication, in this sense, is defined as a work revealing itself to a perceiver.

The intent to communicate, as an aim of performance, is external to the formal definition of communication. The intent to communicate effect, knowledge, or proficiency of habit is external to communication, in its higher sense, because the aim of performance is to produce a good work. Communication, in its higher sense, does not focus upon certain components of a work in a direct and conscious fashion. A performed work communicates by revealment, indirectly.

The <u>habitus</u> operates through the soul of a work, or its operative idea, because this is the inner sphere which intends to make a good work. The spirit of the work, or subjectivity of the performer, is an unintentional component of the soul, transcending the soul but not controlling it. This is analogous to the self expressing itself in a work, or the performer's self expressing the work. The aural product communicates or reveals the soul, in conjunction with the spirit, to the perceiver. Relative to the composed work, the performer is both perceiver and maker; relative to the performed work, a listener is a perceiver of both the composed and performed product.

Intentional communication betrays a concern for the self rather than the work. The communication of effect, in particular, is concerned with the impact of a work on others--another way of saying that the

performer, in this case, is concerned about how others react to his performance product. The practice of intentional communication also feeds the social bias of art because performance for communication is a natural instrument of social purpose. If the performer consciously attempts to communicate external purpose, he unconsciously inhibits the self which flows through the aesthetic purpose of a work. If the performer wishes to please an audience, he risks displeasing his intellect and inhibiting self-expression. This is because self-expression is concerned with the work, and the intellect must be pleased with the sound of the work before the <u>habitus</u> operatively guides the intellect in perfecting the product. What is communicated, then, is the interiority of the work which may result in an effect, indirectly.

Performance for use, rather than making, subordinates the creative intellect to social requirements and promotes the primacy of external goals and the incidence of performer satisfaction. A good work is one which pleases the performer; a beautiful work is one which the performer loves without qualification. Beauty is of no material use; it exists to delight the intellect of a perceiver. Performance for use, then, inhibits the aesthetic experience of beauty.

To encourage aesthetic priorities in a work, the ego must be sacrificed to the work or, in the absence of such sacrifice, the ego will demand that the work please others to enhance itself. The <u>habitus</u> of performance operates through the aesthetic requirements of art because it cannot subordinate itself to external forces, only to the work-to-be-made. Performance for use can occur following the operation of the habitus in making a good work, for itself; similarly,

performance for use can be concurrent with the operation of the <u>habitus</u> so long as the primacy of the primary rule of performance is strictly observed. This is consistent with respecting the primacy of the spiritual, internal aim of performance in the presence of external aims.

The suppression of all human ends in performance to meet creative ends presents a similar dilemma at another extreme. The danger of suppressing human ends in art is that self-expression, being human, may be repressed. This is equated to severing the reversed sign from the direct sign for the purpose of purifying artistic intent. Purified performance is a sterilized product produced by a dehumanized intent. The removal of the performer's personality from his aural product encourages stark objectivity, the impersonality of which violates Maritain's concept of imitation. Art for an ideal is distinct from art for the work, the latter drawing upon the habitus for its internal function.

The <u>habitus</u> proceeds from the intellect and the intellect is rooted in the spiritual self, the person. The <u>habitus</u> is an inner disposition of the person which serves a work willed by the intellect. Consequently, the <u>habitus</u> is not a system of art nor does it serve such an ideal; rather, it serves the interiority of a work-to-be-made.

The <u>habitus</u> is spontaneous because the mind is spontaneous; it moves freely in various directions to find itself in an object. The <u>habitus</u> operates through connaturality because the mind, by nature, seeks itself in an object. The intuition of the <u>habitus</u> depends on connaturality to find its direction; resultingly, the connaturality of intuition is unpredictable and illogical.

Moral virtue and artistic virtue apply to separate ends. The former applies to the human acts of the artist, as a man, while the

latter applies to the artistic acts of the artist, as an artist. Despite these diverse ends, a certain relationship exists between the two virtues because they both exist in the mind of the man, as a man. If the artist's moral virtue, as a man, diminishes, his <u>habitus</u> of art, also a part of the man, will eventually diminish from the physical and mental repercussions of the human acts. In this way, the free exercise of moral virtue for the good of the man also protects the habitus of art.

In addition to this, moral virtue can indirectly enhance the artistic virtue because of the role of self-expression in the practice of art. The self or person is directly subject to the operative perfection of morality; therefore, the enhancement of the self can enhance the habitus in a positive but undefinable way.

Moral virtue can also guide the performer in his use of the performance product in relation to the community and the moral values of the community. A performer need not be a "saint" to perform; however, the possession of moral virtue is an attribute in helping the performer, as a man, to preserve and enhance his <u>habitus</u> of performance while guiding his use of the performance product.

The community, on the other hand, must reciprocate by respecting the free nature of the <u>habitus</u> and its priority of aesthetic value over social value in the making of a performance product. If the aim of performance is the fulfillment of social requirements, the oppressive nature of such requirements repress the <u>habitus</u> by ignoring its inclination to create a good work. External priorities inhibit the operative nature of the <u>habitus</u>, restrict its development, and fabricate the performance product to meet social intent. The primacy of social aims in performance

is a rationalization of the place of fine art in society because this primacy loses sight of the spiritual need for art in human life. A society which preserves the dignity of spiritual pleasure (such as fine art) has less need for the carnal and material pleasures of life.

The conductor, as a performance leader, has a special relationship to the work of fine art because of his leadership role in the practice of performance--a role which pertains to the instrumentality of a performing group. The conductor's first responsibility is to the aural product and, in this sense, the <u>habitus</u> of the conductor must flow through the work in the same manner as the <u>habitus</u> of the aural agents, or instrumentalists, of the work. Hence, the performers, or aural agents, become the instruments of the conductor in his making of the work.

The conductor's secondary responsibility is to those agents, the performing musicians, the instruments of his <u>habitus</u>. If the primary responsibility is violated by external forces such as conductor selfenhancement or social requirements, or if the performance is dehumanized by attempts to withdraw the self from the work, the secondary responsibility to the performers will also be threatened. The observance of the primary responsibility is essential to the fulfillment of the secondary responsibility because the latter is tied to the former.

The existence of the secondary responsibility is rooted in the fact that the aural agents of the work are more than mere instruments; they are human beings and artists in their own right, each possessing his personal degree of <u>habitus</u> and thereby inevitably establishing a personal relationship to the performed work. If the performing

musicians become the pawns of external forces, or subject to conductor whim unrelated to the work, the performers may be inhibited in their inclinations to place themselves into the production of the work. This results in the meaningless motions of performance as contrasted with the fine art of performance, which adheres to the primacy of the work. If performance becomes the meaningless motions of execution, the conductor himself is an external threat to the very art he professes to lead and exemplify.

The aural perception of a work by its agents soon reveal whether the conductor's directives are in line with his <u>habitus</u> and are actually perfecting the work being performed. The intellectual joy of making a good work spills over to the agents who are intimately involved with its execution. When the performers are aurally aware of their personal contribution to the general sound of a good work, the <u>habitus</u> of each musician is inclined in the same general direction, united in the desire to achieve a satisfying final product. The performing group experience reveals certain similarities in the perception of beauty as well as unique differences.

The conductor, however, is the principal agent of the performed work. If the temptation of material considerations weakens the operation of his <u>habitus</u>, the expression of the work will also be weakened. The repression of the conductor's <u>habitus</u> will mute the <u>habitus</u> of his performing group because the primacy of the work is lessened. To restore the strength of his <u>habitus</u>, the conductor must subordinate himself to the aesthetic requirements of the work, as intuitively perceived by his <u>habitus</u>, thereby becoming a true instrument of the performed work.

The performance critic also has a special relationship to a performed work because he judges the work but does not perform it. His aesthetic judgment, in respect to aurally perceiving a work, is similar to the performer's judgment because both performer and critic are perceivers of the aural product.

The essential difference between the performer and the critic is that the performer intuitively applies his judgment to his personal production of the work; the critic uses his skill of critique to communicate his judgment to a performer who is the maker of the work. The performer typically judges a work during his execution of the work and applies his judgment to a further perfection of the product. The critic judges from the execution of the work and applies his critique following the judgment; however, it is left to the performer to perfect the work, to use the critique, and to judge the product in an ongoing manner. Accordingly, in judging the same work, the ongoing operation of his habitus draws the performer more deeply into the aural product than the single perceptive judgment of the critic. In respect to that particular work, the judgment of the performer may have more operative depth in spite of the probability that the critic may possess a superior knowledge of performance. The judgment, in both cases, is intuitive but in the former case it is operative while in the latter case it is external.

If the critic judges conceptually, or through preconception, the work is less likely to teach him its aesthetic intent. If he judges the performer directly, and the work indirectly, the inner spirit of the work is subordinated to the performing skill of the musician.

Criticism is intended to improve the performance product by intuitively perceiving its inner content. To do this, the critic must

allow the aural product to permeate his intellect through the aural sense, thus perceiving it for what it is and allowing his <u>habitus</u> to guide his judgment of the work. A judgment of the performer, and his executive ability, can be made through the work because improving the work requires, by natural necessity, an improvement in execution as well as intent.

The conductor, in his practice of leadership, and the critic, in his practice of critique, are both subject to the guidance of the <u>habitus</u> because the operative nature of this virtue preserves the primacy of the work. This is because the <u>habitus</u> operates through an aural product of performance.

Summary

I. The <u>habitus</u> of performance is a possession of the performer's intellect. The <u>habitus</u> is a changed or deepened intellect; hence, it gives the performer an intellectual power to perform musical works through the inner strength of intuition. The intuition of the <u>habitus</u> adheres to the primacy of a work-to-be-performed, a work willed by the intellect. The <u>habitus</u> perfects its product as the latter aurally pleases the intellect.

A. The spontaneous nature of the <u>habitus</u> reflects the spontaneous nature of the mind from which it proceeds. The <u>habitus</u> flows through the intellectual inclination toward beauty and the intellectual will to perfect an object which reflects beauty.

B. The <u>habitus</u> is acquired or developed through its adherence to a willed work, the resulting content being a latent energy or source of strength for intuition (and the intuitive production

of the next work). The acquired <u>habitus</u> is served by innate musical ability and is enhanced from each production of an aural object willed by the intellect.

C. The <u>habitus</u> rules, by reason, over empirical performing habits and conceptual means of performance.

D. The personal or subjective nature of the <u>habitus</u> requires that a performer become connatural to his object. He facilitates connaturality by allowing the sound of a work to permeate his intellect through his aural sense. Through the personal effort of connaturality, the performer's intuition is stimulated to guide the <u>habitus</u> to its determined end: a pleasing work.

E. Since the virtue of art serves a willed work, the <u>habitus</u> of performance cannot serve a system of art or an artistic ideal.

II. The primary aim of performance is an aural product created for itself. The primary aim involves the principle of disinterestedness because the performance of music is a fine art. The principle of disinterestedness defines the aural product of performance as a product having no necessary use other than its own existence as a good work, a good work being a work created to please its creator. Through his practice of gratuitous performance, the performer needs no necessary reward other than the pleasure derived from his aural product. The aim of performance, then, is a spiritual aim because it depends upon the performer's connaturality with his product. The <u>habitus</u>, and its spiritual interiority, operates through the spiritual aim of performance because the latter is also intellectual and internal in nature.

A. The aim of performance defines the technique of performance as technique, in a higher sense. The means of performance serve a primary intent, that is, to create a good aural product. Technique includes both a spiritual aspect and a material aspect; but technique, in its higher sense, demands that the material rules serve the spiritual rules and the conjoined primary rule (which intends to free the natural inclinations of the intellect to produce a good work). Technique, in its lower sense, is defined as material or external technique, an end in itself, and a technique which takes means as ends. The <u>habitus</u> operates through technique, in its higher sense, because the rules of performance are a possession of the <u>habitus</u>; therefore, technique provides the <u>habitus</u> with a content, operative in nature, which becomes a means to producing a good work.

B. The aim of performance defines the communication of performance as indirect, unintended communication, in a higher sense. The work reveals itself in sound to a perceiver, the revealment containing both creative intent and the personality of the performer. In this way, a composed work reveals itself to the performer and the performed work reveals itself to a nonperformer. The external communication of effect, empirical performing habits, or musical knowledge may occur as a result of internal communication; however, external communication as a direct aim of performance is a violation of the primary aim of performance. The <u>habitus</u> operates through the communication of performance, in a higher sense, because aural perception is

intellectual in nature (a connaturality of the mind with its object).

C. The aim of performance defines the beauty of performance as the intellectual delight or satisfaction derived from the aural perception of a work, or the aural experience of a good or pleasing work. A pleasing sound conveys beauty to a performer because the intellect is naturally inclined to seek it in an object of sound. Since the intellect becomes connatural with a pleasing work, the beauty reflected from the work is connatural beauty. Connatural beauty is the beauty of aesthetic experience, aesthetic beauty being the beauty of aural perception. The aesthetic beauty of music is a momentary glimpse of transcendental beauty, an infinite beauty known to God but not to man (except by means of the aesthetic). Relative to the transcendental realm of God, the aural perception of beauty is a human limitation, an experience of beauty more intuitive than abstract and more illogical than logical. The conceptual production of beauty, through performance, violates the aim of performance because conceptually planned performance, by itself, depends upon the contemplative abstraction of a work. The spiritual mystery of a work belongs to the transcendental realm and is not an abstractable item. Moreover, aesthetic beauty cannot be confined to a system of performance because the transcendental realm, of which the aesthetic is a part, is infinite. The habitus of performance operates through connatural beauty because the intellect is naturally inclined towards beauty.

III. The action of performance is defined as the aim of performance activated by the performer as he places his self into the production and execution of a work. The performer expresses the work directly and himself indirectly; thus, the objective reality of the work is commingled with the subjectivity of the performer in the action of performance, in a higher sense. The <u>habitus</u> operates through the action of performance, in its higher sense, because the personal nature of the <u>habitus</u> relates to the expression of the self in a work.

Α. The action of performance defines artistic judgment as the perception and re-creation of the composer's intent. Artistic judgment relates to the communication of the composed work, in the formal sense; consequently, the intentional sign of a composed work reveals itself aurally to a performer. The written score, or entitative structure, of the work is the material representation of the composer's intent; however, contemplative judgment, by itself, remains on the surface or external level. Artistic judgment includes the assessment of the score but the judgment, in totality, transcends the score by the aesthetic judgment of the work's sound. The aesthetic judgment requires a full consent, by the performer, to the aural reality of the work. This judgment is a perceptive judgment which probes the inner mystery of a composed work as the performer allows the work to communicate itself to him. The habitus operates through such perceptive judgment because the judgment is an intuitive action. It focuses upon the inner work and requires the performer to put himself into the work to activate his intuition. Conceptual judgment, by itself, inhibits the

action of performance because it remains on the surface of the inner work and does not penetrate the spiritual depth of the creative intent.

B. The action of performance defines the creative idea as the performer's vision of his work-to-be-performed. The creative idea is comprehensive but complex, complete but momentary, and initially clear but subsequently obscure. The intuitive appearance of a creative idea is defined as inspiration. The habitus operates through artistic vision because the envisioned work must be intuitively externalized by the discovery of details, which become fixed as they fit the envisioned product; that is, the details must sound right or correct to the performer as he applies them to the evolving work. The habitus guides the externalized details toward the intended product; consequently, both detail and product evolve simultaneously. The conceptual idea, by itself, inhibits the action of performance because the preconception of a work must remain on the material or external level.

C. The action of performance defines artistic imitation as an intermingling of the entitative work (written score), the intentional sign (creative idea), and the unintentional sign (performer's personality). The action of imitation begins with the score but moves beyond the score into the interiority of the work by means of aural perception and production. Aurally, the work is expressed directly and the performer's self is expressed indirectly. The habitus operates through imitation because the work

is a sign; that is, it contains a spiritual mystery which must be perceived to be expressed. The relationship of the direct and reversed signs to the entitative work defines imitation, in its higher sense. The performer must put himself into the work to initiate the imitative action, a requirement which parallels both the action of artistic judgment and the action of artistic vision. The material reproduction of the score, by itself, inhibits the action of imitation because the objectivity of the entitative work is severed from the subjectivity of the performer's intuitive perception.

IV. The moral virtue of the performer, as a man, serves him, as an artist, in three ways. First, the free exercise of good moral virtue protects the <u>habitus</u>; secondly, the presence of good moral virtue enhances the <u>habitus</u>, nonconsciously but profoundly; thirdly, the guidance of good moral virtue assists the performer in his use of the performance product in relation to the social and moral values of the community.

A. The morality of performance makes a distinction between self-expression and self-centered expression. Selfexpression expresses the work directly and itself indirectly, a principle in line with the imitative action of performance. Furthermore, self-expression is a giving of the self (or selfsacrifice) to a work, a principle in contrast with selfsacrifice to the systematic practice of art. Self-centered expression expresses the ego directly and the work incidently by focusing upon the use of the work for self-enhancement. In this way, self-centered expression better serves the systematic practice of art than the good of a willed aural product. Selfexpression, which is analogous to the reversed sign, subordinates itself to the work, for the good of the intended work. The ego enhances itself by using the work to display its individuality. In this sense, the material execution of a work, by itself, serves the ego but not necessarily the work; accordingly, it enhances the performer's individuality but not necessarily his personality. The <u>habitus</u> of performance operates through self-expression because the latter serves the good of the aural product.

The morality of performance makes a distinction Β. between the use of performance and the art of performance (because the ends are separate). The art of performance perfects the product while the use of the product follows its production and has external ends not primary to the work. The use of a performance product is legitimate if the use strictly follows the art of performance, or the aim and action of performance, in its higher sense. The primacy of performance for individuality and performance for social requirements subordinates the aesthetic requirements of performance to external ends; consequently, the art of performance is severed from aesthetic ends. The habitus operates through the art of performance but not through the primacy of use. To preserve his inclination to perform good works, the performer must give his intended work precedence over whatever compensation the use of this work may entail. To preserve the free nature

of the <u>habitus</u> in the performance of music, the community must reciprocate for the performer's personal responsibility in the use of his product. The community can reciprocate by granting him the freedom to perform for the good of his product, in the primary sense, and for the social value of the product, in the secondary sense.

Conclusions

1. The <u>habitus</u> of performance is an intuitive and operative disposition which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without a logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action. The <u>habitus</u> is unpretentious because its relationship to a work is established or structured during the momentary perceptions and operative functions of production, this being in contrast with the pretentious structure of academicism. The performer, in possession of the <u>habitus</u>, knows how to perform his music without conscious certainty of how or why he knows.

2. The internal power or content of the <u>habitus</u> is largely in a preconscious state; that is, the performer is not conscious of its content until the intellect becomes connatural with an object--a musical work, thereby prompting a movement of the <u>habitus</u> from the preconscious mind to the conscious mind. The power of the <u>habitus</u> is freed through the production of music willed by the intellect (through its connaturality with musical sound).

3. The <u>habitus</u> relates to musical performance in the spiritual or internal sense. This relationship does not exclude the material or external aspect of performance; but rather, the material aspect is

subordinated to the spiritual aspect, the realm of the <u>habitus</u>. The material aspect of performance, by itself, requires a mastery of performance skills and a knowledge of musical concepts; consequently, a command of the physical instrument and the printed score is a facilitative means of producing the aural object.

4. The operation of the <u>habitus</u> flows through the sound of a work, as the sound pleases or displeases the performer's intellect. The primacy of a musical work indicates that the musician desires something from the music being produced, this "something" being the delight of aesthetic beauty. He needs no additional reason to perform his music. If his object offers him nothing, no alternative aim of performance can legitimately replace the internal aim.

A musical work, in this sense, is defined as any aural object ranging from short, simple songs--to improvised melodies--to more formal thematic literature. The work, then, is more likely an object of internal will than external taste.

5. The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music is defined as the placing of the self into the work. A performer places his self into a work by becoming totally oblivious to his self, and his surroundings, and by becoming wholly absorbed in the sound of the music and the work that evolves. Within the action of performance, nothing other than sound exists; the mind, as served by the aural sense, is fixed upon the work and does not wander away to the external world without releasing the spell cast over the mind by the work.

6. The art of performance, as discussed in terms of aim and action, is not a compartmentalized system of production. The <u>habitus</u>

operates through its object comprehensively, thereby causing the components of performance to be interrelated and overlapped in their contribution to the final product.

7. The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concurrently; however, the use must be subordinated to the primacy of the art to preserve the latter in its higher sense. The <u>habitus</u> operates through the art of performance and is undeterred by its use, so long as the use does not control or dictate the performance product. Since the use of a performance product is ruled by morality, the use has human ends while the art has artistic or aesthetic ends.

8. It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of the <u>habitus</u> will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and, to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art (the making of the work).

9. The content of the <u>habitus</u> is derived and enhanced from the performer's connaturality with his work; therefore, a reciprocal relationship exists between the development and operation of the <u>habitus</u>, the reciprocality focusing upon the art of performance (operation enhances development; development enhances operation). Consequently, aesthetic delight, perceived as personal enjoyment, facilitates both the operation and development of the <u>habitus</u> because the intellect is drawn into its object spiritually.

10. The relationship of the <u>habitus</u> to musical performance explains why musicians, possessing a <u>habitus</u> of great depth, are able to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and without dependence upon conceptual terminology.

General Conclusion

Maritain shows, through the logic of philosophical argument, the illogical nature of the <u>habitus</u> in respect to beauty and the practice of fine art.¹ Maritain shows, through conceptual consistency, the nonconceptual nature of the <u>habitus</u>. Maritain shows, without dogmatism, the unwavering, undeviating thrust of the <u>habitus</u> towards a work-to-bemade, willed by the intellect. The paradox of this loyalty is that, to be a servant of the work, the <u>habitus</u> must adhere to the unpredictable will of the creative intellect.

It is at this point that the spiritual nature of the <u>habitus</u> becomes evident. Only the spiritual realm of the intellect could provide such depth to the virtue of art, thus causing the resulting complexity of its operative nature. The material level of performance can exist in a factory-like environment, under a thoroughly efficient method of production--but the <u>habitus</u> finds existence within an oppressive environment threatening to its operative freedom. The contrast between the motions of performance and the art of performance is amplified by the personal nature of the habitus and the impersonal nature of logical art.

¹The illogical nature of the <u>habitus</u> is distinct from the irrational nature of habit.

CHAPTER VII

APPLICATIONS TO THE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM IN MUSIC EDUCATION

The Aim of Education and the Aim of Performance

First, it is necessary to restate Maritain's definition of the aim of education. The aim of education is to equip, form, and liberate the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellectual virtues or the <u>habitus</u>.¹ Using this broad definition, the aim of music education can be defined as the intent to equip, form, and liberate the creativity of the spirit, or creative intelligence, to prepare for the development of the habitus of music.

Secondly, it is necessary to restate the aim of performance. The aim of performance is to create a good work through the sound of music, a good work being pleasing to the performer and the object upon which the habitus fixates.²

The essential point in Maritain's definition of the aim of education is the <u>preparation</u> of the intellect for the development of the <u>habitus</u>. Education, in the liberal sense, directs its attention to the natural intelligence of the student and prepares the mind for the development of intellectual virtue. This development occurs through

> ¹See chapter 1 above, p. 11. ²See chapter 3 above, p. 32.

experience in a given object and is not educable in the direct sense.¹

To educate for virtue is a pretense because such education is invariably external to the development of virtue, a spiritual development related to the interiority of the will. This point is consistent with the acquiring of the <u>habitus</u> through the aural production of works, indirectly and nonconsciously, the works being objects of the creative intellect.

Education as formative education is more concerned with the intellect than the will and recognizes that the school is but a partial agency in the totality of the educative process (which continues throughout life).² Since the nature of man's mind remains inherently consistent, the primary aim of education need not be changed or altered to suit modern needs.³ Secondary aims may be adjusted or adapted to changing circumstances and, in fact, periodic reconstruction of the means of education is an enrichment of the process, so long as the primary aim is preserved and protected.⁴

The school performance program should avoid, as implied by Maritain, direct attempts to make musical "dwarfs" or pseudovirtuosos out of student performers. The concept of preparation, as directed at the natural intelligence, places the <u>habitus</u> of performance beyond

²Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education, p. 51; and idem, "Education and the Humanities," in <u>The Education of Man</u>, p. 83.

³Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 52.

⁴Ibid., pp. 52-53.

¹Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 49-50. Teaching toward the natural intelligence helps allay instructional tendencies toward overspecialization. Idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," in <u>The Education of Man</u>, p. 138. For a further discussion on specialization see pp. 142-145 below.

the scope of the school performance program or, at least, beyond any direct aim of instruction. Since the development of the <u>habitus</u> depends upon a performer's personal relationship to his music, this kind of learning is difficult, or conceivably impossible, to reliably plan or accurately prepare by the performance instructor. As a consequence of such an aim, performance instruction generally veers toward the mastery of musical mechanics, which improves execution but, deplorably, encourages the student to express little or nothing of himself through his music. He may, in fact, remain aloof from the intellectual joy of aural production.

The above consequence occurs because the instructor inadvertently confuses efficient and refined performance habits, or external technique, with the <u>habitus</u> and confines the <u>habitus</u> of performance to technique, in its lower sense. Moreover, the intensity of such surface development can alienate the student from his art and make his performance one of impersonality or boredom. This external approach to student performance can do little to assist gifted students who are intellectually inclined to acquire a <u>habitus</u>; and more profoundly, such an approach to the average student performer, who desires the enjoyment of music in preference to technical development, reaches the point of absurdity in its neglect of student will.

The objective of school education, in the liberal sense, is not to teach for the acquisition of an art, and the virtues involved, in a direct manner; but rather, this agency of education should assist students in learning the <u>meaning</u> of an art through the intellect's connaturality with an object, and in comprehending the truth (beauty) which

the object yields (to the student).¹ Liberal education, then, must "see to it that the young person grasps this truth or beauty through the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, and emotional dynamism."² The meaning of the art of performance is defined by the beauty conveyed to the performer through the aural experience of his music. "So I should say that the youth is to learn and know music in order to understand the meaning of music rather than in order to become a composer [or virtuoso]."³

Maritain's definition of the aim of education, and the reconciliation of this definition with the aim of performance, can be further clarified by exploring seven misconceptions of educational aims, as identified by Maritain.

The Particularization of Means over Ends

To perfect means and disregard ends in education elevates the importance of means so refined that the end result of their use is lost in a maze of method.⁴ The concern is with immediacy, or immediate results, rather than the far-reaching implications of educational methods. Such particularization encourages over-teaching, a practice

¹Ibid., p. 71.

²Ibid. Maritain uses the term "sensuous" in reference to the role the senses play in the intellectual perception of beauty. The gift of imagination, of course, also serves the intellect; and the emotional reaction to beauty is a result of the intellectual fulfillment, which defines the affective role.

³Maritain, "The Humanities and Liberal Education," in <u>Education</u> <u>at the Crossroads</u>, p. 63; also see idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," pp. 138-139.

⁴Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 3.

which gives little consideration to spontaneous, unprepared experiences.

The child is so well tested and observed, his needs so well detailed, his psychology so clearly cut out, the methods for making it easy for him so perfected, that the end of all these commendable improvements runs the risk of being forgotten or disregarded.¹

If the performance program confuses performing habits with the <u>habitus</u>, the student performer is viewed as a product of the program, a measurable product which exits in terms of finality rather than potentiality. Quite obviously, the far-reaching implications of performance transcend the observable results during the school years and are not measurable in the material sense. In terms of ends, the performance instructor can monitor current student experiences for their direction or probable outcomes while fully realizing the limitations of such assessment.

Maritain implies that envisioning ends, in spite of human fallibility, is preferable to the glorification of means. This is the case whether the student intends to pursue a musical career or, on the other hand, decides to terminate the performance experience following his school years. Helping the student learn the meaning of music is in contrast with molding him into a performer of music. The student may, in connection with musical meaning, become a proficient performer, but the depth of such proficiency is generally beyond the reach of school instruction. The latter point explains why certain students become good performers in spite of poor instruction. The instructional vision, in looking towards educational ends, determines

1_{Ibid}.

probable outcomes of learning rather than obvious and immediate achievement.

The Refinement of Material Ends

The second misconception of aims is closely related to the first (as discussed above). The education of matter focuses upon the conditioned reflex or sense memorization because it cannot accept the presence of a spiritual mystery, the mysterious nature of the person.¹ The positing of material ends expresses the will of the instructor more than student will and challenges the intellect of the instructor more than student intellect.

The aim of education, spiritually defined, is more mysterious and humble than material ends which attempt to define the entire educational experience in terms of achievable goals.² Since the spiritual aim considers the person, as well as the individual, the unpredictable movement of student will is respected and the latent power of the student intellect is challenged to function for itself.³

Material ends in the performance program are designed to "train" the performer to become musically proficient. Materially defined, goals and results are externalities to be measured and evaluated by the instructor--a way of demonstrating the "effectiveness" of the program to the community, administration, and the field in general. There is no mystery to a technically proficient performance of music, if such external proof of competency is the desired objective. Similarly, good external results are equated with desirable student progress regardless of the personal relationship of the student to his music.

¹Ibid., pp. 4, 7-9. ²Ibid., p. 4. ³Ibid., pp. 9-10.

The primacy of material ends, then, inevitably encourages the impersonality of sterile motions of performance.

The disorientation in performance program directions, of which Reimer and Ball write, is a ramification of the material bias in positing educational aims, as well as a historical incidence of means over ends in achieving short-sighted goals.¹ The disorientation occurs when the externally imposed structure of the performance program conflicts with the internal, spontaneous demands of musical performance, defined as a fine art. Music educators are beginning to realize that pseudovirtuosity may be empty of genuine content; however, the material bias in aims is continuing because the field is more concerned with its own potency than with the inner potentiality of its students.

The performance program, defined by spiritual ends, accepts the mystery of personality by encouraging the student to place his self into his music, to react aesthetically for himself, and to personally envision the potentiality of a work. He is encouraged to commit himself to the risk of artistic performance, a spiritual mystery in itself. Spiritual ends involve the personal inclinations of the student without excluding the material objectives of the program, but also including and, at times, emphasizing personal growth not directly controlled or prepared by the instructor.

The Pragmatic Approach to Truth

Pragmatic education seeks to verify its objectives with empirical measurements administered by the instructor, while simultaneously

1See chapter 1 above, p. 4.

neglecting the truth gained from personal insights of the mind.¹ Pragmatic education, in its extreme sense, is a doctrine of doubt, or skepticism, because (1) it distrusts in truth not provable by teacher verification, and (2) it doubts the intellectual power of the student mind.² In this way, pragmatic education is directly related to, and supportive of, material ends in education because these ends can be verified.

Behavioral objectives are a modern example of the immediacy and objective specificity of pragmatic truth. The observed completion of certain behaviors is equated with personal insight, an admission that the instructor is thinking for his students and assuming that his insights into truth are also their insights, to be drawn out and measured.

Pragmatic aims in the performance program focus upon the performance behaviors of the student and away from the works-to-be-made. Again, the motions of performance are encouraged because each motion is a measurable objective to be assessed for itself and not for its contribution to the beauty of a work. Similarly, the art of performance is subordinated to the motions of performance because the performance action is misconstrued to serve the instructional objectives more than the good of an envisioned work.

Conversely, the art of performance demands that both instructor and students alike serve the good of a work and that intended objectives aim at the perfection of the work rather than the musicianship of the student. Furthermore, the aim of education, in the liberal sense, demands that the student performer's intellect be challenged by the

¹Ibid., p. 13. ²Ibid., pp. 12-14.

aural production of works. It is the power of the student's mind which guides him through the work in search of the good object, the right sound. This is a personal commitment to a work which cannot be easily prepared through performance objectives defined externally, or within the context of a lesson plan. The pursuit of aesthetic beauty, within the mystery of a work, provides the excitement of the performance experience and the incentive to continue the art so long as the object seems incomplete.

The dangers stemming from the use of behavioral objectives in music education have been recognized and defined by Bennett Reimer.

It is tragic to have measurement in its narrowest sense exert great influence on educational processes, yet this tragedy can be witnessed more and more every day. . .

Another weakness of behavioral objectives is their deadening effect on educational innovation, which often requires long periods of freedom before directions become clear. . .

. . The central outcomes of learning in the arts are usually characterized by unpredictability, subjectivity, sensitivity, creativity, originality, inwardness. These qualities do not always lend themselves to prior stipulation in the same way that predictable behaviors do. In fact, they may be stunted by the very operations insisted upon by behaviorists as necessary for effective learning.¹

When the mystery of the student intellect becomes connatural with the mystery of a work, the meaning of the art and the meaning of music, as an aural aesthetic, is inescapably conveyed to the student in the internal sense. This kind of conveyance was never doubted by Maritain, but it is doubted by educators who insist on proving what is not necessary to prove, and trivializing what is profound.

¹"Aesthetic Behaviors in Music," in <u>Toward an Aesthetic Edu</u>cation, pp. 71-73.

Education as Social Conditioning

Education for social adjustment makes a secondary aim of education primary by emphasizing learning experiences appropriate for adjustment to life in a modern society, or the current society within which the school exists.¹ The emphasis of sociologism inadvertently encourages educational enslavement to current trends and the perpetual reconstruction of educational ends, a practice which neglects the spiritual consistency of the primary aim of education, as defined by Maritain.² The encouragement of utilitarianism is also a by-product of sociologism because society, as well as the school itself, finds it convenient to use the functional skills of the students to serve its own ends and, simultaneously, to label such use as "educational" or beneficial to the learner.³

The controversial aims of performance programs: extramusical objectives and nonmusical objectives, bear a direct relationship to Maritain's conception of sociologism.⁴ If the school performance program's primary function is entertainment, this extramusical aim is synonymous with Maritain's concept of utilitarianism. If the success of the performance program depends upon extrinsic honors, or observable social activity, these nonmusical aims are synonymous with the enslavement of performance to material results, as defined by the trends or whims of society, or the temporary fads of presentism.⁵

¹Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 17. ³Ibid., p. 16.

⁴See chapter 1 above, pp. 3-4.

⁵Presentism places its trust in the current, temporary trends of the present rather than the established principles of the past. The impact of extramusical and nonmusical objectives upon the performance program can have a deadening effect upon aesthetic aims in performance because the primary aim of performance requires time, effort, and a personal commitment to a depth of production that surpasses the requirements of external goals. The imposed inversion of priorities for the performance program has had the most obvious repercussions at the public school level and has contributed to the disorientation in the field, as discussed above. This is because sociologism views musical performance as a servile art rather than a fine art, and the student performer as an artisan rather than an artist.

Education for Specialization

Maritain's conception of intellectualism is defined as education for dialectical skill, or the possession of concepts, and the narrowness of specialization, or overspecialization.¹ The focus of intellectualism is upon single areas of emphasis; it is disinclined to view the universality of a field or its broad potentialities for the learner. The nature of intellectualism serves a materialistic philosophy of life through the education of matter toward such primary aims as vocational education or preparation for college.² To achieve its intent, intellectualism may ignore, circumvent, or suppress the student's will in implementing the narrow scope of its content.

Intellectualism in the performance program has taken two forms, one in reaction to the other. Intellectualism as overspecialization occurs when the art of performance is equated with technique, in its

¹Ibid., pp. 18-19. ²Ibid., p. 19.

lower sense. Since technical proficiency is the primary aim, the performance program focuses upon the performance skills of the student; moreover, the proficient execution of performance skills is equated with the making of a good aural product. Performance, in this sense, is limited to execution, which in turn is dependent upon technical training, or the refinement of performance skills. Overspecialization occurs when (1) the performance of music is focused upon the performer rather than the musical product; and (2) the performance program intends to mold its students into performers of music.

Maritain is less critical of specialization which serves an intellectual object; however, specialization which confines an art to narrow ends is defined as overspecialization.¹ It is overspecialization which narrows the aim of the performance program; consequently, an overspecialized performance program may intend, primarily, to teach students to play and/or master an instrument of music, thus accepting the motions of performance as a vehicle of mastery learning.²

²See chapter 1, above, pp. 2-3. Reimer's questions (p. 2) can be answered in light of Maritain's conception of technique. A group performance experience can be a laboratory for musical exploration if technical skill serves the exploration. Rehearsal time is a minimal factor if rehearsing and teaching are synonymous activities. If the performing group intends, as its primary object, to aurally produce

¹According to Maritain, the amount of educational specialization may increase progressively through the school years, but this progression must be carefully monitored for tendencies toward overspecialization. "The Humanities and Liberal Education," p. 64. Teacher consideration of student performing interests is, of course, vital for connaturality; however, the exploration of musical works which are less desirable, or in which the student is less interested, is a counteraction to overspecialization. Similarly, the teacher must, at times, monitor his personal standards, or relinquish some of his preferences, in consideration of student interests and in the interest of lessening instructional specialization.

Music education reaction to overspecialization has resulted in intellectualism, in its second form: the emphasis of conceptual musical understandings intending to teach students about the art of music.¹ Performance action, in this sense, is viewed as an instrument of knowledge rather than an artistic endeavor. Envisioning performance ideas and applying them to a nonconceptual aural product, a risky and challenging adventure, is subordinated to studying the conceptual content of the scored material. Intellectualism, in its second form, regards the scored work as a conceptual finality, from which no spiritual mystery transcends. Conceptually framed, the action of performance is limited to a method: a series of planned lessons which logically and objectively structure the learner's experience of music. The adventurous spirit associated with the nonconceptual, spontaneous action of performance is neutralized by a fabrication of the product's content. Resultingly, the unpretentious nature of the fine arts is stifled by academic pretense.

The elevation of conceptual performance over proficient performance succeeds only in transforming the quasi virtuoso into a student dilettante. The aesthetic beauty of music, which is conveyed aurally, is ignored; the pleasurable experience of aesthetic perception is derided for its "sensuous" or shallow nature.² Obviously, intellectualism, in its second form, misunderstands the aesthetic experience because the academic study of music is erroneously termed a fine art.

works for their own sake, the use of the product for public performances is an insignificant threat to the musical understandings and aesthetic experiences of the participants.

> ¹See chapter 1 above, p. 5. ²See chapter 1 above, p. 5.

The art of performance, through the connaturality of mind with sound, encourages the student's intellect to probe the depths of music aurally and helps define the meaning of music to one who is making his first hesitant commitments of his self to the perfection of a work. The intellectual delight the learner receives from the sound of his object is the perception of aesthetic beauty, which defines the meaning of music. Paradoxically, the student performer can learn the meaning of music, as well as becoming a proficient and knowledgeable performer; however, the meaning of music cannot be discovered apart from the aesthetic experience of beauty. Consequently, intellectualism, in either form, makes what is primary to music secondary to music education and, more specifically, the performance program.¹

The Education of Will

The education of will, or voluntarism, subordinates the education of the intellect to either an imposed discipline or the free expansion of the will.² Voluntarism, taken as external discipline, neglects self-discipline and self-will while voluntarism, taken as free will, neglects teacher discipline or institutional authority. Both extremes of voluntarism isolate the will from the intellect as if each could operate in isolation from the other. To the contrary, the personality

²Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 20-22.

[&]quot;Methods, programs, organization, educational technique are, without doubt, important; but they are, after all, merely secondary. First must come the truth to which the teacher should bear witness" (Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," in <u>The Education of Man</u>, p. 40). In musical performance, the truth of a work is the beauty it conveys to the performer. The teacher must also pursue, without pretense, the truth of a work through his self-involvement in the aural production. There is no easy or logical access to beauty, either for the instructor or the student.

is a commingling of both intellect and will because the will seeks to adhere to an object, an object to be judged and shaped by the intellect.¹ In this way, the will rules the intellect but is shaped through the operation of the intellect and along with the development of the intellect. While the aim of education focuses directly on the natural intelligence, the will is shaped along with it, indirectly.²

Voluntarism in musical performance is often present in conjunction with other misconceptions of education. For example, sociologism may be imposed by the will of the administration, community, or parents; and, at the other extreme, the art of performance may be allowed to degenerate into social activity because the teacher has failed to challenge his students with aesthetic pursuits. Similarly, intellectualism is often imposed on the performance program by the instructor or the professional leadership in music education.

In respect to the latter, educational leaders and agencies have exercised varying degrees of imposition into, and concern with, the performance program and music education in general. The result has been a confusing and dictatorial influx of programs, objectives, and guidelines descending upon the schools from "above." In this respect, the will of the profession has proven to be rather contemptuous of the will of the instructor, much less the will of the students.

According to Maritain, modern education is very concerned about its field, not because of significant new discovery, but because it has lost its own direction.³ This explains the current preoccupation with

> ¹Ibid. ²Ibid., pp. 27-28. ³Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 41.

trend, the "bandwagon" mentality.

A second facet of professional over-concern is the unprecedented high expectations modern education has placed upon itself. Obviously, it has forgotten that the school is only a partial agency, however vital it may be to the education of youth. This oversight has encouraged the profession to arbitrarily mold minds to get its will done, while fearing that a less than total effort might be fatal to its designs.¹

To the contrary, Maritain insists that for the school to assist living, spiritual beings in self-development, more mysteries must be left unsolved than solved. The general direction of learning experiences can be assessed but the final result is unassessable, in the immediate sense.

Inclusive Education

This educational aim assumes that everything (or anything) necessary to a field of study can be taught through classroom experiences, that is, through the preparation of lessons within a specified framework of time.² Again, as discussed above, inclusive education has forgotten that the school is but a partial agency in a lifelong educational experience.³ Furthermore, the frantic preparation required to "cover the material" offers the learner little opportunity for personal meaning or experiential depth. It is the meaning of an art which provides direction and not, necessarily, mandatory exposure to multifarious experiences.

¹Ibid., p. 43.

²Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 22-24. ³Ibid., pp. 25-26.

The inclusive approach to education has induced educators to plan supplementary musical experiences for student performers, activities which, in effect, force the performance program to veer away from the primacy of aural creation. Planned experiences in conducting, composing, and score analysis are designed to ensure that students exiting the performance program will be complete musicians rather than mere performers.

The false premise, from which this aim is derived, is reinforced by its relationship to material ends in education, pragmatic approaches to education, and intellectualism (in its second form). Moreover, the definition of school music, in terms of a partial or directional agency in music education, is discounted or disputed by inclusive education. Curiously, the supplementary experiences, as outlined above, parallel a college music curriculum in scope; therefore, depending on how they are applied, any one or all of these experiences may easily take precedence over the art of performance. If school music programs are encouraged to feed the complexities of fine art directly to the school musician, then, it must be concluded that music education desires to supplant the college music program and its focus upon artistic virtue.

The results of this study imply that the art of performance, defined spiritually, requires a self-commitment to aural production by instructors and students alike. If this art, by itself, can teach the meaning of music to those learners willing to take the risk of such an adventure, the imposition of additional experiences is clearly burdensome and unnecessary for the students involved. It is an unnecessary

duplication of artistic experience as well as the fragmentation of an art into shallow or spurious components.

At the school level, aural creation stimulates the natural inclinations of the student's intellect to produce pleasing sounds and does so with a minimum of specialization. If supplementary experiences are brought into the program, they must be genuinely contributory to aural production. In other words, they must be employed as spontaneous applications to unforseen needs, all of which <u>serve</u> the productive process. Such applications serve aural production by making the work more delightful and fulfilling aurally, an improved product sensed by the ears of the producer. This sort of subordination to an object of creation is alien to inclusive education.

The Reconciliation of Aims

To fulfill the aim of education, the teacher must respect the dignity of the learner's mind and its power to think for itself.¹ To fulfill the aim of performance, the teacher must respect the dignity of a work and its power to reveal its inner truth (beauty) to the performer. The aims are reconciled by guiding or assisting the student in the challenge of aural production and by freeing his intellect to become connatural with musical sound, thereby facilitating the perception of aesthetic beauty in the music through self-fulfillment. This reconciliation is inherently fragile or insecure and difficult to oversee.

Based on the reconciliation of general aims, the aim of the performance program is to assist students in finding meaning in their

¹Ibid., p. 26.

"musical making" or aural production, while recognizing that meaningful experiences cannot be reliably prepared. Through the instrumentality of musical meaning, the performance program can help form the creative intelligence for the development of the <u>habitus</u>, while recognizing that the <u>habitus</u> itself cannot be directly taught. Since personal meaning motivates the learner to self-commitment, it is concluded that a degree of the <u>habitus</u> is acquired by student performers who have achieved connaturality with their music. The development of the <u>habitus</u>, however meager or however profound, is a natural result of an internal relationship between the performer and his object.

The aim of education, as defined by Maritain, has three implications for the performance program:

1. The performance program must direct its attention toward the natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be to teach the meaning of music to the student performer, the art of performance being the vehicle for the learning intended.

2. To fulfill its primary aim, the performance program must avoid teaching toward artistic virtue, that is, to teach for the habitus of performance.

3. The teaching of performance skills and musical concepts, primary to any of the misconceptions of education, should not define the performance program. These material aims are contributory aims of the performance program, necessary but secondary because they serve the classroom art and its focus upon the learner's connaturality with his object.

The aim of performance, as defined in this study, has three implications for the performance program:

1. Since the meaning of music, or the perception of aesthetic beauty, prepares the intellect for the development of the <u>habitus</u>, an immeasurable degree of the <u>habitus</u> is developed as a natural result of the student performer's connaturality with his aural object.

2. The <u>habitus</u>, because of its internal depth, is the least accessible result of the performance program but one which has farreaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue. Consequently, the impact of the <u>habitus</u> upon a student performer's musicianship can be profound without being educable, and conspicuous without being measurable.

3. The material means of performance, because of their external nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program, but these are measurable only in the immediate sense. For students, the material means, by themselves, lack the inner depth of the <u>habitus</u> and, for the instructor, they restrict the farsighted vision required of directional oversight.

The Habitus and the Release of Learner Intuition

Maritain's respect for the intellectual power of the learner is evident in his view of the "agents" in education. The student is the principal agent of education while the teacher is the ministerial agent, or one who assists or guides the learner with authority but without mindless coercion.¹ The ministerial role is a position of moral authority because the teacher must adapt himself to the student.² Moral

¹Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 31; idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 58; and idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," p. 131.

²Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-33; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 58.

authority, however, is not to be mistaken for permissiveness because the teacher must exercise the responsibility of classroom leadership. Education begins when the student adapts himself to the teacher, thus completing the reciprocality of the process.¹

Maritain's view of the agents in education is in contrast with despotic education, in which the teacher is the principal agent, and progressive education, in which the teacher is no agent at all.² The two latter extremes of education relate to the extremes of voluntarism, which is concerned with the will and not the intellect.

According to Maritain, the will and the intellect are intertwined.³ This is in contrast with the view of the academicist, who ignores free will because of the belief that intellectual development precedes and defines it; and the empiricist, who denies the existence of free will because of the belief that unconscious motivations control behavior.⁴ The academic and empirical views relate to the two forms of intellectualism, which tends to ignore or suppress the will in its intellectual pursuits, materially defined. Maritain is especially critical of empirical dynamics. "The fact . . . that there are unconscious motivations which the subject obeys without knowing them furnishes in no manner . . . an argument against free will, for free will begins with intellectual judgment and consciousness."⁵

¹Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 40.

²Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-35.

³The will depends on intellectual judgment but it also controls intellectual movement. See Maritain, "The Conquest of Freedom," in The Education of Man, pp. 162-163.

⁴Ibid., pp. 160-161. ⁵Ibid., p. 161.

The unconscious motivations, of which Maritain writes, emanate from the Freudian unconscious mind, the source of irrational impulse or instinct.¹ The spiritual preconscious mind, as defined by Maritain, proceeds from the soul of man and is the domain of the intellect and the will, the rational mind.² In other words, reason and will exist, not only at the conscious level (the logic of reason and the deliberation of will) but also in the illogical, spontaneous realm of the spiritual preconsciousness, an area which no technique can reach.³ The Freudian unconscious mind might influence the preconscious mind but it does not control or define the spiritual movement. The will emanates from the illogical mind, but this should not be confused with irrational motivations.

The liberation of the mind, then, refers to the uninhibited movement of the preconscious mind to the conscious mind, an internal act which involves both the intellect and the will.⁴ Educational awareness of the preconscious mind and its movement changes teacher emphasis away from external pressure toward the internal aspirations of the spirit.⁵ The free movement of the preconscious mind is defined as the release of intuition or intuitive power. Intuition is defined as intellectual insight into truth, a power for which no training exists.⁶

¹Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 40. ²Ibid., pp. 40-41. ³Ibid., p. 41. ⁴Ibid., p. 42. ⁵Ibid.; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 61.

⁶Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 43; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 61.

Maritain defines truth as the conformity of the mind with reality.¹ Intuitive insight into truth is confirmed by personal verification; thus, the intellect finds joy or fulfillment in finding truth.² Liberal education, as defined by Maritain, seeks to liberate student intuitive power to seek truth for itself, thereby preparing the mind to exercise its own power to reason.³

The release of intuition can be inhibited by the substitution of mechanical drill for insight and the substitution of pre-made formulas for insight because insight must engage the student's self to be released.⁴ These inhibitions relate to the two forms of intellectualism in education.

Education for intuitive insight can be totally betrayed by society if the secondary agent, the teacher, is denied the time or the freedom to educate in such a manner. "It is preposterous to ask people [teachers] who lead an enslaved life to perform a task of liberation, which the educational task is by essence."⁵ The enslavement of teachers to society's whims relates to the aim of sociologism in education.

How, then, can the teacher help free the intuitive power of the learner's mind? The answer appears to encompass the nature of the intellect in two related areas: (1) the intellectual adherence to an object; and (2) the intellectual inclination toward fulfillment.

> ¹Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 47. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 48. ⁴Ibid., pp. 57-58. ⁵Ibid., p. 60.

The Intellect and Its Object

The instructor must allow the student's mind to adhere to an object, one to be studied or made.¹ In the case of performance, the object specified is a work-to-be-performed. The teacher must choose and pursue works which reflect beauty to him and which, in his judgment, have the potentiality for reflecting beauty to his students.² The teacher, with moral authority, must lead the way in the judgment of potential works; however, a consistent consideration of student choices and reactions is necessary to assure the free adherence of the learner's mind to the chosen objects. To ignore the second stage of the process is to risk student apathy or alienation in respect to the works-inprogress.

Maritain admonishes students to create nothing which does not reflect beauty to its creator.³ This philosophical principle relates directly to the primary rule of performance. The performer should perform nothing which does not please the aural sense.⁴

In respect to the teacher, he must make certain that the student grasps each step of the learning experience no matter how slow the grasping, this being particularly important in respect to teacher demonstration or explanation.⁵ The practice of this philosophical principle encourages

> ¹Ibid., p. 61; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 44. ²Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45. ³Ibid., p. 44. ⁴See chapter 2 above, pp. 22-23.

⁵Ibid.; idem, "The Aims of Education," p. 10; idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44 and 50.

the student to place his self into the productive action; for if the student is confused or apathetic, the self will remain external to the work, internally defined. To avoid the motions of performance, the student must perceive the aural reality of his object; to teach for this grasp is to appeal to the intuitive power of the student performer.¹

The teacher may contribute to student confusion or apathy if he presents works in the context of pure objectivity and without a sense of personal conviction that beauty is present within the sounds to be produced. "The first duty of a Teacher is to develop within himself, for the sake of truth [beauty], deep-rooted convictions, and frankly to manifest them, while taking pleasure, of course, in having the student develop, possibly against them, his own personal convictions."²

Maritain also suggests that genuine involvement in a single object is preferable to a superficial involvement in several objects.³ In this case, freeing the mind refers to student mastery of reason over a single object, this being in contrast to burdening his mind with an unreasonable quantity of material objectives.⁴ The music instructor should avoid overly high standards in performance by positing too many material objectives for the performance experience; and by attempting to cover an excessive amount of material in proportion to the reality of time, student ability, and student interest. Such a practice weakens the adherence of the mind to its object because it fragments the performance

¹Maritain, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137.
²Ibid., p. 138.
³Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45.

⁴Ibid., pp. 49-50.

experience into artistic superficiality. This point bears a direct relationship to the aim of inclusive education and the fragmentation it encourages.

The Intellect and Its Aspirations

The release of intuitive power is facilitated if education adapts itself to the spontaneous curiosity of the student.¹ Since this is directed at the natural intelligence, the primary aim of education is aptly served and encouraged.² The facilitation of student curiosity reproportions the classroom experiences to include more intellectual enjoyment and less factual information, objectively conceived.³ More emphasis is given to illumination by personal perception, a subjective experience in contrast with the mere dissemination of facts.

In the above context, informal and unsystematic learning is as important as, and perhaps preferable to, formal and systematic education.⁴ The instrumentality of "play" is important in learning matters of great worth, and great depth, for there is no better way to capture student interest and convey the meaning of a field.⁵ Informal learning does not diminish the importance of a field but, to the contrary, it uses curiosity to a great advantage: to seek truth in an object and to risk creative experiences.⁶

¹Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 72; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 43.

²Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 49-50, 72.
³Ibid., p. 72.

⁴Maritain, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," pp. 152-153.

⁵Ibid. ⁶Ibid.

The playing of an instrument is, in the above context, given a literal definition. Through connaturality, the student's curiosity can be aroused by the potential sound of a work. The intellectual fulfillment and enjoyment occurs when the sound of his object is perceived as "good," an internal, informal discovery.

The Habitus and Intuition

Uninhibited intuitive power is fertile ground for finding the meaning of music. Similarly, the development of the <u>habitus</u> is facilitated because (1) intellectual adhesion to an object relates to connaturality; and (2) the freeing of learner intuition encourages the student to place his self into his aural object. The complexity of the <u>habitus</u> denies a predictable outcome from such classroom involvement; however, the nature of the <u>habitus</u> allows at least the probability that its development will be facilitated through the instrumentality of student intuitive power.

An important point for emphasis is that the enjoyment of music through performance is given a renewed priority in the performance program. Maritain believes that, without personal delight, neither the meaning of music nor the <u>habitus</u> can make a significant impact upon the student during his formative years. It has been established that the performance program should not educate for the <u>habitus</u>; however, the spontaneous development of this virtue is a profound and commendable achievement, not to be disdained or ignored by music education. The pathways to meaning, and to the <u>habitus</u> beyond, are cleared through enjoyment.

Unless we delight in and are moved by a work of art, we may thoroughly discuss and analyze it but we shall never understand it. . . the delight transmitted by beauty thrills not only the senses but also, and first of all, the intuitiveness of intelligence and spirit. Neither the "historical" approach, freeing us from the consideration of the works themselves, nor any irrational and merely sensuous "communication of ecstasy" is an appropriate method. The good method requires first the intuitive delight, both emotional and intellectual, in the work's beauty, second, the rational disquisition of the very causes of this delight and of the intellectual regulations by which the work has been internally and vitally ruled and structured. It is necessary to make clear for the understanding of the pupil the inner logic of a Mozart sonata, read and discussed from the score. But it is first necessary for the pupil to hear the sonata and be delighted in it, and love it with his ears and with his heart. Man's senses are not [an] . . . impure element [to be distrusted]. . . . They are not unworthy of reason, they naturally serve reason and convey its food to it.

¹Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 52, n.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study do not support a total regeneration of the performance program, to be initiated by the profession itself. In other words, Maritain's philosophy of the arts, and of education, does not lend itself to extremist tendencies, externally conceived and imposed; therefore, the implementation of a "Maritain method" designed to turn performance programs upside down would be as arrogant and irresponsible as any methods targeted for replacement.

The findings of this study do support an inversion of priorities in the performance program, but the process of inversion would be internally conceived and developed. Each program, through its teachers, would be encouraged to (1) exercise self-examination or introspection for the identification and evaluation of present priorities and to (2) implement whatever changes might be necessary to correct misconceptions or misdirections.

For most performance programs, new priorities would be defined by a shift of emphasis away from the external influence of institutional, social, or instructional designs to the personal aesthetic inclinations of the primary agent: the student. Similarly, the general content of the performance experience would remain the same; however, no single area of study or performance activity, which threatens the primary focus, would be allowed to dominate or dictate the performance experience.

A minority of performance programs may find that conscientious introspection is a stimulus for a radical change in priorities, internally conceived. Another minority may find little or no change necessary. Change for the sake of change is as potentially harmful as the self-serving resistance to any change at all.

Educational agencies and institutions would, by necessity, be required to invert their priorities in the same direction as the performance programs, not for purposes of imposition, but to provide leadership, encouragement, and assistance to school performance programs in general. To accomplish this, the profession must abandon its preoccupation with precocious recipes as educational ends. It is recommended, therefore, that educators focus their energies upon (1) a renewed recognition of the student as the primary agent in the classroom; (2) a rediscovery of the nature of fine art; and (3) an unwavering defense of these priorities within the context of the performance program.

The Art of Performance and the Classroom Art

Classroom Aims

Classroom performance, which is typically a group experience, should focus its attention upon works rather than students. In other words, classroom performance should pursue the making of good works more than the making of good musicians.

On the surface, this recommendation may appear to contradict the preceding discussion; however, the pursuit of good works is directed at the natural intelligence of the student, this being in line with the primary aim of education. Furthermore, aural production which is pleasing to the students, as well as the instructor, is in line with the

primary aim of performance. The pursuit of beauty in performed works is, in the internal sense, the top priority of classroom performance. Classroom musical production which arouses student curiosity and encompasses student intellectual inclinations is defined as a student-centered experience.

Student mastery of the instrumental or vocal mechanism is, within the framework of the group experience, accomplished through the production of works or in service to a musical object. Classroom experiences in skill refinement should be undertaken to help perfect an aural object, to improve its musical sound to the satisfaction of the students and the instructor, rather than to train for the sake of the skill by itself.

The teaching of musical concepts, through score analysis, should be prompted by the necessity of producing a work rather than merely knowing about the components of works. Terminology and the sign language of score notation are a means of production and students must be shown that conceptual means serve an aural end, an actual end and not a prepared lesson. In the presence of real works, students can come to understand why a personal command of score notation is important and how musical concepts facilitate the experience of making. The use of selected works for the teaching of certain concepts is <u>not</u> aural production and, although the occasional isolation and emphasis of material is desirable, the general practice of performance for knowledge is missing the artistic element and cannot be defined as classroom art.

The proponents of "comprehensive musicianship" have posited objectives and activities which are intended to make, of the student,

a complete musician. First, it is true that the student performer should be viewed, by his teacher, as something more than a skilled technician. Secondly, it is also true that instructional consideration of musical knowledge and alternative musical activities are often ignored by the performance program in favor of commitments to public appearances.

Nevertheless, the most serious and obvious problem with the proposed method or approach is that it focuses upon the student performer rather than the <u>art</u> of performance. Despite different priorities, the focus of "comprehensive musicianship" moves in the same direction as "technical training," the very specialization it intends to displace in importance. Both aims fall into the framework of intellectualism in education.

The scope of works authorized by the above method is not to be confused with the spontaneous selection or discovery of works by the instructor and his students. In respect to the former, the repertoire consists of a carefully selected, analyzed, and prepared sequence of works. Through suggested implementation, objectives and activities are carefully organized, a feature which fails to confront the spiritual mystery of art and seems to tolerate a mode of sameness which encourages the sterilization of classroom performance. The implication is that the student product is to be a copy of an ideal rather than a performer and perceiver in his own right, a learner with personal abilities, inclinations, and goals to pursue. A method which tightly controls the experience of performance also denies teacher-student freedom to operate within an infinity of artistic possibilities for fulfillment.

Again, professional agencies and institutions must accept that, inevitably, the teacher knows his students, and their intellectual

traits, better than any external educational agent. It is the teacher who must choose methods and materials which he judges to be connatural, or to contain the potentiality of connaturality, with the students in his classroom.

Professional advocates of singular approaches to comprehensive musicianship have misunderstood the depth of this concept. Through the formal action of performance, the student is carried to a personal spiritual depth that surpasses the scope of singular approaches. The depth of artistic performance is reached nonconceptually and through the intellect's connaturality with sound. Each genuine experience of art, then, will unquestionably, and immeasurably, enhance a student's comprehensive musicianship without direct preparation for this achievement.

When works-in-progress demand the accomplishment of certain material objectives, a prepared lesson plan or published method should be spontaneously applied for remedial work. The artistic needs will reveal themselves spontaneously, and the instructor's chosen methods must be applied experimentally with a constant monitoring of results. Conceivably, ineffective methods will be discarded while others proven to be effective will be employed. The difficulty of this procedure reflects the difficulty of the art of performance.

Classroom performance for effect is, in actuality, a concern with the group's sound and a corresponding lesser concern with the sound of its object. Performance for effect is concerned with audience approval, parental approval, or administrative approval, all of which are desirable but not as determining factors in the execution of

the classroom product. The desire to please or impress others threatens the primary aim of performance because nonmusical and extramusical concerns can easily dominate the artistic practice.

To neutralize temptation for approval-seeking, each work should be produced and performed as if no one, except the producers, were to be present to hear the performance. The aim to please should be personally defined; that is, the performers should first seek personal pleasure in their art and <u>then</u> they can safely aspire to external fulfillment and hope that their personal fulfillment will be conveyed to others as well. This kind of external approval follows, but does not define, the experience, and it preserves the primary rule of fine art.

Often, classroom performance for effect is an ego-enhancing device which disguises a lack of artistic action. Conversely, performance for the object engages the self but not the ego; therefore, the art of performance teaches the student something of self-commitment to aural products.

It is recommended, therefore, that elementary and secondary level group performance be directed at the creation of works. The growth of external musicianship will occur simultaneously and spontaneously with the depth of production. Furthermore, the internal realm of the <u>habitus</u> will develop apart from institutional or instructional control, undetectable in its growth but profound in its presence.

Classroom Action

The role of artistic judgment in classroom performance begins with the choice of literature, the repertoire of works-to-be-performed. Judgment, as defined in this study, is an ongoing process which would make the selection of works an ongoing process, an intuitive assessment of a work's potentiality as it is perceived in sound.

The moral authority of the classroom conductor requires that he accept and implement his leadership role in the judgment of works and the consequent selection of the performance repertoire. Obviously, by visual score assessment alone, he cannot reliably know in advance which works will facilitate his group's connaturality with sound. Initially, the visual choices are made with the students in mind, in consideration of ability and interest, and with a perspective of the appropriateness of the literature for future performance commitments. Sight-reading the selected works through performance action is a primary determining factor because, through sound, the visual assessment is affirmed or negated. Both the conductor and his students will perceive and react to the initial hearing of the work, in terms of pleasure or displeasure, and the group's ability will be directly tested by the work's level of difficulty. Most works will reveal themselves to be worthy or unworthy of further aural action. Some works will require time and effort before a decision can be made on the desirability of pursuing a final point of completion, thereby providing living proof of the ongoing nature of artistic judgment.

In the case of contemporary music, the classroom conductor must accept the probability of his students' initial displeasure with the complexity of this music. As the aural sense begins to grow connatural with complex music, the instructor can better judge the potentiality of contemporary works, while exercising patience and tact with his students. Works that remain incomprehensible to the students should be discontinued, at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently.

Externally imposed taste cannot legitimately supersede the mind's connaturality with sound, no matter how simple or trite this sensory relationship may appear to the teacher. The matter of style is secondary to the selection of literature because often a teacher purported style of music is, in fact, an imposition of taste upon his students. It is preferable that stylistic considerations be a natural part of choices made in the light of artistic judgment. Works that challenge, as well as please, are not confined to a particular style because beauty is present in all works, to a degree. Exploring the unfamiliar is desirable because works that unexpectedly arouse curiosity or excitement must be discovered. Choices should not be externally determined by style; they should be a natural result of a connaturality with a style, internally perceived. It is probable that the practicality of a particular style may be a determining factor in its initial choice; however, the essential internal test (its connaturality with the student performers) is the primary factor, one which naturally operates within the framework of practicality (so long as external taste does not impose itself upon the selective process).

The reality of the work, or its inner mystery, must be assessed aurally as it is perceived in sound. This is re-creation in its fullest sense. The instructor must teach toward, and demonstrate the presence of, the inner work which lies beyond the score, the outer work.

The action of classroom performance requires creation, as well as re-creation, because (1) the performing group brings its uniqueness into the experience, and (2) the composed work, already complete, is incomplete as an object of performance. Artistic judgment helps the

performer envision the potential product, a creative idea to be pursued intuitively. The instructor must teach his students that the performance idea is more than scored material and more than a single, obvious phenomenon to be fulfilled. Artistic vision is more likely to encompass a series of ideas occurring along the way to a completed product. The ideas unfold and are to be pursued in detail, the details being tested by their application to the evolving work. The teacher must take great care in demonstrating how the spontaneous creative ideas are tested against, and reflected upon, the evolving product; that is, the spawning ideas are more closely tied to the realism of the evolving work than the idealism of a lesson plan.

Inspiration is not a teachable concept, in the direct sense; it is experienced through discovery. The instructor can provide the setting for inspiration but he cannot prepare it or provide it within a lesson plan. He must allow and encourage a free flow of ideas from his students, in addition to the spawning of his own ideas, all of which are applied to, and tested by, the aural results. The proper setting for inspiration is a free and continuous testing of performance ideas in pursuit of the spontaneous discoveries which promote intellectual movement toward its object.

Artistic imitation, as defined in this study, regards the action of performance as something more than simple execution or reproduction of the score. The classroom conductor who defines performance as the execution or externalization of score mechanics is duplicating but not imitating. To imitate, the classroom group and its conductor must become part of their object through self-commitment. As the work

evolves in sound, the aural reality becomes the objective work transfigured by subjective perception; in other words, the score is transformed into the inner work.

The instructor teaches the imitative action of performance by assisting his students in expressing the work through a selfinvolvement in the aural reality perceived. This requires the students to "lose themselves" in their object.

The Classroom Conductor as Instructor

The classroom conductor is first responsible for the production of good aural products, and through this responsibility, he inherits the leadership role in classroom art. As the classroom leader, he is also responsible to the artists, in terms of guiding the experiences of the student performers. In respect to works, his instructional directives should relate to experimentation, application, and perception. In respect to his students, his instructional directives should apply to guidance, assistance, clarification, demonstration, and evaluation. Despotic imposition is not a proper part of either instructional mode.

In respect to despotic aims, the classroom conductor must avoid defining the performance experience as the dissemination of academic rules; the execution of martial drill; art for use; and art for selfenhancement.

The school conductor must seek beauty in his aural product by directing the classroom art in that direction, aurally. He must see to it that his students perceive and understand his directives in relationship to the work-in-progress. In this way, the students can become personally involved in the process of innovation and they can personally

perceive the aural results. In a sense, the student performers, as producers or instruments of sound, are closer to the action of performance than the conductor. With this in mind, the instructor must ensure that the classroom art will not deteriorate into impersonal motions of performance within which external aims or uses predominate. The classroom art is truly a "team effort" in service to an object.

The classroom conductor must recognize the spiritual mystery inherent in each work of art. In other words, he should avoid dictating results in advance or defining his classroom art in terms of preconception. It is preferable that the classroom conductor free his personal <u>habitus</u> to guide him intuitively to the "good" ends. In this way, he will determine means at the moment of production, during the momentary action of conducting. Simultaneously, the means are communicated to the student performers by the practical sign and the aural end evolves of itself. Exposure to such creative depth is an irreplaceable experience for classroom performers because the instructor is a personal example of an artist who has freed his creative intellect in observance of the primary rule of fine art.

Studio Lessons and Apprenticeship Education

The matter of studio lessons relates to Maritain's conception of apprenticeship education. The apprentice performer aspires to become a performer and seeks the guidance of a master teacher in his development. Because such education looks toward the <u>habitus</u>, studio lessons are beyond the scope of Maritain's conception of classroom education, which pertains to the natural intelligence.

In reality, however, each performance program includes and provides for studio-like lessons, in which the teacher plays the role of the master teacher. Because of this reality, and in resolution of the above conflict, it is concluded that studio lessons, private or individualized, are an exception to the conclusions of this study because the focus is upon the student performer; furthermore, the instruction is directed toward the artistic virtue or habitus.

Because the student performer is a novice, unrealistic teacher expectations are as inappropriate in the studio as in the classroom. A minimum of external pressure must be combined with a maximum of positive encouragement. The factor of student aspiration also requires an increased emphasis upon specialization and an increased student responsibility for personal achievement.

The master teacher must challenge, guide, and encourage his student's inner aspirations. As much as possible, the performance material should be objects chosen, or at least agreeable to, the student, with the master teacher assisting and supervising the works' production. The teacher, in the studio, demonstrates and corrects through personal example; the student apprentice imitates the example through practice and application. In other words, the student does the actual making while the teacher observes and oversees, but does not dictate, the final product.

The refinement of performance skill is a necessary part of the studio experience but it does not define its purpose. The acquiring of the <u>habitus</u> is dependent upon the self-commitment of the student to his object; and the master teacher must look towards it, recognize its

presence, give it direction for growth, and provide the setting for facilitating this growth.

The Use of Performance and the Performance Program

The Concert

In respect to the primary aim of performance, the concert experience is the best forum for the performance program to present its works to others, a forum similar to the display of visual works in an art gallery. The use or display follows the production and does not legitimately define it. Some productive action occurs during the concert experience; however, the works are normally and largely produced and externalized during the classroom rehearsal, prior to the public presentation.

Since the works presented in concert are products of classroom action, these works <u>first</u> provided pleasure to the performers during the daily classroom activity. In this case, classroom action and classroom rehearsing are synonymous experiences. The public concert, then, is a natural culmination of the action, the fruits of production made available for enjoyment by others.

Concerts presented to satisfy the school calendar, raise funds, or enhance public relations supersede artistic priorities unless these extramusical elements are relegated to secondary status, a fringe benefit of the art itself.

Because of the perceptive depth involved, the concert experience is very likely more aesthetically rewarding to the performers (and conductor) themselves than to an audience, which must perceive with less depth because of external limitations. The responsibility of the audience is to receive the works and perceive as much as can be perceived from an external position.

The Contest

The pursuit of contest ratings can force the performance program into a dependence upon nonmusical objectives for demonstrating its success or effectiveness. Using contest ratings as a barometer of success is outside of the aesthetic realm because the presence of aesthetic beauty cannot be confined or limited to external measurement. The question of whether the fine arts lend themselves to the competitive arena can be answered in terms of disinterestedness. A product of fine art must first be created for itself before any use, such as competition, can legitimately be undertaken. Consequently, the music contest, defined in terms of nonmusical objectives, is in violation of the primary aim of performance.

Because aspiring for high contest ratings encourages overspecialization, voluntarism (in either extreme), and sociologism, the pursuit of ratings may also violate the primary aim of education. In respect to sociologism, the performance program may inadvertently encourage the community, the school, or parents to use high ratings to advance themselves in the eyes of others. As a result, students may gain a false impression of themselves, of the intent of the performance program, and of the meaning of fine art. Contest ratings, then, can be defined as the "false idols" of fine art, the pursuit of which enhances observable success to the neglect of internal, aesthetic fulfillment. Apart from ratings, the contest experience is desirable if (1) the disinterestedness of the product is enhanced through further learning; and (2) the virtuosity of the student performer is supplemented and enhanced by the adjudicator's suggestions. To accomplish this, the instructor and his students must retain aesthetical objectives in the face of nonaesthetical temptation. They must aspire for conceptual and nonconceptual improvement in their aural product, and they should seek technical assistance in performance execution, by inquiry if necessary.

Artistic Criticism and the Adjudicator

The role of the contest adjudicator can be defined as aesthetic criticism, a form of aesthetic judgment of performed works. While the performer's aesthetic judgment is an ongoing judgment, the adjudicator's criticism is typically a single judgment, external to the productive process. In other words, ongoing aesthetic judgment carries the performer into his object more deeply over a period of time. The adjudicator's criticism is applicable to the product in its present form. The criticism is made in terms of providing direction but it cannot legitimately control the production action in terms of finality. The performer judges through the action; the adjudicator judges from the action.

Often, adjudication is a judgment of taste rather than of works. This is criticism tainted by preconception because the work is judged from views or requirements previously determined by the adjudicator. The judgment of taste is a negative criticism because the adjudicator listens for his preconceptions and judges the work by the presence or lack of such taste. To avoid the bias of taste, the adjudicator must

allow the work to teach him its content by receiving it as a unique aural object and perceiving the object in sound, nonconceptually. The true adjudicator asks the work to reveal itself to him and then judges what it has to say, a way of detecting the inner presence of beauty.

Occasionally, the adjudicator will focus his criticism upon the performer rather than the work, a judgment of the performer's technique and ability. This kind of judgment confuses the judgment of skill with aesthetic criticism while slighting the very object from which aesthetic beauty emanates.

The contest adjudicator must exercise aesthetic criticism by judging the work without preconception. While focusing upon the work, he can judge the performer's technique through his object. The criticism of taste should be avoided in reference to either the performer or his work.

The Marching Band

The marching band experience encompasses two art forms: a martial art and a fine art. Because these art forms, by nature, are in conflict with one another, the marching band presents unique problems to the performance program, as aesthetic education.

Critics of the marching band often deny that this experience has aesthetic properties; however, they also ignore the presence of two distinct art forms within its parameters. The marching band is a fine art when it performs musical works for the good of the work. The marching band is a martial art when it executes physical movements and patterns with military-like discipline, the content of which is learned through physical drill or repetition.

Because the marching band consists of performing musicians, the aesthetic intent should predominate over the martial intent in its operation. This is in contrast to the drum and bugle corps which equalizes martial maneuvers and musical production. Often, the marching band is erroneously equated with the drum and bugle corps; resultingly, it is viewed as an instrument of martial patterns, and colorful display, rather than as an aural instrument enhanced by the visual effects.

Open air acoustics requires a unique approach to aural production, thus giving the marching band its unique aesthetic properties. The sound of the group is affected by the strength of the brass and percussion sections and the choice of block-band formation. The dynamics of sound are generally louder and are executed with less contrast than the concert hall acoustics would require.

Despite the disadvantages of open air acoustics, the aural pleasure of performance exists at the marching band level as well as the concert band level. The difference is a matter of timbre, complexity of sound, and depth. Nevertheless, to regard the marching band as a martial art, and nothing else, is a slighting of the aesthetic potentiality of this experience.

The marching band presents problems to the performance program when it is given precedence over all other components of the program. For example, show band marching can require complex martial maneuvers, thereby over-commiting classroom time to martial drill and saturating the performing band experience with nonaesthetic considerations.

The marching band experience should not define the performance program. If this single component of the program threatens to dominate

the classroom activity, it is the responsibility of the instructor to adjust, reduce, or eliminate the threat in preservation of the classroom art, aurally and aesthetically defined.

The Sports Band

The sports band experience is a controversial, and often abused, component of the performance program. The influence of sociologism has forced many performance programs to emphasize this experience over all of the other components of the program. Consequently, preparation for sports band commitments can saturate the classroom activity and force the classroom art away from its aesthetic priorities.

A common criticism of sports bands, as expounded in educational circles, is that the musical styles typically performed by them lack aesthetical content. This study has provided evidence to the contrary. The aesthetic beauty of music is not confined to a particular style or specified type of production. Furthermore, the artistic production of works should not be confused with its use. Obviously, the sports band object has less depth and complexity than the concert band object; nevertheless, a performer's connaturality with the sound of his object is as important to the sports band experience as any other performance experience.

The instructor, with a personal bias in musical taste, may slight the sports band object, thereby encouraging the impersonal motions of performance. Motions of performance, allowed at any musical level, is inexcusable. The preparation of the sports band object must be directed at the aural good of the work, regardless of the use intended. The sports band presents problems to the performance program when it is given precedence over all other components of the program.

Faced with overcommitment, the instructor should adjust, reduce, or discontinue any sports band activity which threatens the primacy of classroom art. If the primary rule of fine art is observed, the sports band product can then be used for its commitments without harm to the art itself or the student performers involved. APPENDIX

The Research Design

Chapter II

The Habitus of Fine Art

Research Questions

- 1. What is the relationship of the habitus to the intellect?
- 2. What is the relationship of the <u>habitus</u> to the practical order of art?
- 3. What is the relationship of the habitus to the rules of art?

Chapter III

The Aim of Performance

Research Questions

- 1. What is the relationship of beauty to performance?
- 2. What is the relationship of technique to performance?
- 3. What is the relationship of communication to performance?

Chapter IV

The Action of Performance

Research Questions

- 1. What is the relationship of artistic judgment to performance?
- 2. What is the relationship of imitation to performance?
- 3. What is the relationship of the creative idea to performance?

Chapter V

The Use of Performance

Research Question

1. What is the relationship of morality to performance?

Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusions

Summation Question

1. What is the relationship of the habitus to musical performance?

Chapter VII

Applications to the Performance Program in Music Education

Applicative Questions

- 1. How can Maritain's definition of the aim of education be reconciled with the aim of musical performance, as defined by the habitus?
- 2. How can the <u>habitus</u> of music be developed through the release of intuitive power in the mind of the student performer?

Chapter VIII

Recommendations

Annotated Bibliography

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected Works by Jacques Maritain

Approaches to God. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. Translated by Peter O'Reilly. New York: Harper and Bros., 1954. Selected reference: "The Ways of the Practical Intellect," pp. 84-108. Art and Faith. Written in collaboration with Jean Cocteau. Translated by John Coleman. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948. Selected reference: "Answer to Jean Cocteau," pp. 73-135. Art and Poetry. Translated by E. de P. Matthews. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943. Selected reference: "The Freedom of Song," pp. 71-104. Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry. Translated by Joseph W. Evans. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. Selected references: "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order," pp. 5-6. "Making and Doing," pp. 7-9. "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 10-22. "Art and Beauty," pp. 23-37. "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-48. "The Purity of Art," pp. 49-63. "Christian Art," pp. 64-69. "Art and Morality," pp. 70-81. "An Essay on Art," appendix 1, pp. 85-99. "Some Reflections on Religious Art," appendix 2, pp. 100-107. "Apropos an Article by Montgomery Belgion," appendix 4, pp. 113-115. The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 119-150. The same essay is translated by F. S. Flint and entitled "Poetry and Religion." The New Criterion 5 (January 1927): 7-22; and (February 1927): 214-230. Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison in collaboration with J. Gordon Andison. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955. Selected reference:

"Intuition and Duration," pp. 146-179.

Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. Selected references: "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 44-65. "The Preconscious Life of the Intellect," pp. 71-100. "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 106-145. "Poetry and Beauty," pp. 160-195. "Beauty and Modern Painting," pp. 209-228. "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," pp. 229-271. "The Internalization of Music," pp. 300-333. "The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," pp. 354-405. Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of Knowledge. Translated under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. Selected references: "The Concept," appendix 1, pp. 387-417. "'Speculative' and 'Practical,'" appendix 7, pp. 456-464. Education at the Crossroads. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Selected references: "The Aims of Education," pp. 1-28. "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 29-57. "The Humanities and Liberal Education," pp. 58-87. The Education of Man. Edited by Donald and Idella Gallagher. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962; paperback ed., 1967. Selected references: "Philosophy and Education," pp. 39-43. "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 44-82. This essay is reprinted from Modern Philosophies and Education, in The Fiftyfourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, pt. 1. Edited by Nelson B. Henry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. "Education and the Humanities," pp. 83-102. "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," pp. 129-153. "The Conquest of Freedom," pp. 159-179. An Introduction to Philosophy. Newly designed edition. Translated by E. I. Watkin. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962. Selected reference: "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," pp. 193-200. "Language and the Theory of Sign," In Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function, pp. 86-101. Edited by Ruth Nanda Ashen. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957. Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; Phoenix Books, 1970. Selected reference: "The Democratic Charter," pp. 108-146. This essay contains a discussion on the relationship of democracy to education.

Scholasticism, Art and Poetry, The Situation of Poetry, and Art and Faith. The Person and the Common Good. Paperback ed. Translated by John J. Fitzgerald. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. Selected reference: "Individuality and Personality," pp. 31-46. The Range of Reason. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952; paperback ed., [1961]. Selected references: "On Human Knowledge," pp. 3-18. Reprinted from Thought 24 (June 1949): 225-243. "On Artistic Judgment," pp. 19-21. Reprinted from Liturgical Arts 11 (February 1943): 46-47. "On Knowledge Through Connaturality," pp. 22-29. Reprinted from The Review of Metaphysics 4 (June 1951): 473-481. Redeeming the Time. Translated by Harry Lorin Binsse. London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1943. Selected reference: "Sign and Symbol," pp. 191-224. "Reflections on Sacred Art." Liturgical Arts 4 (Third Quarter 1935): 131-133. The Responsibility of the Artist. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. Selected references: "Art and Morality," pp. 21-45. "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 47-65. Reprinted from <u>The Critic</u> 17 (October-November 1958): 19-20, 65. "Art for the People," pp. 67-90. "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," pp. 91-115. The Situation of Poetry. Written in collaboration with Raissa Maritain. Translated by Marshall Suther. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955. Selected references: "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," pp. 37-70. This essay is translated by Kenelm Foster and entitled "On Poetic Knowledge," Blackfriars 25 (November 1944): 422-428: (December 1944): 457-463; and 26 (February 1945): 51-54. The same essay is also translated by Henry Rago and entitled "Poetry's Dark Night." The Kenyon Review 4 (Spring 1942): 149-159. Neither the Foster translation nor the Rago translation contains Maritain's 'Three Philosophical Conclusions,' presented in the Suther translation, pp. 64-70.

185

"A Maritain Anthology on Art and Poetry." Thought 26 (Autumn 1951): 325-

This article contains fourteen passages taken from Art and

341.

"The Experience of the Poet," pp. 71-85. Material from "The Experience of the Poet" and "Concerning Poetic Knowledge" is combined into a single article and entitled "Poetic Experience." The Review of Politics 6 (October 1944): 387-402.

Other Sources

- Ball, Charles H. "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education." In <u>Toward</u> an <u>Aesthetic Education</u>, pp. 57-62. Edited by Bennett Reimer and associates. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1971.
- Broudy, Harry S. "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum." In <u>Perspectives in Music Education: Source Book III</u>, pp. 173-184. Edited by Bonnie C. Kowall. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966.
- Dimler, G. Richard. "Creative Intuition in the Aesthetic Theories of Croce and Maritain." <u>The New Scholasticism</u> 37 (October 1963): 472-492.
- Flannery, Edward H., trans. Glossary to <u>An Essay on Christian Philosophy</u>, by Jacques Maritain. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955.
- Gallagher, Donald, and Gallagher, Idella. <u>The Achievement of Jacques and</u> <u>Raissa Maritain: A Bibliography, 1906-1961</u>. New York: Doubleday, 1962.
- . "Introduction: Toward a Christian Philosophy of Education." In <u>The Education of Man</u>, pp. 9-36. Edited by Donald Gallagher and Idella Gallagher. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.
- Hanke, John W. <u>Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art</u>. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinis Nijhoff, 1973.
- Hay, Gerald C., Jr. <u>Maritain's Theory of Poetic Knowledge: A Critical</u> <u>Study</u>. Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1964; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 64-11, 084, n.d.
- Hazo, Samuel John. <u>An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain</u>. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1957; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 24,744, n.d.
- Lechner, Robert. "Jacques Maritain: Metaphysical Beauty," In The Aesthetic Experience, pp. 49-81. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953.
- Martini, Clare Joseph. <u>Maritain and Music</u>. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1958; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 58-5769, n.d.

- Phenix, Phillip H. <u>Realms of Meaning</u>. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964.
- Prince, Warren F. "Music Education's Split Personality." <u>Music Educa-</u> tors Journal 61 (November 1974): 27-33.
- Reimer, Bennett. "Aesthetic Behaviors in Music." In <u>Toward an Aes-</u> <u>thetic Education</u>, pp. 65-87. Edited by Bennett Reimer and associates. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1971.
- _____. "Patterns for the Future." <u>Music Educators Journal</u> 63 (December 1976): 22-29.
- _____. <u>A Philosophy of Music Education</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
- Schwadron, Abraham A. "Aesthetic Values and Music Education." In <u>Per-spectives in Music Education: Source Book III</u>, pp. 185-194. Edited by Bonnie C. Kowall. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966.
 - <u>Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education</u>. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1967.
- Tate, J. "Plato, Art and Mr. Maritain." The New Scholasticism 12 (April 1938): 107-142.
- Thomas Aquinas, Saint. <u>Summa Theologica</u>. 3 vols. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., Inc., 1947.

Critical Reviews of Maritain's Works

- Belgion, Montgomery. "Art and Mr. Maritain." The Dublin Review 187 (October-December 1930): 201-215. Review of Art and Scholasticism, trans. by J. F. Scanlan, and published by Scribner's in 1930. This was the first English translation of the original French version.
- Carey, Graham. "Book Review: The Responsibility of the Artist." <u>Good</u> <u>Work 23</u> (Pentecost 1960): pp. 94-97. Published in 1960.
- Clancy, William P. "The Intuition of Jacques Maritain." <u>The Commonweal</u> 59 (December 25, 1953): 309-310. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
- Donnelly, Francis P. "The Where and Why of Beauty's Pleasure." <u>Thought</u> 5 (September 1930): 261-271. Review of Art and Scholasticism, 1930.

Frank, Joseph. "Maritain's View of Modern Art." <u>The New Republic</u> 132 (May 30, 1955): 17-18. Review of <u>Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry</u>, paperback ed., 1955.

Gallagher, Donald A. "Future of Education: Specialization or Wisdom?" <u>The Catholic Worker</u> 13 (September 1946): 1-2, 7. Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.

Hamm, Victor M. "Creative Intuition and Scholasticism." <u>America</u> 90 (October 31, 1953): 127-129. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.

Hatzfeld, Helmut. "Book Reviews: The Situation of Poetry." <u>American</u> <u>Ecclesiastical Review</u> 132 (April 1955): 283-284. Published in 1955.

Hausman, Carl R. "Maritain's Interpretation of Creativity in Art." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19 (Winter 1960): 215-219. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.

Heath, Thomas R. "Book Reviews: Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry." <u>The Thomist</u> 17 (October 1954): 583-589. Published in 1953.

Johnson, F. Ernest. "Can Education Pass Its Test?" Cristendom 9 (Winter 1944): 126-128. Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.

Little, Arthur. "Jacques Maritain and His Aesthetic." <u>Studies</u> 19 (September 1930): 467-480. Review of Art and Scholasticism, 1930.

McLuhan, H. Marshall. "Maritain on Art." <u>Renascence</u> 6 (Autumn 1953): 40-44.

Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.

O'Malley, Frank. "The Education of Man." The Review of Politics 6 (January 1944): 3-17. Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.

Phelan, Gerald B. "Book Reviews: Art and Scholasticism." <u>The Philo-</u> <u>sophical Review</u> 41 (November 1932): 638-640. Published in 1930.

Powers, J. F. "Art, the Moon Prince." <u>The Commonweal</u> 48 (May 14, 1948): 102-105. Review of Art and Faith, 1948.

Rauch, Rufus William. "The Esthetic of Maritain." <u>Thought</u> 6 (September 1931): 228-236. Review of Art and Scholasticism, 1930. Rexroth, Kenneth. "Enraptured by Maritain." The Nation 190 (February 13, 1960): 150-151.

Review of The Responsibility of the Artist, 1960.

- Scott, Nathan A., Jr. "Maritain in His Role as Aesthetician." The Review of Metaphysics 8 (March 1955): 480-492. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
- Sillem, E. A. "Jacques Maritain and the Philosophy of Art." <u>The Dublin</u> <u>Review 229 (Second Quarter 1955): 176-187.</u> Review of <u>Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry</u>, 1953.
- Tierney, Michael. "M. Maritain on Education." <u>Studies</u> 33 (March 1944): 21-29.

Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.

Turner, Vincent. "Poets and Painters: M. Maritain on Creative Intuition." <u>The Month</u> 12 (November 1954): 270-280. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.