Six Discourse Markers In Tunisian Arabic: A Syntactic And Pragmatic Analysis

Christopher Adams

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SIX DISCOURSE MARKERS IN TUNISIAN ARABIC:  
A SYNTACTIC AND PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS

by

Chris Adams  
Bachelor of Arts, Asbury College, May 2006

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
of the  
University of North Dakota  
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for the degree of  
Master of Arts

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December  
2012
This thesis, submitted by Chris Adams in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

Dr. Regina Blass, Chair

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Dr. Doug Fraiser

This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

Dr. Wayne Swisher, Dean of the Graduate School

Date

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Department  Linguistics
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Christopher M. Adams

July 13, 2012
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ABBREVIATIONS

MSA Modern Standard Arabic
TA Tunisian Arabic
NP Noun Phrase
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ABSTRACT

The following study is a description and analysis of six discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic. In it I will attempt to determine the syntactic and pragmatic roles of each marker, describing its function in discourse. The final analysis will be based on the pragmatic model of relevance theory.

I have based my study on thirty-two (32) texts in Tunisian Arabic, looking at frequently-occurring discourse markers in these texts and analyzing them based on their discourse roles in terms of local cohesion and pragmatic inference.

The conclusions of this study focus on the conceptual and procedural content of each discourse marker. I have attempted to identify the syntactic and pragmatic role of all six markers, looking at their argumentative functions in discourse. The result is a unified pragmatic function for each discourse marker.
CHAPTER 1

In the following study, I will analyze six discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic from the perspective of both a grammar-based discourse analysis and relevance theory. I intend to describe each marker’s roles in local cohesion and pragmatic inference, attempting to explain the discourse function of each marker and describing any distinctive phenomena associated with it.

In Chapter 2 I will provide some background information on Tunisian Arabic, its sociolinguistic setting and some distinctive features of its syntax, morphology and phonology. Chapter 2 will also describe my research methodology, including the charting of texts and the choosing of which markers to analyze. Chapter 3 contains the theory behind my research, looking at models of communication, especially relevance theory, and applying those models to discourse analysis. I will explain why I chose the path I did in analyzing discourse markers. Chapter 4 contains the analysis itself; in it I study each marker from a local cohesion and pragmatic perspective, ending with a description of the marker’s essential function in discourse. Chapter 5 concludes the study and suggests further avenues of research.
CHAPTER 2

2.1 Relation of Tunisian Arabic to Modern Standard Arabic and other Arabic colloquial varieties

The origins of Tunisian Arabic are from Classical, or Qur’anic Arabic. When Muslim armies arrived in North Africa in the late seventh century (Julien 1970:7), settling in present-day Tunisia and throughout North Africa, they brought their language with them. Over centuries of co-existence between Arabs and Berbers, and the slow domination and integration of Berber communities, Arabic became the native language for virtually all inhabitants of Tunisia; yet the variety of Arabic spoken was highly influenced by the spoken varieties of Berber in the area. Numerous words were adopted into Arabic, and Berber’s propensity to create complex syllables became a part of Tunisian colloquial Arabic. Other more recent influences of Tunisian Arabic include Turkish, due to Ottoman rule from the early sixteenth to early nineteenth century (Julien 1970:282), Italian, and most recently French, as a result of 75 years of French colonial rule. A great deal of French vocabulary is used in Tunisian Arabic, some of which is recognized as being French in origin, while other words have been fully adopted as Tunisian, or “Derja,” as Tunisian Arabic speakers call their own language. The Ethnologue (Lewis:2009) estimates that there are 9,400,000 speakers of Tunisian Arabic. This number is probably closer to eleven million today.
The closest colloquial variety to Tunisian Arabic is Algerian Arabic; I estimate that 75% of its vocabulary are cognates with TA. The two varieties are very similar syntactically, and differ primarily in vocabulary (especially the amount of French words borrowed), vowel positioning and sentence intonation. Libyan and Moroccan Arabic are also similar, while Maltese, not considered an Arabic variety due to sociolinguistic factors, is close to Tunisian Arabic as well. North African varieties of Arabic differ rather significantly from Arabic varieties spoken in the Gulf and the Middle East, and are very difficult for Middle Easterners to understand. While TA and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) are rather similar phonologically (excluding syllable structure), they differ considerably lexically and syntactically.

Most Tunisians view their language as being a corrupted version of Modern Standard, or even Qur'anic, Arabic. It is perceived as a “dialect” without a grammar, and generally unworthy of study. Tunisians live in a classic diglossic situation, in which the low variety (L) is a native tongue and is used for virtually all daily life activities, while the high variety (H) is used in writing, education, and formal settings. Tunisian Arabic's domains of use are growing over time, as it is becoming more and more acceptable socially to use the colloquial variety on television, radio, and social media. Yet it remains largely restricted to the oral domains, as only MSA is used for writing.
2.2 Varieties of Tunisian Arabic

Tunisians typically divide their language into three relatively distinct varieties: coastal, northwest, and southern. These varieties differ largely in terms of vocabulary, with some phonological differences evident. All are easily mutually intelligible. It appears that these differences are diminishing over time due to the growing influence of Tunisian media, largely produced in the capital, where the coastal dialect is spoken (Gibson 1999). I will focus my study on the coastal dialect, as it is considered the standard Tunisian variety; however, I believe all six markers which I will discuss are used in each variety of Tunisian Arabic.
2.3 Overview of syntax, morphology

Tunisian Arabic exhibits SVO basic word order, unlike Modern Standard Arabic, which is VSO\(^1\). Example (1) is a typical Tunisian Arabic sentence:

\[(1) \quad \text{S} \quad \text{V} \quad \text{O} \]

\[
\text{ʕaɾfi} \quad \text{tbɛsːəm} \quad \text{ʔɪbtisɛmɪt} \quad \text{ɪɾəʔaʔ}
\]

boss_1SG.POSS smile.3SG.PST smile of DET_happiness

‘My boss smiled the smile of happiness.’

The claim of SVO word order is debatable, but it seems to be a more reasonable account of the data, as I found through a simple tallying of sentence types from a number of collected stories (not all of which have been used in this study). Out of a total of 358 clauses, only one exhibited clear VSO structure, and fifteen (15) others were VS in nature. These numbers were dwarfed by those of SVO and SV clauses. While simple majority is not proof for a word order template, the evidence does tend to point to SVO word order. Charting of texts (see 2.5 below) made it clear that it is generally easier to fit clauses into an SVO structure than a VSO one. Tunisian Arabic’s SVO structure is confirmed by Amel Khalfaoui (2009:17) in her introduction to Tunisian Arabic.

Yet perhaps a more realistic analysis is that the word order of TA (Tunisian Arabic) is largely dependent on sentence articulation: the topic of a sentence comes first, regardless of its syntactic role. (Gibson 2012, personal correspondence) In the case of sentences with focus-presupposition articulation, the focus is “fronted” before the rest of the clause nucleus, but is often not the subject of the sentence; instead, it occurs before

\(^1\) Here and throughout the paper, I will use the syntactic terminology of generative grammar theory. Any terms I use which may have different meanings across different theoretical frameworks should be interpreted according to generative grammar.
the subject. Word order, then, is rather flexible, and one can find examples of SVO, VSO, SV, VOS, SOV and OSV sentences in natural texts. The following clauses give examples of VS, SOV and VSO word order:

(2) V      S
ʕaql̲tu     χdimə
recognize.3SGF.PST servant
‘A servant recognized her.’

(3) S  O    V
ɛnə  islemen  mens̲ədquʃ
1SG    DET_Slimen   believe.1SG_3SG.OBJ_NEG
‘I Slimen I don’t believe him.’

(4) V        S  O
tɛhdilif       ʔɛnti  hɛdɛjə
give.gift.2SG_to_1SG_POSSIB  2SG  gift
‘Would you give me a gift?’

Another way in which the syntax of Tunisian Arabic (TA) is distinct from that of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is in the positioning of demonstratives. The default position for demonstratives in TA is after the noun, while demonstratives come before nouns in MSA. See example (5, in which the demonstrative follows the head noun:

(5) Head Noun      Demonstrative
ɪlḥæqiqə  mteʃk  ḥedɛjə
DET_truth_of_2SG DEM
‘that truth of yours’

Like most varieties of Arabic, fusional infixes are central to nominal and verbal morphology, as most words are based on a three-consonant root. TA’s verbal morphology is more complex than the morphology of MSA, which isolates as separate words negation markers and indirect objects, for example. Note in example (6 the
fusional inflectional morphology which takes place when a noun is pluralized, and the
numerous morphemes which make up one verb in example (7):

(6) Sing      Plural

\[Dɜbuz\]  \[dəbɛbɪz\]
Bottle      bottles

(7) \(Mɛχðithɛluʃ\)
take.1SG.PST_3SGF.OBJ_to_3SG_NEG

The syllable structure of Tunisian Arabic, and of most varieties of North African
Arabic, is rather complex, as vowels which may occur in Modern Standard Arabic or
Middle Eastern colloquial varieties are dropped. Thus, CCVCCC syllables, such as the
following, are possible:

(8) C V. CCVCCC
\[mɛχsɜɾtʃ\]
lose.1SG.PST_NEG
‘I didn’t lose.’

The consonant inventory of TA is virtually identical to that of MSA, except for
pharyngealized consonants, which do not seem to be realized in typical Tunisian Arabic
speech. For example, the two voiced interdental graphemes in Arabic, ‘dhod’ and ‘dha’,
one of which is pharyngealized and the other of which is not, are pronounced virtually
the same in TA, while they are not in MSA.

The vowel system is noticeably different between Tunisian Arabic and most other
colloquial varieties, in that some vowels (especially those transcribed as an ‘alif’ in
Arabic script) are much more fronted. [a] becomes [æ] in the following example:
2.4 Research on Tunisian Arabic

Tunisian Arabic remains a largely unstudied language; large holes exist in the linguistic literature. The studies which have been produced have primarily focused on sociolinguistic issues (Gibson 1999, Lawson and Sachdev 2000) and morphology (Kilani-Schoch, 1984, Behloul, 1994). Two pieces of research deal specifically with a discourse topic in Tunisian Arabic: Amel Khalfaoui’s study of demonstratives (Khalfaoui 2009) and a study of reference and cognitive status by Gundel et.al. (2007).

2.5 Research methodology of this study

I began my research by identifying and collecting thirty-two (32) texts in Tunisian Arabic. These texts were all from public domain sources: radio shows, TV programs, newspaper articles, and web sites. Each discourse is in Tunisian Arabic; some are more formal than others, and thus bear more similarities (primarily lexically) to Modern Standard Arabic. Most of these stories were collected in audio or video format, and so needed to be transcribed into Arabic script. Once the transcription was finished, I put the texts into chart from using Microsoft Excel, according to Levinsohn and Dooley’s model (Levinsohn and Dooley 2000). The charts were based on SVO sentence structure. I marked clausal constituents which had been moved, discourse breaks, and implicit elements in the clause nucleus. Sentences were numbered and breaks in the discourse identified. I also transliterated the Arabic into the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA), glossed it (largely following Leipzig standards) and provided a free translation.

The thirty-two (32) charts were from the following genres:
Once the charts were ready, I identified all the words in the texts which could be considered discourse markers. Based on that list of markers for possible analysis, I chose six words according to their pragmatic complexity and frequency of occurrence in the texts. I selected the following markers (with number of occurrences in parentheses): 

- *raho* (23 occurrences)
- *mau* (9 occurrences)
- *yekhi* (11 occurrences)
- *mela* (7 occurrences)
- *ti* (12 occurrences)
- ‘*ad*’ (6 occurrences)

I then proceeded to analyze each of these markers based on both a syntactic sentence-level model of local cohesion, and relevance theory pragmatic analysis. (see 3.4.3 below).
CHAPTER 3

3.1 Introduction

I will begin this chapter by comparing two different models of communication: a classical code model and a relevance theory model. After explaining relevance theory and its implications for semantics and pragmatics, I intend to discuss a syntactic model of discourse analysis. This model will be compared to a relevance theory-based analysis, followed by an assessment of the benefits of each. Finally, I will explain how I used each model in my analysis of six discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic.

3.2 Classical Code Model of Communication

Human communication involves a number of complicated processes. According to the classical communication model, a speaker forms a thought which he would like to express to his hearer. He then encodes that thought in a language which both he and the hearer understand. The hearer subsequently decodes the message spoken to her and processes it as a thought in her mind. In this way, we as humans attempt to transfer thoughts from one mind to another.

For instance, if I am walking with a friend on a windy day, I might want to express what I am thinking about the weather. So I encode that thought in an utterance in English and say,
The wind is very strong today.

I have taken my thought about a weather phenomenon (“the wind”), its nature (“very strong”) and the time of its occurrence (“today”), found the appropriate lexical items for each, and encoded them in speech, putting them together according to the grammatical patterns of the language I am speaking. My friend, the hearer, then hears my encoded message and decodes it into a thought in her mind. Thus, we have successfully communicated.

The preceding discussion, then, is a very basic outline of the classical communication model, in which two (or more) interlocutors convey thoughts by means of a linguistic code. Yet, there are a number of problems with this model. It simply does not represent what actually takes place during the communication process. While the encoding of thoughts is a part of communication, what actually happens is much deeper.

3.3 Weaknesses of Code Model, Strengths of Relevance Theory

What are the weaknesses of the classical model? First of all, when people communicate with each other, they typically do not express any thought that comes to mind, nor do they convey random information to each other. You do not say to a random person on the street, ‘The Queen of England was born in 1926.’ There must be specific reasons for you to communicate with others. We as humans are created to communicate in a meaningful way: to express thoughts and ideas which matter in a given context or situation. In a word, we want to be, and need to be, relevant.
3.3.1 Drawing Inferences

A speaker’s goal is not simply to convey information, but to bring about change: a reaction from the speaker, a response, or more generally, a change in the hearer’s thoughts about the world (often called the hearer’s “mental representation”). These communicative motivations may be borne out of any degree of altruism, selfishness, humility or pride, but in all cases, the speaker communicates to the hearer in order to change her mental representation, and perhaps to subsequently affect her actions or beliefs.

Take Blass’ (1990:46) example of turning on the television and hearing three different statements as you flip through the channels:

(11) 1. Mary’s lover died in a Scottish castle.
2. J.R., I’ve learned all your dirty tricks.
3. The temperature in London is 35 degrees Celsius.

The first utterance will probably have no effect on you, as it will normally be completely irrelevant, devoid of any context. The second may have some relevance to you, if you are familiar with the TV show from which it comes. The third statement, about the temperature in London, may prove to be the most relevant to you, if you happen to be traveling to London. So the principle of relevance requires that communication fit with the current mental representation of a hearer, or else there will be no effect or subsequent change. In the case of watching television, much of what is heard is irrelevant, because it does not involve intentional communication between at least two parties who share a mental representation. Sperber and Wilson (1995:156) identify this phenomenon as the “principle of relevance”: 
“Every act of ostensive [that is, intentional] communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.”

So then, intentional human communication requires that a speaker says things which are relevant to others in order to bring about a change in his interlocutors’ thoughts, ideas and actions; and a hearer, too, will assume that what a speaker says to her is relevant. This is what Sperber and Wilson (1995:156) define as the “presumption of relevance”:

“...to the best of the communicator’s knowledge, the ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s attention.”

It is this presumption of relevance which leads a hearer to make the necessary effort to process an utterance, and thus allow for actual communication.

When communication does occur, it brings about, as I have said, a change of some sort. Relevance theory identifies three specific types of such change: contextual implications, contextual strengthening, and contextual weakening (Sperber and Wilson 1986:108-117). These changes are inferences which a hearer makes based on a speaker's utterance. She assumes that what the speaker says to her is optimally relevant, and interprets what he says by making inferences which result in either an implication, strengthening, or weakening of her mental representation. I will look at these in order.

First of all, a speaker may want his hearer(s) to make contextual implications, that is, to draw conclusions about the world. He may provide her with new information, based on her already existing knowledge of the world (mental representation), or may attempt to lead her to a conclusion based on her current mental representation. For instance, if John says to Mary,
(12) I hear there’s going to be a fire drill today.

Mary, who has not yet heard anything about a fire drill, will (assuming she trusts John) draw the implication that she should be prepared for the fire drill, perhaps by studying in the library instead of in her room. This new piece of information has caused her to draw inferences and change her plans accordingly.

The second type of change in mental representation which a speaker attempts to effect in his hearer is called contextual strengthening. In this case, part of a hearer’s mental representation—her beliefs about the world—are confirmed. The message conveyed may be new to the hearer, but its effect is not to bring about a new contextual implication, or conclusion, about reality, but rather to confirm the hearer’s present perception of reality. So if Mary on the same day sees a sign posted, saying:

(13) NOTICE: There will be a fire drill this afternoon at 5:00 PM.

then the initial contextual implications which she drew based on John’s statement will be strengthened. Her belief that there will be a fire drill, and that she should adjust her plans accordingly, is made stronger when she receives the same information from a different, more official, source.

Finally, in addition to contextual implications and contextual strengthening, communication may also cause a hearer to re-define part of her mental representation. Relevance theory gives this phenomenon the term “contextual weakening”. This does not mean that a speaker necessarily presents information which is the opposite of his hearer’s assumptions; instead, the utterance may weaken or eliminate assumptions. That is, the speaker provides information which challenges in some way a hearer’s current mental representation. So then, part of a hearer’s mental representation is adjusted in some way, as old assumptions are thrown out or modified, and typically,
new assumptions take their place. If Mary, at 4:00, speaks with her residence director, who tells her,

(14) They’ve cancelled the fire drill and rescheduled it for next week.

she will now alter her mental representation of the fire drill and her afternoon plans, because she has heard from a trustworthy source information which contrasts what she had originally heard. And so, the utterance has caused a contextual weakening.

3.3.2 The Relevance Theoretic Comprehension Procedure

I have argued, then, that relevance theory more accurately explains the motivations of communication: we communicate in order to bring about changes in people’s mental representations and in our world. But relevance theory is also more accurate than the classical communication model with regard to the means of communication. A classical model identifies the encoding of a thought in language and its subsequent decoding as the vehicle for successful communication. How does relevance theory explain how we communicate? That is, how is it that a speaker takes a relevant piece of communication and conveys it in such a way that the hearer’s mental representation is altered?

Not only does a speaker want to communicate something relevant, which will affect the hearer’s mental representation, but he also communicates that relevant information in a relevant manner. In other words, he draws from his mental representation and his assumptions about the mental representation of his hearer, and forms an utterance which he believes will be optimally relevant. In the case of successful communication, he says no more than he needs to, and no less, and forms his utterance in such a way that his hearer accesses the right context, or inferences, from his utterance. She will
process what he says based on her assumptions about their shared mental representations— including the physical context, their knowledge of each other and of the world, among other things—and choose the first relevant interpretation she comes across. This shared mental representation could be pictured as a Venn diagram: each person's mental representation is largely unshared with the other, but there is overlap. It is that place of overlap from which a hearer draws assumptions about what a speaker is saying.

This process, in which a hearer presumes a speaker's utterance conforms to the principle of optimal relevance, and therefore takes his explicit utterance and looks for contextual implications based on it, is known as the “relevance theoretic comprehension procedure.” (see Sperber and Wilson 1995:163-171) It is, in other words, a complete model of communication which paints a very different picture from that of the code model, looking to relevance and contextual implications as the means of successful communication.

Take, for example, the following exchange:

(15) A: Why do you want to go out for dinner tonight?

B: Your brother's coming.

B's response could be interpreted in at least two different ways: either B wants to go out for dinner to celebrate A's brother's coming, or B is simply informing A that his brother is coming that way at the moment of conversation. The interpretation chosen by the hearer will depend on the context of the conversation: whichever interpretation most easily fulfills the hearer's demand for relevance, or, as Sperber and Wilson (1995:265) say, promises “cognitive effects.” So it is clear that interpreting the relevance of an utterance involves more than just decoding the words that are spoken; the surrounding context, among other things, is also an important factor.
How does a hearer come to the conclusion to which a speaker wants to lead her? He may do his best to make his utterance relevant, and lead his hearer to an interpretation in keeping with their shared mental representations, but there is no guarantee that the hearer will make that same interpretation. Yet we know that most communication takes place successfully, so there must be a way for the hearer to effectively interpret a message. I have hinted at this mechanism above, when I mentioned “explicit utterances”. A hearer understands the explicit content of a speaker’s utterance, but recognizes that he means more than the sum of the semantic content of his utterance. That is, she is aware of what Sperber and Wilson (1995:182) call an “explicature”—explicitly communicated information—and its “implicature”, or the implicit message to which the explicature points. When a hearer listens to an utterance, she runs through a series of possible interpretations, looking for possible inferences—the implicature of the utterance—and when she finds one that is relevant to the shared mental representation of her and the speaker, she stops. It is that first, most relevant, most easily accessible, interpretation which is chosen by the hearer. She opts for the minimal amount of processing required. This then is the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure (Wilson and Sperber 2012:7):

1. Follow the path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (in particular in explicating implicatures).

2. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

This is clear from experience. When a mother says to her child after he has misbehaved, “How old are you?” she is not asking him to tell her his age. Instead, she wants him to think about the appropriate way for a child of his age to act. Perhaps he has been irresponsible or has been in trouble at school; he will subsequently assume that his mother’s explicit statement has to do with that situation, and will look for the
first relevant interpretation of her utterance. He would, then, in successful
communication, understand the statement as a reprimand rather than a request to find
out his age.

Or, if Mike and Kim are taking a course together, and Mike says to Kim,

(16) Are you ready for the test?

Kim will assume that Mike is speaking about the upcoming test in their shared class,
rather than a test she may have in another class, or the blood test she is having next
week. She assumes that Mike’s explicature is optimally relevant to their shared mental
representation, and so will infer the first possible interpretation, using the least
processing effort possible.

3.3.3 Epistemic Vigilance

While a hearer processes an utterance based on the principle of relevance in order to
understand it, she also processes utterances regarding their truth value. If something
about an utterance, whether its source or its message, triggers doubt in a hearer’s mind,
she will evaluate the truthfulness of that utterance through a process called epistemic
vigilance. (Sperber et al 2010) Epistemic vigilance involves the watchfulness of a hearer
to determine whether inferences to which a speaker is leading her are valid or not. If
the inference is a contextual weakening, she will test its validity based on her current
mental representation and her knowledge of the speaker’s competence and benevolence.
She will also do so when the inference is a contextual strengthening or implication;
however, activation of the epistemic vigilance mechanism may not be triggered in these
cases if nothing she infers raises doubts in her mind. The concept of epistemic vigilance
plays an important role in the argumentation process, guiding how a speaker forms his
utterances in an attempt to overcome any predicted epistemic vigilance on the part of his hearer. This will be evident in the case of different discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic, whose functions are in part to overcome a hearer’s epistemic vigilance.

So we have seen, then, that the classical code model of communication falls short of effectively representing what takes place in the communication process. Relevance theory, on the other hand, is a more powerful model for describing and analyzing human communication, as it identifies the principle of relevance as essential to both the motivation and the means of communicating.

3.4 Discourse and Relevance

3.4.1 Models of Global Coherence

As I will be analyzing a number of discourse markers used in Tunisian Arabic, I must first discuss some of the theoretical positions regarding discourse analysis and what makes a text coherent or comprehensible. First of all, a strictly grammatically-oriented discourse model sees a text as being coherent based on the principle of local cohesion: that is, a text is understandable because the elements in the text relate to each other syntactically.

A typical example of this view of discourse relations would be Longacre (1983), who attempts to analyze texts as if they were sentences. He looks at the “role relations” of words: relations such as Experiencer, Patient, and Agent. Longacre identifies these role relations as being syntactic in nature, rather than semantic or pragmatic, although he recognizes that they are part of “the deep or semantic side of grammar.” (1983:xvi) While he admits that pragmatics plays an important role in discourse analysis, he focuses almost exclusively on syntax, analyzing full texts just as a syntactician would
study a sentence. In other words, Longacre’s model of discourse analysis takes a largely syntactic approach to understanding a text, looking at the cohesion of a discourse (for example, the shifting of nuclear\textsuperscript{2} clausal constituents) in order to better understand its content.

Such a model provides valuable insights, but it perhaps does not go far enough in analyzing the root of what holds together and shapes a discourse, and subsequently, why different constituents are in the order they are, and why certain phenomena (verbal aspect, discourse markers, anaphoric reference, etc.) occur in the way they do. The root of a discourse, instead, is relevance. It is not the cohesion of a discourse, nor even, as I will show below, the topic of a discourse, which makes it understandable, but rather the relevance of the discourse to the interlocutors’ shared mental representation: how the text interacts with the context. This is the foundation for effective understanding and analysis of a text.

Take this utterance, for example:

(17) My brother is studying engineering. One day, he went to the store. There are number of stores in town. A few of them are made of bricks. Speaking of bricks, I knew a man who worked as a mason.

While each sentence is linked together, fulfilling the requirements of local cohesion, the overall discourse is completely incomprehensible and incoherent. Why? It is meaningless because there is no over-arching relevance to the utterance. No one would have any reason to make a statement like it, as it as a whole could hardly be relevant to a hearer in any situation (expect as an example in a paper on discourse, that is). And so

\textsuperscript{2} The term “clause nucleus” is not used in generative grammar; I use it to mean any verb or argument within a clause, similar to the way Levinsohn and Dooley (2000) define “clause nucleus.”
it is very difficult to imagine a setting in which a speaker would want to communicate such random information to a hearer. While the example is cohesive on a local scale—each clause relates to the next syntactically and semantically—it still lacks coherence.

Local cohesion, then, is not enough to identify what it is that holds a text together and makes it coherent. Other models of coherence exist; Unger (2006:46-47) notes that there are several competing claims as to what constitutes such “global coherence”. For instance, he cites Giora (1985 710-1), who claims that it is “discourse topic relevance,” or the theme of a text, which holds a discourse together and keeps it “well-formed” (or on topic). She calls this the Relevance Requirement:

Every proposition in a coherent text can be interpreted as being about a certain discourse topic.

Another theory mentioned by Unger is groundedness: a text is held together not by local coherence of linguistic constituents, but by how it “foregrounds” or “backgrounds” certain elements in a discourse in order to linguistically mark the main events or ideas and hence keep the text understandable.

Both of these options, according to Unger, are not without value, yet they do not go deep enough, because much of what makes a text understandable has to do with assumptions about a hearer’s mental representation and her responsibilities in understanding a text. For instance, if I as a modern Westerner read a biography, I expect it to follow a largely chronological order. If it does not, I expect the author to clearly indicate to me that she is making a jump in time. Otherwise, I will have difficulty following the text: it will not be coherent for me. Yet biographies of the ancient Greek world, for example, were under no cultural obligation to follow chronological order—authors did not expect readers to assume a strictly sequential time sequence—and hence, if I read an ancient biography such as one of the Gospels, I may
have a difficult time understanding it, because the author’s assumptions about his work and my assumptions about it do not fully match up. Therefore, it is a shared mental representation, or as Unger (2006:133) says, “a full integration of the utterance into world knowledge” which makes a text understandable. He sees expectations of relevance as the element which make a discourse coherent. As Blass (1986) says, it is assumptions about what is relevant to the context, not linguistic units, which hold a text together.

While this is the case, I want to note that I will still use the concepts of grounding and other discourse features extensively in my analysis of discourse markers (see 3.4.3 below). Grounding is a clear linguistic reality, and as such, is a helpful tool in diagnosing the movement and argument structure of a text. Because discourse analysis deals with linguistic, observable phenomena, it is essential to the understanding of texts and the discourse features of a given language. Yet local cohesion is not, on its own, the essential building block of discourse coherence.

I will, then, follow a methodology similar to that of Levinsohn (Dooley and Levinsohn 2000), in which he studies both the sentence-level syntactic roles or functions of certain discourse phenomena, and also the pragmatic roles of those phenomena. His approach takes advantage of numerous syntactic (including Longacre’s role relations) and pragmatic (including relevance theory) approaches and combines them into one practical way to analyze the discourse of a language. In my analysis, I too will look at both the sentence-level syntactic roles of each discourse marker and the pragmatic roles (especially in terms of relevance theory) which they play.

These two different approaches—syntactic and pragmatic—are assisted by two different types of charting. Charting according to local cohesion is based on the syntactic structure of individual sentences and shows how different clausal constituents are moved. This type of chart brings out foregrounding and backgrounding, points of
departure and the syntactic roles of discourse markers, among other things. A relevance theory chart, however, looks at each sentence as a unit (or utterance) and brings out the explicature behind each utterance and the assumptions and cognitive effects that a hearer draws as a result of each utterance. It helps the researcher see the argument structure of a text and the overall coherence of the discourse. Both these methods of charting are quite useful, especially when looking at the roles of discourse markers in both syntactic function and procedural content. For examples of each chart, see the appendix. Chart (3) is an example of a relevance theory chart, and charts (1) and (2) are examples of syntactic charts.

So I have made the claim that relevance theory provides a better way to analyze the essential pragmatic and argumentative function of elements in a discourse because it more faithfully represents the glue of a discourse, namely, relevance within a shared context.

3.4.2 Analyzing Discourse Markers

Because I will be analyzing discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic, I must first define what I mean by a discourse marker. I will use the term “discourse marker” to mean “a pragmatic indicator with procedural instructions which operate above the clausal level.” This definition includes connectives (two of the six markers I will describe, yekhi and mela, are connectives) but excludes anaphoric referents such as pronouns.

The analysis of discourse markers under a relevance theory framework has been pioneered by Diane Blakemore, (1987, 2002) who has analyzed the pragmatic functions of discourse connectives. She has proposed that discourse markers be seen as words whose primary function is to give procedural instructions to a hearer as she comprehends a discourse and draws appropriate inferences. These markers guide her
along the way as traffic signs, helping her to make the correct inferences by either confirming, redirecting, or eliminating her assumptions of relevance.

For example, someone may hear the following phrase:

(18) So you’re coming, right?

and recognize through the word “so” that the speaker would like her to draw a conclusion. The speaker implicates to the hearer that the context of the utterance should lead her to the conclusion that she is going somewhere with the speaker. The word “so” does not indicate to her any conceptual content, but instead gives her procedural instructions regarding how she should understand the flow of the discourse. A word with conceptual content, on the other hand, would not direct the comprehension process of the hearer, but would bring up an idea or image or concept to her mental representation. A noun such as “dog” would conjure a clear mental image or concept, while verbs like “run” or “eat” would do the same. Even less concrete words, such as “grand,” “yearn,” and “specialization” bring an idea to a hearer’s mind, in contrast to procedural words, which only instruct.

This clean break between conceptual and procedural words, however, is not an accurate picture, as Wilson (2011:17) points out. All words, in fact, contain some procedural functions, and even many discourse markers have conceptual content as well. This is an important point to keep in mind, as later I will discuss two different discourse markers (‘ad and ti) and perhaps two others (raho and mau) in Tunisian Arabic which seem to contain both conceptual and procedural content. Note that even though some of these markers will have conceptual content, they will still be non-truth-conditional, as the content expressed is an emotion, whose truth cannot be challenged from a logical perspective.
What is the benefit, then, of analyzing discourse markers from the perspective of relevance theory? One important result is that markers can often be narrowed down to one pragmatic function, rather than a many-sense (polysemic) definition, which may be the result of discourse analyses which focus strictly on local cohesion. When a researcher is able to understand the basic, pragmatic function of a word, he can more readily analyze it and understand how it should be translated. Certainly the semantic senses of the word can and should be described, but only when the main pragmatic function of the marker has also been identified.

In addition, looking at markers from a relevance theory perspective gives a picture of how the markers operate in terms of their cognitive function. More is understood regarding how each marker leads a hearer to interpret utterances and draw inferences, whether in a setting of argumentation or not. Relevance theory explains more fully how discourse markers function by bringing out their conceptual content and procedural instructions; a pragmatic analysis brings out the argumentative function of a discourse marker, while a syntactic analysis based on local cohesion alone does not.

3.4.3 Process of Analysis of Six Discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic

I first attempted to analyze each of the six discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic which I had chosen (see 2.5) by identifying their syntactic roles in sentences; that is, I analyzed their effect on the local cohesion of a text. I identified where each marker typically occurs within the clause and (in some cases) the sentence articulations in which it is naturally found. Once I had done this, I then analyzed the marker from a pragmatic perspective, identifying whether it tends to co-occur with breaks in the discourse, whether it has any bearing on participant reference, its function in terms of discourse cohesion (cause and effect, explanations, etc.), and so on. Finally, I
summarized the procedural or argumentative function of the marker using a relevance theory model, looking at its pragmatic functions in Tunisian Arabic discourse.
CHAPTER 4

4.1 The Discourse Marker Raho

I will begin by analyzing the discourse marker *raho* from a syntactic perspective, looking at how it functions in terms of local cohesion at the sentence level. I will then attempt to describe its pragmatic function from the perspective of relevance theory.

4.1.1 Syntactic Role of Raho

The word *raho* is rather ambiguous syntactically. Sometimes it seems to occur in place of a noun phrase (NP). In example (19, *rani* (the first person singular form of the marker) appears to take the place of the pronoun:

(19) Qaluli bes tedfaʃ xtiə meʃ defaʃ haq
say.3PL.PST_to_1SG FUT pay.2SG fine because 2SG_NEG pay.PROG price of
wouqf
DET_parking qɔltl̩hom rani(1SG)
say.1SG.PST_to_3PL rani(1SG) pay.1SG.PST
‘They said to me, “You’re going to pay a fine, because you haven’t paid the
parking fee.” I said to them “Rani3 I paid.”

3 *Raho*, as I will explain below, often inflects according to the subject NP of the clause it occurs in. Possible forms include *rani* (1SG), *rak* (2SG), *raho* (3SGM), *rahi* (3SGF), *rana* (1PL), *rakom* (2PL), and *rahom* (3PL).
Yet most of the time, *raho* operates outside the clause nucleus, or at least in an ambiguous position. Note in example (20) how *rahi* seems to repeat the subject NP, while in example (21), *raho* appears at the beginning of the clause:

(20) *U ken ttdɔkæruf enu isme slh ilhosne*
    And if remember.2PL.POSSIB that.3SG names of God DET_wonderful
    *rahi mefihef hasor*
    *rahi (3SGF) in_3SGF_NEG limit*
    ‘And if you happen to remember that the wonderful names of God, *rahi* there’s no limit to them.’

(21) *fɛʃ tɪstɛnɜ qaʕdɜ tħɛb tɔðfəɾ ɪʃib*
    for_what wait.2SG sit.PROG_FEM want.2SG braid.2SG DET_gray.hair
    *raho iraʒəl ətsɛlslu bɪlʔaulɛd*
    *raho (3SG) DET_man tie.down.2SG_3SG.OBJ with_DET_children*
    ‘What are you waiting for sitting around? Do you want to grow old? *Raho* the man you tie him down with children.’

In fact, *raho* sometimes co-occurs with a subject pronoun, as in example (22):

(22) *ɛsmaʕ slimɛn ɛnɜ rani mæʕatʃ n̩nɛʒəm*
    listen.IMP Slimen 1SG *rani (1SG) no.longer can.1SG*
    ‘Listen Slimen, I *rani* can’t stand it any longer.’

*Raho*, then, plays an ambiguous role in the syntax of Tunisian Arabic. It does not function like a pronoun (so it could not be considered an emphatic pronoun, for example), and seems to occur outside the clause nucleus. Because of this, and for pragmatic reasons which I will explain below, I will assume it is best analyzed as a procedural marker.

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*Raho* in its inflected forms functions essentially like a pronoun in Algerian Arabic. Perhaps the grammaticalization of the word went a step further, or took a different turn, in its development in Algerian spoken Arabic. In any case, its use in Tunisian Arabic seems to be that of a procedural marker.
discourse marker. I will not call *raho* a “connective” because, as I will show below, it seems to function within the clause rather than as a connector between clauses.

As is clear from the above examples, *raho* inflects for person, number and gender:

(23) ṭhmɛti tuskun mʕanɜ fɪdaɾ… *rahi*
    mother.in.law_1SG.POSS live.3SGF with_1PL in_DE T_house… *rahi* (3SGF)
    Šamls  fija
    do.PROG.FEM in_1SG

    ‘My mother-in-law lives with us at home… *rahi* she is making me crazy.’

(24) ti fiq Šale roħek ja raẓəl rak ɾak n̩haɾ keməl
ti be.aware.IMP about self_2SG.POSS oh man RAK (2SG) day full
    wɛnti kerak fɪdaɾ
    and_2SG nest.PROG in_DET_house

    ‘Realize what you’re doing, man. Rak all day and you’re nesting at home.’

Note how in example (23, *raho* becomes *rahi* (3SGF), because it inflects according to the subject ‘mother-in-law’, while in example 24, *rak* (2SG) is used, because the subject of the clause is the second person singular pronoun ‘enti.’

The fact that this marker is inflected indicates that it at times somehow associates with the noun phrase, and may guide the hearer to a certain way of processing the information in that phrase. I should note also that *raho*, when it is attached to a NP, seems to be always associated with the subject of the clause. Note that in example (25, *raho* inflects according to the subject of the clause (*rohi* ‘my spirit’), while example (26 is ungrammatical, as *rak* inflects according to the object of the clause (second person singular pronoun).

(25) ɛsmaʕ slimɛn enɜ *rahi* *rohi* talsat
    listen.IMP Slimen 1SG *rahi* (3SGF) spirit_1SG.POSS go.up.3SGF.PST

    ‘Listen Slimen, I *rahi* my spirit is rising up.’

(26) *** Šatitik *rak* ilkurz
    give.1SG.PST_2SG.OBJ *rak* (2SG) DET_ball

    ‘I gave you *rak* the ball.’
Yet as I mentioned above, *raho* often has no association with the subject NP; in these cases, it appears to carry effects throughout the entire clause. When this occurs, *raho* naturally appears in its unmarked form “*raho*” (third person masculine singular), as in example (27):

(27) *ɛmɜ hɛdɛkɜ hadiθ*  *ttisʕa u tsaʕin*  *ilm*  *ili*
but DEM conversation of DET_ninety.nine name which
*sɒkɜɾhom*  *sidi msbi*…  *raho*  *muʃ maʕnɛhɜ*
mention.3SG.PST_3PL.OBJ sir DET_prophet… *raho* (3SG) not meaning_3SGF.POSS
*ɾɜbi ʕandu tɪsʕa u tɪsʕin*  *bɜɾk*
God to_3SG ninety.nine only

‘But that issue of the ninety-nine names which sir the Prophet mentioned… Raho it doesn’t mean that God only has 99.’

4.1.2 The Pragmatic Role of Raho

So far I have introduced the discourse marker *raho*, identifying its syntactic nature and function: a marker which may be fully inflected and carries strong affinities with the noun phrase, but which can also function pragmatically in the scope of an entire clause. I will now cover the pragmatic functions of *raho* from a discourse perspective, before moving on to an analysis of its essential sense based on a relevance theory framework.

*Raho* seems to contain no lexical content; it is purely a procedural marker. It does not bring about in the mind of a hearer any conceptual content, but instead guides her in the interpretation process. While the word’s roots are from the word *ra*, ‘to see’, it appears that *raho* as a discourse marker has been fully lexicalized and no longer conveys to the hearer the explicit semantic content of ‘to see.’ (‘Ra’ alone cannot be used in the same way as *raho*, indicating that the marker has been lexicalized.) Yet because *raho* often inflects according to the subject NP of the clause, it does in fact take procedural content from another constituent and so is influenced by its linguistic
context. The primary function of *raho*, however, has to do with other procedural content, so I must move on to this.

*Raho* seems to mark off important information: it foregrounds the clause to which it is attached. When *raho* occurs in a clause, it indicates to the hearer that the information contained in that clause is salient to the discourse, or is an important point which the speaker does not want the hearer to miss. The following example, taken from the climax of a story, amounts to the moral the speaker wants to leave with his hearers:

(28)  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{rod belik} & \quad \text{yarzulik} & \quad \text{sad raho} & \quad \text{ili} & \quad \text{mstenus yekal} \\
\text{be.careful return.3PL_to_2SG} & \quad \text{the.one.who used.to eat.3SG} & \quad \text{ad raho (3SG)} & \quad \text{the.one.who used.to} & \quad \text{eat.3SG} \\
mnlk & \quad \text{kif} & \quad \text{irak} & \quad \text{igung} & \quad \text{from_2SG} & \quad \text{when see.3SG_2SG.OBJ} & \quad \text{grow.hungry.3SG} \\
\text{‘Be careful they don’t come back to you ‘ad.} & \quad \text{Raho (‘behold’) the one who is used to eating from you, if he sees you, he’ll get hungry.’}
\end{align*}
\]

As the moral of the story, this information is highly important to the discourse, and so the speaker marks it off with *raho*.

Why is *raho* sometimes associated closely with the subject NP and other times not? I propose that whether or not *raho* is inflected according to the subject NP depends on the sentence articulation of the clause in question. If the clause has a topic-comment articulation, *raho* will be used in its bare form; however, if it occurs in a sentence with a focus-presupposition articulation, it will associate itself with the subject NP (the focus of the clause) and inflect accordingly. That is, conceptual elements from the NP are taken on by the marker. The sentence in example (29 has a focus-presupposition articulation, and so *raho* inflects according to the subject NP, while in example 30, *raho* does not inflect because it occurs in a sentence with a topic-comment articulation.

(29)  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[Focus]} & \quad \text{Presupposition} \\
\text{[ens rani]} & \quad \text{mSatf} & \quad \text{nnezam} \\
\text{[1SG rani (1SG)]} & \quad \text{no.longer} & \quad \text{can.1SG} \\
\text{‘I rani (‘behold’) can’t stand it any longer.’}
\end{align*}
\]
Thus, *raho* may or not be associated closely with the subject NP\(^5\) of a clause depending on whether or not it is the topic of the sentence; yet in either case, its pragmatic functions remain the same.

From the perspective of Information Structure, these different sentence articulations are the “formal expression of the pragmatic structuring of a proposition in a discourse.” (Lambrecht 1994:5) That is, there are pragmatic reasons for using different sentences with the same semantic content but different articulations. Here, in the case of *raho*, pragmatic considerations in the discourse affect which sentence articulation is used, and hence determine whether *raho* is inflected or not.

Because it is closely associated with the clause to which it is attached and foregrounds it, *raho* functions on the level of local coherence. The information which it highlights as relevant is not typically the main point of the discourse, but that information will typically support or strengthen the main point, or at least serve to move the discourse along.

*Raho* foregrounds information whether it occurs in its unmarked form or in its inflected forms when attached to a noun phase. For instance, in the following example, an employee was mistakenly identified as his boss. The employee corrects the mistaken person, saying:

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\(^5\) Note that, as I mentioned in section 2.3, the topic of a sentence in Tunisian Arabic is always the subject. Therefore, since *raho* inflects according to the sentence topic, it inflects according to the subject.
Here the speaker brings out the fact that the man in question is the boss rather than the employee by using *raho*, presumably in its inflected form for the third person masculine singular.

Often the information associated with *raho* is non-intuitive, or perhaps unexpected in some way. Not only is the message contained in the clause important information, but it is also new, either because it is unknown or unexpected. This is probably due to the fact that *raho* introduces highly salient information to the discourse—foregrounded information—which is typically unknown to a hearer beforehand. I will say more about the pragmatic implications of this below.

Yet I must note that this is not always the case. Sometimes *raho* indicates intuitive or unsurprising information. In the following example, the speaker is describing a very harsh person and says,

(32) *efkun iqabl* *efkun ke* *raho* *mefihof rahm3*

who meet.3SG.3SG.OBJ who etc and *raho* (3SG) in.3SG.NEG mercy

‘Who can meet him, who can etc.? and *raho* (‘behold’) he is merciless.’

The fact that he is merciless is already clear from what the speaker has said before. So the information attached to *raho*, in this case, is intuitive, unlike most uses of the marker.

Yet *raho* also plays another important pragmatic role in TA discourse. In addition to foregrounding information which is generally non-intuitive, it also carries a connotation of confirmation. That is, *raho* serves to assure the hearer that the information to which it is attached is correct. Example 19 (repeated from above) indicates this:
‘They said to me, “You’re going to pay a fine, because you haven’t paid the parking fee.” I said to them “Rani I paid.”

Note the fact that the speaker uses a form of raho to confirm strongly the fact that he did, indeed, pay the parking fee. Example 27 (repeated from above) also shows raho being used to confirm the truth of a statement:

‘But that issue of the ninety-nine names which sir the Prophet mentioned… Raho it doesn’t mean that God only has 99.’

So then, a speaker uses raho to speak with a considerable degree of certainty, affirming the trustworthiness of what he is saying. Thus, I believe it is justified to identify raho as an evidential marker. By confirming the trustworthiness and full veracity of the information to which it is attached, raho speaks to the truth value of such information, thus functioning as an evidential marker.

I have made the claim then, that raho foregrounds the information contained in the clause to which it is attached, information which is highly relevant to the discourse and often non-intuitive. Thus, in a sense it slows down a discourse, indicating to the hearer, “Listen up! This is important information.” Raho catches a hearer’s attention, giving her a chance to listen well and process the following information as highly relevant to her. In addition, raho functions often as an evidential marker, affirming that the
information with which it is associated is completely true and does not need to be doubted.

### 4.1.3 Analysis of Raho Based on Relevance Theory

How could one interpret this marker from a relevance theory framework? It appears that *raho* marks highly relevant information. That is, it leads the hearer to draw an important inference based on what the speaker has been saying. Because of the important nature of this information, and because it is typically non-intuitive, it is often necessary for the speaker to indicate it clearly with a discourse marker. *Raho* serves to grab the hearer’s attention and point her to an inference highly salient to the discourse. For example, in example (31, the speaker wants his hearer to draw the inference that he is not the CEO, but that someone else is, and that he should address the actual CEO rather than him. He uses *raho* to mark the importance of what he is communicating and confirm strongly to his hearer that it is true. *Raho* gives the hearer instructions to eliminate his previous assumptions and to find relevance in the information attached to the marker. While the basic function of *raho* is not to eliminate previous assumptions, it does guide the hearer as to where to gain cognitive effects, and so sometimes also eliminates assumptions which clash with the intended cognitive effects.

In section 4.1.2 above, I argued that whether or not *raho* occurs in its inflected forms is determined by the articulation of the sentence in which it occurs. However, this is not entirely correct according to a relevance theory perspective. In relevance theory terms, a sentence articulation is a propositional form (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 183-193), and the form used in any given sentence is determined by a pragmatic choice: which form will yield cognitive effects for the hearer with the least processing effort? This issue, of course, is related to the activation of discourse participants and the
general assumptions of a hearer. In any case, these pragmatic considerations of relevance are what guide the choice of propositional form, and thus in the case of *raho*, its use (whether it is inflected or not) is not determined by sentence articulation, but by something deeper: the core context which the speaker is focusing on. He wants to create a context for his hearer in order to lead her to a conclusion, and this context may be just the subject NP of the clause or the entire clause; in either case, it is this context to which *raho* attaches and thus determines whether or not *raho* occurs in its inflected or uninflected forms. It may be appropriate, then, to say that sentence articulation and the form of *raho* are both logical developments of pragmatic considerations, rather than *raho*’s form being a result of sentence articulation itself.

If I were to explicate the logical inferences involved in example (31 above, it would look something like this:

1. Premise: If someone is very well dressed, he must be an important person.
2. Given: The man I am speaking to is very well dressed.
3. Assumption: Therefore, the man must be the CEO of his company.
4. Cancelled assumption (due to man’s statement): The man I am speaking to is not the CEO, but rather an employee.
5. New assumption: The other man is the CEO, and I should not doubt this important fact, because it was introduced with *raho*.

So then, *raho* here is used to replace a cancelled assumption with a new assumption.

Here it is important to note what Unger (2001:133) says about “degrees of relevance” or “degrees of groundedness” in a text. Elements which a grammatically-

---

Note, however, that the pragmatic effects of *raho* still carry throughout the entire clause, as mentioned above.
based model may call “foregrounded” have relevance over a larger section of a
discourse (perhaps the entire discourse), while “backgrounded” elements carry only
minimal relevance: over only one clause, for example. Thus, the question is not
whether or not an element is relevant, but how widespread the reach of that relevance
is. As Unger (2001:203) says:

“… the most foregrounded utterances are those whose main contribution to
satisfying expectations of relevance is via the cognitive effects they achieve. The most
backgrounded utterances are those whose main contribution to satisfying the (global)
expectation of relevance is to create or fine-tune expectations about the relevance of
later utterances. This places “groundedness” on a fully continuous scale. No utterance is
exclusively foreground or background. It also treats groundedness as something which
is not encoded in language. How grounding effects are achieved, moreover, is
thoroughly context-dependent.”

In the case of raho, information is “foregrounded” at a more local rather than global
level.

How does raho foreground information differently depending on whether or not it is
attached to the subject NP of a clause? It would seem at first glance that raho functions
differently in each case; however, its procedural message to the hearer is the same no
matter what: the clause as a whole is an important contextual implication. Sometimes
the noun phrase is emphasized more (when raho inflects according to a subject NP), but
the effects of raho still carry over into the entire clause. Thus, the basic pragmatic
function of raho is identical in both cases.

So a speaker uses raho to lead his hearer to a contextual implication, indicating to
her that the information attached to the marker is highly relevant (“foregrounded”) and
encourages her to pay close attention to what is a very salient point in the discourse. In

7 It should be noted, however, that Unger (2001:258) does not see groundedness as what makes a
discourse coherent, but rather assumptions of relevance.
relevance theory terminology, what takes place is that *raho* creates a context in which the information to which it is attached is relevant. For example, the focus of a sentence defines the scope of the presupposition which follows it, and thus frames how the presupposition is interpreted. The relevance of that utterance is determined by the context created for it through the focus. *Raho*, in the same way, creates the context through which the utterance associated with it becomes relevant on the local coherence level. Yet as Blakemore points out (2002:162), identifying that a marker indicates a contextual implication is not enough to differentiate it from other markers. I must go further.

Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that, as I indicated in section 4.2, *raho* functions as an evidential marker. According to relevance theory, then, *raho* is used to overcome hearers’ epistemic vigilance (see 3.3.3) by affirming the certainty of the information to which it is attached. It speaks to the higher order explication of the truthfulness of a statement which may be in question by the hearer. Thus, *raho* indicates important, salient information in the discourse, that is, a contextual implication, and as an evidential marker confirms to the hearer that she does not need to doubt the veracity of the claim attached to *raho*. Not only does it strengthen information in order to support other information in the discourse, but it also strengthens the truth value claims of the very information to which it is attached, showing that information to be unquestionable. We can see here the dual function of discourse markers: they both guide the hearer in the inferential process, and also shape the argument structure of a discourse, leading to a coherent utterance (Wilson 2011:20).

Now while *raho* functions in an argumentative fashion as an evidential marker, that argumentative function also has a strong affective notion to it. That is, *raho* is used to strengthen the truth value claims of the utterance to which it is attached, and to confirm to the hearer the trustworthiness of the speaker. It speaks to the emotions of
the hearer—whether in a manipulative fashion or not—and tells her to trust the speaker and not worry about doubting his claims. Thus, *raho* strengthens truth value claims by appealing to the hearer’s attitude towards the speaker, encouraging her to put her faith in what he is saying. This agrees with how relevance theory would define evidential markers, identifying their function as strengthening the trustworthiness of the speaker.

*Raho*, then is a unique phenomenon cross-linguistically, as it contains both procedural content from other constituents and also procedural content which guides a hearer’s assumptions. Discourse markers do not typically inflect according to other constituents, and hence *raho* is an intriguing example of the multiple syntactic and pragmatic capabilities of discourse markers.

### 4.2 The Discourse Marker *Mau*

#### 4.2.1 The Syntactic Role of *Mau*

I will now discuss another discourse marker which has similar syntactic properties to *raho*. *Mau*, like *raho*, can “attach” to a noun phrase or to an entire clause. That is, as in the case of *raho*, *mau* can either be more closely identified with the noun phrase and inflect for person, number and gender, or can take a more generic, bare form and associate with the clause as a whole. I propose that, as with *raho*, *mau* associates with a subject NP and inflects accordingly when it occurs in a clause with topic-presupposition articulation. As such, it also, like *raho*, takes on the conceptual information of the subject NP when it inflects for it. Note how *mau* occurs in its inflected form in example (35) (according to the subject pronoun), while it remains uninflected in example (36):

(35) *meni sarsft wæhds...*

Meni (1SG) get.to.know.1SG.PST one_FEM

‘Meni I got to know a girl...’
In the early days mahōỆ they didn’t ask the girl’s opinion

Like raho, mau can occasionally take a syntactic position which appears to be the subject NP, but this would be an inaccurate analysis, as mau often occurs clearly outside the clause nucleus. In addition, even when mau does occur in what could be a proNP position, replacing it with a pronoun does not render a very acceptable utterance.

Compare example (35 above with the following:

(37) *** en3 ʃarsft  waḥd3…
    1 SG get.to.know.1SG.PST  one_FEM
    ‘I got to know a girl’

While example (35 is fully grammatical, example (37, in which ‘meni’ is replaced with the first person singular pronoun ‘en3’, is of questionable grammaticality, as subject pronouns are typically implicit. Mau, then, is not a replacement for a subject pronoun.

Also like raho, mau only appears to associate itself with subject noun phrases, rather than object noun phrases. Thus, as I argued for raho, mau should be considered to carry consequences for the entire clause, rather than one NP constituent, even when it inflects for that constituent. In the following example, mak seems to carry effects over the entire sentence, not even just one clause:

(38) mek taʃraf madam t3w3 ilmsr3h fih u ʃalih em3
    mak (2SG) know.2SG ma’am now DET_theater in_3SG and  o n_3SG but
    ssinima…
    DET_cinema…
    ‘Mak you know ma’am, the theater has its good and bad points, but the cinema…’

---

Mau and mahō exist in free variation
Mak here is semantically associated not only with the fact that the hearer knows something, but also with what she knows. So mau, then, may cover full sentences. In any case, it always seems to be associated with an entire clause rather than a single NP.

4.2.2 The Pragmatic Role of Mau

So syntactically, mau functions in a virtually identical fashion to raho. What about its semantic and pragmatic functions in discourse? Mau is often pragmatically associated with explanations for information which has already been presented, or with answers to a question. This information, to which the clause with which mau is associated points, may be immediately recognizable—in an adjacent clause, for example—or it may be the main point of the discourse. That is, mau may function on a local or global coherence level. In the first example, the hearer (B) responds to a speaker’s (A) expression of incredulity over why the hearer told his fiancée she wasn’t pretty, while in the second example the speaker explains why she didn’t understand her interlocutor well:

(39) A: ʁәltθɔ ỉlklɛm ʰɛðɛʃɔ fi wʁɛθɔ
    say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF DET_words DEM in face_3SGF.POSS
B: ɛi mau ʰɛðɛkɔ ɪli ɲʊskar ʃiŋ wɔqθɔθɔ
    yes mau (3SG) DEM which think.1SG in_3SG at.the.time
‘A: ”You said those words to her face?”
B: “Yes, mau (‘well’) that’s what I was thinking at the time.”’

(40) semahni tʃawudli mesfemtʃf ʃlɪθ
    excuse.IMP_1SG.OBJ repeat.2SG_to_1SG understand.1SG.PST_2SG.OBJ_NEG well
mau awsl mɔɾʒɪ tawɔ nstənus mun bʃad
mau (3SG) first time come.1SG now become.used.to.1SG afterward
‘Sorry, could you repeat that? I didn’t understand you well. Mau (‘well’) it’s the first time I’ve come. I’ll get used to it later.’
In addition to providing “back-explanations,” mau seems to somehow lead into new sections in a discourse. It often indicates a discourse break, and provides an introduction to a new line of thought. This appears to be the same pragmatic function which I showed in the previous two examples, with the only difference being that the reason comes after the result rather than before. For example, the speaker in example (41) tells his hearer that certain chickens are very fearful, but first gives the explanation for their fear:

(41) Qali mau idʒez hɛdə mɛbi fiłqɛʃat ... ŋad
say.3SG.PST to 1SG mau (3SG) DET_chicken DEM raised in_DET_cages... 'ad
idʒezet hɛdumə jɪtlaʕu ˈχaufin jɛsər
DET_chickens DEM turn.out.3PL scared_PL a.lot

‘He told me “Mau (‘well’) that chicken is raised in cages... ‘ad those chickens turn out to be really scared’”

Here we see that mau leads into a new section of the discourse—the speaker’s description of the fearfulness of certain chickens—by introducing a reason for the chickens’ cowardice.

So whether mau indicates a back-explanation or a lead-in, it almost always points to some kind of reason or purpose. This reason is either known or intuitive information; that is, the speaker assumes that the hearer may know the information already, or may be able to deduce the explanation on her own. In the following example the speaker has been talking about a new societal phenomenon: the sedentary husband who spends all his time at home in front of the television. He is speaking with a woman whose husband fits the description, and so overtly recognizes that what he is saying is already known to her, and recognizes her prior knowledge by introducing the information with mak (2SG):
Thus, information associated with mau is not globally relevant. In other words, mau minimizes the importance of information. So I will now use this assumption to analyze a more ambiguous example, in which a counselor is speaking with a patient about his inability to conceal the truth. After they have discussed the patient’s difficulty making friends because of his brutal honesty, the counselor explains to his client why another man has become a father-figure to him:

The use of mau here is much less clear than in other cases, in which less globally relevant information is presented. In this case, mau seems to indicate an explanation of some sort, but it is not clear how important the information is to the general argumentation structure of the text. But if I apply my analysis above based on clearer examples, it seems appropriate to assume that mau functions in a similar way here: the speaker is giving a reason for why his hearer was acting the way he did, but does not want what he is saying to become the main point of the discourse. He wants to focus on his client’s primary problem of never concealing what he is thinking, so he indicates the limited relevance of the clause by introducing it with the marker mau.

So while mau and roho function very similarly from a syntactic point of view, they seem to be near opposites in terms of semantics and pragmatics. While roho highlights important information, mau identifies the clause with which it is associated as being secondary at best. Roho brings up contextual implications, while mau marks off known
or intuitive information which adds little to the hearer’s mental representation, but provides a framework for the more relevant information that will come later in the argumentation process.

4.2.3 Analysis of Mau Based on Relevance Theory

*Mau’s* function is to guide the hearer to process certain information as supporting more relevant information in the discourse; that is, it instructs the hearer to assume that the information to which it is attached strengthens a (often preceding) conclusion. A hearer may be distracted by hearing information which is already known or at least intuitive: Why tell me what I already know? Because of this, the speaker directs the hearer’s processing by telling her that such information is not the most relevant point of the discourse (“backgrounded” information).

Example (41 indicates how *mau* guides the hearer to look for more relevant information. The speaker mentions that the chickens are raised in cages, yet he does not want the hearer to assume that this is highly relevant information, as it is not. (In fact, he does not mention the cages again in the discourse.) Therefore, he introduces the statement about the cages with *mau* in order to eliminate assumptions of relevance about the cages and instruct his hearer to look for more salient information, namely, that the chickens are very cowardly.

Take, for instance, example (42 above. The logical process a hearer goes through when listening to this utterance is as follows:
1. Premise: If someone tells me a piece of information, he assumes I don’t already know it.

2. Given: The speaker is telling me information I already know about how sedentary people like my husband act.

3. Assumption: He assumes I don’t know this information and that it is a new contextual implication for me.

4. Cancelled assumption: The speaker introduced the information with *mau*, indicating to me that he knows the information is intuitive or already known to me.

5. New assumption: The information the speaker is giving me strengthens the main point of what he is talking about and is not pointing to a contextual implication which he expects me to draw.

*mau*, then, in this case, serves to set off information as an intuitive contextual strengthener and to point the hearer to look elsewhere for primary relevance.⁹

*mau* instructs the hearer to look elsewhere for more relevant information; yet this information is not always self-evident, as it may be the main point of the discourse rather than a clear linguistic element. In any case, *mau* is pragmatically associated with contextual strengthening material in the argumentation process, giving instructions to the hearer to look for cognitive effects in the information to which *mau* points, on both the global and local scale.

### 4.3 The Discourse Marker Yekhi

In the following discussion I will analyze the word *yekhi* in much the same way that I have studied *raho* and *mau*, looking at its syntactic role in the sentence, then analyzing

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⁹ *Mau* may also minimize the affective impact of information to which it is attached, much like the way that *raho* uses emotion to strengthen the trustworthiness of the speaker and the veracity of an utterance.
its pragmatic functions, and finally analyzing yekhi’s function according to relevance theory. I will finish by briefly comparing yekhi to similar discourse markers in a few other languages.

### 4.3.1 The Syntactic Role of Yekhi

The discourse marker yekhi always occurs clause-initially, functioning as a connective. It appears to somehow connect together thoughts from adjoining clauses. Notice how in example (44, yekhi occurs between two clauses:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{m̩ʃitlu} & \quad \text{tul} & \quad \text{u} & \quad \text{qɔltlu} & \quad \text{hæqiqtu} & \quad \text{fi} & \quad \text{wr̩hu} \\
\text{go.1SG.PST_to_3SG} & \quad \text{and} & \quad \text{tell.1SG.PST_to_3SG} & \quad \text{truth_3SG.POSS} & \quad \text{in} & \quad \text{face_3SG.POSS} \\
\text{yekhi} & \quad \text{wr̩hu} & \quad \text{ətq莉} & \quad \text{gəḥarli} & \quad \text{u} \\
\text{pass_turn.3SG.PST} & \quad \text{stare.down.3SG.PS} \quad \text{T_to_1SG} & \quad \text{and} & \quad \text{say.3SG.PST_to_1SG} \\
\text{qali} & \quad \text{say.3SG.PST_to_1SG} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘I went directly to him and told him the truth about him to his face. Yekhi his face changed, he stared at me and said…’

Yekhi could, in the right setting, be replaced with another connective, thus confirming its role as a connective in discourse. As examples (45 and (46 show, ‘ad may replace yekhi and the utterance remains acceptable:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{jeχi} & \quad \text{n̩haɾ} & \quad \text{ʕajɪtli} & \quad \text{ɪlpɛi} & \quad \text{dɛi} & \quad \text{ʒɛi} \\
\text{face_3SG.PSSP} & \quad \text{call.3SG.PST_to_1SG} & \quad \text{DET_CEO} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ʕad} & \quad \text{n̩haɾ} & \quad \text{ʕajɪtli} & \quad \text{ɪlpɛi} & \quad \text{dɛi} & \quad \text{ʒɛi} \\
\text{one.day} & \quad \text{call.3SG.PST_to_1SG} & \quad \text{DET_CEO} \\
\text{Yekhi/’ad} & \quad \text{one.day} & \quad \text{the CEO called me in} \\
\end{align*}
\]

### 4.3.2 The Pragmatic Role of Yekhi

What is the function of yekhi, then? It often indicates that what follows is some kind of conclusion based on what has been said previously. The utterance in example (47 follows an explanation of how a woman had been poorly treated by a number of
people, and culminates with her children’s standing up for her. Yekhi is used to introduce the children’s reaction:

(47)  jɛχi  auledhs  mehamluʃ  fih3
      yekhi  children_3SGF.POSS accept.3PL.PST_NEG  in_3SGF
‘Yekhi (‘so’) her children didn’t accept her treatment…’

But yekhi may also occur at the beginning of a discourse. In these cases, it appears that a conclusion is being assumed, even though the arguments leading up to it may not be explicit. The utterance in example (48 is spoken after someone walks into a room and says “Good morning” to another person. The person in the room responds to the new arrival:

(48)  jɛχi  win  kʊnt?
      Yekhi  where  be.2SG.PST
‘Yekhi (‘so’) where were you?’

Yekhi here is not the conclusion of explicitly spoken assumptions, but rather the conclusion of assumptions from context: the fact that the hearer had just arrived.

In addition, the use of yekhi often has a clear association with time. Yekhi may mark an event which occurs after the passing of time or after a number of events mentioned in the discourse. In example (49, a boy is telling about how he was playing a game in front of his house, when a man and woman, who are very important to the story, pass by. In example (50, the speaker was telling how he got to know a girl and liked her, and then eventually spoke directly to her about marriage.

(49)  kʊnt  qaʕəd  filʕatbɜ  mteʃ  darnaʃ  nelʕab  fi ʒu
      be.1SG.PST  sit.PROG  in_DET_front.step  of  house_1PL.POSS play.1SG  in game
      mteʃ  vidio  jɛχi  hek  ilmvʁa  u  raʃal  muʕadin
      of  video  yekhi  DEM  DET_woman and  DET_man  pass.by.PROG.PL
‘I was sitting on our front door step playing a video game Yekhi (‘so’) that woman and man were passing by.’
In both cases, there is an ambiguous passage of time in between the events leading up to yekhi and the event which takes place following the marker. Clearly what is mentioned after yekhi is what the speaker is building up to.

What, then, is the significance of yekhi in these examples? Other connectives could take the place of yekhi in examples (49 and (50 above:

(51) ʕad hɛk ɪlmra u ɪɾaʒəl mɪtʕadin
‘Ad DEM DET_woman and DET_man pass.by.PROG_PL
‘Ad that woman and man were passing by.’

(52) ʕad ɲhar qɔlthɛl̩hɜ fi wɪʒhɜ
‘AD one.day say.1SG.PST_3SGF.OBJ_to_3SGF in face_3SGF.POSS
‘Ad one day I told it to her face.’

So it appears that yekhi serves to do more than mark a change in action or scene, or to serve simply as a pause for the hearer’s sake. Rather, it gives the hearer a conceptual image or procedural instructions to follow.

Thus far, I have claimed that yekhi appears to have an argumentative focus in which it identifies a conclusion, but that it may also operate in narratives, introducing events which occur after a passage of time. How can these differing senses be brought together? It appears that yekhi points to a conclusion, or more generally, to highly relevant information which occurs after a series of events or propositions. In the case of argumentation, yekhi appears after a set of reasons and indicates the conclusion, while in narrative, yekhi points to the final, important event to which a series of events build up. In both cases, yekhi marks off what matters: the important conclusion of the matter.

See, for example,
In this example, the speaker explained what he had said to his fiancée and why: that he simply expressed what he was thinking at the time. So, because of his direct nature, he told it to her to her face. The conclusion of the matter, as yekhi indicates, is that he acted as he always does.

In addition, yekhi often opens a question: the speaker wants to confirm a conclusion he has made, or to disagree with a conclusion that his hearer has made. In example (54, a man is looking for his car (a taxi). He asks people if they have seen it, and eventually one person responds. In example (55, a wife (B) tells her husband (A) to stop hanging around the house all day, but he interprets that to mean he should play cards at cafes. She, however, disagrees with his conclusion.

In both cases, the use of yekhi confirms my analysis above, in which I proposed that yekhi leads hearers to a conclusion or summary, that is, to the implication of the preceding material.
4.3.3 Analysis of Yekhi Based on Relevance Theory

How then should yekhi be interpreted under relevance theory? It seems that yekhi points the hearer to a contextual implication. The speaker wants to give the reader the following procedural instructions: “Take what I have just told you, and conclude this about it. This is the most important thing, and everything else which I stated previously serves to point to it. Assume that previous information building up to it serves as strengthening material for the following implication.” As I mentioned above, this conclusion or contextual implication is typically known or intuitive to the hearer; therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the speaker may use yekhi to affirm to the hearer what she may already be assuming.

It may be helpful if I explicate the logic behind a few of the examples above. First of all, example (44, in which yekhi is used in its argumentative function:

1. Premise: If a son speaks directly and rudely to his father, his father will become angry and offended.
2. Given: The speaker (the son) spoke directly and rudely to his father.
3. Assumption: The father must have become angry and offended.
4. Confirmation of assumption: (3) is in fact what happened. The father’s angry response is introduced by yekhi, indicating it as the intuitive contextual implication drawn from previous strengthening material, thus confirming the hearer’s assumptions.

And example (45, which uses yekhi in its narrative, sequential function:

1. Premise: If a speaker is telling a story and giving information about a previous state of affairs, that information is relevant to what comes after it in the discourse.
2. Given: The speaker is discussing how he used to dress sloppily because he was poor.
3. Assumption: The speaker’s wardrobe must be relevant to the narrative he is telling.
4. Confirmation of assumption: The speaker’s wardrobe led to his boss’ taking action to make him look more appropriate for a work setting. This action is introduced by yekhi,
indicating that it is the intuitive contextual assumption drawn from the previous strengthening material, thus confirming the hearer’s assumption.

In both cases, then, yekhi follows contextual strengthening material and confirms to a hearer that she should draw contextual effects from the intuitive contextual implication which she has already drawn.

Yekhi, then, instructs the hearer to accept what follows as a reasonable conclusion to the preceding information. It may function in an argumentative or non-argumentative (narrative, for example) context, following Unger’s typology of conclusion-indicating connectives. (Unger 2007) It appears to function in a similar manner to veça (Unger 2007) in Kurdish (a conclusion-indicating connective with argumentative or non-argumentative functions), so in English, donc in French, or sie in Sissala. (Blass 1993)

This concurs with Blass’ hypothesis that certain procedural markers may very well function in quite similar manners cross-linguistically, as deep human processing, despite differences in surface form, remains the same culture to culture. (Blass 2012)

4.4 The Discourse Marker Mela

4.4.1 The Syntactic Role of Mela

I will now describe and analyze the discourse marker mela, following the same pattern as above with yekhi. Mela functions very similarly syntactically to yekhi; it always occurs clause-initially, and appears to have a clear connective function:

(56) filwɔqt  ili  enti  ʃandik  miet  miljon  hau  ʃandi  miljon  mels  rɔbi  
in_DET_time  which  2SG  to_2SG  one.hundred  million  here  to_1SG  million  mela  God  
subhansho  ws  tʃalɔ  ʃandu  bɑʃi  esme  
Praised  and  Exalted  to_3SG  many  names

‘...at the time that you have one hundred thousand dinars (you say) “I have one thousand dinars.”’ Mela God praised and exalted has many names.’
Both uses of *mela* in the examples above occur between clauses. In example (56, the speaker gives an analogy to prove his point, and then reiterates that point, introducing it with *mela*. In example (57, the speaker describes how different people pray, but then gets back to his main point about asking for God’s help to become less forgetful, introducing the main point with *mela*.

Like *yekhi*, *mela* can also be replaced by other connectives under the right circumstances, further confirming its role as a discourse connective. Note how in example (58, the utterance from example (57 is repeated, but *mela* is replaced with another discourse marker (not analyzed in this paper): ‘*ale kul ya hal*’. The result is an acceptable, grammatical utterance:

> ‘There are those who said “Oh protector, protect me”… *Mela* sir, the one who wants to get rid of that forgetfulness and gullibleness and hardness of heart…’

4.4.2 The Pragmatic Role of Mela

Again, like *yekhi*, *mela* points to some form of conclusion or result. In the following example, the speaker (A) says she doesn’t believe a certain person. Her hearer (B) then...
makes an assumption based on this person’s supposed lack of trustworthiness, introducing her assumption, or conclusion, with *mela*:

(59)  

A:  

\[ \text{ɛnɜ islemɛn menssdquf} \]  

\[ 1\text{SG DET_Slimen believe.1SG_3SG.OBJ_NEG} \]  

B:  

\[ \text{mɛls metqɔliʃ ilɨ ilhækeʃa fɜm}_3 \text{m inh}_3 \]  

\[ \text{mela tell.IMP_to_1SG_NEG that DET_story there.is fr om}_3 \text{SGF} \]  

‘A: “I don’t believe (what) Slimen (says).”’

B: “*Mela* (‘therefore’) don’t tell me there’s something to the story…”’

Yet unlike *yekhi*, *mela* cannot mark the passage of time. Example 58, which uses *mela* to break up two subsequent events, is incomprehensible:

(60)  

\[ \text{m̩ʃit lɪlħanut mɛlɜ qabɛlt saḥbi} \]  

\[ \text{go.1SG.PST to_DET_story mela meet.1SG.PST friend_1SG.POSS} \]  

‘I went to the store. *Mela* (‘therefore’) I met my friend.’

These conclusions which are marked by *mela* are not typically intuitive, as per *yekhi*. Instead, what follows *mela* seems to be understandable from context, yet not obvious.

In the following example, the speaker gives an analogy to explain why God has more than the ninety-nine names identified in Islam: you can talk about having a certain amount of money for specific purposes when in reality you have more.

(61)  

\[ \text{fɪlwɜqt ilɨ ɛnti ʕandɪk miɛt mɪljon hau ʕ andi mɪljon mɛlɜ ɾɜbi} \]  

\[ \text{in_DET_time which 2SG to_2SG one.hundred million here to_1SG million mela God} \]  

\[ \text{sʊbħanɜho wɜ tʕalɜ ʕandu baɾʃɜ ɛsmɛ} \]  

\[ \text{Praised and Exalted to_3SG many names} \]  

‘… at the time that you have one hundred thousand dinars (you say) “I have one thousand dinars.” *Mela* (‘therefore’) God praised and exalted has many names.’

Once he has given his reason, he follows with the conclusion, introduced by *mela*. This conclusion, however, is not clearly intuitive from the reasons provided alone.

Again, like *yekhi*, *mela* often introduces a question. Because *mela* introduces a non-intuitive conclusion, it may be used in question form when someone wants to test
whether or not the conclusion they are forming is correct, or to ask a question out of incredulity: “How can this be the case?” In example 60, the speaker (B) explains to his psychiatrist (A) that if he had friends, he wouldn’t have come to him for counseling.

(62) A:  
And friends_2SG.POSS what be.3SGF.PST DET_relationship between_2SG and between_3PL  

B: mekenf sandi shab doktur mela salef zink  
be.3SG.PST_NEG to_1SG friends doctor mela why come.1SG.PST_2SG.OBJ 1SG  

‘A: “And what was your relationship with your friends like?”’

B: “I didn’t have friends, doctor. Mela (‘therefore’) why did I come to you?”’

Mela, then, again introduces a conclusion, only this time in question form, as the speaker questions what other conclusion could be possible given the current state of affairs. So like yekhi, mela may introduce a question in order to test a hypothesis, but as I stated earlier, these hypotheses are much less intuitive or expected for the hearer.

One common way that mela is used is in the question:

(63) mela le  
mela no  

which means something to the effect of, “Does the evidence point to anything else?” That is, “Do you really want me to assume (mela) something else (le)? That seems rather counter-intuitive.” Thus, mela indicates conclusions which are unexpected or not immediately obvious to the hearer.

4.4.3 Analysis of Mela Based on Relevance Theory

From a relevance theory perspective then, mela, like yekhi, points to a contextual implication. However, this implication is not, like yekhi, intuitive or obvious to the hearer. Thus a speaker uses mela to give his hearer the following procedural
instructions: “Assume that what follows is the conclusion of what I have been telling you, that is, the contextual implication I would like you to draw. But be aware that it may not be what you had expected and may not be immediately accessible to your mental representation.” See the logic of example (56:

1. Premise: If a speaker is giving an analogy, that analogy should relate to his topic and strengthen his argument.

2. Given: The speaker is giving an analogy related to talking about how much money one has.

3. Assumption: This analogy relates to his main topic of how many names God has.

4. Confirmation of assumption: The speaker returned to his main point (that God has more than 99 names) and re-introduced it with *mela*, indicating that what he had been talking about leads to the non-intuitive assumption of (3).

5. New assumption: If people can talk about having different amounts of money in different contexts, God can talk about having 99 names when he really has more.

*Mela*, then, like *yekhi*, follows strengthening material and leads the hearer to a conclusion or to a contextual implication. However, this conclusion is not intuitive, as in example (56, and so *mela* indicates clearly to the hearer the conclusion she should draw based on preceding information. In this way, *mela* may function more like ‘*therefore*’ or ‘*then*’ than ‘*so*’ in English. (For the pragmatic distinctions between ‘*so*’ and ‘*therefore*’ see Blakemore 1988:188.) *Mela* guides a hearer to a highly-relevant contextual implication which, while understandable from context, is not nearly as accessible as implications which are preceded by *yekhi*, and thus must be explicated and marked by the speaker himself.
4.5 The Discourse Marker Ti

In the following discussion I will analyze the discourse marker *ti* in Tunisian Arabic. I will describe its syntactic functions, its conceptual and procedural content, and its role as an interjection.

*Ti* is less easy to define than the previous four markers which I have discussed. It does not function as a discourse connective, as *do yekhi* or *mela*, nor does it carry the clausal procedural functions of *raho* and *mau*. Instead, as I will explain below, it contains both procedural and conceptual content, and as such is more complex in its role in discourse.

4.5.1 The Syntactic Role of *Ti*

*Ti* always occurs clause-initially, as in example (64):

\[(64) \text{*ti* muʃ  mɛnʕaɾɜfʃ   dɔktuɾ mɛn̩nɜʒɛmʃ   nɪkðɪb} \]
\[\text{Ti not know.1SG NEG doctor can.1SG NEG lie.1SG} \]
\[\text{‘Ti it’s not that I don’t know, I can’t lie.’} \]

The word ‘*ti*’ is the second half of the second person singular (masculine and feminine) pronoun ‘*enti*.’ It seems to have been lexicalized from the pronoun, and still bears strong affinities to the second person singular. In virtually every use of the word, the hearer is being consciously addressed. In example (65, the speaker is criticizing her hearer, speaking directly to him and introducing the utterance with *ti*:

\[(65) \text{*ti* fiq     ʕalɛ  ɾoħɛk   ja  ɾaʒəl  ɾak   n̩haɾ  kɛm əl} \]
\[\text{ti become.aware.IMP about self.2SG.POSS oh man rak (2SG) day full} \]
\[\text{wenti   kerk    fsdar} \]
\[\text{and.2SG nest.PROG in_DET_house} \]
\[\text{‘Ti realize what you’re doing, man. Rak all day and you’re nesting at home.’} \]

*Ti*, however, is not a replacement for the full pronoun *enti*. Using *enti* in place of *ti* in example (65 produces an unacceptable utterance:
Nor does there need to be a verb conjugated in the second person singular in the clause in which ti is associated, as example (67 shows:

(67) *etudiā zɛdɜ… ti ʃpihom  fi ʒɔɾti*
    student also… ti what_with_3PL in footstep_1SG.POSS
    ‘Another student? Ti what’s wrong with them, always following me?’

There is no clear linguistic presence of the second person in this example. Thus, ti is not equivalent to nor substitutable for the full second person pronoun enti.

Yet there are cases where ti does not even appear to address a hearer. Example (67 above contains no overt reference to a second person singular pronoun, and in the following example, we again find no evidence of a second person being consciously addressed. The speaker (the host of a radio program) is discussing the difficulties of copying long URL addresses into programs with limited character space, and complains,

(68) *twiːɾ … meʃandik ɪlhaq  ken fi mie?  u ʔarbaʃin  karekter ti*
    ‘(with) Twitter… you are allowed only one hundred forty characters. Ti the URL address alone takes them all up.’

There is no clear addressee here, as he is giving a prepared speech. May we assume from this example, then, that ti may be used in a way not clearly associated with the second person singular? Probably not, because even in this case ti is perhaps best analyzed as being associated with the second person singular, as the radio presenter is trying to connect with his listeners. He wants to make it sound like he is speaking directly to you, and so uses the discourse marker ti. Thus, it seems most reasonable to
assume that part of ti’s semantic value is closely associated with the second person singular pronoun.

4.5.2 The Pragmatic Role of Ti: Conceptual and Procedural Content

Ti is a procedural marker, but it contains more than just procedural content. It is always used in a context in which there is strong emotion, usually anger. Therefore, it also plays a role as an interjection. In example (69, the speaker has a lot of work to do and wants to be left alone, while in example (70, the speaker is complaining about other guys trying to steal his girlfriend:

(69) u enz mezel ʃandi fɔa bef ʧrsrt ʃ ti
d and 1SG still to_1SG free.time in.order.to have.fun.1SG ti
qiluni
leave.alone.IMP.PL_1SG.OBJ
‘Like I still have time to have fun? Ti (’man’) leave me alone!’

(70) etudiã zɛd₃… ti ʃpihom fi ʒɔɾti
student also… ti what_with_3PL in footstep_1SG.POSS
‘Another student? Ti (’man’) what’s wrong with them, always following me?’

It seems that when a speaker uses the marker (it could, perhaps, be called an interjection) ti, he wants to express the fact that the current state of affairs is not how things should be: he is unhappy with what is taking place. This suggests conceptual content: the speaker is not, as in the case of the previous four markers, giving procedural instructions to his hearer, but is rather expressing to her in a strong way his displeasure with the situation.

Yet ti does seem to have other procedural functions as well. It also instructs a hearer not to accept the current situation just as the speaker has not accepted it, and may call her to give an explanation for why things are the way they are. The speaker, then, is giving the following instructions: “Do not accept that what I am speaking about
is normal” and “Be prepared to give an account of this situation.” Evidence for this point can be seen from the fact that *ti* often occurs in clauses with imperative verbs. The speaker is calling the hearer to explain what is going on and to make a change. Example (71) shows how *ti* can be used with an imperative, as speaker B uses the marker in conjunction with the imperative ‘tell’:

(71) A: *filhæqiq3 mejismfaj mlih*
    in_DET_truth hear.3SG_NEG well
B:  *ti qli straf qNheli bisrıraha*
    *ti* say.IMP_to_1SG deaf say.IMP_3SGF.OBJ_to_1SG in_DET_honesty

‘A: “To tell you the truth, he doesn’t hear well.”
B: “*Ti (‘man’)* tell me he’s deaf, tell it to me honestly.”’

I must make a note here about interjections and their role in syntax and pragmatics. It appears reasonable to consider *ti* (and, as I will show below, ‘*ad*’) an interjection. But I have considered it an interjection with procedural content (in that it instructs the hearer to give an account of the situation and change it in some way), and as Wharton (2009:88) says, if an interjection carries “speech-act or propositional-attitude information,” that is, procedural content, then it could be considered a discourse marker. The only difference between an interjection and a standard discourse marker would be that the interjection lacks the typical “syntactic integration” of normal discourse markers. Therefore, although *ti* could be analyzed as an interjection and despite its fringe position in terms of syntactic roles, it seems reasonable to analyze it as a discourse marker. The fact that, as I have shown, *ti* contains both conceptual and procedural content seems to justify its analysis as a discourse marker.

As I mentioned in section 3.4.2, it is perfectly viable for a marker to contain both conceptual and procedural content, while still being considered the same lexeme. (Wilson 2011:17) The marker *ti*, with its close associations with the second personal pronoun, contains conceptual content in the form of anger and dissatisfaction, and
procedural content which instructs the hearer to give an account of the situation and make a change. *Ti*, thus, has an important argumentative or persuasive function in discourse. It tells the reader: “Recognize my dissatisfaction; make it your own; give account for the situation; and do something about it.”

### 4.5.3 Culture and Argumentation Norms

It may be helpful to include here as well a short explanation of argumentation norms in Tunisian culture. It is much more acceptable and culturally appropriate for a Tunisian than for a Westerner to express emotion and show passion or force when discussing an issue with someone. These expressions are a necessary way to show one’s concern for the issue being discussed and conviction that his opinion is correct. Thus, the markers *ti* and ‘*ad (see 4.6 below), which both express anger and frustration in an argumentative context, may occur more frequently in discourse than their equivalents (if those exist) in English, for example. The following excerpt, in which one friend (A) gets angry with another (B) for getting involved in his personal business, but then wants to know who it is who is trying to steal his girlfriend, shows some of the conversational norms at play:

---

60
(72) A: beți sar eʃkun tæhki ja beți beți
Beji happen.3SGPST who speak.2SG oh Beji Beji

B: w3lahi haqni mengɔlɑf
by_God right_1SG.POSS say.1SG_to_2SG_NEG

A: ti jɪzi ᵁad beți ti mustenus teʒoð ʕalijə enti ti
ti enough ‘ad Beji ti used.to take.seriously.2SG on.1SG 2SG ti
 qaɬi ʕale eʃkun tæhki ja beți
tell.2SG_to.1SG about who speak.2SG oh Beji

B: ʕale iliʔetudiɑ ilɛ ɪtɾwɔziɛm
about DET_student of DET_third

A: eʃnuɜ etudiɑ zedɔ uuu ja rsbi ti ʃpihom fiʒɔɾti
what student also ooh oh Lord ti what.with.3PL in_footstep.1SG.POSS
 ken jɪtlɛu bəqɾajɪthom ɣiɾlɛm
if take.care.3PL of_studies.3PL.POSS better_for.3PL

‘A: “Beji, so who are you talking about, Beji? Beji?”

B: “By God, I shouldn’t tell you.”

A: “Ti enough ‘ad, Beji, ti are you used to taking me seriously? Ti tell me who it is
you’re talking about, Beji.”

B: “About the student from the third floor.”

A: “What, a student too? Ooh, God, what’s with them, always following me, if they
focused on their studies, it’d be better for them.””

Uses of ti and ‘ad (see below), begging, and showing emotion are evident in this
element. Cultural norms of argumentation largely determine the surface structure of
conversations, and certain discourse markers play an important role in the process of
argumentation.
4.6 The Discourse Marker ‘Ad

4.6.1 The Syntactic Role of ‘Ad

I will now analyze the marker ‘ad, following the same pattern as I did with ti. ‘Ad may occur either in a clause-initial (as in example (73) or clause-final (example (74) position:

(73) ṣad qɔlti miluωl ili enti theb telqa hæl
‘ad say.2SG.PST_to_1SG from_DET_beginning that 2SG want.2SG find.2SG solution
lḥmɛtik
for_mother.in.law.2SG.POSS
‘Ad you should have told me from the beginning that you want to find a solution
for your mother-in-law (problem).’

(74) rod bɛlɪk yarʒʕulik ṣad
be.careful return.3PL_to_2SG ‘ad
‘Watch out that they don’t return to you ‘ad.’

Yet it may not appear inside a clause nucleus. Example (75, a synthetic utterance based on example (74, is ungrammatical because ‘ad occurs inside the clause nucleus:

(75) *** rod bɛlɪk ṣad yarʒʕulik
be.careful ‘ad return.3PL_to_2SG
‘Watch out ‘ad they that don’t return to you.’

4.6.2 The Pragmatic Role of Ti: Conceptual and Procedural Content

Like ti, ‘ad contains conceptual value as well as procedural value. It expresses anger or frustration, as in the following example:

(76) Ti jizi ṣad begi ti mustens teχoð ṣalija enti
ti enough ‘ad Beji ti used.to take.seriously.2SG on_1SG 2SG
‘Ti that’s enough ‘ad (‘come on”) Beji ti are you used to taking me seriously?’
The speaker, who wants his addressee to give him a piece of information, wants to indicate that “things are not as they should be.”

More evidence for ‘ad’s conceptual content of anger is a few idiomatic phrases which use ‘ad:

(77) le ʕad
    no ‘ad

(78) jizi ʕad
    enough ‘ad

Both of these express frustration and anger. They tell a hearer that a situation, or more commonly, what has just been said, is unacceptable and should be stopped somehow.

But ‘ad also has another use which seems quite distinct from the function I described above. It may indicate a return to main-line events in a narrative (or perhaps description or argumentation). In this case, ‘ad indicates to the hearer that what has come before was only supporting information to the main-line narrative or argument. See example (79, in which the speaker is describing the cowardly nature of chickens, and then returns to the main point of what he is saying: that farmers must therefore always watch out for snakes and other predators.

(79) təɾʕabu  u  meSatʃ  ibiðu  ki  ilʕadə
    shake.3PL and  no.longer  give.eggs.3PL  as  DET_normal
ʕad  telqa  ɪlmuɾɜbi  dimə  iɾod  belu  u  jʕɜs
‘ad  find.2SG  DET_farmer  always  be.careful.3SG  and  guard.3SG
‘… they shake and no longer give eggs like usual. ‘Ad (‘come on’) you find that the farmer must always be on guard.’

In this case, then, ‘ad serves to background previous information and indicate to a hearer that what follows is much more salient to the discourse. Therefore, this sense of ‘ad will almost always occur at clear discourse breaks.

I have said then, that ‘ad expresses frustration and anger towards a situation, and also indicates a return to a main-line narrative or argument. So what is the essential
sense of ‘ad? It seems that a speaker uses ‘ad to tell his hearer: “Move on to what is important.” That is, “What I or you have been discussing is not the contextual implication which should be drawn and is at best a strengthener. It’s time to move on to the important things we need to talk about.” Thus, if ‘ad is used in its more clearly conceptual sense, expressing anger or frustration, the speaker is telling the hearer to turn away from perceived peripheral actions or statements, and to move on to serious or salient matters. When ‘ad is used in its more procedural sense in descriptions or argumentations, it indicates to the hearer that what the speaker had been talking about is only strengthening material for the more important implications which he has now returned to.

‘ad, then, has important ramifications for argumentation and persuasion in discourse in Tunisian Arabic. It is a relatively strong marker with a clear persuasive function. In both its conceptual and procedural forms it instructs hearers to eliminate assumptions of relevance about preceding material and return to information of higher relevance. As such, it may sometimes function like the English phrase ‘come on,’ and, in fact, the word itself comes from the MSA word ‘to return.’

4.7 Conclusion

I have thus attempted to provide an analysis of each discourse marker according to its syntactic and pragmatic roles. While much remains to be studied on each of these words, I hope that the preceding analysis can be a starting point for further research.

\[10\] For further data, see the appendices, in which three charted texts have been included.
into the procedural and argumentative functions of each of the six markers in Tunisian Arabic.
CHAPTER 5

What, then, have I proposed in this study? First of all, I have attempted to utilize the advantages of both a local-cohesion syntactic model and a relevance theory pragmatic model. Focusing on local cohesion and on syntactic roles in general gives the researcher an opportunity to work with observable phenomena and make as objective an analysis as possible. Relevance theory, on the other hand takes those observable phenomena and analyzes them from a pragmatic framework, identifying how discourse features operate in terms of expectations of relevance. Thus, my analytical method has utilized numerous theories and forms of analysis, but I hope it has proved effective. It is certainly useful, through syntactic analysis of the local coherence functions of discourse markers, to work with empirical, observable data on which to base an analysis.

In the course of analysis, I have found a number of interesting discourse phenomena. The fact that raho and mau take conceptual content from subject NPs in certain clauses (that is, they inflect according to the subject), for example, is rather unique. In addition, raho is especially distinctive in that it may function as an evidential marker which takes conceptual content. The distinction between the types of conclusions indicated by yekhi and mela is instructive; and the procedural and conceptual content carried by ti and ‘ad give further evidence for Blakemore’s idea that markers may carry both types of content. In addition, the impact of a culture’s argumentation or conversational norms on observable discourse phenomena is an important consideration.
What avenues of further research does this study point to? First of all, there are a number of other discourse markers in Tunisian Arabic which have not been studied and need to be analyzed in a similar fashion. In addition, little research has been done on discourse features in Tunisian Arabic in general. I hope to further study the discourse of Tunisian Arabic and look at other important phenomena, including participant reference and verb aspect and serial verbs, based on the charts I have already compiled. With regard to discourse studies in general, the analysis I have presented in this paper encourages further research on markers which contain procedural and conceptual content. Of special interest may be more cross-linguistic studies which indicate whether my analysis of raho as an evidential marker which may take conceptual information from a subject noun phrase is reasonable.

It is my hope and prayer that this study has provided useful data which will further cross-linguistic research on discourse markers and their role in utterance creation and interpretation. At the very least, it has served to help balance what Blakemore calls the “the over-dependence of discourse marker research on English.” (Blakemore 2002:2) I also hope that the analysis I have provided will encourage better understanding of the discourse features and syntax of Tunisian Arabic, spur other researchers on to studying the language, and encourage Tunisians to see the intrinsic value of their native language.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Unger, Christoph (2007) Epistemic vigilance and the function of procedural indicators in communication and comprehension.


APPENDICES

The following appendices are three texts from the thirty-two (32) discourses which I charted. The first two charts, examples of the discourse charts I wrote for each of the 32 texts, are written in Arabic script and IPA, glossed and translated. I have assumed SVO word order. Pre-posed or post-posed nuclear elements from the clause have been marked with a bold border around the cell. Discourse markers analyzed in this study have been highlighted, each with a different color. The final chart, number (3), is an example of what a relevance theory chart would look like. The explicatures, assumptions, and cognitive effects of each utterance in the discourse are outlined. The charts in (2) and (3) come from the same text.
So you told me sir

the first time you spoke with your father in all honesty you were seventeen years old

I isn't it like that

yes

OK, there we are

so at the peak of adolescence

I went directly to him and told him the truth about him to his face
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sent #</th>
<th>He stared me down He said to me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>so his face changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>He stared me down He said to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>that's my repayment from you after all I taught you after all I fed you after all I clothed you after all, after all...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Listen, mister youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>please 3SG.PST 2SG.OBJ NEG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outside | Inside | 0 | 1 | S | Focus | PoD Connective | Sent # |
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<tbody>
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<td>Inside</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Focus</td>
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<tr>
<td>you don't like it there's the door</td>
<td>شئ</td>
<td>nei</td>
<td>Anything</td>
<td>ولت</td>
<td>focus</td>
<td>null</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couldn't do) anything</td>
<td>حصول بش تراجع</td>
<td>قدما</td>
<td>الحرف</td>
<td>qad</td>
<td>me</td>
<td>null</td>
<td>null</td>
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<tr>
<td>matter how much I tried to go back on the words</td>
<td>لغة باللغة</td>
<td>التي</td>
<td>كنت</td>
<td>كن</td>
<td>if</td>
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<td>null</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* if you could tell me sir about the first romantic relationship you made

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<td>اول علاقة</td>
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<td>ناسك</td>
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<td>PART</td>
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<tr>
<td>a relationship</td>
<td>لا تعرف</td>
<td>عنها</td>
<td>عرفت</td>
<td>الم</td>
<td>عنك</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>null</td>
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<tr>
<td>a relationship</td>
<td>اول علاقة</td>
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<td>ناسك</td>
<td>كان</td>
<td>if</td>
<td>PART</td>
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<td>19</td>
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* kept her, you know
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| fsrira | m'Gaha | 20 |  | | | | 
| in DET Serious | with 3SGF | want.1SG.PST enter.1SG | AND |  | | | 

and I wanted to enter into a serious relationship with her.

and build the marriage nest

and go into the golden cage

oh really? You like birds?

do you hatch, too

doctor, what does that have to do with that

no

that does have to do with that

what

we're here trying to identify the issue
<table>
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<th>Inside</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>PoD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I understand, I understand</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>no no</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>not</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>come.3SGF.PST</td>
<td>DET_story</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it came about naturally</td>
<td>by DET_nature_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>come.3SGF.PST</td>
<td>DET_story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so one day I said it to her face</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>say.1SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I said to her</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>say.1SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listen, daughter of people</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>say.1SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it's true that you are just average-looking</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>say.1SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but I like you because of your morals</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>by DET_necessity</td>
<td>say.1SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>PoD Connective</td>
<td>Sent #</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and also your mind is clean</td>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in face_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>DET_words DEM</td>
<td>say.2SG.PST_to_3SGF</td>
<td>PART</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translation:**

What was her reaction after you said those sweet words to her face?
Outside Inside Q V S Focus PoD Connective Sent #

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لا</th>
<th>le</th>
<th>no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>normal</th>
<th>waqtha</th>
<th>hejja</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>normal</td>
<td>time_3SGF.POSS</td>
<td>3SG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

she was fine at the time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رد فعل أسرة شويبة</th>
<th>kmr</th>
<th>ems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reaction has a little</td>
<td>be_3SG.PST to_3SG</td>
<td>brother_3SGF.POSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but her brother, he had a harsh reaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>للمهمة للمهمة</th>
<th>ت</th>
<th>ای</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>understand.1SG.PST.2SG.OBJ understand.1SG.PST.2SG.OBJ</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

yes, I understand, I understand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لا</th>
<th>le</th>
<th>no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>سلامة</td>
<td>it</td>
<td>ems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on_1PL</td>
<td>not</td>
<td>but</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but what's that to us

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>بينك وبينهم</th>
<th>دكتر</th>
<th>صديق</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>between_2SG and between_3PL</td>
<td>doctor</td>
<td>friends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and your friends, what was the relationship between you and them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لبناك ودلي</th>
<th>mdkn</th>
<th>and</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mdkn</td>
<td>mdkn</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I didn't have friends doctor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لم</th>
<th>ول</th>
<th>ول</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>did not have</td>
<td>نقل</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

yes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لم</th>
<th>ول</th>
<th>ول</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>didn't have</td>
<td>نقل</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

why else did I come to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لم</th>
<th>ول</th>
<th>ول</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>didn't come</td>
<td>نقل</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

على حقيقة

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لم</th>
<th>ول</th>
<th>ول</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>اتي</td>
<td>نقل</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in face_3SG.POSS on truth_3SG.POSS say.1SG.to_3SG
I see

and we sit and shoot the breeze like that and in your subconscious, he replaces your father

now, you’ll find that uncle Ajmi that barber is an old man, he is

and in your subconscious, he replaces your father
Outside

between_2SG AND between_3SG

DET_break happen3SG.PST

which father_2SG.POSS

your father, the one that a break happened between you and him

I see

Come on, say deaf

tell me honestly

you know, sir,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>PoS/Connective</th>
<th>Sent #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sfna</td>
<td>what</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>ممکن</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*what your problem is*

*your problem is you don’t know how to lie*

*and most people must...*

*and this you must know well!*

*most people don’t want to listen to the truth especially the truth that concerns them*

*it’s not that I don’t know, doctor*
Outside | Inside | O | V | S | Focus | PoD Connective | Sent #
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---

it's something stronger than I am

** ***

what does that mean

什么那意味着

** ***

now we've begun to grab the string that will take us

now we've begun to grab the string that will take us...
I now have another problem

It's not enough that the one who passes by me tell him the truth about him to his face

And also I'm not sure that that is the truth?
Once I parked my car on the street across from Champion.

And I got out to shop

Of course I paid the cost of parking

I put the receipt on top of the dashboard

And went in

Your brother (I) was at peace, not worried about the little car.
I finished my shopping and left to put (what I had bought) in the car and head towards home.

My wife was waiting for what I had bought and that day we had guests (coming).

I came, looking for the car.

I didn’t find it.

I doubted the place.

I went.

I returned.
I asked

someone until when

I said to him

yes

He said to me

saw them towing it
When I went to them I found the car

I put what I had bought with a store on the street; may God have mercy on the parents of the owner And I went to the towing garage under Champion to see what had happened

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer</th>
<th>Inner</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>PoD</th>
<th>Connective</th>
<th>Sent #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with small store in DET.street parking.pos</td>
<td>DET.shopping.goods</td>
<td>put.1SG.PST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and have mercy on parents.of.3SG</td>
<td>in.order.to DET.situation see.1SG</td>
<td>in.order.to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the towed garage under Champion</td>
<td>go.1SG.PST</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When I went to them I found the car

I asked them about the reason for its towing

They said to me
You're going to pay a fine because you haven't paid the cost of parking.

I said to them, they didn't want to listen.

I didn't give up with them.

Wont pay the fine unless we check.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer</th>
<th>Inner</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>PoD</th>
<th>Connective</th>
<th>Sent #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to DET car</td>
<td>with_1Sg</td>
<td>go.3PL.PST</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

God guided them And they went with me to the car

I looked on top of the dashboard

I didn't find anything

Where did the receipt go?

I opened the door of the car

I found it fallen in front of my seat

At first they wouldn't give in You're going to pay the fine

And after a manager of theirs came
**told him the story** and **he intervened** May God have mercy on his parents.

And they let me go.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer</th>
<th>Inner</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>PoD</th>
<th>Connective</th>
<th>Sent #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>عائلة</td>
<td>حكايته</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Det.story</td>
<td>Tell.1SG.PST_to_3SG</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ودخل</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>و</td>
<td>intervene.3SG.PST</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والده</td>
<td>يرحم</td>
<td>الله</td>
<td>parents_3SG.POSS</td>
<td>have.mercy.3SG</td>
<td>God</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>و</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سبيوني</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>saibuni</td>
<td></td>
<td>AND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterance</td>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once I parked my car on the street across from Champion.</td>
<td>At one point in time in the past the speaker parked his car across from the Champion store in downtown Tunis</td>
<td>1CA: The store he is speaking about is the one in downtown Tunis, not another one of the same stores somewhere else in the city or country. 2CA: The car he is speaking about is his taxi, as the speaker is a taxi driver.</td>
<td>These two sentences set up the scene and strengthen what is to come</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And I got out to shop</td>
<td>The speaker then got out of his car and went to shop in Champion.</td>
<td>1CA: The speaker shopped in Champion, as he mentioned the store in the previous sentence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of course I paid the cost of parking</td>
<td>The speaker paid the parking charge at the machine.</td>
<td>1CA: The script of paying for parking is activated: paying at a machine, getting your ticket and putting it on the dashboard, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I put the receipt on top of the dashboard</td>
<td>The speaker took the receipt from the parking machine and put it on the dashboard of his car (so that it could be seen by the inspectors).</td>
<td>1CA: The speaker did what he was supposed to according to the cultural script of paying for parking: everything is in order.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And went in</td>
<td>The speaker went into the Champion store.</td>
<td>1CA: Again, the assumption is that the speaker went to shop in Champion, not somewhere else.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your brother (I) was at peace, not worried about the little car.</td>
<td>The speaker was not worried at all about his car, and thought nothing of it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I finished my shopping And left to put (what I had bought) in the car and head towards home</td>
<td>The speaker finished shopping in Champion and brought his items to put them in the car and go home.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My wife was waiting for what I had bought And that day we had guests (coming)</td>
<td>The speaker’s wife needed the items he had bought in Champion, because she needed to make dinner for guests who were coming to their house that night.</td>
<td>1CA: The cultural script of hosting is activated, including serving dinner and the role of the wife in cooking dinner. 2A: The hearer assumes that the speaker is in a hurry, as his wife is waiting for him.</td>
<td>intensification of the importance of the actions: again raises expectations of relevance for what is to come: some kind of conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I came, looking for the car</td>
<td>The speaker came to where his car should have been and looked for it.</td>
<td>1CA: The orientation of the discourse is in the street outside of the store, where the car should be (“I came” rather than “I went”)</td>
<td>Orienting this section of the discourse around the car’s position also raises expectations of relevance for the hearer regarding the car’s salience of the story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Text #3: The Towed Taxi, Relevance Theory Chart
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Utterance</th>
<th>Explicature</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>I didn’t find it</td>
<td>The speaker did not find his car.</td>
<td>The speaker should find this information to be highly relevant: all other information has strengthened this event and led up to it.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The “choppiness” of the narrative here is typical of peaks in the discourse: fast action without additional information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I doubted the place</td>
<td>The speaker began to doubt that he had come to the right place.</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICA: The speaker went to another street to see if he could find his car; he didn’t just go off somewhere.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>I went</td>
<td>He went somewhere else to look for his car.</td>
<td>1CA: The speaker did not find his car in the other street, and so came back to the same place.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I returned</td>
<td>He didn’t find it, and returned to the same place.</td>
<td>1CA: The speaker did not find his car in the other street, and so came back to the same place.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>I asked</td>
<td>He began to ask people on the street if they had seen his car.</td>
<td>1CA: The speaker found people nearby where he thought left his car and asked them if they had seen it; he didn’t ask random people random questions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>until someone said to me</td>
<td>Finally, after he had asked a number of people, someone said to him</td>
<td>ICA: This went on for some time until someone had relevant information for him</td>
<td>The specificity of this utterance raises expectations of relevance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>So it was a taxi?</td>
<td>Is the car you’re looking for a taxi?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>I said to him</td>
<td>The speaker said to this man</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Yes, it was a taxi.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>He said to me</td>
<td>The man said to him</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>I saw them towing it</td>
<td>I saw the towers tow a taxi away.</td>
<td>ICA: The cultural script of towing is activated: who does it, where the car is taken, how you get the car back, etc.</td>
<td>Expectations of relevance in 15 are met here: here is the implication of what is strengthened in 15.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>I put what I had bought with a store on the street; may God have mercy on the parents of the owner And I went to the towing garage under Champion to see what had happened</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICA: The cultural script of “amen”, or an entrustment, is activated: store owner keeps items for speaker.</td>
<td></td>
<td>These actions are the result of 20 and strengthen the actions to come.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>When I went to them I found the car</td>
<td>When the speaker went to the workers at the towing garage, he found his car at the garage.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The rapidity of this action indicates that finding the car is not the most relevant occurrence in the story: hearer looks for relevance elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>I asked them about the reason for its towing</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICA: The speaker knew of no reason why his car should have been towed: he had paid the parking fee. So he wanted to be given a reason for the towing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Utterance</td>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>They said to me</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICA: more of the cultural script for towing activated: requirement to pay fine for towing</td>
<td>This brings up a contextual weakening or contrast to the hearer: hasn't the speaker paid the fee? It is this conflict of assumptions: that he has paid, and that he has not paid, which creates the conflict in the story and moves the discourse along.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>You're going to pay a fine Because you haven't paid the cost of parking</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICA: The ticket had somehow fallen. 2CA: The speaker in fact did pay the parking fee and is in the right.</td>
<td>Important contextual implication: we now have a resolution to the contrast and have found out what happened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>I said to them</td>
<td>I said to the parking garage employees</td>
<td></td>
<td>Speaker reiterates the contextual contrast: there are two conflicting ideas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>I paid</td>
<td>I paid the parking fee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>They didn't want to listen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>I didn't give up with them</td>
<td>I continued to argue with them and didn't give in.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>I won't pay the fine unless we check</td>
<td>I said to them that I will not pay the fine unless we check my car for the ticket and do not find it</td>
<td>ICA: Speaker has a right to prove his innocence</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>God guided them and they went with me to the car</td>
<td>I am in the right, and God calmed them down and showed them that, and they went with me to check for the ticket in the car.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Raises expectations that a contextual implicatoin is coming: growing conflict through contrast/weakening.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I looked on top of the dashboard.</td>
<td>I looked for the ticket on top of the dashboard where speaker left it.</td>
<td>ICA: ticket should be on top of the dashboard where speaker left it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>I didn't find anything</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual contrast strengthened: is speaker wrong?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Where did the receipt go?</td>
<td>I asked myself, where did the receipt go?</td>
<td>ICA: Speaker holds on to his innocence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>I opened the door of the car</td>
<td></td>
<td>Raising expectations of relevance again: what will happen?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>I found it fallen in front of the seat</td>
<td>I found the ticket. It had fallen in front of the seat</td>
<td>1CA: The ticket had somehow fallen. 2CA: The speaker in fact did pay the parking fee and is in the right.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>At first they wouldn't give in You're going to pay the fine</td>
<td>The employees still didn't want to let him go without paying the fine.</td>
<td>1CA: They felt that it was not their fault the ticket was not on the dashboard, and that the speaker should still pay.</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>And after a manager of theirs came</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unexpected continuing contrast leading to more conflict.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>I told him the story And he interve ned May God have mercy on his parents</td>
<td>I told him about what happened with my car, and he decided that I did not have to pay. I'm very thankful to him</td>
<td>1CA: manager has power to overrule his subordinates 2CA: the speaker did not have to pay.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>And they let me go</td>
<td>They allowed me to take my car and go</td>
<td>Final contextual implication: they let me go, the contrast was resolved.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>