2000

War and Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV: A Historical Study and Annotated Bibliography Volume II

William Anthony Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
https://commons.und.edu/theses/955

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact zeinebyousif@library.und.edu.
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV:
A HISTORICAL STUDY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
VOLUME I

by

William Anthony Young
Master of Arts, University of North Dakota, 1993
Master of Arts, University of Southern California, 1985
Bachelor of Arts, University of the State of New York, 1990
Bachelor of Science, University of Maryland, 1982

A Research Project
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
December 2000
This research project, submitted by William Anthony Young in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

[Signatures]

This research project meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

[Signatures]

Dean of the Graduate School
PERMISSION

Title: War and Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV: A Historical Study and Annotated Bibliography

Department: History

Degree: Doctor of Arts

In presenting this research project in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my research project, or in his absence, by the Chairperson of the department of the Dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this research project or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my research project.

Signature  William Young
Date  16 October 2000
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................. viii

ABSTRACT. ................................................................. xii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

CHAPTER I - GENERAL STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL HISTORY, 1648-1715/21 ........................................ 7
  1.1. European Diplomatic Relations .............................. 12
  1.2. French Studies ...................................................... 22
  1.3. English Studies ................................................... 32
  1.4. Dutch Studies ........................................................ 37
  1.5. Spanish Studies .................................................. 41
  1.6. Austria and the German States ......................... 42
  1.7. The Baltic and East Europe .............................. 47

CHAPTER II - THE ART OF DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE
OF LOUIS XIV ................................................................. 52

CHAPTER III - WARFARE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV .......... 95
  3.1. General Studies ................................................... 103
  3.2. French Military Power ......................................... 117
  3.3. The English Army and Navy ............................. 147
  3.4. Dutch Naval Power ............................................. 162
  3.5. Military Powers of Northern and Eastern Europe .... 170

CHAPTER IV - FRENCH EXPANSIONISM AND THE WARS
AGAINST SPAIN AND THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1648-1678 .... 182
  4.1. French Foreign Policy .......................................... 194
  4.2. The Spanish Question ........................................ 221
  4.3. John de Witt, William III of Orange, and the Dutch
       Republic .............................................................. 230
CHAPTER V - ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CROMWELL AND CHARLES II, 1649-1685 ........................................... 243
5.1. General Studies in English Foreign Policy, 1649-85 ....... 255
5.2. English Diplomacy in the Era of Cromwell, 1649-59 ....... 262
5.3. The Foreign Policy of Charles II, 1660-85 ..................... 277

CHAPTER VI - FRENCH AGGRESSION, THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE, AND THE NINE YEARS' WAR, 1678-1697 ................................................. 303
6.1. French Foreign Policy, 1678-1697 ................................. 330
6.2. English Foreign Policy under James II, 1685-1688 ........... 365
6.3. The Maritime Powers to 1697 ....................................... 371
6.4. James II, the Irish War, and the Jacobite Threat to England, 1689-97 ......................................................... 401
6.5. Victor Amadeus II, the Savoyard Alliance, and Spanish Italy ................................................................. 406
6.6. Leopold I, the German States, and the Contest with Turkey and France ......................................................... 416

7.1. Reference Works on the War of the Spanish Succession ............................................................... 478
7.2. The Partition Treaties and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1697-1701 .............. 480
7.3. French Foreign Policy, 1697-1715 ................................. 488
7.4. Foreign Policy of the Maritime Powers, 1697-1713 .......... 501
7.5. Austrian Policy under Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI, 1697-1714 ............................................... 542
7.6. The Minor Powers and the Grand Alliance, 1697-1714 ............................................................... 549
7.7. The War of the Spanish Succession - General Military Studies ............................................................. 564
7.8. The Conflict in the Low Countries and Germany .......... 568
7.9. The Conflict in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula .............. 584
7.10. The Peace of Utrecht and Rastatt ................................. 599

CHAPTER VIII - THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE BALTIC AND THE TURKISH THREAT IN EASTERN EUROPE, 1648-1721 ........................................ 606
8.1. The Decline of Poland-Lithuania ..................................... 661
8.2. Sweden, Denmark, and the Baltic ................................. 671
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This bibliographical study was accomplished as a research project for a doctorate in history at the University of North Dakota. Under the guidance of Professor Playford V. Thorson, Jr., I collected and read the works of other historians as well as prepared a brief analysis of each study. My interest in the Age of Louis XIV was kindled by the opportunity to study international political relations and warfare as well as serving as a military historian for the United States Air Force while living for thirteen years in Germany, England, and The Netherlands. My time in Europe allowed me to travel throughout much of western Europe, to visit most of the major capital cities, palaces, fortresses, and battlegrounds associated with the era of the Sun King.

A research project like this obviously has little originality. I am indebted to the numerous historians whose works are reviewed in this study. I am also grateful for the outstanding support of Professor Thorson in the preparation of this study. He provided guidance, constructive criticism, and friendship. Special appreciation goes to Professors Gordon L. Iseminger, C. Edmund Clingan, James F. Vivian, and David G. Rowley who read the manuscript and provided useful ideas and corrections. Moreover, reading courses directed by
Professors Thorson, Rowley, and Thomas Howard allowed me to examine many studies cited in this bibliographical study. The interlibrary loan staff at the Chester Fritz Library aided in my search for books, journal articles, and dissertations. I especially want to thank Carla Hemberger, Cynthia Iverson, Mary Morley, Mayumi MacGregor, Kerry Hackett, and Dee Ann Bilben. My study was also assisted by the Montgomery G.I. Bill as well as a Neil C. Macdonald Scholarship in 1997-98. In addition, I want to thank Professors Sidney Brown, James Herzog, Richard Langhorne, Richard O. Collin, Bruno Lerner, Ronald C. Finucane, George I.R. McMahon, William M. Winter, Walter Ellis, Jarrell C. Jackman, Robert F. Erickson, Herbert H. Rosenthal, D. Jerome Tweton, Stanley Murray, Albert I. Berger, Gerald Lawrence, Frederick A. Kremple, Marcus von Wellnitz, Michael Hill, Therese B. Weiss, Carole E. Adams, and Anthony M.C. Mooney for their instruction in history over the years. I also want to thank Paul J. Rose, Kurt Glaser, Michael Banks, Robert McGeehan, A.J.R. Groom, Margot Light, Randolph Kent, Marc Trachtenburg, and Stewart Pyke for their instruction in international political relations.

In addition, I had the support of the United States Air Force History and Museum Program. Robert T. Cossaboom and John Leland of Headquarters Air Mobility Command provided vital support for my doctoral studies. I am also grateful to Grant Hales, Vincent Breslin, Christopher Reineck, Charles Arnold, Dennis Pitts, Richard H. Kohn, William E. Stevens, Patrick Murray, Gerald
Wright, Roger Miller, Thomas Schott, Robert Beggs, and Billy K. Harris for their encouragement.

My family and close friends played a major role in the completion of this research project. My wife, Patricia D. Young, avidly supported my studies and the preparation of this paper. Our four children, Mark E. Young, William A. Young, Jr., Geoffrey A. Young, and Heather A. Young lost irreplaceable quality time with their father who was buried in books and journal articles. My parents, Kenneth J. Young and Marilyn M. Young, as well as my parents-in-law, John D. Groves and Janet A. Williams, provided encouragement. The reassurance of Mark E. Massen, Stan Greicar, Philip O'Brien, as well as Caroline and Vincent Sheppard also proved motivational. After the flood of April 1997, Linda and Cecil Tinderholt of Northwood gave much appreciated shelter and support to the author and his family. However, this work is dedicated to my wife, who has weathered nearly two decades of my historical studies, travels, and book buying. My debt to her can never be repaid.

William Anthony Young
Grand Forks, North Dakota
August 1999
For

Patricia Diana Young
ABSTRACT

In the last forty years historians have produced numerous books and articles on European diplomatic relations and military affairs during the era of Louis XIV. However, there exists no up-to-date annotated bibliography listing and describing these works or older, but valuable studies. The latest annotated bibliography to appear regarding early modern history is Hugh Dunthorne and Hamish M. Scott, Early Modern European History c. 1492-1789 (London: Historical Association, 1983) which devotes less than six pages to international relations and warfare. John Roach’s A Bibliography of Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) also contains little on war and diplomacy and fails to provide anything more than a list of books. In addition, the most recent edition of The American Historical Association’s Guide to Historical Literature (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) contains only a highly select listing of works on European war and diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV. William Calvin Dickinson and Eloise R. Hitchcock’s The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1713: A Selected Bibliography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) is valuable, but it concentrates on only one aspect of the Wars of Louis XIV.
The following research project is an annotated bibliography of studies concerning war and diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV. The bibliography contains eight chapters concentrating on different aspects, including general studies in international political history, 1648-1715/21; the art of diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV; warfare in the Age of Louis XIV; French expansionism and the wars against Spain and the Dutch Republic, 1648-1678; English foreign policy under Cromwell and Charles II, 1649-1685; the formation of the Grand Alliance and the Nine Years' War, 1678-1697; the First and Second Partition Treaties and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1698-1714; as well as the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic and the Turkish threat to Europe, 1648-1721. The bibliography reviews over 500 works including books, journal articles, and theses published in English. The beginning of each chapter includes a short narrative of the topic considered before listing the annotated citations. The citations include a brief review of each work. The bibliography also cross references studies between chapters as well as contains an index of authors cited.

This bibliography serves as a valuable research tool for history teachers, graduate students, researchers, and specialists.
INTRODUCTION

Diplomatic history, especially of early modern Europe, has been out of fashion in the last half of the twentieth century. This is surprising since foreign policy was the principal concern of rulers and statesmen in the late seventeenth century, and the wars which resulted were important influences on the evolution of government and the development of society.\(^1\) The Age of Louis XIV is known for the rise of modern diplomacy, dynastic struggles, creation of standing armies, and numerous wars. The era’s great wars include the Franco-Spanish Wars (1635-59, 1667-68, 1683-84), Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-54, 1672-74, 1688-97), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13).\(^2\)

1665-67, 1672-74), Dutch War (1672-78),² Nine Years’ War (1688-97),³ Irish War (1689-91),⁴ and War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13/14) in the west; the Thirteen Years’ War between Poland and Russia (1654-67), First Northern War (1655-60),⁵ and Great Northern War (1700-21) in the north and northeast; as well as the Venetian-Turkish Wars (1645-70, 1684-99), Habsburg-Ottoman struggle for Hungary (1663-64, 1683-99),⁶ Polish-Turkish Wars (1671-76, 1683-99), and Russo-Turkish Wars (1677-81, 1686-1700, 1710-13) in the southeast.⁷

²Some historians call this conflict the War of the First Coalition against Louis XIV.

³Historians also refer to the Nine Year’s War as the War of the League of Augsburg, War of the First Grand Alliance, King William’s War, War of the Palatinate Succession, War of Orléans, and as part of the First World War (1683-99). More recently, John Childs has called the conflict the War for the English Succession (John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries [Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991], 5, 26).

⁴Historians also refer to this conflict as the Williamite War and Jacobite War.

⁵This conflict is also referred to as the War of the North, Nordic War, the Deluge, and the Second Northern War by some historians.

⁶The second conflict is known as the War of the Holy League. The German Empire allied with Poland (1683) and Venice (1684) and had the financial support from the Papacy to fight the Turks. Poland and Russia allied against the Turks in 1686.

There have been few comprehensive bibliographies listing studies in English pertaining to the war and diplomacy of this period during recent years. Many available bibliographical essays suffer from their concentration on France and England. Examples include John B. Wolf's bibliographical essay that focuses on the general history of Louis XIV's France, Stephen B. Baxter's regarding the reign of William III, John C. Rule's on the reign of Louis XIV, and Ragnhild M. Hatton's on the Sun King. Only a fraction of these essays are devoted to the study of international political relations and military affairs. Even the bibliography compiled to supplement the New Cambridge Modern History series contains little on war and diplomacy, and fails to provide anything more than a list of books. The latest annotated bibliography to

---


10 Rule, 407-62.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
appear regarding early modern European history by Hugh Dunthorne and Hamish M. Scott devotes less than six out of ninety-two pages to international relations and warfare. And, most recently, the third edition of the annotated bibliography published by the American Historical Association contains only a highly select listing of works on European war and diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV.

In spite of such limited coverage in bibliographies there has been a steady, albeit modest, publication of monographs, articles, and theses regarding war and diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV during the last forty years. Much of this scholarship has been accomplished by Anglo-American historians. This study attempts to provide an up-to-date, annotated bibliography of select studies concerning European diplomacy and conflict during the last half of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. It is intended to serve as an introduction and a research tool for researchers, teachers, and students to the literature available in the English language regarding the history of international political relations during the Age of Louis XIV.

---


This study considers literature on war and diplomacy covering the era from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the death of Louis XIV (1715), with the exception of studies on the Great Northern War that lasted until the Peace of Nystad (1721). The work is divided into eight chapters concentrating on different aspects of war and diplomacy. The first three chapters consist of general studies in international political history as well as the art of diplomacy and warfare. The subsequent chapters concern French expansionism and the wars against Spain and the Dutch Republic, English foreign policy under Cromwell and Charles II, the formation of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV and the Nine Years' War, as well as the First and Second Partition Treaties and the War of the Spanish Succession. Moreover, this study includes a chapter on the Baltic and East Europe, focusing on the decline of Poland-Lithuania as well as the rise of Sweden and Russia during 1648 to 1721.

This select bibliography reviews over 500 works, including books, journal articles, and unpublished dissertations. The beginning of each chapter includes a short narrative of the topic considered before listing the annotated citations. Each citation focuses on the author's thesis or purpose for the study as well as any conclusions. Most of the studies reviewed in this bibliography are based on archival research and published primary sources. Comments are made about those works that were prepared mainly with the use of secondary sources. Remarks are also made of research conducted in languages beyond
French, Latin, English, Dutch, German, and Spanish for each study cited. Moreover, notice is made of works that contain useful maps, appendices, and bibliographies. Finally, this bibliography also includes cross references between chapters as well as an index of authors cited.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL STUDIES
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL HISTORY, 1648-1715/21

In the decades after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the European states system gradually evolved and by the early eighteenth century had become established in its modern form, one in which several leading powers were almost equally matched. France, Britain, and Austria had clearly emerged as Great Powers by 1715, with Russia and Prussia quickly approaching this status while Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden were in decline.

In the century and a half before the Peace of Westphalia, relations between the European powers had been dominated by the apparent attempt of the House of Habsburg to achieve hegemony. The Habsburgs controlled the Spanish Empire, the German Empire, and the Burgundian Circle of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Franche-Comté. With such possessions the Habsburgs held a predominant position in Europe.\(^1\) The only major challenges

to the Habsburg power base came from the Dutch revolt and subsequent Eighty Years' War (1568-1648),² the Turks, and during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), France and Sweden. France, at first diplomatically and then, after 1635, militarily, cooperated with her traditional allies, the Dutch Republic, Denmark, Sweden, and some German states, against Spain and Austria with their German allies.³ Although the war, which was largely fought in Germany, did have its religious side, it was essentially one for and against the power of the Spanish Habsburgs in western Europe and that of their Austrian cousins in the German Empire and their family lands in central Europe. The Thirty Years' War in its final stages proved a massive defeat for the Habsburgs. The senior partner, Spain, had been decisively beaten by the French and the Dutch. With its Catalan, Portuguese, and Neapolitan provinces in revolt, Spain appeared on


the point of collapse. In the east the Emperor Ferdinand III (1637-57) was threatened by the conquest of his own family lands by the French, Swedes, and their German allies. In 1648, all of the combatants, except for France and Spain who continued fighting till 1659, agreed to the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia.

The territorial changes resulting from the Peace of Westphalia were few and limited to the German Empire. Yet the peace was one of the most important in European history, and it has been viewed as opening the modern era of international relations. The peace signaled the end of the long era of Habsburg ascendancy, particularly of the Spanish branch, and the beginning of the predominance of Bourbon France. It established the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Austria as major powers in their own right. Spain, on the other hand, had been defeated and appeared to be disintegrating. With the death of Philip IV of Spain (1621-65), Louis XIV (1643-1715) looked to annex Spanish lands to increase French security along its eastern border. His aggressive policy in the Spanish Netherlands led to the War of Devolution (1667-68), Dutch War (1672-78), and the Franco-Spanish War (1683-84). Such aggression led to the formation of coalitions against France that eventually

---


5The last war is sometimes referred to as the War of the Reunions.
matched the diplomacy and military might of Louis XIV in the Nine Years' War (1688-97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13/14). The Age of Louis XIV, however, contained much diplomatic and military activity not necessarily associated with the struggle against Bourbon France. England and the Dutch Republic fought three wars over commercial rights, Austria and its allies defended Europe against Turkish aggression, and eastern Europe remained a theater of contention throughout most of this era.

There are few general surveys that focus on international political relations during the Age of Louis XIV. Perhaps the best introduction is the first three chapters of Derek McKay and Hamish M. Scott's The Rise of the Great European Powers, 1648-1815 (1.1.9) and John B. Wolf's Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620-1715 (1.1.17). The essays by Ragnhild M. Hatton, War and Peace, 1680-1720 (1.1.5), and Andrew Lossky, "International Relations in Europe" (1.1.8), are extremely valuable. For good general surveys of European history during this era, see Ragnhild M. Hatton's Europe in the Age of Louis XIV (1.1.3), John W. Stoye's Europe Unfolding, 1648-1688 (1.1.14), and John B. Wolf's The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715 (1.1.16). For general discussions on French foreign policy there is Geoffrey R.R. Treasure's Seventeenth Century France (1.2.10), John B. Wolf's Louis XIV (1.2.11), Andrew Lossky's Louis XIV and the French Monarchy (1.2.7),

These five conflicts are commonly referred to as the Wars of Louis XIV.
Gaston Zeller's "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting" (1.2.12). Andrew Lossky's "France in the System off Europe in the Seventeenth Century" (1.2.6), Paul Sonnino's "The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars" (1.2.9), and Jeremy Black's "Louis XIV's Foreign Policy Reassessed" (1.2.1) are important. For England, see James R. Jones' works Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century (1.3.3) and Britain and the World, 1649-1815 (1.3.4). The Dutch Republic is best served by Alice Clare Carter's Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667-1795 (1.4.1) and Jonathan I. Israel's The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (1.4.4). Spanish policy is carefully considered in Robert A. Stradling's Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720 (1.5.2). For the Baltic region, see Jill Lisk's The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic, 1600-1725 (1.7.2) and Stewart P. Oakley's War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790 (1.7.4). Austrian policy and the German states are briefly considered in Charles W. Ingrao's The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815 (1.6.8), Jean Bérenger's A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1273-1700 (1.6.1), and John Gagliardo's Germany under the Old Regime, 1600-1790 (1.6.6).
1.1. European Diplomatic Relations


Professor Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter, examines international relations from 1679 to 1793. This survey focuses on Black's specialty of eighteenth-century diplomatic history. It includes only one chapter consisting of sixty pages of narrative relating to the later half of the Age of Louis XIV. The choice of 1679 instead of 1648 as a starting point is controversial. Discussion focuses on Louis XIV's foreign policy, the Austro-Turkish conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the Great Northern War. The study includes three relevant maps and a brief bibliography. It is a difficult survey for undergraduates and contains very few footnotes.


This work by Professor Charles H. Carter of Tulane University, an expert on the diplomatic history of early modern Europe, especially Anglo-Spanish relations during the early seventeenth century, serves as a guide to diplomatic archives and a manual on how to use them. It concentrates on archives in England, Spain, France, and Belgium. The author describes various types of diplomatic sources, collections, and
repositories for the period 1500 to 1700. His study is a valuable reference work.


Ragnhild M. Hatton, a professor of international history at the University of London, provides an interpretative survey of Europe in the Age of Louis XIV. She considers western Europe as well as both Scandinavia and eastern Europe. Emphasis is on international relations, absolutism, society, and culture. Hatton argues that Europe developed into a cosmopolitan civilization during 1648 to 1721, and that absolutist rulers were concerned with maintaining the balance of power in Europe to prevent another conflict like the Thirty Years' War. The study contains 213 illustrations, six maps, a listing of European rulers, a genealogy depicting the Spanish succession, chronologies of major events concerning war and peace, European expansion, commercial treaties, as well as a select bibliography.


This book examines, in eleven essays, the relationship between Louis XIV and his neighbors. It is divided into two sections, a general one dealing with aspects of the whole reign, and one of case-studies which treat either a briefer period or a specific one. The authors are all experts...
in their field, six of them French, five are Anglo-American scholars. Of the French essays, all translated into English, four have been previously published while two have been specially written for this volume. Only one of the five Anglo-American contributions, the one by Hatton, has been published before while the others were specially composed for this book. Each of the essays are cited separately in this bibliography. Hatton includes an extremely useful chronology of diplomatic events, two maps, a glossary, and a listing of key diplomatic players in this work.


In this brief essay based on her inaugural lecture, Hatton provides an analysis of war and diplomacy from 1680 to 1720, concentrating on the Wars of Louis XIV and the Great Northern War. Her thesis focuses on the increasing importance of modern diplomacy. Hatton acknowledges that the era consisted of many wars. However, she notes the absence of ideological conflicts similar to the Thirty Years' War. After 1648, with the rise of absolutism, the Great Powers attempted to create a peaceful international political system that avoided the bloodshed and misery of the Thirty Years' War. European states created large standing armies, promoted international law, and supported the rise of modern
diplomacy in efforts to avoid conflict. Hatton points out Louis XIV's desire for arbitration over the questions of the electorate of Cologne and the Rhine Palatinate in 1688, as well as the collaboration of the Sun King and William III in the First and Second Partition Treaties to work out a solution over the Spanish succession in 1698-1700 as examples of diplomatic efforts to maintain peace. However, she acknowledges that peace was impossible to achieve because of the mistrust among the European states. Even so, Hatton argues that this period gave rise to humanitarian warfare, the condemnation of atrocities and breaches of customary rules of war, as well as the use of continuous diplomatic relations in efforts to resolve issues with the aim of achieving an acceptable balance of power and peace.

Hatton's study is important. It launched a new wave of study in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European diplomacy in English universities. Nonetheless, she fails to address the fact that the creation of large standing armies resulted in the carnage of great battles like Malplaquet (1709) or the destruction and misery associated with the French devastation of the Rhine Palatinate (1688-89) or the Grand Alliance's "scorched earth" policy in Bavaria in 1704.

This volume has many valuable essays concerning various aspects of international politics from 1680 to 1720. Six of the essays by Professor Mark A. Thomson have been previously published. Eleven essays, including works by Andrew Lossky, Ragnhild M. Hatton, John C. Rule, and Stewart P. Oakley, were written specifically for this book which is in honor of Thomson. Many of the essays are cited separately in this bibliography.


In the third and final volume of his classic survey of the history of European diplomatic relations, David Jayne Hill, an accomplished diplomat and former Assistant Secretary of State for the United States (1898-1903), narrates the interactions of the Great Powers during 1648 to 1774. Hill devotes 337 pages on the Age of Louis XIV, concentrating mainly on France, the Dutch Republic, and England. This work, now dated, relies heavily on secondary sources. It contains tables of European rulers and two relevant colored maps.

In this essay, Professor Andrew Lossky of the University of California, Los Angeles, furnishes a brief overview of international relations in Europe from 1688 to 1721. He notes that this period marked the end of French preponderance, the consolidation of the Habsburg monarchy in central Europe, the emergence of Britain and Russia, as well as the development of a states system based on the balance of power concept. Lossky primarily focuses on the policies of Louis XIV and the creation of an anti-French coalition led by William III. The essay contains valuable discussions on diplomatic practices and international law.


Undoubtedly the best recent analytical survey of international political relations covering 1648 to 1815. Derek McKay of the University of London and Hamish M. Scott of the University of St. Andrews, both specialists in eighteenth-century European diplomatic history, incorporate recent research in their discussion of the development of the European states system. The authors discuss domestic history when it is essential for understanding foreign policy. This study contains three chapters concerning the Age of Louis XIV: "The Rise of France, 1648-88," "The
Rise of Britain, 1688-1714," and "The Emergence of Austria and Russia, 1660-1721," totaling ninety-three pages. It also includes a chapter on diplomacy and the European states system. The study is based on secondary sources and lacks footnotes. It includes four pertinent maps and a valuable select bibliography.


In this traditional work, Professor Mowat of the University of Bristol surveys European diplomatic relations from the Burgundian wars of Charles the Bold to the French Revolution. The author devotes eight chapters to the Age of Louis XIV, including discussions on diplomacy of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-59, the Dutch War, War of the League of Augsburg, the partition treaties, War of the Spanish Succession, as well as Scandinavia, eastern Europe, and the conflicts with the Turks. Although dated, the survey supplies a useful outline of diplomatic transactions. It is based on secondary sources.


Professor Frederick L. Nussbaum of the University of Wyoming writes a general survey of European history covering a twenty-five-year period that entails the first half of Louis XIV's reign. The author argues that anarchy ruled international politics and war. He states in his thirty-
two-page chapter on international relations: "It was a period of marked unintelligence, immorality and frivolity in the conduct of international relations, marked by wars undertaken for dimly conceived purposes, waged with the utmost brutality and concluded by reckless betrayals of allies" (p.148). The study includes forty-nine illustrations.


Sir Charles Petrie traces the history of European diplomatic relations from the Italian Wars to the Peace of Utrecht divided neatly into twenty-two chapters. The author, who is highly sympathetic to Louis XIV, devotes seven chapters to the period 1643 to 1713. He fixes on western Europe with only one chapter of five pages in length addressing northern Europe from the Thirty Years' War to the Great Northern War. The study is based on secondary sources and has no footnotes. It contains six useful maps and a list of European rulers.


This is an assortment of texts translated into the English language. Chapter IV called "The Battle for Europe" has contemporary writings on the siege of Vienna (1683), the French destruction of the Rhineland (1689), an assessment of French strengths and weaknesses during the Nine Years' War (1692), and other gems. It includes brief editorial
comments regarding each document as well as a chronology of major events during the seventeenth century.


A specialist in the history of central Europe during the seventeenth century, John W. Stoye of Oxford University renders an excellent general history of Europe from 1648 to 1688. The study combines narrative and analysis in a survey that examines equally all of Europe, not just the west. It includes valuable insight on affairs in central, northern, eastern, and southeastern Europe. Stoye points out that in most of Europe the institution of monarchy, shaken by events in the 1640s, was by 1688 more strongly entrenched than ever. The work contains genealogies of ruling dynasties and a bibliographical essay, but it lacks footnotes.


Geoffrey W. Symcox, a professor of history at the University of California at Los Angeles, provides an miscellany of primary texts translated into the English language concerning war and diplomacy from 1618 to 1763. The collection includes the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), Louis XIV’s declaration of war against the Dutch (1672), the political
testament of Carlos II of Spain (1700), and a short editorial note on each document. It contains a brief, but useful bibliography.


This is an outstanding history by Professor John B. Wolf of the University of Minnesota on the great wars of the period and their impact on shaping European institutions and society. The author appraises the source of the conflicts and politics of the age, as well as the growth of vast military, administrative, and diplomatic organizations. He professes that "the wars regulated the timing and set the direction of the historical process" (p.xiii). Wolf puts forward the argument that the Nine Years' War was part of a world war lasting from 1683 to 1699. He addresses all aspects of European diplomacy and warfare during this era. The study includes forty-seven illustrations and a bibliographical essay.


This is another useful study by a great diplomatic historian. Wolf examines the emergence of France as the great military power of Europe after 1650, and the development of anti-French coalitions. He argues that such coalitions, formed to counter French domination, represented the beginning of diplomacy based upon the maintenance of the European balance of power. The work fixes on French relations with other
European states. It is based on his own research and secondary sources, but the study lacks footnotes.

1.2. French Studies


In this article, Professor Black defends the foreign policy of Louis XIV. He takes issue with historians that depict the Sun King's policy as aggressive. He stresses the French monarch's concern with the Spanish threat, which was evident in the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-59, as well as the question of the Spanish succession after the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV of Spain, in 1665. European rulers did not expect the sickly four-year-old heir, Carlos II, to live long, and Leopold I of Austria as well as Louis XIV were possible heirs to the Spanish Empire. Both rulers were married to daughters of Philip IV. Hence, the Sun King feared the possibility of both the German and Spanish Empires being ruled by Leopold I and cooperating against French interests. Black views Louis XIV's foreign policy as one of "contingency" in his quest to avoid Habsburg dominance over France. He notes the Sun King's military success in the War of Devolution, Dutch War, Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84, and Nine Years' War that led to the reestablishment of French international prestige and contributed to the Bourbon acquisition of the Spanish throne in 1700.

Professor François Bluche of the University of Paris at Nanterre supplies the first full-scale biography in English of Louis XIV since the publication of John B. Wolf’s _Louis XIV_ (1.2.11) in 1968. This is a conventional biography based on published primary and secondary sources in the French language which covers the full-range of the Sun King’s life. The author incorporates recent research by French historians. An open apologist for Louis XIV, the author examines both the positive and negative aspects of the Sun King’s long reign. He argues that the king’s foreign policy was a continuation of the policies of Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin which aimed to divide the threat of Habsburg Spain and the German Empire to France. The anti-French coalition only developed because France had become too successful in diplomacy and war, and not only divided its enemies but gained European predominance. He views Louis XIV fully justified in fighting for the Spanish succession. Mark Greengrass provides a fine English translation of this 1986 French best-seller. He adds a short bibliographical essay for English readers. The study contains an appendix listing not only the European rulers of the age, but valuable lists of French ministers, heads of departments, and marshals during this era.

This study serves as an excellent introduction to the reign of Louis XIV. It is broad in scope and makes French research available to English readers. In this translation of a study originally published in French in 1966, Professor Pierre Goubert of the University of Paris at the Sorbonne, who is sympathetic to the monarch, achieves a successful balance in his discussion of royal politics, diplomacy and war, as well as social and economic history. The study includes a useful chronology, but lacks footnotes.


In this essay, Professor Hatton argues that Louis XIV was a relatively sensible and moderate ruler in his dealings in foreign affairs. She provides a historiographical review of the Sun King's relations with his fellow monarchs, noting that Louis XIV's long personal reign (1661-1715) lasted much longer than the rule of his neighbors, and this fact contributes to the difficulty of understanding the Sun King's seemingly confused foreign policy. Hatton points out that it is difficult to summarize the Sun King's foreign policy because of the many changes in his outlook during his long reign. She notes that recent historians
deny any pattern to the king's foreign policy, interpreting his course of action as responses to incidents provoked by circumstances. Still, these historians assume that the underlying motive of his policy was the desire to control Europe, the search for hegemony and preponderance. Hatton disagrees with this assumption. She depicts the king's policy as one similar to those of Richelieu and Mazarin aimed at strengthening France's position in Europe against the Habsburg threat, not European hegemony. But, the author believes that the Sun King made some serious miscalculations that resulted in hostile relations with his fellow monarchs. This study is useful for its historiographical review of literature on Louis XIV and his foreign policy.


Hatton's short biography of the Sun King, based on her own archival research and that of others historians, is intended for the general reader. She focuses on Louis XIV as a person as well as the political history of his reign. Hatton briefly discusses war and diplomacy. The work contains 125 interesting illustrations.


Professor Lossky examines French foreign policy towards its Habsburg rival. Lossky notes the significant Habsburg threat to France in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The combination of Habsburg power in both the Spanish and German Empires encircled France. Only under Richelieu and Mazarin did France begin to turn back the Habsburg threat that had occupied Paris in 1591-94. Both French ministers employed the policy of supporting the German princes against Habsburg exertions of power. In fact, Mazarin had France join the German League of the Rhine, a defensive coalition against the Habsburgs, in 1658. Such a policy played an important role in breaking up the Habsburg encirclement of France, as well as ensuring French security.

Lossky criticizes Louis XIV's foreign policy after the death of Mazarin. He states that there is "little to commend in his foreign policy in the first thirty years of his personal rule . . . . One is hard put to it to discover any real idée directrice in Louis's foreign policy prior to the 1690s, apart from the general assertion of grandeur and purely opportunist seizures of small bits of land that lay poorly protected" (p.42). The author points out that the Sun King's aggressive actions along France's eastern border aimed at acquiring Spanish territory turned the Dutch and German princes against him, and promoted the formation of an anti-French coalition during the Dutch War. His continued aggressive policies in the 1680s resulted in France "stumbling" into the
Nine Years' War, a conflict "that he had not wanted, had not planned, and for which he was woefully unprepared" (p.45). The author argues that only after the Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk) (1697) did Louis XIV begin to pursue a coherent foreign policy with the objective of the Spanish inheritance. This article is an excellent brief analysis of French policy during the seventeenth century.


In this excellent study, Professor Lossky provides a political biography of Louis XIV. He concentrates on Louis XIV's foreign policy and his instruments of power for administering the affairs of France. He stresses the Sun King's obsession with breaking the Spanish encirclement of France which led to numerous wars in western Europe. The study is based on primary and secondary sources.


Professor John T. O'Connor of the University of New Orleans supplies a brief essay on French foreign policy during the reign of Louis XIV. The author describes the continuity between the diplomatic practices and anti-Habsburg policies of Richelieu and Mazarin with that of the Sun King. O'Connor stresses Louis XIV's quest for *gloire* and European hegemony. The essay concentrates on the Habsburg-Bourbon struggle.
prior to the Nine Years' War, with only three pages devoted to 1688 to 1713.


In this essay, Professor Paul Sonnino of the University of California, Santa Barbara, stresses the continuity of French aggression and expansionism in the Franco-Habsburg dynastic struggle since the late fifteenth century. He notes the policies of Richelieu and Mazarin during the Franco-Spanish War (1635-59). His thesis is that Louis XIV's burning desire for foreign adventure and conquest, as well as the influence of key advisers, were the key factors in French aggression and the Wars of Louis XIV.

The author emphasizes the influence of Marshal Turenne on Louis XIV concerning hostility towards the Spanish Netherlands with the aim of territorial aggrandizement which led to the War of Devolution (1667-68). Louis XIV backed off only after the Dutch Republic, England, and Sweden formed the Triple Alliance (1668) to oppose French annexations in the Spanish Netherlands. Again, Turenne was instrumental in urging the Sun King to plan and launch a war against the Dutch Republic—the Dutch War (1672-78)—in revenge for its part in the formation of the Triple Alliance. Turenne argued that France needed to crush the Dutch
Republic to ease the way for territorial annexations in the Spanish Netherlands. The Sun King failed to achieve his goals because of the opposition of Austria and Brandenburg. However, still seeking annexation of Spanish lands, Louis XIV launched an offensive and captured Luxembourg before agreeing to the Truce of Regensburg (1684). Once he set his sights on acquiring German territory in the Rhine Palatinate and control of the electorate of Cologne, Louis XIV's actions united Austria, England, the Dutch Republic, and numerous German states in a coalition against France in the Nine Years' War (1688-97). In this conflict, the Sun King failed to achieve his goals in a costly war, and quickly lost interest in the quest for territorial expansionism. But, as Sonnino points out, Louis XIV was forced into accepting the inheritance of the Spanish Empire for his grandson, Philip of Anjou, so as not to allow the Austrian Habsburgs the opportunity to acquire the Spanish inheritance and create a significant threat to French security. His mistake, according to the author, was to deploy French forces into the Spanish Netherlands in support of his grandson, Philip V, and instigate the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13/14).

Sonnino's essay stresses the continuity of the Franco-Habsburg struggle for European hegemony over two centuries. The death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665, and the succession of his son, the sickly Carlos II,
with no other Spanish Habsburg heirs available, threatened the existing European balance of power. This situation, combined with the territorial ambitions of Louis XIV, created a volatile diplomatic situation centered on the Spanish inheritance from 1665 on. The author correctly attributes the causes of the wars to the ambition of the Sun King, the influence of key advisers, and the question of the Spanish inheritance. This brief essay obviously lacks the detail of many diplomatic studies, but it provides a concise, analytical explanation on the origins of the Wars of Louis XIV.


This general survey, written by Geoffrey R.R. Treasure of Harrow School, provides a convenient outline of French foreign policy in the seventeenth century. Treasure narrates the efforts of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV to shape France into a mighty European power. The theme of the work is the evolution of the centralized state in France. It is a useful introduction for undergraduates despite the lack of footnotes. The study contains nineteen illustrations and two maps.


In this excellent political biography on Louis XIV, Professor Wolf focuses on the king's part in the development of French diplomacy,
military strength, bureaucracy, as well as in the rise of the European balance of power as the most important contributions of his reign. The author stresses the continuity in foreign policy between Mazarin and Louis XIV. He professes that Louis XIV's wars were not begun simply for personal reasons of gloire, and that "Louis' wars often began with the same unwarranted optimism and shaky moral and political justifications that we find in the actions of other seventeenth-century monarchs" (p.xiv). Wolf addresses the importance of advisers in the formulation of foreign policy, and makes excellent use of his extensive archival research in the War Archives at Vincennes in his coverage of the many military campaigns. However, the author's discussion of diplomatic negotiations, strategy, and military operations dwells mainly on the Low Countries, the German states, and England to the detriment of the Italian states, Spain, and Portugal. The work includes fifty-one illustrations, five maps, and extensive notes.


A brief summary of Louis XIV's foreign policy by a great French historian, Professor Gaston Zeller of the University of Paris at the Sorbonne. Focuses on the Sun King's policy in the Low Countries,
diplomatic practices, and the development of international law from 1648 to 1688. The author provides an excellent short account of the origins and conduct of the War of Devolution and Dutch War, as well as Louis XIV’s policy of Reunion. Zeller notes that the king’s continued aggression along France’s eastern border combined with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) aroused foreign opposition, including two of Louis’ allies, Brandenburg and Sweden, and resulted in the formation of the League of Augsburg (1686). The author states that:

Having been supremely successful, both in war and by 'legal' methods of annexation, Louis did not realize that he had aroused forces which France alone was unable to withstand. In 1688 Louis stood at the summit of his power. The second part of his reign was to bring about its decline; his relentless pursuit of prestige and glory had succeeded in uniting most of Europe against France (p.221).

1.3. English Studies


In the most recent survey on the subject, Professor Jeremy Black examines Britain’s "seemingly inevitable" rise to the status of a Great Power in the European states system between the Restoration and the French Revolutionary Wars. The author, a highly published historian of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century, concentrates on the relationship between domestic circumstances and foreign policy as well
as the decision-making process involved in the formulation of policy. The book is divided into two parts. The first section is thematic. Black analyzes the making of foreign policy in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain. Discussion includes an examination of the role of Parliament and the influence of the crown, the diplomatic system, as well as the importance of strategic and military considerations, trade, and the growing effect of public opinion and the press. The second half of the survey is a narrative interpretation of events, including a thirty-two page summary of English involvement in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Spanish Succession. The study contains extensive use of original quotations and five useful maps.


Gerald Howat superficially treats English foreign policy from 1603 to 1688 in this survey. It is based on secondary works, and the author ignores many important studies. However, Howat’s eighty-nine page narrative of English foreign affairs from Cromwell to the Glorious Revolution serves as a useful introduction to the subject. Appendices include the full text of the Treaty of Dover (1670), five maps, and a serviceable chronology.

In this brief study, Professor James R. Jones of the University of East Anglia provides an excellent synthesis and reinterpretation of British foreign policy from 1603 to 1713. He emphasizes the close interdependence of Britain and Europe in the seventeenth century, noting that events in England cannot be fully understood unless they are related to the developments and forces abroad. The author focuses on London's relations with France, the Dutch Republic, and Spain. He describes England's transition from comparative isolation and unimportance in European affairs at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and its full involvement as a major influence after 1688. The end of isolation was a very gradual process. The most important factor before 1688 was the diversification, as well as expansion, of overseas trade, in both exports and imports. The author notes that the wars against the Dutch were nothing more than trade wars, but the wars against Louis XIV were for nothing less than national survival. The study includes a valuable chronology, two maps, and a select bibliography.


Professor Jones supplies an excellent survey of British foreign policy covering 1649 to 1815. He begins by analyzing the instruments of
foreign policy: naval power, military strength, and the diplomatic service. He next devotes 128 pages to the period 1649 to 1713. Jones describes and analyzes the development and operation of the policies that governed England's relations with the rest of the world. He examines the influences that helped determine foreign policy, citing the importance of the interaction between domestic politics and the actual conduct of foreign affairs. Jones focuses on English expansionism, both economically as well as politically. He notes that by the 1650s English trade expansion, in competition with the more successful Dutch, had drawn England into the mainstream politics of the Baltic region and the western Mediterranean. In international politics, Britain, under the direction of William III, emerged as a Great Power in the decades after 1688 as the country systematically developed its military power and diplomatic service in order to survive the threat posed by Louis XIV and his Jacobite puppets. The work contains a valuable bibliography.


This study by Paul Langford of Oxford University is a fine introduction to the conduct of British foreign policy from 1688 to 1815. The author devotes just twenty-eight pages to the period covering the Glorious Revolution to the Peace of Utrecht. He states that "if the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was a revolution in anything . . . it was in
foreign policy" (p.43). The pro-French foreign policy of James II quickly turned to the anti-French position of William III. Langford argues the English fought the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession to safeguard the Protestant succession in England.


In this short essay, Professor Mark A. Thomson of the University of Liverpool addresses the change in Parliament’s involvement in foreign policy from the Nine Years’ War to the War of the Spanish Succession. The author stresses William III’s control of foreign policy during the Nine Years’ War. However, he argues that Parliament acquired a keen interest in foreign policy as the public became more informed of international relations via newspapers. This interest resulted in Parliament fighting for and achieving influence upon the formulation of foreign policy during the reign of Queen Anne.


In this study, John Brewer of the University of California at Los Angeles stresses the importance bureaucratic and financial developments that contributed to the rise of Britain as a Great Power after the Glorious Revolution. He argues that the use of increased taxation, a
surge in deficit financing, and substantial growth in public administration were the backbone to Britain’s military, commercial, and imperial success in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Essentially, Britain built an efficient and effective military-fiscal state. The study includes ten tables and eleven graphs. It is recommended for individuals interested in the impact of economics in diplomacy and warfare.


D.W. Jones of the University of York examines England in the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession. The author scrutinizes the English economy and the ability of England to sustain the wars against Louis XIV for nearly twenty years and emerge financially stronger at the end of the conflicts. The study is recommended for economic and social historians. It contains fifty-three tables and four graphs.

1.4. Dutch Studies


This study is an excellent introduction to Dutch foreign policy. Alice Clare Carter of the University of London examines Dutch foreign affairs during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Based mostly on Dutch sources, Carter devotes fifty-nine pages to the Anglo-Dutch wars.
and the Dutch Republic's forty-year-struggle with Louis XIV. She provides discussions on the origins of the Barrier policy, the Anglo-Dutch commercial agreement of 1674, and the Anglo-Dutch defensive treaty of 1678. Carter notes the contribution of the Dutch in checkmating French aggression under Louis XIV, including the successful defense of the eastern and southern Dutch frontiers as well as the Dutch role in defending the English Protestant succession against the Catholic Jacobite menace. She stresses the Dutch attempt to maintain their independence in external affairs despite the influence of powerful neighbors. The study contains a map of the Dutch Barrier Towns in the Spanish Netherlands during the War of the Spanish Succession.


This is a translation of Oranje en Stuart, 1641-1672, originally published by Professor Pieter Geyl of the University of Utrecht in 1939. The author describes the relationship between the houses of Orange and Stuart beginning with the marriage of the future stadholder, William II, and Mary, the daughter of Charles I of England. Although both Charles I and the Stadholder Frederick Henry viewed the marriage as a means of strengthening their power and influence in domestic and foreign affairs, the union resulted in providing new life to the Regents of Holland in their struggle against the House of Orange. Geyl argues that both the internal
history of the Netherlands and Dutch foreign policy are incomprehensible without an understanding of the pressures placed on the House of Orange, and its ambitions inspired by the more powerful Stuart kings. The study is written for readers having extensive knowledge of Dutch history and geography.


Professor Geyl supplies a history of the Dutch Republic from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Utrecht. Originally published as a part of his three volume Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam in the 1930s, this study serves as a useful introduction to Dutch political and diplomatic history covering all aspects of Dutch affairs in Europe and overseas. Geyl is sympathetic towards the administration of John de Witt, but he provides an adequate portrayal of the House of Orange. The work is heavily based on Dutch archival materials and contains four detailed maps.


In this recent survey of Dutch history in the early modern era, Professor Jonathan I. Israel of the University of London describes the emergence of the United Provinces as a Great Power, and explains its
subsequent decline in the eighteenth century. The study scans the full-spectrum of political, religious, economic, social, and intellectual history of the Dutch Republic. Israel devotes 179 pages to Dutch political history from 1650 to 1713, including the Anglo-Dutch wars, Dutch involvement in the Glorious Revolution, and conflicts with Louis XIV. His discussions of the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession are too brief. He considers the War of the Spanish Succession in just seven pages. The study is based on archival work as well as published primary and secondary sources in Dutch and English.


The first comprehensive assessment in the English language of the stadholders of the Dutch Republic. The study by Professor Herbert H. Rowen of Rutgers University includes an analysis of the stadholderates of William II (1647-50) and William III (1672-1702) as well as the First Stadholderless Period (1650-72). Rowen emphasizes the importance of the House of Orange's role in political and military leadership that withstood the challenge by the Grand Pensionary, John de Witt. The study is based primarily on Dutch sources. It is a valuable study for both undergraduates and graduates.
1.5. Spanish Studies


Professor John H. Elliott, an expert on Habsburg Spain, of Oxford University, reviews recent studies published in the English and Spanish languages on Spanish foreign policy in the seventeenth century. Noting that there exists few monographs, despite the wealth of available primary resources, that explore Spanish policy, the author hails the studies by Robert A. Stradling (1.5.2) and Jonathan I. Israel (4.3.5) as important efforts to improve this situation. Elliott notes that most studies address the internal reasons that contributed to the decline of Spain in the seventeenth century. However, he points out that to understand Spain's decline one needs to also explore the significant military and overseas expenditures of Habsburg Spain.


Robert A. Stradling of the University of Wales at Cardiff examines the slow ebbing of Spanish power during the seventeenth century. Using archival sources, the author provides a useful and concise account of the Spanish-Dutch conflict, Spain's role in the Thirty Years' War and in Italian affairs, as well as the Franco-Spanish rivalry and the interaction
of all of these with the revolt of Catalonia and the secession of Portugal. One particularly useful service Stradling performs is to make the English-reading public aware of the extent of Spanish recovery in the 1650s, at least in the political and military sphere, and of the dangers of believing that Spain no longer counted as a power in European affairs after 1640. The study includes a valuable bibliographical essay and five maps.


In this collection of twelve essays, Stradling addresses Spanish foreign policy and military concerns during the seventeenth century. Many of the essays focus on Spanish politico-military affairs during the Thirty Years’ War. The pieces on Spain’s survival after the Thirty Years’ War (4.2.7) and the foreign policy of Medina de las Torres (4.2.5) which concern the Age of Louis XIV are reviewed elsewhere in this bibliography.

1.6. Austria and the German States


Professor Jean Bérenger of the University of Paris at the Sorbonne renders a survey of the Habsburg Empire from its medieval origins to 1700. The study includes a twenty-page discussion of Austrian foreign relations in the late seventeenth century, including the First Northern
War, Transylvanian Question, Austro-Turkish War of 1662-64, Dutch War, and the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1683-99. The study has limited value to students of Austrian diplomatic and military affairs during the reign of Leopold I.


R.R. Betts, the Masaryk Professor of Central European History at the University of London, supplies a brief overview of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1648 to 1688. In addition to discussing political, economic, and cultural history, the author relates Austria's involvement in the First Northern War, Leopold I's rivalry with Louis XIV, and the struggle against the Turks, including the siege of Vienna in 1683.


The essay by Professor Francis L. Carsten of the University of London addresses in a brief manner the political, social, and economic changes in the German States after the Peace of Westphalia. In matters of diplomatic affairs, he notes that the German States continued their involvement in conflicts after the Thirty Years' War. Carsten points out that Louis XIV found it easy to find allies among the German princes and
to use them in his struggle against the Habsburg Empire. Additionally, the German States played a key role in Austria's battle with the Turks.


In this essay Carsten addresses the Hohenzollern's rise from the electors of Brandenburg to their coronation as kings of Prussia in 1700-1. He depicts the foreign policies of Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-88), during the First Northern War and the Dutch War, as well as Frederick III’s during the Nine Years' War and its aftermath that resulted in his coronation as Frederick I, the first Prussian king. Hohenzollern foreign policy focused on diplomatic and military support for the Habsburgs and William III of Orange against Louis XIV's France. The author also describes the internal policies of the Hohenzollerns based on the army and bureaucracy that united Brandenburg-Prussia as a growing power.


This is a short history of the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia from 1134 to 1786. Originally published in 1937, this introduction to Brandenburg-Prussian history contains an all too brief discussion of Brandenburg's foreign policy under the Great Elector and Frederick I. It includes
summaries of the First Northern War, War of the Spanish Succession, and Great Northern War.


John Gagliardo, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, supplies a valuable survey of the German states from 1600 to 1790. He examines the political, social, economic, religious, and cultural history of Germany. The study includes two excellent chapters totaling thirty-six pages on German foreign relations from 1648 to 1721. It contains a useful bibliography and seven maps.


This study is the standard work on the development of Germany from the Peace of Westphalia to the eve of the revolution of 1848-49. Professor Hajo Holborn of Yale University focuses on the growth of absolutism, tracing the history of the Austrian Empire and the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia. Two chapters are especially relevant: "Germany, the Wars of Louis XIV, and the Rise of the Austrian Empire, 1660-99" and "Germany and the Restoration of the European Balance, 1700-21." They serve as a useful introduction to the complexity of German and Austrian foreign relations during the Age of Louis XIV.

Professor Charles Ingrao of Purdue University provides an outstanding survey of the Habsburg monarchy from the Thirty Years' War to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The author includes coverage of social, cultural, and economic developments, but he especially focuses on the political and diplomatic elements that led to the rise of Austria as a Great Power. He believes that "Habsburg statecraft played the most decisive and unifying role in determining virtually all aspects of its [Austria's] history, including its social and cultural evolution" (p.xii). Ingrao discusses the diplomatically weakened state of the Habsburg monarchy at the end of the Thirty Years' War, and how it successfully fought both the Ottoman Turks and Louis XIV's France during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with the result that Austria regained its Great Power status. The work includes six useful maps and an up-to-date bibliography of studies on Austria. The study is recommended for teachers, graduate students, and undergraduates. It lacks footnotes.


Professor H.W. Koch of the University of York supplies a useful survey of Prussian history. Although his focus is on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Koch provides a valuable thirty-five page summary
of Brandenburg-Prussian war and diplomacy under the Great Elector and Frederick I.


This collection of documents includes the Sultan's declaration of war on the German Empire, an account of the raising of the siege of Vienna, and John III Sobieski's account on the raising of the siege in 1683. It contains useful chronologies and genealogical tables.


Originally published as Monarchie et peuples du Danube in 1969, Professor Victor-L. Tapie of the University of Paris at the Sorbonne furnishes a traditional history of the Habsburg Monarchy from the Middle Ages to its demise at the end of World War I. The author concentrates on political, economic, social, and cultural history. The study, however, contains inadequate coverage of diplomatic and military history during the reign of Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI.

1.7. The Baltic and East Europe


In this general survey David Kirby, a reader in history in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London,
explores the history of northern Europe. In the early modern period Sweden was a major European power, occupying a central position in international politics. Its rise and decline, and the passing of regional hegemony to the new powers of Russia and Prussia, serve as the central theme of the study. Kirby considers international and political developments as well as economic, social, religious, and cultural history. The study is based on prodigious reading in a number of languages, and treats the affairs of Sweden-Finland, Denmark-Norway, Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and lesser states such as Courland and Pomerania. The discussions on Sweden as a Great Power and the rise of Russia are especially valuable. The study contains four useful maps of northern Europe and a listing of rulers in the Baltic lands.


Jill Lisk provides a survey of international relations between five states bordering the Baltic Sea during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. She concentrates on the rise and fall of Sweden and on the emergence of Russia and Brandenburg-Prussia as major powers, while noting the contrasting decline of Denmark and Poland. The study, based on secondary works, contains nine helpful maps illustrating Baltic trade and the main territorial changes and military campaigns of the era. It is a good introduction for undergraduates.

In this survey, Stewart P. Oakley of the University of East Anglia examines the course of Baltic conflicts from 1560 to 1790, tracing the emergence of Sweden as a Great Power and its eventual demise in the face of Russian power, and later Brandenburg-Prussia. Besides addressing the struggle for Livonia in the late sixteenth century, the Time of Troubles, and the Thirty Years' War, Oakley examines the First Northern War (1655-60), the Baltic in the late seventeenth century, and the conflict between Charles XII and Peter the Great. This study, based on secondary sources, is complex, involving the policies and actions of the many powers neighboring the Baltic. This work is not an easy read. But the effort to struggle through the complex world of Baltic diplomacy and wars is both challenging and rewarding. This is the first general study in the English language of war and diplomacy in the Baltic during early modern Europe since Jill Lisk's study *The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic, 1600-1725* (1.7.2). It includes valuable maps, a chronology, and a list of rulers.


Professor Michael Roberts of the Queen’s University at Belfast provides an analysis of Swedish imperialism from 1560 to 1718. He
discusses political, security, and economic historiographical explanations for the rise of the Swedish Empire. The author also explores the strengths, weaknesses, and decline of the Swedish Empire. The study is based on secondary works published in the Swedish language as well as his own studies on Swedish history. It contains four valuable maps.


In this brief essay, Professor Jerker Rosén of the University of Lund reviews the diplomatic and political history of Sweden and Denmark from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Ryswick. The author stresses the Dano-Swedish struggle for hegemony in the Baltic until the Scandinavian Powers were overshadowed by the struggle between Louis XIV and anti-French forces. Rosén's essay provides an excellent introduction to the complex diplomacy of the Baltic which involved the Nordic Powers as well as the Great and Minor Powers of northern and western Europe.


Dorothy M. Vaughan of Oxford University sketches relations between Europe and the Turks from the Middle Ages to the Peace of Karlowitz (Carlowitz) (1699). She provides a thirty-one page summary
of Turkish policy, including Turkish aggression in eastern Europe and the subsequent defeats after the siege of Vienna in the late seventeenth century.


In this article, Professor Zbigniew Wójcik examines the diplomatic history of eastern Europe after the First Northern War leading up to the Truce of Bakhchisarai (1681). Wójcik considers the foreign policy aims and the conduct of diplomacy of the major powers in eastern Europe, including Russia, Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria, as well as the influence of Brandenburg-Prussia, France, and Sweden in eastern European diplomatic affairs. The author argues that this turbulent period of wars (the Thirteen Years' War, First Northern War, Polish-Turkish War, Russo-Turkish War, and Austro-Turkish War) and their outcomes shaped a new balance of power in eastern Europe that greatly contributed to the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and resulted in the decline of Poland-Lithuania.
CHAPTER II
THE ART OF DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

The art of diplomacy and the sending of representatives on ad hoc diplomatic missions was commonplace to the ancient and medieval worlds.¹ However, the characteristics of modern European diplomacy began with the development of resident embassies and continuous political relations in the fifteenth century.² In the late fifteenth century, Milan, followed by the Pope and other Italian rulers, led the way in establishing permanent diplomatic


²For background on diplomacy from Ancient Greece to the rise of resident embassies in the fifteenth century, see Harold Nicolson's brief and useful The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, The Chichele Lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953, (London: Constable, 1954), 1-47.
representation in the capitals of Europe and in Constantinople in an effort to maintain the balance of power in Italy. In the sixteenth century, this emerging network of resident embassies as well as the concept of the balance of power gradually spread outside Italy, until it embraced the majority of western and central European states. Rulers had their permanent diplomatic representatives abroad promote closer contacts with assigned states, and provide them with dispatches and reports concerning news of political events useful in the formulation of foreign policy. Although resident embassies were part of the monarchical and bureaucratic states emerging at this time, this trend towards permanent, continuous diplomacy was far from firmly established. The


sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries saw a disruption in the tentative steps towards permanent diplomatic representation because of the difficulties of Protestant embassies in Catholic countries and vice versa during this period of numerous and widespread religious conflicts. The next decisive developments in the evolution of diplomacy occurred during the long personal rule of Louis XIV (1661-1715).

During the Age of Louis XIV, the European states system gradually acquired ministers and foreign offices charged more or less specifically with the conduct of foreign affairs as well as an elaborate web of continuous diplomatic representation. Most diplomatic historians believe that France led the way in the development of modern foreign offices. They argue that by the end of the seventeenth century, France possessed the most efficient diplomatic organization in Europe, one which had at its disposal able negotiators, plentiful funds, expert knowledge, and the prestige of past success. Moreover, most

---


7Anderson, 201.
historians profess that the French foreign ministry remained throughout this period the object of admiration and envy on the part of many other countries. They also note that in the last years of Louis XIV’s reign the Marquis of Torcy, the secretary of state for foreign affairs (1699-1715), improved the foreign ministry with the creation of the dépôt des affaires étrangères, a rudimentary press office, as well as specialized departments, each under a high official, for the handling of current diplomatic business.

During the late seventeenth century, the European powers permanently established a network of embassies and minor missions, linking most of the major European capitals and many of the smaller courts. Louis XIV took the lead in this exchange of diplomats and the other states, especially the Maritime Powers, quickly followed him, largely to counter French power. In fact, as early as 1661, the Sun King maintained resident ministers of varying ranks in twenty-one states. In general, most historians believe that France, under Louis XIV, had the most fully developed and wide-spread system of permanent

---

8For an opposing view, see the writings of Professor William J. Roosen (2.24, 2.26, 2.27, and 2.28).


embassies in Europe, and French diplomats enjoyed a high reputation for their competence.

In addition to its leadership in completing the institutional framework, France served as the main influence in the creation of diplomatic traditions and practices for the European states system during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Most historians agree that French methods and techniques in diplomacy became the model for the rest of Europe during this period. They attribute the dominance of French diplomatic practices to the military ascendancy of Louis XIV's France, the resources it had to spend on foreign subsidies and financing its diplomatic service, as well as the parallel successes of its diplomats. The power and influence of Louis XIV's France also led to the use of French instead of Latin and Italian as the language of international relations, which was needed to support the increasingly complex and extensive European diplomatic network created between 1648 and 1715.


12Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy, 1660-1793 (London and New York: Longman, 1991), 64; William F. Church, Louis XIV in Historical Thought from Voltaire to the Annales School (New York: Norton, 1976), 9. Roosen disagrees with the view that French diplomats were superior to other European diplomats (see Roosen, 2.27).

There are few general studies on the art of diplomacy during the Age of Louis XIV. A good starting point is William J. Roosen’s *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (2.28) and Matthew S. Anderson’s *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919* (2.3). An important brief essay is William J. Roosen’s "Seventeenth Century Diplomacy: French or European?" (2.27). On particular aspects of diplomatic practices, see Edward Robert Adair, *The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (2.1), Ragnhild M. Hatton, "Gratifications and Foreign Policy: Anglo-French Rivalry in Sweden during the Nine Years' War" (2.7), Richard Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830" (2.16), Stewart P. Oakley, "The Interception of Posts in Celle, 1694-1700" (2.20), C.G. Roelofsen, "The Negotiations about Nijmegen's Juridical Status during the Peace Conference" (2.23), William J. Roosen, "Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach" (2.25), and John C. Rule, "Gathering Intelligence in the Age of Louis XIV" (2.32).

Most studies on diplomatic institutions and practices during the Age of Louis XIV concern the French method of diplomacy. For the theoretical aspects, see Charles H. Carter, "Wicquefort on the Ambassador and his Functions" (2.5), H.M.A. Keens-Soper, "François de Callières and Diplomatic Theory" (2.11), and H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer, *François de Callières: The Art of Diplomacy* (2.12). For the practical side the best works
include Harold Nicolson's "The French System" (2.19), Victor-L. Tapié's "Louis XIV's Methods in Foreign Policy" (2.35), as well as William J. Roosen's "The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV" (2.30) and "The Ambassador's Craft: A Study of the Functioning of French Ambassadors under Louis XIV" (2.29). Analysis of the French diplomatic corps is located in Dennis Harold O'Brien's, "Louis XIV's Diplomatic Corps, 1648-1671" (2.21) and "Mazarin's Diplomatic Corps, 1648-1661" (2.22), as well as William J. Roosen's "The True Ambassador: Occupational and Personal Characteristics of French Ambassadors under Louis XIV" (2.31). For an examination of the French Political Academy, see Joseph A. Klaits, "Men of Letters and Political Reform in France at the End of the Reign of Louis XIV: The Founding of the Académie Politiq" (2.13) and H.M.A. Keens-Soper, "The French Political Academy, 1712: A School for Ambassadors" (2.10). For criticism of the view that France led the way in the development of diplomatic institutions and practices, see William J. Roosen's "Seventeenth Century Diplomacy: French or European?" (2.27), "A New Way of Looking at Early Modern Diplomacy - Quantification" (2.24), and "How Good were Louis XIV's Diplomats?" (2.26).

Besides the French, there are few studies of diplomatic institutions and practices of other states. England is covered in Phyllis S. Lachs, The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II and James II (2.14), Margery Lane, "The Diplomatic Service under William III" (2.15), Henry L. Snyder, "The British
Diplomatic Service during the Godolphin Ministry" (2.34), and David Bayne Horn, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789* (2.9). Russia is treated in Dan Altbauer's "The Diplomats of Peter the Great" (2.2) and Avis Bohlen's "Changes in Russian Diplomacy under Peter the Great" (2.4). There are no studies in the English language regarding the other Great and Minor Powers.

2. The Art of Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV


Edward Robert Adair of McGill University examines the position and privileges of ambassadors focusing on the development of the idea of exterritoriality during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The author reviews the writings of contemporary jurists, and he focuses on analyzing the theory and practice of exterritoriality, citing mostly English and Dutch examples. He argues that, in most cases, states recognized the diplomatic immunity of ambassadors from criminal and civil jurisdiction in practice before it was embodied in law. This study is valuable to students of international law and diplomacy.


In this article, based on Russian primary sources, Dan Altbauer of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem investigates the growth of Russia's diplomatic corps during the era of the Great Northern War and the War
of the Spanish Succession. He writes that prior to Peter the Great, Muscovy had employed ill-prepared diplomatic representatives on temporary missions, and did not engage in the western practice of sending permanent diplomatic representatives abroad. Muscovite diplomats were largely ignorant of western European languages and culture as well as lacking in diplomatic training. Most had little experience in the art of diplomacy. Altbauer notes that Muscovite diplomacy suffered from these limitations.

During his reign, Peter I gradually improved the quality of the Russian diplomatic corps. He began appointing permanent diplomatic representatives abroad in 1700. For this purpose he chose men of ability from old Muscovite or prominent families as ambassadors. To assist these men, Peter picked others who had gained diplomatic training from manuals; experience abroad, such as in Venice; and received a broad education including European languages and western European culture. To expand the diplomatic corps the Tsar had younger men assigned to Russian embassies abroad to receive diplomatic training. Many sons of ambassadors later followed in their father's footsteps. Altbauer professes that by the end of Peter's reign the Russian diplomatic corps was on par with those of most other European countries.

Professor Matthew S. Anderson of the University of London renders a survey of the development of modern diplomacy. He begins with the emergence of resident ambassadors in the Italian states during the fifteenth century and discusses the further development of diplomatic practices, diplomatic services, and foreign offices up to the Peace of Versailles in 1919. The author writes that during the Age of Louis XIV, "the core of diplomacy continued to be the resident diplomat, concerned largely with the collection of information and reporting home relatively frequently in despatches of which particularly important or delicate parts were usually in cypher" (p.41). He stresses that diplomats were preoccupied with precedents and ceremonies as well as the safeguarding by the ambassador of the honor and standing of the ruler he represented abroad. The study is highly recommended as an introduction to the practice of diplomacy.


In this article, Avis Bohlen of the University of Paris explores the transition of Russian diplomacy from Muscovite to western-style practices. He notes the Muscovite practices, including little use of envoys to make contacts with foreign courts. Peter the Great, however,
initiated the use of permanent representatives abroad at Warsaw in 1700 as well as Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the Dutch Republic and Turkey in 1701. The author describes how these ambassadors at first lacked adequate diplomatic training, knowledge of foreign languages, funds, regular sources of information, intelligence networks, regular methods of receiving and transmitting information, established diplomatic procedures, and prestige at their assigned posts abroad. European respect for Russian diplomats came with Peter the Great's military success against Sweden at Narva in 1709. The rapid rise in Russia's importance in the European states system resulted in the Tsar assigning permanent resident diplomats to Hamburg (1709), England (1710), Hanover (1711), France (1720), and Spain (1724). He had already sent one to Brandenburg in 1707. Bohlen stresses the quick improvement of the quality of Russia's ambassadors and diplomatic network in the second half of Peter I's reign. The article is based on Russian sources.


procedure as generalized topics, and the second volume concerns how an individual ambassador should go about performing his various functions. The first book could serve as a handbook for those sending or receiving ambassadors while the second would serve best as a handbook for ambassadors in the field.


Richard Langhorne and Keith Hamilton of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office provide an historical analysis of the evolution of diplomacy from Ancient Greece to the twentieth century. Of particular interest is their discussion of diplomacy during the Renaissance and Early Modern Europe. The authors describe the rise of the resident ambassador in the Italian city-states and the gradual spread of this diplomatic function throughout Europe. Langhorne and Hamilton concern themselves with the issues of diplomatic recruitment, training, routine, ceremony, precedence, security, secrecy, immunity, administration, salary, as well as the development of diplomatic theory, foreign ministries, and peacetime conferences. The study is highly recommended as an introduction study for students of international political history and international relations. It is based on published primary and secondary works.

Professor Ragnhild M. Hatton's essay addresses the role of gratifications in diplomatic affairs. Using Sweden during the Nine Years' War as a case-study, she assesses the impact of foreign gratifications on the formulation and conduct of Swedish foreign policy during the conflict between France and the anti-French coalition led by the Maritime Powers. She describes the various attempts by France and the Maritime Powers to influence Swedish ministers, courtiers, and officials with money-presents and pensions to gain Sweden's support, or at least to deny its military, naval, and diplomatic power to the other side. Both Louis XIV and William III viewed the support, or neutrality, of Sweden as vital during the war. The rivalry for Swedish military support gradually evolved into a desire for diplomatic backing in the peace negotiations. Hatton's research shows that France and the Maritime Powers distributed exorbitant amounts of money to gain the support of Charles XI's court. But, she argues that the gratifications failed to affect Swedish policy because Charles XI pursued an independent policy aimed at protecting Swedish commercial and diplomatic interests.

In this essay, Professor Hatton discusses the historiography of the Congress of Nijmegen (Nymegen) in 1676-79. Although mentioning numerous studies published in the German, French, and English languages, she stresses that much historical research still remains to be done on the congress. The author cites gaps in the diplomacy of Spain and the Spanish Netherlands, the Papacy, the diplomatic activities of the English mediator Sir Leoline Jenkins, and numerous diplomatic issues concerning individual states and negotiators. She also points out the need for research on diplomatic innovations at Nijmegen. She notes that both Catholics and Protestants met together at the congress, and there was no need for two separate meeting places (Osnabrück and Münster) as in the making of the Peace of Westphalia.


Professor David Bayne Horn of the University of Edinburgh, a specialist in eighteenth-century British diplomatic history, supplies an analytical history of the British diplomatic service from the Glorious Revolution to the French Revolution. He notes that during the reign of William III foreign policy became more important to England as the
Maritime Powers opposed French aggression and achieved success in the Nine Years' War. The author argues that the British diplomatic service expanded in size and became more professional beginning in the late seventeenth century. The government organized a regular hierarchy of diplomatic ranks, salaries, and allowances. Even so, the British government lacked a centralized foreign ministry. The secretaries of state for the northern and southern departments handled foreign affairs until the creation of the foreign office in 1782. Horn points out that during the era of the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, William III, and later the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Treasurer Godolphin, bypassed the state secretaries and directed foreign relations. English diplomats abroad were expected to follow their instructions strictly and correspond regularly with London. Horn's main emphasis is on the eighteenth-century British diplomatic service. He addresses such subjects as the recruitment and selection of diplomatic candidates, the education and training of recruits, diplomatic ranks, salaries, the operational cost of the diplomatic service, as well as diplomatic duties, ceremony, and correspondence.
In this article, H.M.A. Keens-Soper of the University of Leicester peruses the Marquis of Torcy's experiment in training young men to become diplomats with the establishment of the first Political Academy in 1712. Realizing the value of highly qualified diplomats, especially in the era of the Nine Year's War and the War of the Spanish Succession, Torcy, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1699-1715), supported the concept of training aspiring diplomats methodologically instead of by chance and long experience abroad. Torcy, a uniquely qualified diplomat, had been groomed by his father and predecessor as foreign secretary, Charles Colbert de Croissy, to become a diplomat. Keens-Soper notes Torcy's desire to train a corps of diplomats to improve the effectiveness of French foreign relations. In 1710, he created the dépôt des affaires étrangères at the Louvre to hold the vast collection of French diplomatic papers. The students of the Political Academy aided in collecting and classifying these documents as well as utilizing them in their study to become diplomats. In their training, the students studied diplomatic history since the Peace of Westphalia, the diplomatic manuals of Abraham de Wicquefort and François de Callières,
foreign languages, and international law. Although Torcy held high hopes for the Political Academy the experiment lasted only six years beyond the death of Louis XIV. Keens-Soper argues the experiment was moderately successful as a first attempt to create a school for diplomats.


Keens-Soper argues that François de Callières (1645-1717) played an important role in the development of diplomatic theory with his essay *De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains* (published in 1716). Callières wrote the treatise based on his own diplomatic experiences as a French envoy during the Nine Years' War. Keens-Soper compares the contribution of Abraham de Wicquefort (1606-82) and his *L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (1680-81) with the effort of Callières, believing that Wicquefort contributed little to the development of diplomatic theory whereas Callières emphasized compromise and moderate behavior in international political relations. Callières stressed the importance of professional diplomats advocating compromise and moderation in maintaining international peace and mediating the clash of interests. Keens-Soper points out that Callières wrote his essay concerning diplomatic mediation while Louis XIV was on the defensive against the anti-French coalition. The article is useful for its brief description of the evolution of diplomatic thought from the Renaissance.
to the Age of Louis XIV, the development of the French diplomatic method mirrored by other states, and the writing contributions of both Callières and Wicquefort based on their different diplomatic experiences.


This volume is a translation of François de Callières' classic *De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains*, originally published in 1716.

The authors include a biographical introduction, based on French manuscript sources, which gives an account of Callières' life as a writer and diplomat; a discussion of the origins of the work; and, most importantly, an assessment of the intellectual and historical background to which the treatise belongs. The study contains a valuable bibliography of works on diplomatic theory covering the period 1648 to 1815.


Joseph Klaitis of Oakland University examines the origins of the French Political Academy addressed by Keens-Soper (2.10). He asserts that Torcy planned for the academy to serve purposes other than preparing novices for a career in diplomacy. The minister hoped for the academy to become a forum for historical research on French diplomatic
history which would lend itself to glorifying the reign and accomplishments of Louis XIV. However, Klaits agrees that Torcy primarily founded the academy to remedy the failings of French diplomacy. French diplomacy suffered from the incompetency, organizational deficiencies, and inadequate finances of embassies abroad. The role of the academy was to provide a formal education in diplomatic usages to men who would staff the emergent, professional bureaucratic foreign service envisioned by Torcy. He planned for the academy to focus on training students in diplomatic procedure so that they could form permanent diplomatic staffs that would not only assist ambassadors and envoys, but also ensure the continuity of French diplomacy between the assignment of ambassadors at each post. Torcy also hoped the academy would increase the prestige of a diplomatic career, and thus draw promising young men away from more rewarding military careers to the foreign service.


In this monograph, Phyllis S. Lachs of Rutgers College of South Jersey surveys the English diplomatic institution and its growth under Charles II and James II from 1660 to 1688. She includes detailed descriptions of the nature of English embassies, the intricacies of business and ceremonial duties, the ambassadors and their households,
the cost of service, as well as diplomatic privileges and immunities. The study is based primarily on English diplomatic papers. It includes a valuable list of English diplomatic personnel during this period.

In her study, Lachs refers to the English diplomatic corps during this era as a "youthful, rather irregularly developed organization" (p.4). Unlike the Italian states and France, England had not yet established a broad network of permanent or resident embassies. The Crown maintained permanent diplomatic representation only in certain European capitals where English political and commercial interests were strong, and in Constantinople and Moscow the diplomatic function was carried on by trading companies. The author notes that the Crown chose its own diplomats, but few of these men measured up to the seventeenth-century ideal of a nobleman chosen for his skills in statecraft, law, and foreign languages. Lachs attributes this deficiency in the quality of diplomats to the fact that the majority of English noblemen did not consider the foreign service as a profitable or prestigious career but as a way station toward political preferment at home. Appointments as ambassadors, envoys, ministers, or agents were usually contingent on a man's record of loyalty to the royal cause during the English Civil War, or his active support of the Court.
The author professes that a post as the head of a mission might be an arduous one for several reasons. First, she notes the poor diplomatic communications between Whitehall and ministers abroad, which kept diplomats ill informed about important ongoing negotiations. Secondly, the gathering and transmitting of intelligence presented both personal and official problems for diplomats because of the expense of paying for information and courier service, and the fact that diplomatic secrets were easily intercepted in the mail. Moreover, diplomats were expected to adhere to the elaborate, expensive, and rigidly defined etiquette of seventeenth-century diplomacy although salaries were constantly in arrears. The author emphasizes that rules regarding public entries, audiences, visits, and the signing of treaties were taken as serious indicators of international prestige.

During this period, the Crown began to improve its administration of the diplomatic corps. Lachs describes how England improved its diplomatic corps by fixing salaries by grade and place to attract quality diplomats, and by increasing the professionalism of the members of the embassy staffs. The Crown began choosing official secretaries, who were picked for their diplomatic experience, to head embassy staffs and assist ambassadors with correspondence, gathering intelligence, and
keeping embassy files, in addition to providing continuity between successive ambassadors at one location.


Margery Lane examines the relationship between the King-Stadholder, William III, and the English diplomatic service from 1688 to 1701. She emphasizes that William III took control of English foreign policy and served as his own foreign secretary, conducting much of the important negotiations abroad himself, and demanded strict obedience of the diplomatic service to his instructions. The author points out that William’s control of foreign relations benefitted England because the King-Stadholder knew the princes and courts of Europe much better than did his agents. Moreover, the English diplomatic service, simple in its composition, lacked the talent, finances, and diplomatic network compared to the Dutch diplomatic resources available to William III. Lane stresses that The Hague was the diplomatic capital of western Europe during this era. Her essay also addresses diplomatic salaries, the cost of maintaining an embassy, the difficulties associated with delayed diplomatic instructions during the Nine Years’ War, and the risks involved with diplomatic travel.

In this article, Richard Langhorne, the Director and Chief Executive of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, briefly surveys the early development of organized diplomacy. He addresses the Congresses of Osnabrück, Münster, Oliva, Nijmegen, Ryswick (Rijswijk), Karlowitz (Carlowitz), and Utrecht during the Age of Louis XIV, as well as later international gatherings. The author discusses the problems of titles, precedence, mediators, methods of exchanging notes, and diplomatic ceremony. He notes that these early congresses quickly broke down into private diplomatic discussions and separate peace treaties.


Albert J. Loomie's article deals with the importance of the role of the *Conducteur des Ambassadeurs* in diplomacy. He discusses the creation of this position in France during the reign of Henry III in 1587 and Spain under Philip IV in 1626. The *Conducteur des Ambassadeurs* played a unique role in diplomatic affairs. His office gave him direct access to the king and in most respects a monopoly over the rights of foreign envoys to visit the king or his secretaries. Moreover, in so far as a monarch might play a personal role in foreign policy, the *Conducteur des*
Ambassadeurs was the monarch’s spokesman to the diplomat. Thus, the office holder played a major role in controlling the flow of continuing diplomatic negotiations between foreign envoys and the monarch. Loomie explores the history of the office, and notes that Louis XIV changed the office title to Introducteur des Ambassadeurs. He also stresses the importance attached to appointing a high-ranking and knowledgeable nobleman to the position. However, the author fails to provide specific examples of the office-holder’s impact on French diplomacy during the Age of Louis XIV.


John J. Murray of Coe College examines the most celebrated case involving the question of diplomatic immunity during the early modern era. He describes the Dutch arrest of Baron Georg von Götz, the first minister of Charles XII of Sweden, his secretary, Gustavus Gyllenborg, and Andreas Ernst Stambke, the Swedish ministerial secretary, in the Dutch Republic on a diplomatic mission in 1717. The Dutch arrested these men upon the request of their ally, Britain, who had arrested Count Karl Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister to London, for dealing with the Jacobites. Although British leaders claimed the Swedish officials in the United Provinces were also involved in a Jacobite conspiracy,
Murray argues that the real reason focused on the desire of pro-Hanoverian members of the British Parliament to isolate Sweden’s most capable diplomat, Götz, so as to avoid the possibility of a separate peace between Sweden and Hanover’s Russian and Prussian allies during the Great Northern War. The violation of diplomatic immunity occurred to protect George I’s Hanoverian interests with the continued maintenance of the Northern Alliance of Hanover, Russia, Denmark, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Poland-Saxony against Sweden. Murray reviews the viewpoints of contemporary writers on international law and diplomatic immunity. He states that the Dutch released the Swedish diplomats because of French diplomatic pressure, not because of concerns for maintaining international law.


In one of his published lectures, Harold Nicolson, a distinguished diplomatic historian, addresses the French diplomatic method from the rise of Cardinal Richelieu to the French Revolution. His thesis is that France set the tone of diplomacy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that during the reign of Louis XIV French influence on diplomatic method became predominant and a model for all of Europe. Nicolson argues that the French diplomatic machine began its surge
toward dominance under the tutelage of Richelieu. The cardinal centralized the responsibility for foreign affairs in his care to increase the effectiveness of French foreign policy. Moreover, he strongly advocated the continuous process of French negotiations, instead of ad hoc talks, with rival states to more effectively support and defend state interests. He strongly believed that once treaties were negotiated, signed, and ratified, the agreements must be observed "with religious scruple" (p.52). Nicolson argues that Richelieu's views significantly influenced contemporary diplomatic thought.

The author describes how Louis XIV continued Richelieu's efforts to improve the functions of French diplomacy. The king made the secretary of state for foreign affairs a permanent member of the royal cabinet, and nominated only those men for the position of foreign secretary that possessed previous diplomatic experience. The Sun King also built up his diplomatic service to exceed that of any other state, but he maintained a small foreign office, consisting of just five officials.

Nicolson notes that Louis XIV disapproved of conference diplomacy. He viewed such diplomacy as a too slow, expensive, and cumbrous method of negotiation. Instead, the king preferred confidential discussions between diplomatic experts as a better method to reduce international tension and champion French interests. The author cites
the views of Callières in *De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains* as the best definition of the French diplomatic method. Louis XIV and Callières supported the buildup of a professional diplomatic corps that would serve the monarchy with a continuous system of diplomacy.


In this short essay, Stewart P. Oakley of the University of East Anglia renders an account of postal espionage during the Nine Years' War. He concentrates on the interception of mail between the Scandinavian countries and France at Celle in northern Germany. His research is based on the copies of intercepted diplomatic dispatches and instructions supplied to William III and the Dutch government, now in English and Dutch archives. The author notes the importance of the Scandinavian countries to the Maritime Powers during the conflict and the peace talks at Ryswick. Intercepted, copied, and decoded letters by officials of the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, close friends of William III, provided the Maritime Powers vital information about Louis XIV's Baltic policy as well as the diplomatic positions of both Denmark and Sweden. Oakley argues that the Maritime Powers used such intelligence to counter French diplomacy in northern Europe.

Dennis Harold O'Brien examines the composition of the French diplomatic corps directed by Cardinal Jules Mazarin and Louis XIV from 1648 to 1671. During this period the French diplomatic corps asserted its supremacy over all others in Europe and became the model for European sovereigns to emulate. In his paper the author explores the foreign policy of Mazarin and Louis XIV between the Peace of Westphalia and the Dutch War, the structure of the French diplomatic corps, and the social background of the fifty-nine French ambassadors, envoys, and plenipotentiaries employed during this period. His thesis is that both Mazarin and Louis XIV chose, for the most part, their diplomatic appointees from lesser ranking men of the First and Second Estates that presented no threat to the royal power. Appointees were men who would loyally follow the diplomatic instructions of the Crown. O'Brien's research in French archives proves that two-thirds of the appointees came from the Second Estate. He disproves the claims of earlier historians that Mazarin and the Sun King picked diplomats from the high nobility of the robe and sword. In an appendix of 203 pages O'Brien provides an extensive biographical sketch on each of these diplomats, including discussions of their social origins, diplomatic missions, and a
summary of the basic matters that they dealt with during their diplomatic missions.


In this article, Dennis Harold O'Brien of West Virginia University publishes the findings of his dissertation mentioned above (2.21). The author, however, focuses upon the French diplomatic corps during the era of Cardinal Mazarin. He stresses that Mazarin sent permanent diplomatic representatives to fifteen countries, and favored appointing these individuals to the diplomat rank of ambassador extraordinary and ambassador over sixty percent of the time instead of the less prestigious designations of envoy and resident. O'Brien argues that Mazarin chose his diplomats from men of the lesser nobility who were no threat to the Crown, and would loyally carry out his diplomatic instructions. The article includes two tables listing the names of Mazarin's diplomats with their diplomatic and social ranks.


Using both Dutch and French sources, Professor C.G. Roelofsen of the University of Utrecht describes the French and Dutch difficulties in choosing a site and agreeing on its juridical status for a peace
conference to end the Dutch War (1672-78). The author relates the early proposals to hold the talks at Dunkirk or Cologne in 1673-74 under Swedish mediation. The Dutch disapproved of holding talks on French territory at Dunkirk while the activities of the German emperor, including the abduction of the French agent, Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, destroyed any chance of talks at the Imperial Free City of Cologne. Finally, the Sun King, desperately seeking peace, agreed to hold talks under the mediation of its recent ally, England, on Dutch territory at Nijmegen in 1675. Both the French and Dutch agreed to establish a neutral zone around Nijmegen to ensure the safety of diplomats and lessen the threatening stances of both French and Dutch armies in the region. Roelofsen compares the Congress of Nijmegen to Münster, arguing that "the choice of the site, as well as the guarantees for its functioning on a peaceful enclave represented a carefully elaborated compromise." He calls the Congress of Nijmegen a "masterpiece of seventeenth-century diplomatic ingenuity" (p.118).


In this article, Professor William J. Roosen of Northern Arizona University attempts to prove, through the use of quantification and computer data processing, his thesis that France was not the leader in
European diplomacy during the Age of Louis XIV (see 2.27). The author loaded data from Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Grosz's *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden* (1936) into a computer program that allowed him to make comparisons of diplomatic practices between states. He found that Austria, Brandenburg-Prussia, and France sent the most diplomatic missions abroad out of a total of 5,037 missions from 1648 to 1715, and rulers preferred to use the rank of envoy for their diplomatic representatives sent abroad. He discovered that Louis XIV employed men of a higher social rank than did other European rulers, which may have given France an advantage in diplomatic affairs. Although the findings were limited, Roosen supports further use of computers and quantification in diplomatic history.


Roosen stresses the importance of diplomatic ceremonial or protocol in the conduct of international relations during the Age of Louis XIV. The author argues that diplomatic ceremonial upheld more than princely glory and honor. It served the function of illustrating and reinforcing the authority, dignity, and legitimacy of rulers, in addition to clarifying the relative positions of states in the international hierarchy. He provides
numerous examples of ceremonial practices and the effects of such conventions, focusing on the practices of Louis XIV in his relations with other rulers.


The author continues his challenge to the belief that French diplomatic institutions, practices, and diplomats were superior to those of the rest of Europe during the Age of Louis XIV (see 2.24, 2.28, and especially 2.27). In this essay he argues that the Sun King's "diplomats were not of consistently high quality. Although some were excellent, others were not. In this sense the diplomats who served the Sun King were no different from the representatives of other early modern rulers" (p.90). He cites some French diplomatic failures, such as the poor relations between French ambassadors and the Papacy in Rome because of the personalities of the Frenchmen. The author, however, dismisses the possibility that French representatives to Rome may have been carrying out the orders of their master. Even so, Roosen's argument serves as a reminder that the diplomatic corps of Louis XIV was not perfect.
In this revisionist essay, Professor Roosen questions the commonly held belief that France was the leader of European diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV. The author agrees that some French diplomatic practices were better than those used in the rest of Europe, but he argues that, "for the most part, French practices were fundamentally the same as those used by England, the Netherlands, Sweden, the emperors, and even the popes. The vaunted differences between the practices of the French and the rest of Europe are very difficult to find" (p. 84). Roosen cites the French strengths as the monarch's control of foreign affairs without parliamentary opposition, and the drafting of superior instructions for diplomats abroad. However, he professes that France fell behind other European states in the creation of diplomatic archives, the distribution of diplomatic newsletters to representatives abroad to keep them informed of important international developments, and the employment of permanent secretaries at embassies. Roosen's revisionist viewpoint is much overstated, but his argument that it is difficult to prove French leadership in diplomacy during the Age of Louis XIV is valid.

This is a valuable general study on European diplomacy during the Age of Louis XIV. In this revisionist work, Roosen argues that this period experienced few great diplomatic innovations like the development of the resident ambassador in earlier centuries. He states:

In the terms of practice and institutions, diplomacy was carried on in essentially the same way in 1715 as it had been in 1648. The last half of the seventeenth century seems to have been a period in the evolution of diplomatic method when change and development were momentarily absent (p.189).

To support his thesis, the author describes European diplomatic practices and institutions, concentrating on the conduct of diplomats and their masters. He summarizes the diplomacy and wars of the period, followed by discussions on the formulation of foreign policy, the role of ambassadors, gathering and transmission of information, including courier and postal service, ciphers, spying, and deciphering intercepted mail. Moreover, the author describes the general duties of diplomats from negotiations and court ceremonies to the protection of countrymen abroad. The majority of his examples are drawn from English, French, Swedish, and Dutch diplomacy. Roosen downplays the refined developments in diplomatic institutions and practices. Few diplomatic historians agree with Roosen’s thesis, but his study is useful as a general study of European diplomatic practices and institutions from
1648 to 1715. The study contains a useful chronology of diplomatic
events from 1648 to 1721 and a brief bibliography, but it lacks an
index.

2.29. Roosen, William J. "The Ambassador's Craft: A Study of the Functioning
of French Ambassadors under Louis XIV." Ph.D. diss., University of
Southern California, 1967. 204 pp.

In his doctoral dissertation Roosen examines the diplomatic practices
of French ambassadors during the reign of Louis XIV. He describes the
selection of ambassadors, their training and preparation, a typical
embassy abroad, a diplomat's duties and responsibilities, as well as
stresses the importance of an ambassador gathering information and
reporting this data back to the Sun King and his ministers for use in
formulating foreign policy. He focuses on the French ambassadors to
Spain, England, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden. Roosen shows that
Louis XIV's ambassadors lacked formal diplomatic training until late in
the reign, but he believes that the informal training an ambassador
gained from communications with his predecessor, diplomatic
instructions, and oral interviews with the king and his ministers,
combined with experience during an embassy, served as adequate
career training for the foreign service (p.67). Even so, the author is
unsure of the effectiveness of Louis XIV's ambassadors. The study is
based mainly on published French primary and secondary works, and
adds to Camille-Georges Picavet's *La Diplomatie Française au Temps de Louis XIV (1661-1715), Institutions, Moeurs et Coutumes* published in 1930. Roosen's study includes appendices listing the French secretaries of state for foreign affairs as well as the ambassadors to England, the Dutch Republic, Spain, and Sweden during the second half of the seventeenth century.


In his earliest published article, Professor Roosen addresses the role of ambassadors under Louis XIV. His conclusions are based on the analysis of seventy permanent ambassadors abroad from 1661 to 1715. He notes that the ambassador's primary duties were to advance the Sun King's interests by carrying out negotiations according to diplomatic instructions, gathering and sending information to Versailles, influencing local politics in favor of France, assisting Frenchmen engaged in commerce abroad, and upholding the king's prestige in diplomatic ceremony. The author discusses the ambassador's information gathering techniques, including monetary gifts to government officials and courtiers in addition to espionage, and the importance of diplomatic reports from ambassadors abroad in the formulation of French foreign policy. He also points out that ambassadors carried out their duties with little assistance beyond a personal secretary. He argues that French
diplomatic functions changed little during the reign of Louis XIV. This brief essay is extremely valuable for its description of the role and importance of French diplomats in foreign affairs during this period.


Professor Roosen investigates the backgrounds of French resident ambassadors during the reign of Louis XIV. He finds that all sixty-six men employed by the Sun King as resident ambassadors were nobles, and that on 103 diplomatic missions men from the nobility of the Robe served as ambassadors forty, the nobility of the Sword thirty-nine, clerics nineteen, and the minor nobility five times as resident ambassadors. Although the nobility of the Robe served on more diplomatic missions their numbers declined after 1690 as Louis XIV relied upon military men to perform duties as diplomats. Roosen's research shows that ambassadors were between thirty and sixty years old at the time of their appointment, and that family connections had little to do with their appointment as ambassadors. Many of the appointees had previous diplomatic experience as delegates to peace conferences, envoys to Minor Powers, or diplomatic secretaries. The author also brings to light that few French ambassadors abroad knew the language of the country to which they were accredited. They relied
on Latin and French to conduct diplomacy (p.129). Roosen points out that the career of an ambassador lacked prestige during the reign of Louis XIV.


Professor John C. Rule of Ohio State University reviews Lucien Bély's monumental study Espions et Ambassadeurs au Temps de Louis XIV published in Paris in 1990. The study addresses the employment and influence of spy networks and the functions of ambassadors in the events leading up to the Peace of Utrecht. Rule stresses that Bély focuses on the social aspects of spies and ambassadors. The work discusses the type of spies at work during the war, the location of their activities, and the transmission of their intelligence information, as well as the social background and influence of ambassadors and envoys at the Congress of Utrecht. The review contains a brief, but valuable discussion about intelligence gatherers, including spies in the immediate war zone, agents secreted at or near strategic sites, spies on missions, gadflies living at court or in major urban centers, deep-seated spies (moles), diplomats recruited by a foreign power, and the spy-masters who directed field operations.
Rule briefly examines the significant growth of the foreign office during the reign of Louis XIV. The department grew from fewer than a dozen commis in the early reign to nearly forty by 1705 (p.69). The rapid growth of the commis occurred under the direction of Charles Colbert de Croissy and his son and successor as secretary of state for foreign affairs, the Marquis of Torcy. The author stresses the client-patron relationship between the foreign minister and his commis, and notes the domination of five great families in the foreign office from the 1690s to 1715: the Blondels, Adams, Mignon-Fourniers, Pecquets, and Clairambaults. He describes their functions as bureau chiefs, disbursers of subsidies to French allies, correspondents to designated foreign princes, deciphers of important letters from abroad, maintainers of codes, ciphers, and passports, as well as preservers of diplomatic archives.

In this essay, Henry L. Snyder of the University of Kansas discusses the British diplomatic service during the Godolphin Ministry (1702-10).
He argues that under William III the English diplomatic service, which included Dutch diplomats, grew into a major diplomatic system. However, the King-Stadholder controlled English foreign policy and the Anglo-Dutch diplomatic system. After his death, English politicians, under the leadership of Lord Treasurer Godolphin, had to not only anglify the diplomatic service, but they also needed to maintain and direct this major diplomatic system. Snyder points out that Godolphin and the Duke of Marlborough replaced the leadership of William III and took control of the main aspects of English foreign policy during this period. In fact, Marlborough served as ambassador to The Hague and several other courts in addition to influencing English foreign policy and leading the military coalition against Louis XIV. At the same time, the English diplomatic corps gradually recruited young men of modest means by way of the patronage system to serve as diplomats abroad. Snyder notes that many of England’s diplomats were military officers by 1709. He concludes that the British diplomatic service of the eighteenth century was the creation of William III, Queen Anne, and their ministers.


Professor Victor-L. Tapié of the University of Paris at the Sorbonne describes Louis XIV’s personal conduct of foreign affairs from 1661 to
1715 in this article first published as "Aspects de la Méthode de Louis XIV en Politique Etrangère" in Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1966. The author begins by declaring that Louis XIV "maintained personal control over foreign affairs and took full responsibility for their conduct. He regarded foreign policy as the essence of his function as king and acknowledged the deep attraction it held for him" (p.3). Tapié admits, however, that important discussions took place in the Council of State which included only a few ministers of state, one of whom was the secretary of state for foreign affairs. But, the king was not subject to any rules or customary procedures when he came to make a decision of state. For the execution of foreign policy the Sun King had a secretariat for foreign affairs, organized as a proper ministry in the course of the reign. Its head drafted the orders for ambassadors and other diplomats and read their dispatches. This office was held for long periods by Hugues de Lionne, Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, Charles Colbert de Croissy, Pomponne once more, and, for the last sixteen years, Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, son of Croissy and son-in-law of Pomponne. These men were great officials, experienced diplomats, and first-class administrators. They were the king's servants, the loyal executors of his foreign policy.
According to Tapié, the central focus to Louis XIV’s foreign policy was French military might. He writes: "Military power was an essential instrument of foreign policy: it was necessary to defend what was already possessed and to make new acquisitions" (p.5). Force was crucial in the pursuit of French claims in Alsace and the Spanish Netherlands, or later to defend his borders against the anti-French coalition. Louis XIV believed in negotiating from strength! The author addresses the king’s use of diplomats, diplomatic instructions, gratifications, negotiations, and his belief in moderate treaty terms. Using examples, Tapié traces the evolution of the Sun King’s conduct of foreign affairs from his early aggressive policies to the defense of France against coalition forces.

See also:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III

WARFARE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the European states system experienced a series of epic struggles including the Wars of Louis XIV, the Austrian defeat of the Turks, and the triumph of Peter I of Russia over his Swedish rival Charles XII. The major conflicts were lengthy struggles: the Thirteen Years' War (1654-67) between Russia and Poland; the Dutch War (1672-78), a conflict that began with a French attack on the Dutch Republic but widened to include most of western Europe; the Nine Years' War (1688-97); the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13/14); and the Great Northern War (1700-21). In these struggles the armies and navies of the European powers served as instruments of foreign policy. These agents of war and diplomacy, especially those belonging to the Great Powers, experienced significant changes in organization, size, and combat effectiveness during the Age of Louis XIV. So much so, that some historians challenge the Roberts'
thesis of a "Military Revolution" from 1560 to 1660, and argue that the true revolution of the early modern period occurred during 1660 to 1720.¹

In 1660 few states had anything resembling a standing army. The crucial development in the Military Revolution was France's adoption of a large standing army between 1640 and 1680. From the beginning of his personal reign in 1661, Louis XIV supported the creation of a large standing army to back his assertive foreign policy. In fact, the Sun King's domination of Europe was primarily based on his ability to recruit, arm, and train a larger standing army than his rivals. The French monarch's army increased from 30,000 in 1659 to 97,000 in 1666.² The army reached a peak of 253,000 in the Dutch


War, 340,000 in the Nine Years' War, and 255,000 in the War of the Spanish Succession. Such immense wartime expansion was in turn a response to the fact that, from the 1680s onwards, the Sun King's rivals had come to realize that the only way to combat French power was to organize, equip, and train their own armies on a comparable scale. Thus, the Dutch, English, and Austrians built up large standing armies to counter French aggression by the 1690s. Moreover, Peter the Great increased the size and efficiency of the Russian army in the fight against Charles XII in the Great Northern War.

Louis XIV and his ministers also led the way in improving military administration. They sought to avoid reliance on the credit of military entrepreneurs and establish the principle of state-controlled, state-funded armies. François Michel Le Tellier, the Marquis of Louvois, the secretary of state for war (1668-91), with the avid support of his king, regulated the payment of the troops; standardized their drill, training, arms, and equipment; and introduced distinctive uniforms in the assertion of the king's control over the army. In addition, Louvois improved the French logistics system of munitions and provisions, establishing a system of strategically positioned supply depots near the French frontier. At the same time, Louis XIV invested heavily in fortifying

---

France's vulnerable frontiers and harbors. He had Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban construct thirty-three new fortresses and renovate many more as well as fortify the docks at Dunkirk. Fortresses played an important role in the style of warfare fought during this age. One historian has noted that "sieges were far more frequent than pitched battles and were begun as readily as battles were avoided." And, in siege warfare, the French, especially under the guidance of Vauban, were the leaders in both offensive and defensive operations.

Navies expanded in the same way as armies. Powers that had both land and sea frontiers pursued fluctuating naval policies, depending on the changing view of their relative importance. Only England, secure in island isolation, consistently regarded the navy as more important than the army. In the mid-seventeenth century standing navies, unlike armies, were nothing new. However, they were very expensive to equip and maintain. With the realization of the importance attached to winning and protecting overseas trade, the major sea powers of the Dutch Republic, England, and France increased the size of their navies in the 1650s to 1680s, relying upon purpose-built warships instead of converted merchantmen; standardized their naval arms and equipment;

4Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815, 97.

provided officer and crew training; and developed their naval fighting tactics, such as in-line ahead formation attacks, broadside firing, and disciplined firepower. The Dutch possessed the largest fleet, operating an unrivaled 100 ships carrying 4,000 guns and 21,000 men in the 1660s, but by the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) the English had surpassed their rival. Even so, the English navy failed to gain command of the seas because while it fought the Dutch in three naval wars during the 1650s to 1670s, the French, under Jean Baptiste Colbert, the secretary of state for the navy (1669-83), had built up a large fleet with additional naval bases to challenge English and Dutch control of the seas. In 1683, the French fleet consisted of 120 vessels mounting fifty or more cannon. Within five years Louis XIV's fleet was over twice the size of the Dutch, and even outnumbered the English. However, the naval race continued, and each of the three powers built and fitted ships at an unprecedented rate during the Nine Years' War. The English, nevertheless, moved into an unassailable position of supremacy after their defeat of the French fleet at La Hogue in 1692. This defeat caused France to change its naval strategy from *guerre d'escadre* to the *guerre de course* (attacks on Anglo-Dutch trade rather than fleet action) for the duration of the Wars of

---


Louis XIV. Thus, England had gained control of the seas by out-building both its ally, the Dutch Republic, and defeating in battle its enemy, France, during the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession.

There are several important general studies that focus on warfare during the Age of Louis XIV. The essays of David G. Chandler, John W. Stoye, John S. Bromley, and A.N. Ryan in "Armies and Navies" (3.1.4) are a good starting point. Both Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (3.1.2) and Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles (3.1.14) stress the important military developments of this period. For detailed information regarding these developments and the art of warfare, see David G. Chandler's The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (3.1.3). Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory (3.1.10) examines the battle tactics of the era. Siege warfare and fortresses are considered in Christopher Duffy's Fire and Stone (3.1.8) and The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789 (3.1.9). Peter Padfield's Tide of Empires (3.1.11) is perhaps the best general survey on naval matters during this era. And, as for the impact of warfare on society, see Matthew S. Anderson's study War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789 (3.1.1).

---

There is a significant volume of literature devoted to the armed forces of France and England. For Louis XIV's army, see John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (3.2.11), William H. Lewis, "The Army" (3.2.7), Ronald Martin, "The Army of Louis XIV" (3.2.17), and chapter four in Weigley (3.1.14). The Sun King's military strategy and management of the French army are discussed in John A. Lynn's "A Quest for Glory: The Formation of Strategy under Louis XIV, 1771-1715" (3.2.8), John B. Wolf's "Louis XIV, Soldier-King" (3.2.27) and John A. Lynn's "The Sun King's Star Wars" (3.2.15). Lynn also provides an important reevaluation of the troop strength of the French army in "Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siècle, 1610-1715" (3.2.13). The best study on Marshal Vauban is F.J. Hebbert and George A. Rothrock, *Soldier of France*, (3.2.6). There are no adequate studies on Le Tellier or Louvois, nor French military commanders such as Turenne, Condé, Vendôme, and Luxembourg. The Sun King's navy is examined in Baron Armel de Wismes, "The French Navy under Louis XIV" (3.2.26) and Geoffrey W. Symcox, "The Navy of Louis XIV" (3.2.22). As for England, Correlli Barnett provides an adequate overview of the development of the English army in the relevant chapters of *Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970* (3.3.1) and Paul M. Kennedy does the same for its navy in *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (3.3.10). Cromwell's military and navy are examined in Charles H. Firth's *Cromwell's Army* (3.3.9), Michael Baumber's "Cromwell's
Soldier-Admirals" (3.3.3), Bernard Capp's *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660* (5.2.2), and Michael Baumber's *General-at-Sea: Robert Blake and the Seventeenth Century Revolution in Naval Warfare* (3.3.4).

For the army of the Restored Monarchy see John Childs' *The Army of Charles II* (3.3.7) and *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution* (3.3.6). Important studies on William III's army include John Childs' *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (3.3.8) and *The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697* (6.3.5), and his navy is analyzed in John Ehrman's *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697* (6.3.9). The military of Queen Anne is best presented in David G. Chandler's * Marlborough as Military Commander* (3.3.5), Major R.E. Scouller's *The Armies of Queen Anne* (3.3.11), and John H. Owen's *War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1702-1708* (7.7.4). In addition, see John M. Stapleton, Jr., "Importing the Military Revolution: William III, the Glorious Revolution, and the Rise of the Standing Army in Britain, 1688-1712" (3.3.12).

As for the other powers, the Dutch navy is best served by Peter Padfield's *Tide of Empires* (3.1.11), James R. Jones' "The Dutch Navy and National Survival in the Seventeenth Century" (3.4.4), and Jaap P. Bruijn's *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century* (3.4.3). There is no study of the Dutch army in the English language, but Stephen B. Baxter's *William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702* (6.3.2) is useful. For Russia,
see especially Christopher Duffy's "Peter I, 'the Great', 1682-1725" (3.5.2), Richard F. Hellie's "The Petrine Army" (3.5.3), and Edward J. Phillips' *The Founding of Russia's Navy* (3.5.7). Sweden's army is discussed in Alf Åberg, "The Swedish Army: From Lützen to Narva" (3.5.1) and Ragnhild M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, (8.2.5). There is little on Austria other than Thomas M. Barker's *Double Eagle and Crescent* (6.6.1) and John W. Stoye's *The Siege of Vienna* (6.6.13). Christopher Storrs' "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665-1700)" (6.5.5) illuminates an important gap in historiography. However, the military of the German states and Denmark during the Age of Louis XIV lack adequate studies in the English language.

### 3.1. General Studies


Matthew S. Anderson, a professor emeritus of international history at the University of London, provides a useful introduction to the study of war and its impact on society from the beginning of the Thirty Years' War to the French Revolution. The author focuses on the breadth of the European experience, using English, Russian, Polish, German, and French sources. The second part of this work serves as an outstanding brief survey of warfare from 1660 to 1740. Anderson discusses the struggles for power, the creation of large standing armies, the growth
of naval power, and the increase of effective and detailed state control over armed forces. He argues that war and the preparation for war had a significant impact, sometimes destructive and sometimes constructive, on the European economy and society. On the debit side, war inflicted demographic losses by slowing the growth rate of population and economic growth, especially seaborne trade, as well as destroying houses, crops, and animals. It diverted both labor and capital from relatively productive to relatively unproductive uses such as the building of fortifications and the conduct of sieges. On a more positive note, these decades of conflict saw the emergence, on a much larger scale than ever before, of heavy capital investment in industries associated with supporting armies and navies. Anderson notes that the balance sheet varied widely from state to state. However, war, for the most part, served as a financial strain for every state. The study contains a valuable bibliography.


In this analytical study of European warfare, Professor Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter challenges Michael Roberts' thesis that a "Military Revolution" occurred between 1560 and 1660. Instead, Black argues that more significant changes took place from 1660 to 1720 (p.7). He stresses that these changes were both qualitative and
quantitative. The author notes the important improvements in military and naval administration, especially in the ways in which armies and navies were trained, equipped, paid, and controlled by their governments. Better administration allowed the recruitment and maintenance of larger armies. Black points out that the European states greatly expanded the size of their standing armies during this period, particularly between 1680 and 1710. This was certainly true of Austria, France, Russia, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Savoy-Piedmont. In addition to the growth of standing armies, the era experienced technological changes in land warfare, including the replacement of the pike by the newly developed socket bayonet, the substitution of the matchlock musket by the flintlock, and the development of the pre-packaged cartridge, which increased infantry firepower and maneuverability.

There were also considerable changes in naval warfare from 1660 to 1720. Black recognizes that the Dutch, English, and French invested heavily in naval power and greatly expanded the size of their fleets during the 1650s to 1680s. There was also a shift from bronze to cast-iron guns, as advances in cast-iron technology provided cheap and dependable heavy guns. Moreover, the development of in-line ahead tactics greatly altered naval warfare, not only tactically, but also by
increasing the importance of heavily gunned ships of the line, and thus of the states able to deploy and maintain substantial numbers of such ships. The study is based both on archival research and a wide knowledge of important secondary works. It includes a brief, but useful bibliography.


In this outstanding monograph, Professor David G. Chandler of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, examines in detail the tactical organization and handling of the European armies of the late seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. In four parts, Chandler deals with the cavalry, infantry, artillery, and engineering services of the period, describing their representation, organization, equipment, training, and tactical employment. He concentrates on the English and French forces with discussion of Dutch, Swedish, Prussian, Austrian, Russian, and Turkish practices on a more limited scale to demonstrate regional differences and peculiarities. The work serves as a useful handbook for specialists, graduate students, and teachers. It includes a valuable bibliography, seventeen illustrations, thirteen diagrams, and four appendices listing the more important wars, battles, and sieges of the period.

This is a highly valuable collection of essays by prominent military historians. In the first essay, Professor Chandler sketches the developments in the art of land warfare during the Age of Louis XIV. The author stresses that compared to the Thirty Years' War "the conduct of military operations [during this period] tended to become limited . . . [with] objectives . . . restricted to dynastic or commercial ambitions . . . [and] that the fighting itself was increasingly regarded as a relatively gentlemanly affair governed by firm conventions" (p.741). He addresses the growth of standing armies, the impact of Le Tellier and Louvois in French military administration, developments in infantry weapons, the effects on tactics and tactical formations, the art of fortification and siege warfare, as well as field operations. Following this essay, John W. Stoye of Oxford University appraises the impact of war on society. He discusses recruiting and the composition of French, German, English, Swedish, Danish, Polish, Russian, and Brandenburg-Prussian armies in addition to military-civilian relationships. And, finally, Professor John S. Bromley of the University of Southampton and A.N. Ryan of the University of Liverpool trace the development of European navies during this period. They stress that the French, English, and
Dutch possessed the most powerful navies of the period, with the English acquiring predominance during the War of the Spanish Succession. The authors discuss the navies, shipbuilding, dockyards, and bases of the leading naval powers, as well as the fleets belonging to Sweden, Denmark, and Russia.


Chandler presents the memoirs of two participants in the War of the Spanish Succession. Captain Robert Parker of the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland and Eugène-Jean-Philippe, Count of Mérode-Westerloo, throw considerable light on the day-to-day conduct of Marlborough's most important campaigns. The author provides a valuable introduction, map, glossary of military terms, and appendices containing a biographical listing of key persons, list of sieges, and a discussion of military techniques employed in the conflict.


In this article, Professor John Childs of the University of Leeds traces the military career of Frederick Hermann von Schomberg (1615-90), Marshal of France, to support his thesis that the standing armies during the Age of Louis XIV were not national armies. The author accepts that the standing armies of the late seventeenth century were national in
terms of control, political direction, and administration, but their composition was cosmopolitan and international. He stresses that standing armies consisted of a mixture of natives and foreign mercenaries. The Great Powers recruited in lesser countries and also hired, formed, and trained troops from their fellow rulers. Hesse-Cassel, Württemberg, the Swiss Cantons, Saxony, and Denmark all rented their native manpower to England, France, Austria, Spain, and the Dutch Republic. A quarter of the armies of Louis XIV came from states other than France, and nearly one-half of the troops of the Dutch Republic were enlisted abroad. During the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, England hired as many German and Scandinavian soldiers as it raised subjects from within its own frontiers. In his case study, Child describes Schomberg's military career as an officer in six different armies: he fought for the Dutch Republic, Sweden, France, Portugal, Brandenburg-Prussia, and England at different stages of his life. In his career the German-born Schomberg had served as a French marshal, general-in-chief of the Brandenburg-Prussian army, the second-in-command of Dutch forces, and the second-in-command of the English army. Childs believes that Schomberg "fitted into a style of life followed by hundreds if not thousands of central and western Europeans during the seventeenth century -- the international military brotherhood" (p.48).

In this brief study, Professor Childs surveys European armies and warfare from 1648 to 1789. He centers his attention on the creation and employment of standing armies, noting the interrelationship between permanent military establishments and absolute rule, the burden of such armies on governments and society, as well as military administration, organization, and operations. The author chooses his examples from a wide range of states including England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Poland, and the Dutch Republic. However, there is little discussion of military operations from 1648 to 1700. The study serves as a good introduction for the general reader to the armies and warfare of this period. The work contains five illustrations and a valuable annotated bibliography, but it lacks footnotes.


This is a fascinating study on the arts of fortification and siege craft from 1660 to 1860, a period when fortress warfare often exercised a decisive influence upon military strategy, politics, and urban life. Christopher Duffy of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst discusses the processes of designing and building fortresses as well as siege warfare, from the opening blockade to the final capitulation or storm.
The author focuses on the work of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707), the chief engineer of Louis XIV who constructed or rebuilt about sixty fortresses to protect French frontiers. Duffy argues that Vauban’s work ushered in the classic century or military engineering, which lasted from the high tide of the Sun King’s conquests in the 1680s and 1690s to the fall of the old political and military order at the time of the French Revolution. He stresses that well-sited fortresses served a great variety of strategic ends. For offensive war, two or three well-sited strongholds gave the best possible base for a move into enemy territory, such as Louis XIV’s armies proved in the 1670s to 1690s. Moreover, the French monarch employed a curtain of fortresses in eastern and northeastern France to defend his frontier against advancing English, Dutch, and Imperial forces in the War of the Spanish Succession. Mention is made of the engineering work of Vauban’s contemporaries, the Dutch Menno van Coehoorn (1641-1704) and the Swedish Erik Dahlberg (1625-1703). This study is useful for students of military history. It includes eighty-five illustrations, a description of the sieges of Namur in 1692 and 1695, a glossary of fortress and siege warfare terminology, as well as hints for touring a fortress.

In this sequel to his *Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660* (1979), Duffy supplies a history of fortress warfare during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His thesis is that the construction and employment of fortresses and fortress systems shaped the calculations of strategists and statesmen, and often dictated the course of military campaigns during this period. He explores the influence of the fortress in the dynastic wars of the Bourbons, Habsburgs, and Hohenzollerns, the contest for influence in the Baltic, the crusades of the West against the Turks, and in the peculiar conditions of colonial campaigning and the War of American Independence. The chapters "Louis XIV and the Apogees of the Old Fortress Warfare, 1660-1715", "The Masters: Coehoorn and Vauban", "The Battle for Sweden’s Trans-Baltic Bridgeheads", and "The Last Crusade - the Repulse of Ottoman Turkey" are outstanding depictions of the role of fortresses and siege warfare during the Age of Louis XIV. The author concentrates on military operations and sieges, emphasizing points of special technical or strategic interest. The study contains 154 illustrations, an extensive bibliography on the history of warfare from 1660 to 1789, and a glossary of fortress and siege warfare terminology.
It is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students interested in gaining an understanding of the nature of warfare during the Age of Vauban.


The author provides a valuable, detailed discussion on land warfare battle tactics from the Nine Years' War to the end of the Seven Years' War. He describes the evolution of the tactical doctrines of the period, arguing that most the tactical systems employed were based on available weaponry: the flintlock musket and socket bayonet. He devotes 137 pages to the infantry and cavalry tactics used in the Nine Years' War, Turkish wars, War of the Spanish Succession, and Great Northern War. He states that the adoption of the flintlock in the 1680s and 1690s changed infantry firing formations and tactics. The Dutch, British, and Prussians quickly developed platoon firing which gave them the advantage of continuity of fire in linear warfare. Moreover, Nosworthy relates the success of Charles XII of Sweden and the Duke of Marlborough in changing cavalry tactics from the use of pistols and carbines to rely on cold steel. The study is based on published primary sources and secondary works. It is recommended for specialists and individuals interested in war games.

In the second volume of his *Tide of Empires,* Peter Padfield, a specialist in naval history, examines European naval campaigns from 1654 to 1763. He stresses the importance of naval strength to the rising seaborne trading powers of Europe and their quest to expand markets in search of wealth. Chapters include discussions of Dutch naval and economic power, the Second Anglo-Dutch War, the rise of French naval power under Jean Baptiste Colbert, the Third Anglo-Dutch War, and the naval struggle of the Maritime Powers against Louis XIV in the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession, ending in the triumph of British naval power. The study is largely devoted to the naval campaigns during the Age of Louis XIV. It contains a glossary of naval terminology and forty-six illustrations, including eight battle diagrams of particular interest. The work is recommended as an introduction study to naval warfare of the era.


Dave R. Palmer of the history department at West Point provides a short overview of the Wars of Louis XIV. Discussion includes the rise of French power, Louis XIV and the ministerial system, the evolving
command and staff system, and the military campaigns of the War of
the Spanish Succession. The study contains seven useful maps and
twenty-two illustrations.

Half of the Seventeenth Century.” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum

In this article, Géza Perjés examines the effect of logistics on military
strategy in the late seventeenth century. The author ponders how the
Great Powers supplied their enormous armies in the field? He analyzes
the logistical requirements of the armies, including bread, fodder, and
transportation. He investigates the use of supply magazines and
contractors. In his final analysis, Perjés argues that logistical problems
had a great impact on military strategy by limiting the opportunities for
armies to achieve decisive victories.

from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana

Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple University gives an account
of the conduct of war from the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 to Waterloo
in 1815. He argues the thesis that warfare during this period was
dominated by the quest for decisive victories on the battlefield. He
writes:

> War between 1631 and 1815 revolved around grand-scale battles
> because, in that age more than any other, the economic, social,
and technological circumstances of war permitted the massing of
tens of thousands of soldiers on a single field for the test of
battles, while at the same time military strategists hoped by
means of battle to secure decisions in war, and thereby to secure
the objects for which men went to war, with a quickness and
dispatch that would keep the costs of war reasonably
proportionate to the purposes attained (p.xii).

However, Weigley points out that decisive victories remained elusive.

In part one of his study the author devotes 163 pages to an examin-
ation of the Thirty Years' War, the army and wars of Louis XIV,
Marlborough's battles in the War of the Spanish Succession, the
emergence of the Great Powers of eastern Europe, and the rise of naval
power. The author notes that Louis XIV failed to fight a decisive battle
in his early wars because of the increasing strength of the anti-French
coalition. He stresses that Marlborough, despite his tactical victories,
could not achieve a decisive strategic victory because of the defensive
French fortress system and Louis XIV's ability to raise, train, and equip
new armies to compensate for losses. Weigley's study explores the
foreign policy of the contending adversaries, the strategic thinking and
the personalities of the military commanders, the tactical maneuvering
on the battlefield, the role of armaments and technology, as well as the
performance of the soldiers. It is based on secondary works and lacks
footnotes, but includes a useful annotated bibliography. The work
serves as a good introduction to the conduct of warfare during this period.

3.2. French Military Power


Professor Paul W. Bamford of the University of Minnesota explores the employment of the French galley fleet in the Mediterranean Region during the reign of the Sun King. In 1665, Louis XIV created the French Galley Corps as a tool of royal authority. The corps consisted of fifty galleys employing fifteen thousand oarsmen by 1690. But, the author argues the galley fleet was of little value as a fighting force. He believes the fleet "contributed little to the power of Louis' navy and still less to his ability to command the sea. Galleys represented a deflection of French maritime energies as far as power is concerned" (p.47). They were no match for the sail-driven warships that dominated the seas in the late seventeenth century. The galleys were too light to carry heavy ordnance and were highly vulnerable to cannon fire. Moreover, they had a limited range and were difficult to row in stormy seas. Such limitations meant the French avoided employing the fleet in combat, with the first action taking place in 1702. Even so, Louis XIV spent lavishly
on this largely obsolete, accident-prone, and poorly built fleet. However, Bamford points out that the monarch used the galleys primarily as prisons and propaganda tools. At a time when crusading was still in favor, the Sun King demonstrated his Christian faith and fervor to the Pope, the Knights of Malta, and other forces in the church through his enslavement of Protestants and infidels on the galleys. The work holds limited value to the study of naval warfare during this period.


The development of an effective system of army intendants contributed to the rise of French military power in the seventeenth century. In this monograph, Professor Douglas Clark Baxter of Ohio University examines the roles and functions of army intendants during the Thirty Years' War as well as under the leadership of Louis XIV's first war minister, Michel Le Tellier (1642-68), a former army intendant of the army in Italy, and his son, François Michel Le Tellier, the Marquis of Louvois, who later replaced his father as secretary of state for war (1668-91). Baxter stresses that the role of army intendants, who were appointed to their positions for only one campaign, was to serve as agents of royal power in the field armies and act as the chiefs of the civilian-military hierarchies. They were administrators who handled
matters of finance and supply as well as served as the war minister's personal agents within the field armies: they were informers who reported everything to their master. With such men the Crown asserted its authority over its field armies. The study includes an appendix listing 191 appointees serving as army intendants from 1630 to 1691.


Sir Reginald Blomfield, an architect, provides the first biography of Vauban in the English language. He concentrates on Vauban's activities as a military engineer and architect. The study is based on studies by French military writers and Vauban's own writings. The author views Vauban as "perhaps the greatest military engineer that has ever existed" (p.v). His book is informative despite its lack of a critical examination. It includes thirty-five illustrations of fortress designs, a list of places fortified by Vauban, and a glossary of fortification terminology.


René Chartrand supplies a brief analysis of the French army under Louis XIV. He sees the Sun King's military as "the first modern army" (p.3). The author describes how Louis XIV took over the army from the Colonel-General of the French Infantry, the Duke of Epernon, in 1661. The Sun King, with the aid of Le Tellier and his son, Louvois,
transformed the French army from "a small, rag-tag collection of semi-independent units to a very large and modern force controlled by central authority -- an army both feared and imitated by the rest of Europe" (p.8). In fact, the French army had up to four hundred thousand men as compared to one hundred thousand Austrian and seventy-five thousand English during the War of the Spanish Succession (pp.11-12).

In building up this army Louis XIV demanded and obtained order, discipline, and absolute loyalty to the Crown. Louvois, who Chartrand calls "a great administrator and probably one of the greatest army reformers in modern times," managed to reduce corruption greatly, notably by the actions of war commissioners and army intendants who carefully supervised the army (p.8). Louvois stressed officer education and professionalism, as well as drill practice, strict discipline, and the need for standard weapons and uniforms for the king's army. The author includes brief comments about French army units, uniforms, and weapons, in addition to forty-five illustrations and one map. This study is primarily aimed towards individuals interested in war games, but it has value for historians since little has been published in the English language on Louis XIV's army.
Military historians agree that siege warfare and the work of Marshal Vauban played a key role in French foreign policy and military strategy during the Age of Louis XIV. In this essay, originally published in 1943, Henry Guerlac, a professor of the history of science at Cornell University, examines the role of science and Vauban in Louis XIV's military machine. He argues that science and warfare have always been intimately connected, and the designing of fortresses involved a fair amount of mathematical and architectural knowledge. He views Vauban as "the great military engineer" of the age and notes the marshal's significant influence on military architecture, strategy, and war during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Guerlac provides a brief account of Vauban's long and illustrious career. He stresses the marshal's achievements were "in applied science and simple applied mathematics" (p.77), and his most significant contributions were in the science of fortification and the art of siege craft. Vauban designed over a hundred fortresses and harbor installations as well as conducted over fifty sieges (p.75). He built extremely defendable strongholds besides perfecting the system of building parallel trenches to capture enemy fortresses. Guerlac shows that Vauban urged Louis XIV to round out his
northeastern frontiers with further annexations and the construction of a fortress system to serve as further bases for attack as well as to defend France in the 1670s.


Professor George A. Rothrock of the University of Alberta and F.J. Hebbert, a fortification specialist, supply only the second biography of Vauban in the English language, the first having been published fifty years earlier by Sir Reginald Blomfield (see 3.2.3). The authors provide an overview of Vauban's work and ideas. They argue that past writers have overemphasized Vauban's work in the design and construction of fortifications. They profess that Vauban's principal innovations concerned the attack, and the marshal always believed that "the best defense was an aggressive offense" (p.xvii). The authors write an excellent account of Vauban's early career as Louis XIV's chief engineer and his role in fortress construction and siege warfare while the king was pursuing military gloire in the War of Devolution to the Nine Years' War. Less satisfying is the authors brief description of the War of the Spanish Succession down to Vauban's death in 1707. Although they attempt to provide an account of the life of Vauban, the authors are at their best in relating the design and construction of fortresses as well as...
the sieges conducted by Vauban. The study contains thirty illustrations. It is recommended as the best biography on Vauban.


This essay by William H. Lewis serves as a useful introduction to the reform and modernization of the French army under the Sun King. Lewis, a retired British military officer educated at Sandhurst, focuses on the accomplishments of the Marquis of Louvois, the French war minister (1668-91). He begins by describing the French army during the first half of the seventeenth century, stating "the armies which under Louis XIII and Mazarin had fought Spain, were a hard-bitten, hard-fighting, undisciplined, ill-fed, badly paid rabble, held together by the prestige of famous generals and colonels, living by loot and extortion, things of horror and terror to the civilian population, friend and foe alike" (p.125). Lewis notes the extensive corruptive practices of the army captains in recruiting, muster-calls, the paying of troops, and equipment availability which meant the Crown had no idea of the effective strength of the army until it deployed to the field.

The author depicts how Louis XIV took control of the army as the new Colonel-General of the Infantry, and employed Louvois to reform the army into an organized, disciplined, and effective fighting force. To accomplish this goal, the war minister reformed the officer corps by
suppressing the sale of commissions; introducing the new ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, which were achievable by merit alone; punishing captains who falsified muster rolls; and introducing mandatory officer training. These reforms contributed to Louvois' creation of a modern, professional officer corps. The war minister also attended to reforms to improve the quality of the enlisted force. He tightened up recruiting procedures, instituted a uniform scale of pay and ensured that soldiers received their pay, improved military hospitals and homes for ex-soldiers, as well as enforced drill, weapons training, and strict discipline. Even so, the author points out that the crown experienced difficulties in acquiring sufficient numbers of recruits to defend French borders in the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession. In addition to these reforms, Louvois was responsible for introducing the use of strategically-positioned supply magazines which allowed the French army to attack and catch its enemies off guard early during campaigning seasons. But, Lewis also points out some serious problems with the French army. For example, he notes the corruption of supply contractors damaged military readiness; the slow acceptance of the flintlock and bayonet over the musket and pike limited the combat performance of the French army in the Nine Years' War; and Louis XIV's personal control of military decisions from Versailles hampered field
operations in the Low Countries during the War of the Spanish Succession.


Professor John A. Lynn of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana examines the decision-making process, values, limitations, and circumstances associated with the creation of Louis XIV’s grand strategy from 1661 to 1715. The author stresses the Sun King’s complete control over the formulation of foreign policy and strategy. However, the monarch considered advice offered by members of the Council of State and leading military generals. Lynn also emphasizes Louis XIV’s values of war, dynasty and *gloire* (defined as reputation or prestige). As for limitations, Lynn notes that Louis XIV’s attempt to maintain a large army and fight long-lasting wars against great coalitions was affected by a shortage of money. Financial difficulties led to Louis XIV pursuing a strategy that placed the French army near or in enemy territory to conduct “courses” (raids into enemy territory to forage, collect grain, and seize livestock) or collect “contributions” (payments from villages and towns occupied by the French army). Lynn also stresses the importance of positional warfare (the design, construction,
defense, and attack of fortifications) in the making of French strategy and conduct of military operations. Louis XIV sought to achieve a pré carré (straighten or square off) of the French frontiers to make them more defensible. The pré carré would allow the French army to more effectively defend the frontiers with fewer fortresses.

Professor Lynn outlines the three stages of Louis XIV’s strategy. In the first stage (1661-78), the Sun King sought to advance his gloire by conquering new territory. In the second stage (1678-97), Louis XIV sought to establish defensible frontiers on the French northern and eastern borders. The last stage (1697-1714) was dominated by the French army fighting a holding action on friendly territory (the Spanish Netherlands, Piedmont, and Spain) outside French boundaries. The author argues that each of Louis XIV’s strategies was flawed. The Sun King miscalculated that each of his wars would be brief. He believed that his wars would be fought against isolated weak enemies, resulting in easy victories for France. The Sun King did not expect to fight wars of attrition against large anti-French coalitions that would limit his achievements. The study is highly recommended reading for those individuals interested in military strategy.

Professor Lynn suggests that contributions played an important role in financing the Wars of Louis XIV. He argues that contributions or French extortion in enemy or neutral territory paid for about twenty-five percent of the French war effort (p.134). However, the author admits that there is little documentation to support his suggestion. Even so, the scant evidence shows that the Spanish Low Countries and the Rhineland were lucrative sources of contributions during the Wars of Louis XIV.


In this essay, Lynn argues that positional warfare played an important role in mobilizing resources for the maintenance of French armies as well as defending France in the Wars of Louis XIV. His essay focuses on the French use of fortifications and fortified lines to tap the wealth beyond their borders. The French army used fortifications and fortified lines to control and intimidate towns and villages beyond the French frontier to provide contributions of food, fodder, or money to support Louis XIV's army. In fact, Lynn believes that twenty-five percent of the cost of maintaining the French army in the field was paid for by contributions (p.146). Moreover, Lynn describes how the French
employed fortifications as forward bases for conducting courses or raids into enemy territory to gather food, fodder, and other supplies. Lynn convinces the reader that fortifications played a much larger role than as a defense barrier in the Wars of Louis XIV, especially since these conflicts turned into wars of attrition.


This is a highly valuable work that fills a major gap in Ludovician historiography. Professor Lynn provides the first detailed study of the French army in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He stresses that the army was the largest institution created by the Bourbon monarchy, and it played a significant role in France’s rise to European dominance during the grand siècle. The author examines the tremendous growth of the French army along with its administration and supply, military command, rank and file, military technology, and tactics. He concludes that the era witnessed few changes in military tactics, especially concerning the cavalry and artillery. Even so, the French infantry adopted Dutch and Swedish arms, drill, and tactics. The army changed from muskets and pikes to flintlocks and socket bayonets in the later part of the century. Operationally, the French avoided battle and embraced siege warfare. Louis XIV and his generals preferred siege
warfare because of the costly nature and indecisiveness of battles. In
siege warfare the French were masters of fortress construction and
siege operations. The study is based on research in French archives as
well as published primary and secondary works. It includes a
bibliography of studies published in the French and English languages.

Contributions during the Grand Siècle.” The Journal of Modern History
65 (June 1993): 286-310.

The author explores the role of armed requisition in supporting the
expansion of the French military in the seventeenth century. Professor
Lynn discusses the growth of the French army from 60,000 soldiers at
the beginning of the century to 125,000 during the Franco-Spanish War
(1635-59) and 340,000 in the reign of Louis XIV (p.286). He argues
that the increased size of the military made it impossible for the monarch
to maintain the French army and keep it in the field by way of regular
taxation alone. Regular taxation needed to be supplemented by what
Lynn calls the “tax of violence.” During the Franco-Spanish War, this
tax of violence took the form of the French army pillaging villages and
towns within the borders of France to meet their needs. He states that
“extortion of money, goods, and even sex . . . was an integral and
necessary aspect of the way in which the Bourbon monarchy tapped the
resources required by the army” (p.290).
In the reign of Louis XIV, the French use of the tax of violence within their borders declined. Lynn shows that the Marquis of Louvois and his army intendants acquired greater control over the French army, instilling stronger discipline by punishing the officers of army units which pillaged French towns. However, the author stresses that the tax of violence did not end, it merely evolved into the practice of demanding contributions from enemy and neutral villages outside of French territory. The French army demanded contributions from these villages and towns for "protection." Those villages and towns that failed to pay were burned down. Lynn professes that the practice of contributions became an integral part of France's fiscal base for war after 1667. He believes that the largest contributions were extorted from the Spanish Netherlands. He estimates that twenty-five percent of French military operations and expenditures were acquired by the way of contributions (p.306).


In this important essay, Professor Lynn publishes his research concerning the growth of the French army during the seventeenth century. His findings revise the "paper strength" military figures employed by
historians in the past (for example, see Chartrand, 3.2.4 and Lewis, 3.2.7). He writes:

For over a century, historians divided French military expansion into two stages. First, in order to challenge Spain, Richelieu and Louis XIII assembled an army of unprecedented size in 1635. Totaling 150,000 or more, this force was at least twice as large as any previous wartime military maintained by the French monarchy. A second phase of growth followed the military and administrative reform associated with the first decades of the personal reign of Louis XIV. Troop strength reached 280,000 during the Dutch War (1672-78) and hit 400,000 in the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97), continuing at that level for the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) (p.117).

Lynn's research, however, shows that the French army reached a high level of 125,000 men during the Thirty Years' War. In the Wars of Louis XIV, the French military machine reached wartime highs of 134,000 in the War of Devolution, 253,000 in the Dutch War, 340,000 in the Nine Years' War, and 255,000 in the War of the Spanish Succession. His research supports the two-step concept of French military expansion under Richelieu and Louis XIV. Richelieu nearly doubled his previous troop levels when France declared war on Spain in the Thirty Years' War. Later, the Sun King commanded wartime forces almost three times greater. However, Lynn's research proves that Louis XIV did not command an army of 400,000 strong during his last two wars, and, in fact, he led fewer forces in the War of the Spanish Succession than during the Nine Years' War.

This is a brief article depicting the brutality of armies toward civilians in the seventeenth century. Lynn describes the transition from extortion by marauding soldiers during the Thirty Years' War to the more refined extortion of contributions in the late seventeenth century. He describes the threat of rape by marauding soldiers, the French practice of executions (destroying villages that failed to pay contributions), as well as the French policy of reprisals (heavy-handed retaliation on enemy villages for enemy raids on French villages). This is an interesting article.


In this outstanding article, Professor Lynn traces the evolution of Louis XIV's military strategy from conquest in the War of Devolution and the Dutch War to the establishment of an iron frontier that would provide absolute security for France after 1675. The author describes the monarch's quest for military gloire during the first two wars, stating that "the young Sun King burned to fight a great war, winning victories that would enlarge his domains and burnish his gloire" (p.91).

The change in French strategy occurred when Louis XIV's army was forced to withdraw from the Dutch Republic in 1674. The king now
shifted from the offensive to the defensive, seeking to create defensible French frontiers. As Lynn points out, "Louis feared invasion more than he lusted for conquest" (p.91). The monarch viewed France as a vulnerable, isolated state, surrounded by hostile powers. He saw the Austrian Habsburgs as the most dangerous threat to French security. He therefore supported the efforts of Vauban to build a modern fortified curtain that would secure the northern and eastern borders of France. Lynn explains Louis XIV’s policy of Reunion to gain Strasbourg and Luxembourg in the early 1680s and the French preemptive strike against the Imperial fortress at Philippsburg in 1688 as attempts to round out his frontier and secure defensible borders against the Imperial threat to France. He notes that Strasbourg and Philippsburg were two of the three critical crossing points (France already held Breisach) over the Rhine that might be used by an invading army. However, such aggressive action alarmed his international rivals, and resulted in the creation of the Grand Alliance against France in 1689. The author believes that:

Louis never seemed to have appreciated how his quest for absolute security threatened his neighbors. What he saw as squaring off his frontiers for the sake of defense, his neighbors read as territorial aggrandizement. The same fortress that blocked a potential route for an invading army could also enable the French to attack. Vauban’s fortresses . . . projected French power by providing invasion routes for Louis’s armies, stockpiling supplies to power an initial assault, and guaranteeing control over
areas that could give long-term logistical and financial support for aggressive campaigns. Therefore, by its very nature, Louis's security compromised that of his neighbors (p.96).

Lynn concludes that the strategy of absolute security failed to guarantee peace. On the contrary, it precipitated crises or turned minor wars into major ones.


Focusing on the French example, Professor Lynn disputes Geoffrey Parker's theory that the design and construction of bastioned fortresses—the trace italienne—was responsible for the massive growth of armies in the seventeenth century. Parker in his The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (1988) believes that the rise of bastioned fortresses compelled states to create large standing armies to garrison as well as attack enemy structures in wartime. Instead, Lynn argues that French economic and demographic development made military expansion possible, and that the French army experienced its great growth after Louis XIV's quest for gloire had diplomatically isolated France and forced the monarch to create an army that could match the threat of the anti-French coalitions. The author is
willing to admit, however, that the trace italienne was a factor in the growth of the French army, especially after the Sun King made the fortresses the center of his military strategy. The article contains information on 107 French sieges during the grand siècle.


In this essay, Ronald Martin of Rancho Santiago College provides the latest overview of Louis XIV's army. He points out that the king initiated reforms based on the army's performance and difficulties in the War of Devolution "to make the army more responsive to its master's voice" (p.115). Martin discusses the full spectrum of army reforms under Louis XIV and the Marquis of Louvois. He argues that "drill, inspections, and uniforms all testified to Louis XIV's personal intention to mold an institution worthy of his foreign policy . . ." (p.116). He points out that the French army that invaded the Dutch Republic in 1672 was the largest army in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire. The size and effectiveness of the Sun King's army impressed the other European states, and they cringed in fear of French aggression. At the beginning of the Nine Years' War, "the well-supplied, uniformly attired troops striking out from a barrier of Vauban citadels seemed unstoppable," writes Martin (p.121). But, the anti-French coalition, led
by William III, was able to counter the French army, resulting in three unsuccessful campaigns in 1689-91. The formidable French army was not invincible. Martin argues that the French army, especially after the death of Louvois, had stagnated and remained tied to the pattern developed in the 1660s and 1670s while the other countries of Europe not only copied the French army, but went beyond it in the evolution of tactics, including the use of flintlocks and bayonets, which required more precise drill and more effective discipline.


Martin explores the career of Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier, Marquis of Barbezieux, the son of Louvois, as French Secretary of State for War (1691-1701). The author destroys the myth that Louis XIV disliked the twenty-three-year-old Barbezieux and bypassed the minister in matters of military affairs. Martin does admit that the king served as his own war minister while Barbezieux gained experience in handling the administrative details of the office after Louvois' sudden death in 1691. However, the author's research shows that Barbezieux handled the direction of the Nine Years' War from 1695 on. When Barbezieux died suddenly in 1701, Louis XIV appointed the inexperienced Michel de Chamillart as his new war minister (1701-9) followed by Daniel Voison
(1709-15), breaking the hold of the Le Tellier family over the office. During the War of the Spanish Succession the Sun King once again served as his own war minister with Chamillart and Voison handling administrative details.


Ronald Martin provides a detailed discussion of Jules Louis Bolé, the Marquis of Chamlay's (1650-1719) career in the French war ministry under the Marquis of Louvois, and his rise to influence in the entourage of Louis XIV in the 1670s and 1680s. He shows that Chamlay won the king's confidence through his technical expertise in organizing troops movements and his highly favorable campaign histories of the Dutch War. After the death of his patron, Louvois, Chamlay assumed the role of key military advisor to Louis XIV from 1691 to 1715. Martin analyzes his subject's contribution to French military and diplomatic policy. The study is based on research in French archives.


This is an examination of the Marquis of Seignelay's administration of the French navy during the 1680s. Donald G. Pilgrim states that Seignelay at first pursued a defensive naval strategy aimed at preserving
French hegemony in the western Mediterranean which his father, Colbert, had been wrested away from the Spanish and Dutch in the 1660s and 1670s. Naval activity elsewhere was very limited, consisting mainly of reinforcing existing colonies in the West Indies and Canada and several minor expeditions to Siam and Louisiana. The author points out that French naval strategy only shifted away from a defensive stance after William III of Orange's landing in England in 1688. The challenge of the Maritime Powers forced Louis XIV and Seignelay to mount a large-scale naval offensive in the English Channel and North Sea aimed at crushing English naval power as well as launching a military expedition in support of the Irish and Jacobites in Ireland. However, the Sun King failed in both of these enterprises. Pilgrim stresses the inadequacies of the French navy in explaining these failures. He discusses the limitations of Seignelay's administration during the crisis of 1688-89, focusing upon the secretary's personal shortcomings, the financial weaknesses of the state, the general inadequacies of industries producing munitions and naval stores, and the lack of reserves of naval manpower. The author emphasizes that Seignelay failed to reform the administration of the navy to ensure the status of France as a first-class naval power.
In this essay, Professor Geoffrey W. Symcox of the University of California at Los Angeles reviews the significant gaps in historical knowledge on Louis XIV's navy. He finds the lack of adequate studies surprising since the Sun King's navy was the strongest in Europe at one time, and in 1690 it defeated the combined English and Dutch fleets at Beachy Head, but the French fleet quickly fell into decline after 1692. Symcox believes that the lack of naval finances and trained seamen are the keys to the decline and fall of French sea power after 1690. The author notes the lack of studies devoted to naval finances, administration, fighting tactics, the use of galleys to control enemy coastlines and sea lanes, as well as the *guerre de course*. He argues that Louis XIV made the right choice in abandoning the *guerre d'escadre* in the later stages of the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession. Symcox writes: "I believe that Louis XIV stood no chance of winning a conventional naval war against England and Holland, with their greater reserves of ships and sailors and their more advanced commercial economies" (p.134).

Symcox provides the latest brief survey of the Louis XIV's navy (see also Wismes, 3.2.26). He addresses the origins of the fleet under Richelieu and describes the intensive warship and naval base construction program under Colbert. The French navy reached parity with the English and Dutch in 1680, and, according to the author, the French warships were faster and more maneuverable than their English and Dutch counterparts. Symcox notes that Louis XIV had little interest in naval affairs, but supported Colbert's program of naval expansion during years of financial stability. At the beginning of the Nine Years' War the French fleet was stronger than the combined fleets of the English and Dutch (p.138). However, the king dropped his support of the navy because of financial constraints during the Nine Years' War and concentrated on the land war. Symcox criticizes France for the lack of a clear naval strategy and its failure to exploit its strategic advantage in the Irish War and after the victory of Beachy Head (1690), which he believes contributed to the downfall of the fleet and the strategy of guerre d'escadre. The author discusses naval reforms during the Age of Louis XIV as well as the change to the guerre de course after 1692.

In this dissertation, Ben Scott Trotter scrutinizes the administration of French fortifications during the Age of Vauban. Based on considerable research in French archives, this study, prepared under the guidance of Professor John C. Rule, discusses the evolution of fortification administration prior to and including the reign of Louis XIV up to 1691. Trotter notes that the Crown consolidated the administration of fortifications under two separate departments in 1661, one falling under the control of the Le Telliers and the other under the Colberts. The author focuses on the career of Vauban as a fortifications bureaucrat, arguing the thesis that the Sun King employed Vauban not only as an engineer and expert in siege warfare, but as an administrator to provide the vital link between the two fortification departments. Vauban's work was vital in creating some, albeit limited, unity between the often at odds Le Tellier and Colbert families, and his efforts as a bureaucrat greatly benefitted Louis XIV's control over the management of his fortress frontier. To remedy the problems associated with two distinct fortification administrations, the Sun King united the two agencies into one upon the deaths of Seignelay and Louvois in 1690-91.
The dissertation includes ten figures, appendices listing the fortifications under the two departments, and a valuable bibliography.


This is a valuable translation on siege craft and fortification written by Marshal Vauban, the undisputed master of siege warfare during the Age of Louis XIV. In this manual written for the instruction of young military engineers, Vauban explains his preference for sieges instead of field battles, outlines step-by-step the proper conduct of sieges and defenses, comments scathingly on the mistakes most frequently made in this sort of war, and sums up seventeenth-century expertise in such fundamental matters as the construction of mines to blow up enemy works and the fabrication of floating bridges. His calculations of requirements in munitions for siege warfare suggest why logistics and transport constituted one of the major military concerns during this period. The study includes twenty-nine illustrations.


General Max Weygand provides the only biography available in the English language on one of France's great military commanders, Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne (1611-75). Published in
1930, this study by the French Chief of the General Staff is an uncritical examination of Turenne's military career from the Thirty Years' War and the Fronde to the War of Devolution and Dutch War. Weygand emphasizes the marshal's genius for strategy and outlines his military campaigns. More than half of the book is devoted to Turenne's actions during the personal reign of Louis XIV.


Baron Armel de Wismes, an author of numerous works on French naval history and a member of the Comité de Documentation Historique de la Marine Française, surveys the role of the French navy during the Age of Louis XIV. The author notes the inferior position of the navy compared to the importance of the army to French security. However, he stresses the influence of Richelieu and the build up of the navy under the secretaries of state for the navy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1669-83) and his son, the Marquis of Seignelay (1683-90). In 1667, Colbert's navy consisted of sixty warships. Within five years the fleet expanded to 100 warships, and it had reached 230 warships by 1681 (p.247). Wismes addresses the creation of a naval officer corps, recruitment of seamen, the importance of seaborne trade and colonization, and the careers of the famous French commanders, Abraham Duquesne (1610-
88) and Anne Hilarion de Cotentin, the Count of Tourville (1642-1701) and their naval victories in the Dutch War and the Nine Years' War. He notes the French adoption of in-line ahead battle tactics perfected by the Dutch and English.

Wismes blames Louis XIV's withdrawal of support for the French navy and main battle fleet actions on the naval disaster of La Hogue (1692). Instead, with the encouragement of Vauban, the Sun King directed the fleet to protect French seaborne trade and support the actions of French privateers against Anglo-Dutch trade in Europe and the western hemisphere. In fact, the new naval minister, Louis Phélypeaux, the Count of Pontchartrain (1690-99), loaned the king's ships to privateers to encourage such action. Wismes discusses the careers of several famous privateers, including Jean Bart (1650-1702), René Duguay-Trouin (1673-1736), and Jacques Cassard (1679-1740). Despite considerable success against Anglo-Dutch shipping, the French lost command of the seas to the superior British fleet during the War of the Spanish Succession.


Professor John B. Wolf of the University of Minnesota assesses Louis XIV's ability as a soldier-king in this outstanding essay. The
author describes how the Sun King sought military gloire after assuming personal control of the crown in 1661. Louis XIV gained valuable experience serving in campaigns during the War of Devolution, Dutch War, and the first years of the Nine Years' War. During these campaigns, the king viewed the conduct of his early commanders, the Viscount of Turenne and Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, as well as Vauban conducting a siege at Lille (1667). His war experiences, so argues Wolf, developed the king's keen interest in military administration, organization, discipline, logistics, fortress construction, and siege warfare. The author believes that Louis XIV recognized his own inability to command troops in the field, and therefore focused on managing the army, allowing tactical commanders to carry out military operations based on his decisions. He stresses that the king made the major decisions about military matters with the advice of his leading military experts. Wolf states that Louis XIV was cautious in his decision-making, preferring siege operations instead of battle. The Sun King, however, was willing to commit to battle if he had faith in his field commander, believed French forces to be stronger than the enemy's, and had adequate finances and supplies set aside for the action. As Wolf writes:

It is . . . evident that Louis understood that a successful battle might force his enemies to accommodate themselves to his
demands, and that he was quite willing to urge a trusted commander to undertake to fight a battle in the open field when he believed that there was a good chance for success” (p.219)

"On the other hand," Wolf states, "Louis was also always conscious of the balance of military power and the fact that a general could lose a war in an afternoon. When his enemies were manifestly stronger than he was, Louis always urged caution as the better part of valor" (p.219).

See also:


3.3. The English Army and Navy


Correlli Barnett, a British military historian, traces the history of the British army during the modern era in this excellent introduction study. He devotes two chapters to discussing the rise of the British standing army and its employment in the Irish War, Nine Years' War, and War of the Spanish Succession. Barnett argues that the beginning of the modern British army dates from the reign of James II (1685-88) when the king increased the size of the military in response to the Monmouth Rebellion (1685) (p.120). The royal army of Charles II established in 1660-61 had only 8,500 men and could hardly be called a standing army, especially when the standing army of the Commonwealth had 40,000 troops in 1659 (p.115). The author describes the English fear of royal absolutism as the primary obstacle blocking the creation of a modern standing army similar to Louis XIV's during the reign of Charles II.

After 1685 the Catholic monarch, James II, increased the English army by including troops from Ireland and Scotland. This army, however, lacked the organization and administration of the French model. After the Glorious Revolution, the shortcomings of the British army hampered William III's plans to secure the Protestant succession.
against James II and fully employ the British army against French forces in Ireland and the Low Countries. Considering the situation a national emergency Parliament authorized the enlargement of the army. The King-Stadholder relied upon his own expertise, and that of John Churchill and others who had served under Turenne in the French service, to train the British army in the French methods of warfare while at war with France. The author relates the British battle campaigns of the Irish War, Nine Years' War, and the War of the Spanish Succession under the leadership of William III and the Duke of Marlborough. He describes their successes and failures, as well as noting the problems associated with the poor military organization of a hastily expanded army; the lack of recruits, discipline, barracks, and professional officers; and sea transport.

Barnett praises the leadership of William III and his successor as leader of the British army, Marlborough. He especially commends Churchill for his talent as an outstanding strategist, tactical commander, and logistician, citing his 250-mile march from Flanders to the Danube and the victory at Blenheim (1704) as the turning point in the War of the Spanish Succession. The author notes that the British military system called for strong, effective leaders such as William III and Marlborough. Both men, in their respective wars, served as commander-in-chief of the
British army. Barnett notes that sturdy leadership was necessary since the sovereign increasingly shared control of the army with Parliament from 1689 to 1713, and the country lacked both a war ministry and general staff to assist in the direction of the wars. Instead, the decision-making responsibilities for army policy and administration were shared by the monarch, commander-in-chief, master-general of ordnance, Lord Treasurer, secretaries of state, and secretary to the armed forces. This study serves as an excellent introduction to the rise of the British army.


   Michael Barthorp supplies a brief examination of military forces under the command of the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author notes that Marlborough's army was an international force consisting of British, Dutch, Danish, Prussian, Austrian, and other German troops. He stresses that the British regiments played a vital role in Marlborough's army, but they represented a relatively small number of troops compared to the other allied forces under his command. In this study Barthorp concentrates his discussion on the British element of the army. He notes the grand effort to rebuild the British army at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, which was necessary because of Parliament's reduction of William III's army of 50,000 men by over half after the Peace of Ryswick.
(Rijswijk) (1697). Even so, the British army stood at a wartime high of just 70,000 men, with a mere 22,000 serving under Marlborough in the Low Countries (p.8). Barthorp discusses the organization, quality of troops, uniforms, equipment, armament, supply and transport functions, grand tactics, and employment of Marlborough's army during the war. The study includes forty illustrations, a table listing the British regiments employed in the Low Countries and Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession, and a chronology of the war. This is an interesting short study meant primarily for individuals interested in war games. It is based on secondary sources and lacks footnotes.


In this article, Michael Baumber addresses the naval reforms and innovations which contributed to England's naval victories against the Dutch in the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). He first notes the Lord Protector's use of soldier-admirals to command the English fleet. Just one of Cromwell's seven admirals was a career seaman. However, the English seafaring generals achieved considerable success against the Royalist fleet and in the wars against the Dutch and Spanish. The author points out that Cromwell's soldier-admirals led the English fleet to a series of victories which were not to be matched until the days of Admiral Horatio Nelson.
In the First Anglo-Dutch War, Cromwell’s navy emerged victorious in the first three out of four pitched battles (Kentish Knock, Portland, and North Foreland, also known as the Gabbard), with its only loss at Dungeness, against the Dutch navy in 1652-53. In the fifth encounter, the English, led by General-at-Sea George Monck, employed in-line ahead fighting tactics for the first time to smash the Dutch fleet off Terheide, south of Scheveningen. Baumber’s thesis is that these victories occurred because of superior English guns and tactics, not exceptional English seamanship as argued by other naval historians. He believes that the Dutch were better seamen. Even so, the English, who were usually outnumbered by Dutch ships in sea battles, countered the enemy by employing larger ships that carried more and bigger iron guns than the Dutch. The English also used a relatively new innovation, the tactic of broadside firing, that is the practice of firing all of the guns on one side of the ship at the same time. In addition, the English used for the first time the tactic of in-line ahead attack in engaging the enemy fleet off the Dutch coast near Scheveningen in 1653. This tactic gave the broadsides of each English ship the opportunity to use their maximum field of fire. The smashing English victory had profound effects for the future of naval operations. Baumber states that "the principle of fighting in-line ahead, established at Scheveningen, endured
throughout the subsequent age of sail" (p.47). The author attributes the development of this tactic and the establishment of conditions to allow its use to General-at-Sea Robert Blake, Cromwell's leading soldier-admiral from 1649 to 1657. Blake’s reforms, including the Articles of War, pay raises for ship captains, increased promotion possibilities, and prize money for sinking enemy men-of-war, established the conditions and discipline necessary to conduct in-line ahead fighting tactics.


Baumber supplies a biography of Robert Blake (1598-1657), one of three military generals who the English Commonwealth appointed as naval commanders in 1648 with the aim of instilling discipline and order in the navy. The author argues that Blake played a key role as a naval tactician, and, more importantly, as a leader who helped create a disciplined English fleet capable of achieving the naval victories of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54) and Anglo-Spanish War (1655-60) (see Baumber, 3.3.3). Blake and the other Generals-at-Sea were needed to force English naval captains to adopt fighting tactics required to achieve these naval victories. Baumber explores Blake's career in the Parliamentarian army as well as his naval command against the Royalist
fleet (1649-51), Dutch navy (1652-54), and Spanish fleet (1654-57).

The study is based on archival and published primary sources.


In this excellent biography, Professor Chandler examines the military leadership of John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722). The author views Marlborough as "the greatest soldier produced by the British Isles in modern history" (p.x). He sketches Marlborough's early career and considers the battle of Sedgemoor (1685), the first engagement in which Churchill played a leading role, as well as his desertion of James II in favor of William III and Mary II in 1688. Chandler describes and analyzes Marlborough's campaigns during the Nine Years' War, Irish War, and the War of the Spanish Succession. Much of the biography is devoted to relating Marlborough's ten consecutive campaigns that led to the allied victories at the Schellenberg (1704), Blenheim (1704), Elixhem (1705), Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), and "raised the reputation of British arms to a level which had not been known since the Middle Ages" (p.331). Chandler stresses Marlborough's strategic qualities, his preference for battle as the sole means of achieving long-term advantages and his desire to avoid slow-moving siege warfare. In regards to tactics, Marlborough sought to defeat the enemy in battle,
inflicting the maximum damage in the process. His method was invariably to seize the initiative and keep it throughout an engagement. In combat, he stressed the close cooperation of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In addition to this account of Marlborough's campaigns, Chandler devotes one chapter to describing and analyzing the art of war during the War of the Spanish Succession. The study includes thirty-three illustrations, seventeen maps and diagrams, and two appendices listing Marlborough's major combat engagements and sieges. It is recommended as the best study concerning Marlborough's military campaigns against Louis XIV's France.


In this sequel to his study on the English army during the reign of Charles II (see 3.3.7), Professor Childs examines the growth of the British army under James II (1685-88) and its role in the monarch's downfall in the Glorious Revolution. The author stresses the monarch's employment of the army to impose royal policies and establish royal absolutism. He begins by describing how James II quadrupled his brother's army, brought in 5,700 soldiers from the Irish and Scottish armies, as well as recalled six regiments which had been serving under Dutch command to increase the size of his peacetime standing army. Thus, the British army that opposed the invasion of William of Orange...
consisted of about 30,000 troops in 1688 (p.184). Childs shows that this army contained 1,869 English officers, and just 11 percent of these officers were Roman Catholics (p.22). This research destroys the myth that James II was staffing his army with a high proportion of Catholic officers. Moreover, the author’s research proves that only a tiny minority of officers defected to William in 1688, and very few of these officers took any troops with them. Most of the army remained loyal to James II after his downfall, and this depletion of not only officers, but the noncommissioned officer ranks affected the combat strength of William III’s army in the Irish War and Nine Years’ War at the beginning of his reign (p.197).


In the first of a trilogy of works on the English army during the late seventeenth century, Childs describes the creation of the English monarchy’s first peacetime standing army during the reign of Charles II (1660-85) and against the background of Restoration politics. The author argues that this army was the beginning of Britain’s modern army. However, he goes on to show that Charles II’s army, based on the French model, was poorly led and consisted of a mere 6,000 troops during peacetime. The army experienced little combat service, fighting brief campaigns in the Low Countries (1678) and at Tangier (1680).
Childs devotes his efforts to describing army organization and administration, as well as its role in society. The study is recommended for specialists.


In the last study in his trilogy on the British army from 1660 to 1702, Childs examines the army during the reign of William III. The author emphasizes the continuity of the British army in character and administration from the military under James II to William III despite the purge of suspect officers and soldiers. With immediate military needs, the King-Stadholder pressed the British army into action in the Irish War and the Nine Years' War. This unreformed army served both in Ireland and the Low Countries under inexperienced officers, but Childs argues that it gradually evolved into a professional army by way of combat experience. Childs describes civil-military relationships, the role of the army in politics, army and regimental administration, the nature of the officer corps, the profile of the common soldier, as well as the army during the large-scale and long campaigns overseas. The army in Flanders reached a wartime high of 29,100 personnel from 1694 to 1697 (p.268). He notes that England disbanded this standing army after the Nine Years' War. Childs' research included English and Dutch...
archives. The study is recommended for specialists in military and political history.


This is a classic study by the famous military historian Charles H. Firth. In this work Firth examines the English Parliament’s New Model Army which defeated the Royalist Army, overthrew the monarchy during the English Civil War, and then defended the Protectorate under Oliver Cromwell. The author describes the organization, administration, military life of the soldiers, and campaigns of the New Model Army. He is especially good at detailing the tactics of the infantry, cavalry, and dragoons in the battlefield. Although focusing on the English Civil War this study is valuable for depicting England’s first standing army and its role in politics during the 1650s. The work retains its value as an excellent introduction to the subject. John Adair provides an up-to-date bibliography.


Professor Paul M. Kennedy of the University of East Anglia traces the rise and decline of British naval supremacy in this highly recommended study. In two early chapters the author depicts the rise of English naval
mastery from the English Civil War to the Peace of Utrecht. He stresses the corresponding relationship of the rise of English naval power and the commercial expansion of England.

Kennedy begins by recounting the navy's support of Parliament against the monarchy in the English Civil War. Recognizing the importance of the navy in the conflict, Parliament, supported by the mercantile community, employed the navy to protect Roundhead strongholds, London's trade and financial power, in addition to blockading the ports controlled by the Royalists. After the war, the Protectorate, realizing the need to defend England's rapidly expanding overseas commerce, established a national standing navy and increased the fleet from thirty-nine ships to over two hundred ships in 1649-60 (p.46). The Protectorate improved naval administration and service conditions for sailors, the professionalism of officers, and logistic support for the fleet, as well as built new dockyards and eliminated corruption in naval affairs. With this improved fleet, England challenged its commercial rival, the Dutch Republic, resulting in the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). Kennedy describes this trade war and Charles II's two Anglo-Dutch Wars (1665-67, 1672-74). He argues that the Anglo-Dutch wars, which were fought to eliminate Dutch commercial competition with England, achieved little success after the first conflict
because of Dutch naval strength under Admiral de Ruyter. In fact, the author professes that the Treaty of Westminster (1674) was "a peace which virtually restored the status quo ante and served to emphasize how futile the conflict with the Dutch had been" (p.63).

England's struggle against France began with Louis XIV's naval superiority in 1689. The wars against France were primarily land conflicts. However, the French fleet allowed James II and French troops to invade Ireland and raise a revolt against the Protestant succession as well as threaten a French invasion of England. English naval action led to the French naval disaster at La Hogue, which ended the invasion threat to England, and gave the Royal Navy strategic command of the sea after 1692. During the rest of the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession the English fleet concentrated on protecting merchant shipping. In the later conflict, England became a Mediterranean power with the acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca as bases to protect its Levant trade. Kennedy points out that naval power did not win the wars against Louis XIV. He stresses that superior British economic power and victories in land war achieved this feat by wearing down the Sun King's resources to continue the conflicts. Nonetheless, the Royal Navy's protection of overseas commerce enabled the growth of Britain's economic power. The study includes useful maps depicting
the growth of England's naval power under the Protectorate as well as
the locations of naval battles during the Anglo-Dutch wars.


Major R.E. Scouller deals with the organization and administration of
the British army during the reign of Queen Anne (1702-14). His thesis
is that the foundations of Marlborough's famous victories were "laid in
swift movement, skillful management of long lines of communications,
and good husbanding of men—all factors dependent on organization and
administration before the battle, which is as much a test of them as it
is of the men snapping their firelocks or pushing their pikes" (p.xi). The
author therefore focuses on the details of army organization, recruiting,
pay, clothing, quartering, artillery, logistics, transport, discipline, and
medical services in this useful, but challenging study. He stresses the
heavy financial strain of British military campaigns.

the Glorious Revolution, and the Rise of the Standing Army in Britain,

In this thesis, John M. Stapleton, Jr., examines the dramatic devel-
opment of the British army into a first-class fighting force after the
Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. He stresses the role of William III and
the British experience of fighting under the King-Stadholder alongside
the combat-hardened Dutch army in the Nine Years' War (1688-97).
Under William III, the British army experienced a massive increase in size, adopted the flintlock musket and socket bayonet, as well as learned the advanced fighting formations and firepower tactics of the Dutch military. The experience of the Nine Years' War resulted in the British army, under the Duke of Marlborough, developing into one of the best fighting forces in Europe during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13/14). This is a valuable study that stresses Britain's late participation in the Military Revolution. It includes appendices depicting the growth of the British infantry and cavalry from 1660 to 1712 as well as illustrations of Anglo-Dutch fighting tactics.

See also:


3.4. Dutch Naval Power


This is the only biography of the famous Dutch Admiral Michiel Adriaanszoon de Ruyter (1607-76) available in the English language. In this classic study Professor Petrus J. Blok of the University of Leiden depicts the naval career of De Ruyter and the campaigns of the three
Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-54, 1665-67, and 1672-74). In the first conflict De Ruyter served as a commodore under the Dutch fleet’s supreme commander, Admiral Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp (1598-1653). De Ruyter turned down the offer to assume command of the Dutch fleet after Tromp’s death in action at Terheide. However, De Ruyter accepted the offer twelve years later, and quickly rebuilt the Dutch fleet to defend the commerce of the United Provinces. In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, De Ruyter carried out the famous raid up the Medway that humiliated and destroyed the English fleet in dock, resulting in the highly favorable Peace of Breda (1667). In this conflict, De Ruyter had the Dutch fleet employ the English tactic of in-line ahead attack while adding his own newly developed tactic of concentrating his ships and breaking through the enemy’s line. The Admiral’s fame increased with his successful defense of the Dutch coastline against the superior forces of the combined Anglo-French fleets during the Third Anglo-Dutch War. His defense of the Dutch Republic was the primary reason for England withdrawing from the French alliance and agreeing to the Peace of Westminster (1674). The biography lacks an index, bibliography, and footnotes.

In this essay, Professor Jaap R. Bruijn of the University of Leiden discusses the organization and administration of the Dutch fleet, made up of converted merchantmen, during the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) against Spain, and the sudden need to reform the navy during the First Anglo-Dutch War. The defeat caused the Dutch to begin a vast construction program of purpose-built warships to equip its first standing fleet, create a professional naval officer corps, and develop new fighting tactics. Bruijn views the First Anglo-Dutch War as a key turning point in the evolution of the Dutch navy, and he also regards the Anglo-Dutch alliance in 1688 as significant. With the alliance, the Dutch Republic could concentrate on the land war against France and leave its fleet to serve in a secondary role under the command of the English navy in the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession.


Bruijn argues that the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century was a Great Power based on its economic, political, cultural, military, and naval strength in this survey study (p.xiii). He specifically examines
the rise and decline of the Dutch navy and its employment as the protector of maritime trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He notes that the rise of the Dutch Republic as a naval power at the end of the sixteenth century was almost as rapid as its decline at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.

The author begins by describing the Dutch navy of the first half of the seventeenth century. He relates the fleet's operations in the Dutch struggle for freedom in the Eighty Years' War against Spain in addition to its maritime expansion into European waters and beyond. By 1648, the Dutch Republic was recognized as an independent state and a leading economic and seafaring country with interests that spread over Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia. The Dutch economy reached its zenith between 1648 and 1672. Bruijn stresses that political instability in France as well as England, together with great rivalries among the Baltic powers, enabled the Dutch Republic to attain its preeminence in European power politics in spite of its relatively small territory, its population under two million, and the vulnerability of its commercial interests. During this period, nonetheless, the Dutch Republic was challenged by England for control of international commerce. The author views 1652 as a watershed year, with the beginning of the first of three Anglo-Dutch wars in the 1650s, 1660s,
and 1670s. He stresses that these conflicts as well as the French invasion in the Dutch War (1672-78) had no lasting impact on the Dutch economy (pp.67-68). The key factor to Dutch economic decline was the continuing Franco-Dutch economic war after the 1670s. The author discusses changes in naval administration, strategy, tactics, as well as the naval campaigns against England, France, and the Baltic powers from the First Anglo-Dutch War to the War of the Spanish Succession. He argues that 1713 served as another watershed year because it represented the end of an era of intensive sea and land warfare. The Dutch fleet was rarely important to Dutch commerce and survival in the eighteenth century. This is an excellent study for specialists, teachers, and graduate students on the Dutch navy. It contains two maps, twenty illustrations, seven tables, and a valuable bibliography.


In this article, Professor James R. Jones of the University of East Anglia addresses Dutch overseas commerce, national security, and its navy. His thesis is that the Dutch Republic withstood the English and French challenges to its commercial status and national security despite the handicaps of its geographical position and an inferior navy largely due to the primitive state of naval warfare in the seventeenth century.
Jones points out the geographical and strategic factors that limited the Dutch Republic's ability to maintain its status as Europe's leading commercial power in the late seventeenth century. He notes the geographical location of the Dutch Republic, which was hemmed into a corner of the North Sea, and the strategic limitations of the sailing routes of its merchantmen, placing the Dutch at the mercy of English and French fleets and privateers in the North Sea, English Channel, and along the French coastline, as well as the Scandinavia fleets in the Baltic. He stresses the ease at which enemy fleets could blockade the United Provinces and paralyze Dutch trade.

In regards to the Dutch navy, Jones describes the poor state of the fleet before and during the First Anglo-Dutch War. He notes the decentralized Dutch admiralties of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hoorn, Middleburg, and Harlingen that caused inefficiency; the lack of a professional officer corps and combat-trained sailors; as well as the fact that the Dutch navy consisted mainly of converted merchantmen, which were poorly built for combat, slow, and lacked adequate armament.

Jones argues that the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 1650s to 1670s "posed the severest challenge to the Dutch Republic and its trade" (p.24). He relates that the Dutch admiralties realized the danger to their national and commercial security during the First Anglo-Dutch War, and
thus created a new navy with purpose-built warships similar to the large, heavily armed English fleet, and established a corps of professional officers after 1654. However, this new and expensive fleet achieved few offensive victories in support of Dutch interests. In 1665, off Lowestoft, in its first offensive engagement against the English fleet during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, the new Dutch fleet suffered its most devastating defeat of the Anglo-Dutch wars, losing sixteen warships and four thousand men (p.29). Jones indicates that this action demonstrated the superiority of the English fleet over the Dutch. The author, however, goes on to relate the Dutch fleet’s successful raid up the Medway in 1667. But, he points out that the Dutch launched this operation only after England had tied up its fleet in harbor because of financial difficulties: a far cry from challenging and defeating the English fleet at sea. In the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch were unable to demonstrate any offensive capabilities when facing the combined Anglo-French fleet. De Ruyter’s success in his defensive strategy came from his superior use of the Dutch coastline against the English fleet and the rift between the Anglo-French allies. Throughout this essay Jones stresses the inferiority of the Dutch Republic’s navy and geographical position compared to England and France, and that its fleet could only continue to protect Dutch commerce and security as long as English and
French naval warfare remained primitive. But, the author is willing to admit that "the last (and greatest) single-handed achievement of the Dutch navy" was the successful invasion of England in support of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (p.31).


In this article, R.E.J. Weber addresses the adoption of line-ahead naval battle tactics by the Dutch fleet during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). Employing Dutch sources, the author disproves the claim that Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp created the line-ahead battle tactic against the Spanish at the battle of the Downs in 1639. He describes Dutch naval tactics as focusing on single ships' duels and boarding. However, such tactics and the general lack of fighting discipline led to defeat in the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). To improve the effectiveness of the fleet, John de Witt coordinated and gained the agreement of the admiralties to adopt English line-ahead battle tactics with three squadrons after the Dutch disaster at Lowestoft during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. De Witt believed that the employment of three Dutch squadrons in the fleet would cause less confusion in naval combat than the previously preferred five or seven squadrons. The author stresses the influence of De Witt in the
introduction of new fighting instructions in 1665-66 and the Dutch need for discipline in naval combat.

See also:


3.5. Military Powers of Northern and Eastern Europe


In this essay, Alf Åberg of the *Krigsakrivet* in Stockholm addresses the Swedish-Finnish military machine from the Thirty Years' War to the beginning of the Great Northern War. Focusing on the reign of Charles XI (1660-97), Åberg discusses Swedish military reform, organization, administration, recruiting, and the difficulties of maintaining a peacetime...
standing army, mobilizing, and concentrating forces on enemy frontiers. The author stresses the problems of defending the long frontiers of Sweden-Finland and Swedish territory in northern Germany. He points out that Charles XI, who pursued a purely defensive strategy, sought to secure his frontiers by constructing new fortresses and strengthening those in existence under the guidance of Erik Dahlberg. By 1697, Charles XI possessed more than fifty fortresses and forty redoubts guarding his frontier. The author writes:

Sweden was to remain armed and alert, her dominions linked together by a Baltic which had become a Swedish lake. An enemy trying to break through the country's defences at any point would be checked by garrisons of the fortresses until the main army had been assembled, and would then, by deployment of the fleet, be ejected from the areas he had occupied (p.277).

But, as Åberg points out, Charles XI concentrated his defensive effort in Sweden's southern provinces, building up the great coastal fortresses of Göteborg, Karlskrona, and Wismar to the detriment of defenses in the east.

In fighting tactics, Charles XI continued the traditions and fighting style of Gustavus Adolphus and his successors. Swedish tactics focused on quick, bold offensive movements employing the close coordination of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Åberg notes that unlike other European armies, the forces of Charles XI and Charles XII employed the
musket and pike as part of their offensive tactics, with both the infantry and cavalry mounting charges against enemy formations. He states that "it often happened that the impact of an infantry attack produced a quick decision" (p.282). Such tactics required much training and large-scale maneuvers to perfect. Åberg credits Charles XI for the creation of the modern Swedish army, stating that "the Swedish army was a highly finished instrument when the young Charles XII took it into his hands" in 1697, and "on the battlefield of Narva it was to apply the lessons it had learned during the long period of training at home" (pp.286-87).


Christopher Duffy examines the growth of Russian military power under Peter the Great (1689-1725). The author argues that Peter I built an army that broke the power of the Swedish Empire in the Great Northern War (1700-21) by borrowing western military ideas and practices and employing them to fit Russian military requirements. Duffy discusses the influence of foreigners in Peter I’s creation of a modern Russian standing army in the late 1690s. This army adopted western style military training, fighting formations, linear fighting techniques, and arms. Despite this new look, the Russian army was defeated at Narva.
(1700) by Charles XII's Swedish forces because of the inexperience of the Tsar's troops.

The defeat at Narva resulted in Peter I having to rebuild his military from scratch. The Tsar quickly rebuilt his forces using conscripts and volunteers to expand the army from 34,000 in 1700 to 200,000 troops in 1705 while Charles XII fought the forces of Augustus II of Poland-Saxony (p.17). He reorganized the Russian army to increase fighting effectiveness and created new regiments, including dragoons and artillery, with the aid of western experts. Duffy points out, however, that despite the Tsar's reliance upon foreigners for creating the new army, only one-third of his military officers were foreigners (p.39). After Narva, the new Russian army gained war experience invading Livonia and Ingria in 1701, and earning victories at Eristfer (1701), Hummelshof and Nöteburg (1702), Dorpat and Narva (1704), and Kalicz (1706). In the meantime, Peter I's military created new regulations to refine the Russian military machine. Training and discipline became the key to Russian military accomplishments. For those soldiers who required disciplinary action Duffy states "executions were carried out through hanging and quartering, breaking on the wheel, burning or beheading, and the victim might be put in the mood for the ordeal by having a red-hot iron bored through his tongue beforehand" (p.32). The author argues
that the Tsar created one of the most effective infantry forces in Europe, but the Russian cavalry remained inferior because of professional ignorance and the lack of quality horses (p.34).

Peter the Great built up this new army while Charles XII was fighting Augustus II in Poland and Saxony. But, in 1706, the Swedes began to turn eastward against Russia. The Russians defeated the Swedes at Dobroe (1708), causing Charles XII to redirect his forces southward. Peter I defeated the Swedes at Lesnaya (1708), followed by the victory at Poltava (1709), which destroyed the Swedish army.

The Russians exploited this victory against Charles XII by capturing Ingria, Livonia, and Estonia in 1709-10. Russian siege operations captured Viborg, Kexholm, Riga, Pernau, and Reval. The Russian military machine wore down the Swedes who were without the leadership of Charles XII. The Russian naval victory off Cape Hangö (1713) gave Peter I control of the strategic Åland Islands, thus enabling the Russians to strike at Sweden directly. However, as Duffy points out, the British fleet interfered with any plans that Peter I may have had against mainland Sweden before the Peace of Nystad (1721). Although the author does not examine Russian naval affairs, he states that Russia's Baltic fleet consisted of 124 Russian and fifty-five captured ships in 1721 (p.35). Duffy's work is noteworthy for the description of
Peter I's creation of a western style Russian army that made Russia a Great Power.


Richard F. Hellie of the University of Chicago stresses the continuity of fundamental military institutions and practices between the reigns of Tsar Alexis I (1645-76) and his son, Peter the Great (1689-1725). The author notes the origins of Peter I's military reforms and combat capability stemmed from Alexis I's army that fought in the Thirteen Years' War (1654-67) against Poland. Specifically, Hellie finds that Alexis I had adopted the western style of warfare and military organization, employed foreign mercenary officers from the west to train and lead the Muscovite army, begun the process of creating a professional native officer corps, and built up a large standing army of over 200,000 troops. In fact, the author points out that Alexis I's army earned a military reputation just as outstanding as the reformed army of Peter the Great. However, the Russian army had declined after the death of Alexis I, and it only regained its reputation under Peter I after the defeat at Narva (1700).

Hellie admits that "Peter certainly was one of the outstanding field commanders of his age" (p.251). He discusses the Tsar's military accomplishments against Sweden as well as the army reforms that
contributed to the smashing defeat of Charles XII at Poltava (1709). Besides rebuilding a western style standing army, Peter I's efforts to improve his military included improving military organization and administration, creating a general staff, adopting the bayonet and the infantry charge with fixed bayonet as a shock tactic, establishing a highly mobile artillery service, introducing the use of dragoons, developing disciplined pursuit of fleeing enemy from the battlefield, and furthering the process of creating a professional native officer corps. Although emphasizing the continuity between the two armies, Hellie acknowledges the Petrine generalship and discipline, the bayonet and artillery, as well as the ability and willingness to pursue and annihilate the enemy were significant improvements that made the Russian army formidable in the early eighteenth century.


In this essay, John L.H. Keep focuses on Peter the Great's military reforms and the impact on Russian society. He outlines the organizational and administrative changes of the reign, citing Peter I's interest in war and his desire to fight Sweden as the driving factors towards reform. Keep notes the Russian loyalty to the Tsar and the rising importance of military service for the noble classes during this
period. He believes that Peter I's main achievement was to create a standing army based on the integration of traditional Muscovite and westernized military elements, as well as "to impose uniform conditions of service, to institute a system of discipline based on hierarchical principles, to establish military schools, and to bring the troops under centralized administration by the War College in St. Petersburg" (p.97).

The author stresses the Tsar's use of the military as a bulwark for royal power and the financial strain of supporting a standing army and fighting Sweden in the Great Northern War.


Angus Konstam provides a brief study of Peter the Great's infantry and cavalry. He addresses the Tsar's first army and the creation of the New Model Army of 1700. The author describes Russia's military organization, administration, recruitment, manpower, uniforms, equipment, artillery, and tactics. The study includes one map, 100 illustrations, a chronology of the Great Northern War, and a short bibliography.

Wiesław Majewski of the Polish Military Institute discusses Polish-Lithuanian military strategy and tactics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He describes the eastern methods of Polish warfare, including a heavy reliance on cavalry. The author points out that a large cavalry was needed to defend the Commonwealth's vast frontier from Muscovite and Tartar invasions. The Poles employed both husaria (heavy cavalry) and light cavalry. All cavalry units were armed with lances, pistols, muskets, or reflex bows. The chief method of fighting was to charge with drawn sabers and shatter the enemy formation. With such reliance upon cavalry maneuvers, the Polish army preferred to battle the Muscovites, Swedes, and Tartars in the open field. The Poles liked to use the element of surprise, but an alternative was to divide the army into two, one part to engage the enemy and one to attack him from the rear. Majewski notes that the Polish army, especially the husaria, was highly successful against its opponents in the open field. However, the effectiveness of the Polish cavalry diminished when confronted by fortified enemy positions and the effective use of artillery. The author implies that the experience of Polish warfare influenced Gustavus Adolphus and other military leaders of the
seventeenth century. He describes the charge of 20,000 horsemen under the command of the Polish king, John III Sobieski, that forced the Turks to lift the siege of Vienna in 1683.


Edward J. Phillips examines the creation of the Russian navy during the early years of Peter I's reign. His thesis is that the Petrine navy represented the most remarkable innovation of the Tsar's military modernization, and the navy played a significant role in carrying Russia from the periphery to the center of European politics and diplomacy. The author focuses on the creation and development of the Azov fleet that contributed little to the rise of Russia as a Great Power despite its tremendous expense. However, Phillips stresses that the experience of the Azov fleet greatly aided the creation of the much larger Baltic fleet that achieved considerable success against Sweden at Lake Ladoga and Nöteborg (1702), Nienshants (1703), Riga, Reval, and Viborg (1710), Helsingfors (1713), and Hangö (1714), which shattered Charles XII's monopoly of the Baltic. This study is based on Russian archival sources and contains nineteen valuable appendices. It is noteworthy for its consideration of the "Petrine naval revolution."

Professor Jan Wimmer, the secretary of the Polish Commission on Military History, examines the military experience and tactics of John III Sobieski. The author discusses Sobieski's military experience in the First Northern War as well as in the Polish wars against the Tartars, Cossacks, and Turks. Sobieski's military success resulted in his election as the Polish king in 1674. Wimmer briefly describes Sobieski's military tactics, which consisted of his employment of the Polish cavalry in surprise attacks against enemy positions, supported by dragoons, both on horseback and on foot. Most of the essay is devoted to citing particular examples of Sobieski's military campaigns.

**See also:**


CHAPTER IV
FRENCH EXPANSIONISM AND THE WARS AGAINST SPAIN AND THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1648-1678

France developed into the first modern Great Power after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). French participation in the conflict was part of the ongoing Franco-Habsburg struggle for hegemony that began in the sixteenth century. In this war, France, under the direction of Louis XIII (1610-43) and his chief minister, Armand Jean Duplessis, Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu (1624-42), created successive coalitions with a wide range of anti-Habsburg forces to oppose the growing power of the Habsburg alliance of the German emperor and the Spanish king.¹ France, at first diplomatically and then, after 1635,

militarily, cooperated with its traditional allies, the Dutch Republic, Denmark, Sweden, and some German states against Spain and Austria with their German allies. The French war effort was essentially against the increasing strength of the Spanish Habsburgs in western Europe and the Austrian Habsburgs in the German Empire and their family lands in central Europe.²

The French and their allies dealt the Habsburgs a massive defeat in the Thirty Years' War. The turning point came with the Prince of Condé’s victory over the powerful Spanish army at Rocroi, thus establishing the reputation of the French army in 1643.³ Before long the French and their Dutch allies had decisively beaten the forces of Philip IV (1621-65), the senior Habsburg ruler, to a point where Spain appeared ready to collapse. In the east, the French, Swedes, and their German allies threatened the conquest of Ferdinand III's (1637-57) family lands. In this circumstance, the Habsburgs agreed to the

his Spanish rival the Count-Duke of Olivares.


Peace of Westphalia (1648), ending both the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War. However, both France and Spain remained at war until 1659. Cardinal Jules Mazarin, who served as the effective ruler of France during the minority of Louis XIV (1643-61), had refused to make peace with Spain, seeking instead to destroy France's main enemy.

The Peace of Westphalia represented the end to Habsburg predominance in Europe, and the beginning of the primacy of Bourbon France. The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück also established the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Austria as major powers in their own right. Mazarin's triumph at Westphalia not only destroyed Habsburg predominance, but it also laid the foundations of Louis XIV's expansionist policies. French gains in Alsace, including the fortress of Breisach situated at the southern tip of Alsace and on the right bank of the Rhine, within the German Empire, both isolated and weakened Spanish possessions in the Low Countries and Franche-Comté, making these areas tempting for French aggression.

In the continuing Franco-Spanish War (1635-59), Cardinal Mazarin sought to defeat the forces of Philip IV and coerce Spain into surrendering the Burgundian Circle (the Spanish Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Franche-Comté), its possessions in Italy, and Catalonia. Such aims looked to establish a French empire. However, the outbreak of the French civil war (1648-53) paralyzed Mazarin's government, thus allowing the Spanish to recover and invade France.
In 1653, Mazarin regained control of the government, ending the *Fronde*, and quickly reestablished French military might over the Spanish. The war continued in the Spanish Netherlands with the English Protectorate allied to the French cause. In 1658, a combined Anglo-French force, under the command of the Viscount of Turenne, defeated their Spanish enemy at the battle of the Dunes and captured Dunkirk. Shortly thereafter, in 1659, Philip IV and Mazarin, with both Spain and France financially weakened from the war, agreed to the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), thus ending the Franco-Spanish War. This peace signaled the end of Spain as a dominant European power, and represented the beginning of Spanish defensive efforts to maintain the Burgundian Circle against further French ambitions.

The Peace of the Pyrenees brought limited territorial aggrandizement to France. Mazarin acquired Artois and small parts of Flanders in the north along with Roussillon and Cerdagne in the south. In addition, the cardinal gained Philip IV's agreement for a dynastic marriage between Louis XIV and the

---


Spanish Infanta, Maria Theresa, which occurred in 1660. This marriage gave the Bourbons a claim to the Spanish throne.

Louis XIV assumed personal control of France after the death of Mazarin in 1661. He quickly asserted personal control over both his army and foreign policy. The two were closely bound together since foreign policy depended on military might. With a thirst for *gloire*, Louis XIV renewed the aggressive French foreign policy of Mazarin. He became involved in disputes with Spain and the Papacy over questions of diplomatic precedence in 1661-62. But, more importantly, he sought to secure France's northern frontier and the vulnerability of Paris against the Spanish threat. His aim was to extend French borders into the Spanish Netherlands in the north and the Spanish Franche-Comté in the east. However, he began his territorial expansion by purchasing Dunkirk, which Spain had ceded to England in the Peace of the Pyrenees, from the restored Charles II in 1662.

With the death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665, the Sun King pressed Maria Theresa's claims to the Spanish succession with hopes of at least obtaining Spanish lands along his northern and eastern frontiers. The French queen was Philip IV's daughter by his first marriage. Spain, however, crowned Carlos II (1665-1700), the sickly son of Philip IV's second marriage. Even so, Louis XIV pressed his queen's rights to inherit lands in the Spanish Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Franche-Comté using the local legal inheritance
arguments associated with the law of devolution which gave preference to daughters of a first marriage over the son of a second one. Having stated its case, France demanded the cession of large areas of the Spanish Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Franche-Comté. Setting the stage for military action Louis XIV had already diplomatically isolated Spain by acquiring close relations with England, an alliance with the Dutch Republic (1662), and the support of the German states by way of French membership in the League of the Rhine and its status as a defender of the Peace of Westphalia. Thus, in May 1667, Louis XIV’s army of 85,000 soldiers invaded the Spanish Netherlands, beginning the War of Devolution (1667-68). The French army quickly routed the Spanish forces in the Low Countries and then attacked the Franche-Comté.

The rapid success of Louis XIV’s army stunned Europe. The crisis situation and fear of further French aggression led to the Anglo-Dutch Peace of Breda (1667), the break up of the League of the Rhine, and the formation of the Triple Alliance (1668) of England, the United Provinces, and Sweden. This alliance was formed to exert diplomatic pressure to end the Franco-Spanish war, and succeeded with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) in 1668. In the treaty France agreed to return the Franche-Comté. However, France was

---

allowed to keep Lille, Tournai, Binche, Ath, Douai, Armentières, Courtrai, Menin, Bergues, Furnes, Scarpe, and Charleroi in the Spanish Netherlands.

The peace settlement failed to satisfy the Sun King's ambition for territorial aggrandizement along his northern and eastern borders. He blamed John de Witt, the Dutch Grand Pensionary, and the States General for the formation of the Triple Alliance against continued French military action. He, therefore, began to prepare France for a war against the Dutch Republic, realizing the need to destroy the Dutch in order to acquire Spanish lands.\(^7\) War preparations included building up the French army as well as diplomatically isolating the Dutch Republic. He began by gaining the alliance of Charles II of England with the secret Treaty of Dover, and effectively breaking up the Triple Alliance in 1670. At the same time, France militarily occupied Lorraine and forced Duke Charles IV (1634-75) into exile. French diplomacy and subsidies next acquired alliances with Sweden and many German states, including the electorates of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier; bishopric of Münster; and Bavaria, as well as gained Austrian neutrality in 1670-72. Louis XIV's diplomats left the United Provinces isolated with only the diplomatic assistance of the much weakened Spain.

The conflict began with the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74). Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1672, Louis XIV's army marched up the corridor of the bishopric of Liège (a possession of France's ally, Elector

\(^7\)Ibid., 122.
Maximilian Heinrich of Cologne), crossed the Rhine into the bishopric of Münster and invaded the Dutch Republic on its eastern border, beginning the Dutch War (1672-78). The march was carefully calculated to avoid traversing the Spanish Netherlands and thus provoking Spain. Under the leadership of Louis XIV and his generals, Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, the French army traveled quickly across Dutch soil, taking control of the provinces of Gelderland and Utrecht. But, the Dutch, desperate to save the province of Holland, opened the sluices and flooded the polders between the Zuider Zee and the Rhine. This action bogged down the French advance. In the meantime, the States General, realizing the failure of De Witt, gave William III of Orange full powers as head of state and the military. The flooding of the polders not only saved Holland, but the action also gave William III time to reorganize Dutch defenses and create a coalition against French aggression.

Louis XIV's aggression, dramatic military success, and substantial demands for territory at Dutch expense alarmed Europe. The beginning of the coalition began with military assistance from Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, to the Dutch. In 1673, the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, Dutch Republic, and the Duke of Lorraine formed a military alliance in the Treaty of The Hague. Before long, in October 1673, Louis XIV was forced to order the withdrawal of the French army from the Dutch Republic because of exposed and overextended supply and communications lines after the Imperial
army, under Count Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-80), outmaneuvered Turenne in Germany. The Dutch War had turned into both a European and defensive war for France. As the war bogged down along the French frontier the Sun King began losing allies. England, Münster, and Cologne withdrew from the war in 1674 and Sweden was decisively beaten by the Great Elector in 1675.

By 1676 both Louis XIV and the anti-French coalition were militarily and financially exhausted from the war. Diplomats met at the Congress of Nijmegen (Nymegen) and worked out peace agreements in 1676-78/79. The Franco-Dutch peace included a return to the territorial status quo. However, Spain was forced to cede the Franche-Comté and about a dozen fortified places in the Spanish Netherlands to France. Thus, France's eastern frontier was extended and its northern frontier consolidated. In addition, France acquired Nancy and Longwy in Lorraine, and gained Freiburg from the German Empire.

As for literature published in the English language there is a significant lack of studies on Mazarin's foreign policy and the Franco-Spanish War in the 1650s. The best studies are Geoffrey R.R. Treasure's *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (4.1.23), Georges Livet's "International Relations and the Role of France, 1648-60" (4.1.7), Carl J. Ekberg's "Abel Servien, Cardinal Mazarin, and the Formulation of French Foreign Policy, 1653-1659" (4.1.2),
and Dennis Harold O'Brien's "Louis XIV's Diplomatic Corps, 1648-1671" (2.21).

There is an increasing interest in the foreign policy of the early years of Louis XIV's personal reign. John B. Wolf's Louis XIV (1.2.11) and Paul Sonnino's "The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars" (1.2.9) are good starting points. For the Sun King's conflict with the Papacy, see Paul Sonnino's Louis XIV's View of the Papacy, 1661-1667 (4.1.21) and John T. O'Connor's "French Relations with the Papacy during the Dutch War" (4.1.10). There is little on the origins and conduct of the War of Devolution. Claude T. McIntosh's "French Diplomacy during the War of Devolution, 1667-68, the Triple Alliance, 1668, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668" (4.1.9) is useful. Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789 (3.1.9) briefly treats the military aspects of this conflict as well as the Dutch War. The secret partition of the Spanish Empire is addressed in Jean Bérenger's "An Attempted Rapprochement between France and the Emperor" (4.2.2). Much of the literature on the early years of Louis XIV's personal reign centers on the Dutch War. The best studies include Paul Sonnino's Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War (4.1.19), Herbert H. Rowen's, The Ambassador Prepares for War (4.1.14), Carl J. Ekberg's, The Failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War (4.1.4), and Paul Sonnino's, "Louis XIV and the Dutch War" (4.1.18). Sonnino's essays on the influence of Lionne (4.1.16), Pomponne
(4.1.15), Turenne (4.1.22), and Colbert (4.1.17) in the decision to invade the
Dutch Republic along with Ekberg's "From Dutch to European War" (4.1.3) and
"The Great Captain's Greatest Mistake" (4.1.5) are valuable.

Spanish foreign policy during the later years of Philip IV and early reign of
Carlos II is best served by the works of Robert A. Stradling. His "Seventeenth
Century Spain: Decline or Survival?" (4.2.7), Philip IV and the Government of
Spain, 1621-1665 (4.2.6), "A Spanish Statesman of Appeasement: Medina de
las Torres and Spanish Policy, 1639-1670" (4.2.5), and Europe and the Decline
of Spain (1.5.2) are key works on Spanish policy. Jonathan I. Israel's The
Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (4.3.5) and "Spain and
Europe from the Peace of Münster to the Peace of the Pyrenees, 1648-59"
(4.2.3) offers the background to Spanish policy after the Peace of Münster.
Gerald L. Belcher, "Anglo-Spanish Diplomatic Relations, 1660-1667" (4.2.1)
and C.F. Scott, "The Peace of Nijmegen: Some Comments on Spanish Foreign
Policy and the Activity of Don Pedro Ronquillo" (4.2.4) are valuable.

Unfortunately, there are no studies in English that adequately address Spanish
diplomatic and military activities during the War of Devolution and the Dutch
War.

Dutch foreign policy is well served by the available literature in English.
General studies devoting attention to the foreign policy of the First
Stadholderless Period and early years of William III of Orange include M.A.M.
Franken's "The General Tendencies and Structural Aspects of the Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of the Dutch Republic in the Latter Half of the Seventeenth Century" (4.3.2), Alice Clare Carter's Neutrality or Commitment (1.4.1), and Pieter Geyl's The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century (1.4.3). De Witt's foreign policy, especially in regards to France, England, and Spain, is best treated in Herbert H. Rowen's John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672 (4.3.9) and John de Witt: Statesman of the "True Freedom" (4.3.10). For the Anglo-Dutch Wars, see also James R. Jones' "The Dutch Navy and National Survival in the Seventeenth Century" (3.4.4) and The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (5.1.4), C.R. Boxer, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century, 1652-1674 (4.3.1), P.G. Rogers, The Dutch in the Medway (4.3.6), Peter Padfield's Tide of Empires (3.1.11) and Charles Wilson, Profit and Power (5.1.6). The Triple Alliance of 1668 is addressed in Herbert H. Rowen's "John de Witt and the Triple Alliance" (4.3.8) and Kenneth H.D. Haley's An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: Sir William Temple and John de Witt, 1665-1672 (5.3.11). Rowen discusses the origins of the Dutch War in "The Origins of the Guerre de Hollande: France and the Netherlands, 1660-1672" (4.3.11). The rise of William III as the leader of the anti-French coalition is considered in Stephen B. Baxter's William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702 (6.3.2). Mary Caroline Trevelyan focuses on the Dutch military response to the French invasion of the United
Provinces in William the Third and the Defence of Holland, 1672-1674 (4.3.13). Dutch policy at the Congress of Nijmegen is addressed in Herbert H. Rowen’s "The Peace of Nijmegen: De Witt’s Revenge" (4.3.12) and D.J. Roorda’s "The Peace of Nijmegen: The End of a Particular Period in Dutch History" (4.3.7).

4.1. French Foreign Policy


This is the first biography in English of Louis XIV’s younger brother, Philippe, Duke of Orléans (1640-1701). Professor Nancy Nichols Barker of the University of Texas at Austin describes Philippe’s life under the shadow of the Sun King. More importantly, she addresses the role played by Philippe in the Dutch War as the king’s second-in-command of the French army (1672-73, 1676-77), and his military successes in the sieges of Orsoy and Zutphen (1672), Wick (1673), Bouchain (1676), and the victory against William III of Orange and the Spanish-Dutch army at the battle of Cassel (1677). The victory allowed Louis XIV to capture both Saint-Omer and Cambrai as well as establish defensible French borders in the northeast. Barker argues that Philippe’s victory at Cassel led to the highly jealous Louis XIV terminating his brother’s military career. The Sun King had failed to engage and defeat
the Spanish-Dutch army in battle, and Philippe's victory stole some military *gloire* away from his older brother. Although it does not address foreign policy, this study is valuable for depicting Louis XIV's thirst for *gloire* against the Dutch Republic.


   Historians attribute the success of French foreign policy during Louis XIV's minority to Cardinal Mazarin. In this revisionist essay, Carl J. Ekberg of Illinois State University instead emphasizes the role of Abel Servien in the formulation and conduct of French foreign policy from 1653 to 1659. His thesis is that Servien, who had served as the chief negotiator for the French in the making of the Peace of Westphalia, played a key role as Mazarin's closest collaborator and foreign policy advisor in the diplomacy that led to the Anglo-French alliance (1657) and the formation of the League of the Rhine (1658) which both contributed to forcing Spain into the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659).

4.1.3. Ekberg, Carl J. "From Dutch to European War: Louis XIV and Louvois are Tested." *French Historical Studies* 8 (Spring 1974): 393-408.

   The Dutch War is viewed as the turning point in Louis XIV's reign, and the withdrawal of French forces from the Dutch Republic as the turning point of this conflict. In this article, Ekberg examines the withdrawal of Louis XIV's army from Dutch territory during the Dutch
War (1672-78). He begins by noting that the Dutch flooding of the polders brought a sudden halt to the French invasion and the development of a military stalemate in the United Provinces in 1672-73. In the meantime, however, the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs joined the Dutch in the war against French expansionism. The intervention of Austria and Spain threatened the "vastly overextended" French armies in the Dutch Republic and Germany (p.398). With the Austrian army under Montecuccoli outmaneuvering Turenne in Germany and Spanish-Dutch forces assembling under the command of William III of Orange in the Spanish Netherlands, France was threatened with an invasion in late 1673.

Ekberg argues that Louis XIV and Louvois were exceptional planners and executioners of offensive warfare, but their success and confidence led to them to fight a war without considering the defense of France and its allies in the event of the formation of an anti-French coalition aimed at ending French expansionism. The author believes Louvois, who knew Louis XIV prized the conquests of 1672, lacked the courage to advise the king, in spite of the recommendations of France's leading generals, to withdraw French forces from the Dutch Republic as well as the skills for effectively redeploying troops to defend France in a timely manner. After much procrastination, Louis XIV finally ordered the withdrawal of
French forces in the Dutch Republic and their redeployment to defend France's ally, the Elector of Cologne, against Orange and Montecuccoli. However, the French forces arrived too late to prevent the loss of Bonn (1673). The author stresses that the fall of Bonn served as:

- a powerful strategic and psychological victory for Louis XIV's enemies. It dispelled the mystique of French invincibility; it broke the French domination of the course of the Rhine; it encouraged the vacillating German princes to join the growing anti-French coalition; and it was ultimately an important factor in convincing the German Diet to declare a *Reichskrieg* against France the following May (p.402).

The action also led to Cologne being forced out of the war in 1674.

In his final assessment, Ekberg argues that Louvois, in spite of his technical virtuosity, failed on the larger matters of war and diplomacy as Louis XIV's war minister. He neglected to limit Louis XIV's ambitions and maintain France's security and prestige at all times. Louis XIV's ambition and careless campaigning in 1672-73 resulted in the formation of the first coalition of powers to militarily oppose French policy. The author notes that the Sun King and his war minister committed the grave error of encouraging the alliance of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, thus undoing one of Mazarin's greatest diplomatic achievements, the separation of the Habsburg powers.
In this monograph, Ekberg focuses on the initial phase of the Dutch War from 1672 to 1674, especially emphasizing the diplomatic and military events that led to the French withdrawal from the Dutch Republic in the fall of 1673. Ekberg argues that Louis XIV conducted the French invasion of the United Provinces paying little attention to the advice of his ministers, generals, and diplomats beyond that offered by his war minister, Louvois. He notes that the Sun King disregarded the interests of the French state, namely the defense of the northeastern frontier of the realm, in search of his own personal military gloire as well as revenge against the Dutch for their part in the Triple Alliance (pp. 173-74). Ekberg contends that Louis XIV and Louvois miscalculated the risks involved in the Dutch War and lacked firm political and military objectives during the first phase of the conflict. Both men expected a brief, limited war. This mistake resulted in the rise of William III of Orange as his primary enemy and the beginnings of an anti-French coalition centered on an alliance of the Dutch Republic and the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs. The study contains two useful maps depicting military operations in 1673 and a chronology of the Dutch War. It is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.
Ekberg scrutinizes Marshal Turenne's German campaign of 1673 that resulted in the Imperial army outmaneuvering French forces, joining with the Dutch army, and capturing Bonn, the capital city of Louis XIV's chief German ally, Elector Maximilian Heinrich of Cologne. Such action seriously damaged the Sun King's alliance system as well as forced the French to withdraw from the Dutch Republic. In this excellent article, the author explains the difficulties associated with Turenne's mission of intercepting Leopold I's army sent to aid the Prince of Orange in the Dutch War. He cites Louis XIV's failure to ensure the superior army size of Turenne's forces compared to the Imperial army led by Count Raimondo Montecuccoli. The king preferred to employ troops urgently needed by Turenne in his own campaign in Lorraine, Trier, and Alsace. Moreover, Louis XIV failed to follow the marshal's advice of positioning a French blocking force in Germany north of the Main in order to prevent the advance of the Imperial army up the right bank of the Rhine. Turenne also had the difficulty of operating in Germany and trusting the neutrality of German states while fear spread of French intentions in Germany. In fact, Turenne was outmaneuvered not only by the military genius of Montecuccoli, but with the assistance of the previously neutral...
Bishop of Würzburg. Ekberg calls Turenne’s greatest mistake his overconfidence in operating in the rugged terrain of central Germany with overextended lines of supply and communications, while at the same time underestimating Montecuccoli’s ability to conduct a campaign of elusive maneuvers over this difficult ground. As the author writes, "Montecuccoli did not wish openly to confront the French army and offer battle: he did not have to do this in order to fulfill his responsibility, which was to disrupt French operations along the Rhine River and embarrass the French position in the Low Countries" (p.116).


This is a valuable study on dynastic marriage and diplomacy. Ruth Kleinman, a professor of history at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, supplies a biography of Anne of Austria (1601-66), regent of France during the minority of her son Louis XIV from 1643 to 1661. After the death of Louis XIII in 1643, Anne, the king’s Spanish Habsburg bride, continued the war against her brother, Philip IV, and Spain with the support of her chief minister, Cardinal Mazarin, for seventeen more years until the Peace of the Pyrenees. Kleinman argues that Anne and Mazarin genuinely sought peace in the negotiations of 1642-45, but Philip IV looked to recover by diplomacy and the advantage of his sister serving as the French regent what Spain had lost.
in the war. Anne would not bend to her brother’s wishes, desiring instead to uphold the royal inheritance of Louis XIV. After the *Fronde*, Anne slowly withdrew from political affairs. However, in the diplomatic negotiations leading to the Peace of the Pyrenees, Anne’s influence gained the dynastic marriage between Louis XIV and the Spanish Infanta. The author discusses the care taken by Anne and Mazarin over the clauses about inheritance rights to the Spanish crown, indicating French scheming beyond the making of peace through dynastic marriage. This is a fascinating examination of the role of dynastic marriage in diplomatic affairs.


Professor Georges Livet of the University of Strasbourg provides an overview of the French role in international political relations from 1648 to 1660. He focuses on Mazarin’s diplomacy during the Franco-Spanish War and the shifting diplomatic balance in Europe. The author argues that the cardinal’s chief diplomatic concerns were to safeguard the highly favorable Westphalia settlement, consolidate the French position in Germany, and secure a strong frontier for the defense of France. Livet concentrates his discussion on French relations with the German states, Maritime Powers, and Spain, as well as French diplomatic
intervention in the First Northern War (1655-60). He applauds Mazarin’s diplomatic efforts that led to the English alliance against Spain (1657), creation of the League of the Rhine (1658), Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), and treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen (1660). These diplomatic achievements not only acknowledged France’s predominant position in Europe, but limited Austrian influence in Germany, ended the Spanish threat to France, provided territorial acquisitions, and restored peace to the Baltic. Livet stresses that Mazarin laid the foundations of French continental supremacy (p.434).


In this article, Ronald Martin of Santa Ana College notes the influence of Jules-Louis Bolé, the Marquis of Chamlay on Louis XIV during the Dutch War. Chamlay, a maréchal des logis and master of troop movements, who served as Louvois' assistant, gradually rose in importance during the conflict because of his military expertise as well as his literary contributions praising Louis XIV’s military victories during the Dutch War. Such writings convinced the Sun King that France had won the war on the battlefield and had lost the peace at Nijmegen.
Claude T. McIntosh investigates Louis XIV's foreign policy, the origins of the War of Devolution, the course of the conflict, and the subsequent peace agreement. Based on research in French archives, the author argues that the Sun King was set on territorial aggrandizement in the Spanish Netherlands as part of his arranged marriage with Maria Theresa. He discusses Franco-Spanish diplomacy, the marriage contract between Louis XIV and Maria Theresa, Philip IV's inability to pay his daughter's dowry to obtain her renunciation of the Spanish throne, the question of the Spanish succession after the death of Philip IV in 1665, and Louis XIV's justification for invading the Spanish Netherlands in 1667. The Sun King cited the laws of *Jus Devotionis droit de dévolution*, claiming territory in the Spanish Netherlands to satisfy Spanish debts to Maria Theresa, to justify his invasion of the Low Countries. McIntosh relates French diplomatic and military preparations for the invasion, including alliances with Neuburg, Cologne, Mainz, and Münster (1666-67), negotiations for the possible partition of the Spanish Netherlands with Austria and the Dutch Republic, and the massing of 55,000 troops on the border of the Low Countries (pp.83-84). However, Louis XIV's military aggression and quick success in the
Spanish Netherlands resulted in European opposition to French policy. McIntosh believes that the formation of the Triple Alliance between the Dutch Republic, England, and Sweden played a prominent role in convincing Louis XIV to accept the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and temporarily halt further French territorial expansion in the Low Countries. He stresses that Louis XIV sought to avoid a confrontation with a growing coalition that might include German states. Even so, the author points out that the Sun King had already gained diplomatic triumphs with the secret partition agreement with Leopold I concerning the Spanish succession as well as the terms of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The peace agreement gave France Charleroi, Binche, Ath, Douai, Tournai, Oudenaarde, Lille, Scarpe, Armentières, Courtrai, Menin, Bergues, and Furnes in return for the Franche-Comté. This is the only study devoted to the War of Devolution in the English language. It includes a bibliographical essay on secondary works concerning the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle published in the French and English languages.


John T. O'Connor of the University of New Orleans examines the strained diplomatic relations between Louis XIV and the Papacy during
the Dutch War. The author notes that Clement X (1670-76) and Innocent XI (1676-89) both sought to mediate the conflict. Like Rietbergen (see 4.1.12), O'Connor notes the Papal desire to end the Dutch War and unite the Catholic powers against the Turkish threat in eastern Europe. However, the tension between the French crown and the Papacy hampered any Papal effort to mediate the war. The author discusses the extremely limited influence of the Papacy with Louis XIV; the difficulties of the Sun King's support of the Turks; as well as the Austrian kidnapping of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, the Sun King's French agent in Germany, during peace talks at Cologne that damaged any attempt for the Papal mediation of the conflict. O'Connor concludes that "in the balance, French relations with the Papacy in the era of the Dutch War amounted to a fairly regular pattern of mistrust, animosity and confrontation" (p.59).


René Pillorget of the University of Tours examines the relationship between the archbishop-electors of Trier to France from 1635 to 1676, concentrating on the rule of Karl-Kaspar von der Leyen (1652-76). The author notes the strategic importance of the electorate of Trier which dominated the Moselle valley and included Coblenz as well as the
fortress of Ehrenbreitstein at the confluence of the Moselle and Rhine rivers. Both rivers were important in the troop movements north and south as well as east and west. But, the electorate of Trier was militarily weak and prone to fall under the protection of a more powerful state. During the reign of Philipp-Christoph von Sötern Trier had allied with France against the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War. However, Karl-Kaspar with Spanish aid rose to power in Trier during the French Fronde. Pillorget argues that Karl-Kaspar foolishly pursued anti-French policies and allied with Spain (1652-61, 1668-76) believing that Habsburg military power would protect the electorate. The author describes how Mazarin failed to acquire the loyalty of Trier in spite of the dispersal of French subsidies aimed at gaining Karl-Kaspar's adherence to the League of the Rhine. Instead, Karl-Kaspar served as a Spanish agent in Germany promoting an anti-French position to protect the Franche-Comté and the Spanish Netherlands from 1668 on. Pillorget points out that the electorate of Trier served as one of the coalition members against France in the Dutch War, and experienced French occupation of the city of Trier and the Moselle valley as a consequence. This is a valuable study depicting the difficulties of the smaller German states caught between the Franco-Habsburg powers in the seventeenth century.

P.J. Rietbergen of the University of Nijmegen scrutinizes the Papal attempt to mediate the peace negotiations between the combatants of the Dutch War. He argues that the Papacy sought a peace settlement to end the conflict as soon as Spain and Austria joined the coalition against France in 1673. The Papacy desired an end to the war among Catholic states, and instead, the formation of a coalition, led by Austria, Spain, and, if possible, France, against the Turks in eastern Europe. The Pope and his nuncios focused on pressuring both Austria and Spain to conclude a peace, realizing that Louis XIV would not drop his territorial claims, cease to support Hungarian rebels rising against Leopold I, or end his secret contact with the Porte. Although seeking a neutral stance among the combatants, the Papacy's aim to quickly conclude a peace in order to concentrate Catholic efforts against the Turks favored Louis XIV's ambitions (p.41). Rietbergen argues that despite England serving as the official mediator of the Peace of Nijmegen, the Papacy exerted some influence on the Catholic powers, especially Austria and Spain, in the making of the final settlement.
Professor Herbert H. Rowen of Rutgers University provides a brief sketch of the career of Simon Nicholas Arnauld, Marquis of Pomponne, who twice served as Louis XIV's secretary of state for foreign affairs (1672-79, 1691-99). Rowen argues that Pomponne was useful to Louis XIV as a "moderate" foreign minister, one who sought moderate terms in peace negotiations. He notes that Pomponne's diplomatic style contrasted sharply to the Sun King's rash decisions and actions in international affairs. In one example the author describes Pomponne's support for the acceptance of Dutch peace proposals during the Dutch War in June 1672. Having the upper hand and occupying the eastern portion of the United Provinces, the Sun King and Louvois ignored the foreign secretary's advice and sought to further humiliate the Dutch militarily. This strategy backfired after the Dutch flooded the polders and held off further French advances while William III of Orange negotiated an anti-French coalition. Rowen also depicts Pomponne's role in the Peace of Nijmegen and the French acquisition of the Franche-Comté. Louis XIV, nevertheless, dismissed Pomponne because the minister negotiated a too moderate peace settlement. But, the Sun King restored Pomponne as foreign secretary, sharing the position with the Marquis of Croissy, once France's aggressive policy met a military
stalemate against the anti-French coalition during the Nine Years' War. Louis XIV saw the need for a less aggressive foreign policy to break up the coalition. In the making of the Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk), the Sun King employed Pomponne along with the Marquis of Torcy to negotiate the moderate peace terms and a return to the status quo. In summing up the usefulness of Pomponne, Rowen writes "when Louis XIV wanted prudence and moderation in a councillor, he turned to Pomponne" (p.548).


Rowen examines the role of Pomponne in the origins of the Dutch War. Rowen's study, based on archival work in France, indicates that Pomponne played a key role in carrying out Louis XIV's plans for war against the Dutch Republic during his brief embassy to The Hague prior to the Dutch War.

The young diplomat first became an important player in the Sun King's diplomacy as an ambassador to Stockholm in 1665-69, where he won a reputation as a skillful diplomat. With Louis XIV set upon waging war against the Dutch Republic for its role in the Triple Alliance Pomponne was transferred to The Hague in 1669. In gearing up for the war, Louis XIV had the objective of diplomatically isolating the Dutch.
Republic. He eyed an alliance with England and Sweden to break up the Triple Alliance aimed against French expansionism. He sent Pomponne to The Hague to deceive the Dutch Grand Pensionary and the States General as to French intentions in regards to the Spanish Netherlands. Pomponne’s mission consisted of reassuring the Dutch that France meant no hostility towards either the Spanish Netherlands or the Dutch Republic.

By 1671, Louis XIV had completed his diplomatic and military preparations for an invasion of the Dutch Republic. He had acquired an alliance with England and neutralized Charles of Lorraine. The king also believed France with the use of subsidies could obtain an agreement with Sweden. Thus, the Sun King sent Pomponne to Stockholm to negotiate Swedish neutrality or an alliance. However, shortly after arriving in Sweden, Pomponne was recalled to Paris to become Louis XIV’s foreign minister following the death of Hugues de Lionne. When Louis XIV marched with his army across the Rhine and invaded the United Provinces, Pomponne, who had continually assured De Witt of France’s peaceful intentions, was at his side.

Professor Paul Sonnino of the University of California, Santa Barbara, explores the role of Pomponne as foreign secretary during the Dutch War. He finds that Pomponne lacked the influence of Louvois and Colbert in the decision-making process. Even so, the foreign secretary improved his standing with the king when he performed an instrumental role in acquiring Swedish intervention in the conflict in 1675. However, the poor performance of Charles XI's army at Fehrbellin damaged Pomponne's reputation. Shortly thereafter, in the French quest for peace, Louis XIV employed Pomponne to negotiate a satisfactory settlement at Nijmegen while simultaneously loosening the French military machine on the Spanish Netherlands to conquer the territory that would provide defensible borders for France. The military campaigns achieved considerable success as the foreign secretary concluded a moderate peace that provided France with the Franche-Comté as well as some territory in the Spanish Netherlands. Sonnino points out that the Sun King was immediately pleased with the peace settlement, but before long believed that France could have acquired much more territory in the Spanish Netherlands. In fact, he blamed Pomponne for losing the peace when France had won the war.
In this article, Sonnino investigates the role of Hugues de Lionne, Louis XIV's first secretary of state for foreign affairs, in the origins of the Dutch War. The author argues that Lionne was a devoted supporter of Cardinal Mazarin's foreign policy and alliance system achieved in the League of the Rhine. In the Spanish Question, the foreign minister supported Maria Theresa's rights in the Spanish Netherlands, but he sought to avoid war in the attempt to extend French borders. Sonnino stresses that Lionne, who lacked the influence of Louvois with the monarch, failed to moderate Louis XIV's aggressive foreign policy leading to the War of Devolution, knowing that the conflict would destroy Mazarin's alliance system. When the opportunities arose, he was therefore an avid supporter of the secret treaty of partition (1668) and Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668) that sought to stabilize French aggression. In his advice from 1668 on, Lionne urged the Sun King to be patient and wait for the death of the sickly Spanish king, Carlos II, desiring not to further provoke Spain or the Dutch Republic. Louis XIV, however, ignored such advice and prepared for a war of revenge against the United Provinces. Instead of resigning, Lionne, who was "too enamoured with staying in office" assisted the king in his "extremely
dangerous enterprise” against the Dutch (p.73). He was instrumental in acquiring alliances with England and Sweden, as well as the initial neutrality agreements with Cologne, Münster, and Hanover that later became offensive alliances after the foreign minister’s death in 1671.


In contrast to other historians, the author argues that Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the controller-general of French finances and naval secretary, advised Louis XIV against the Dutch War. Colbert opposed the tremendous financial cost associated with the military buildup in the newly conquered territories in the Spanish Netherlands after 1668, especially in light of a declining French economy due to high taxes, and further military preparations for the invasion of the Dutch Republic. However, Louis XIV ignored Colbert’s advice. The Sun King threatened to dismiss the minister if he failed to avidly support plans for invading and defeating the United Provinces. Sonnino points out that Colbert gave in to the Sun King’s demands. He devised a financial policy aimed at paying for the Dutch War.


Sonnino provides a brief sketch of the Dutch War comparing Louis XIV’s military memoirs with the course of actual events. The author

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
notes that the Sun King liked to embellish French successes and ignore failures. Sonnino comments on the origins of the conflict, the invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672, the watershed year of 1673, and the defensive campaigns of 1674-78 against a growing anti-French coalition. He describes the Sun King’s strategy in the later years as an attempt to seize territory that would provide France a defensible frontier as well as convincingly demonstrate French military might and constraint in the making of a compromise peace. With this purpose, the French army under the leadership of Louis XIV captured the Franche-Comté in 1674, Dinant, Huy, and Limbourg in 1675, Condé, Bouchain, and Aire in 1676, Valenciennes, Cambrai, and Saint-Omer in 1677, as well as Ghent and Ypres in 1678. The French army also demonstrated its superior might in battle at Senef (Seneffe) and Sinsheim (1674), the battle of Turckheim (1675), the relief of Maastricht (1676), and the battle of Cassel (1677). In 1678, with the French army threatening to overrun the Spanish Netherlands, the anti-French coalition led by Orange agreed to the Peace of Nijmegen.


In this major contribution to the historiography of the Dutch War, Professor Sonnino explores the motives of Louis XIV, the advice of his
principal confidants, and the diplomatic maneuvers that led to the French invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672. The study examines the decision-making process of Louis XIV's court. Sonnino's thesis is that Louis XIV was impatient to win further military *gloire* as well as eager to annex the Spanish Netherlands. The French plan was to besiege a few outlying Dutch strongholds and force the much weaker Dutch into diplomatic concessions concerning the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands. The Sun King hoped that Spain could be prodded into intervening in the Dutch War, thereby allowing France to immediately conquer and annex the Spanish Netherlands, instead of waiting for the death of Carlos II and the implementation of the secret partition treaty (1668) between Leopold I and himself. A series of postponements, dramatic changes of plan, shifts of alliances, and opposition of ministers delayed a conflict which might have begun in 1669. Sonnino points out that the ministers in Louis XIV's Council of State were divided in their support of a war against the United Provinces. The author views Marshal Turenne as the "evil spirit" who convinced the Sun King of easy French victories and the need of an English alliance (p.7). Sonnino believes that because of the split among the members of the Council of State the conflict was not inevitable. He fully describes how the leading warmongers neutralized or won over their opponents to the war. The
study is based on massive archival research in twelve countries. It is highly recommended for specialists and graduate students.


In this article Sonnino examines Louis XIV's memoirs on the Dutch War. He notes the many revisions, misplaced recollections, and changing interpretations of the decision-making and course of the war. The author points out that the Sun King fails to acknowledge mistakes in diplomacy and strategy, blaming errors in judgement on his advisers and his own "pardonable youthful ambition" (p.48).


The author examines the Sun King's view of the Papacy in the 1660s based upon the monarch's own memoirs and diplomatic correspondence. Sonnino stresses that Louis XIV held a low opinion of the political power of the weak and corrupt Papacy. He believes that this attitude stemmed from the very independence of the Papacy and its capacity for interfering in the affairs of France. Relations between Louis XIV and Alexander VII remained tense. The author argues that "Louis simply resorted to ignoring the Papacy as much as possible, feeling little apprehension about the consequences" (p.68). For example, the French monarch repeatedly disregarded Papal requests for military assistance.
against the Turkish threat in eastern Europe during the 1660s. Sonnino fully describes the diplomatic crisis of the Créqui Affair (1662), the legation of Cardinal Chigi to France, as well as Louis XIV's skillful handling of diplomacy and his dogged insistence on maintaining the international prestige of France in relations with the Holy See.


Sonnino argues that among Louis XIV's advisers Marshal Turenne served as the principal instigator of the war against the Dutch. The road to the Dutch War began during the War of Devolution when Turenne acquired considerable influence with the Sun King as the commander of the royal army. In spite of the threat of the Triple Alliance, Turenne argued that the French army could easily achieve further victories in the Spanish Netherlands, but Louis XIV agreed to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668). After the conflict, the marshal advised the monarch to acquire an alliance with England, and then attack the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic in the quest to conquer more territory in the Spanish Netherlands. The author sees the combination of Louis XIV's eagerness to annex more of the Spanish Netherlands and Turenne's opinion that the French army could achieve quick and easy victories against the Dutch and Spanish as the primary factors that led to the Dutch War.

Professor Geoffrey R.R. Treasure of Harrow School fills a striking gap in the historiography of seventeenth-century France and Europe with this biography of Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602-61). The author relates the early life and career of the Italian-born Papal diplomat that later entered French service under Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu. Treasure focuses on Mazarin's career as the chief minister of France (1643-61) during the minority of Louis XIV, discussing in detail Mazarin's foreign policy in the later stages of the Thirty Years' War, as well as in the French civil war and Franco-Spanish War. The author emphasizes Mazarin's strong desire to extend the French frontier in the northeast and east to increase French security against the Habsburg threat, noting that the cardinal was of the generation that remembered the Spanish invasion of France in 1636. He credits Mazarin with making the French monarchy stronger after the *Fronde* as well as the diplomatic successes of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees which increased French territory, security, and influence. He views Mazarin's territorial gains as substantial, but not provocatively excessive, and the creation of a bloc of friendly Francophile German princes in the League of the Rhine "one of the most significant achievements in French diplomatic history" (p.248). The study includes two useful maps.

This is a brief examination of the ceremony associated with the proclamation of a peace settlement. Andrew P. Trout of Indiana University Southeast at Jeffersonville describes the proclamation of the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678 as an example. He notes that the Crown proclaimed the peace at eleven places in Paris with heralds, musicians, cannon, bonfires, and fireworks. The article is of limited value.

See also:


4.2. The Spanish Question


This is a valuable examination of Anglo-Spanish diplomatic relations, especially focusing upon the nature of Spanish diplomacy, from the Restoration of Charles II of England to the outbreak of the War of Devolution. Gerald L. Belcher explores the desperate character of Spain's international position after the Peace of the Pyrenees. He notes the decline of Spanish military power, the loss of territory and prestige to France in the Franco-Spanish War (1635-59), the continuing Portuguese war of independence (1640-68), the further territorial aspirations of Louis XIV in the Spanish Netherlands, and the lack of a healthy male heir to Philip IV and the Spanish Habsburg Empire. Spanish diplomatic fortunes were further weakened by Charles II of England's marriage to Catherine Braganza and the creation of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance (1661). This marriage alliance as well as Cromwell's acquisitions of the former Spanish possessions of Dunkirk and Jamaica in the Anglo-Spanish War (1655-60) contributed to tense relations between Philip IV and Charles II. Spain, however, could ill afford to declare war against England despite Charles II's military support of Portugal. The sale of Dunkirk to France in 1662 marked the low point of Anglo-Spanish relations during this period.
Diplomatically isolated and facing the hostility of Portugal, France, the Dutch Republic, and England, Philip IV sought to improve relations with Restoration England. His primary aims were to split up the Anglo-Portuguese alliance as well as to strengthen Spain against expected French aggression. Philip IV still sought to reconquer Portugal. Charles II was amenable to improved Anglo-Spanish relations, looking for commercial advantages for the English mercantile community, an end to the Spanish-Portuguese War, as well as an ally against the United Provinces and France, especially during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). However, Philip IV’s terms called for England to return Jamaica and Tangier, part of Catherine of Braganza’s dowry, to Spain along with an end to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. England would not agree to such outrageous terms.

Philip IV decided the best way to face Spain’s enemies in Portugal and France was to restore Spanish military power and prestige. The monarch therefore launched a major offensive aimed at smashing the Portuguese in 1665. But, the Spanish attack turned into a disastrous defeat at Villaviciosa, and Spain became anxious for an alliance with England, especially after the death of Philip IV in September 1665. The regency government of Spain stood defeated by Portugal and defenseless against France. In such a weakened position, the regency
government desperately negotiated with England and Portugal for a truce and, hopefully, an Anglo-Spanish alliance against France. However, Portugal refused Spain's terms, thus ending the possibility of English diplomatic and military assistance to Spain. In fact, in March 1667, Portugal agreed to an alliance with France. This alliance allowed Louis XIV to isolate Spain diplomatically in preparation for his offensive in the Spanish Netherlands. Spanish diplomacy had failed to accept its weakened position in the international world and had hesitated too long in accepting English and Portuguese demands. Belcher argues that a stubborn Spanish policy cost Philip IV and the regency government a much needed alliance with England, an alliance that Charles II strongly desired against the Dutch Republic and France. The study is based on English and Spanish archival materials.


This is an interesting essay first published in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique in 1965 that points out that war between the Bourbons and Habsburgs over the Spanish succession was not inevitable. Professor Jean Bérenger scrutinizes the attempted rapprochement between Louis XIV and Leopold I in 1667 and 1668. Negotiations
focused on an acceptable partition of the Spanish Empire upon the death of the sickly Carlos II of Spain, the last male Habsburg of the Spanish line, in order to avoid a major European war over the Spanish succession.

Bérenger begins by noting the initial diplomatic talks aimed at acquiring a partition agreement during the reign of Philip IV in 1663-64. He points out that both Louis XIV and Leopold I had married daughters of Philip IV and had justifiable claims to the Spanish lands. The German emperor had the best claim to the Spanish succession as the senior male member of the Austrian Habsburgs, but the Sun King possessed the military power to contest a succession unacceptable to French interests.

Although the first talks failed, the War of Devolution revived Austro-French negotiations for a Spanish partition. French military success in the Spanish Netherlands combined with the problem of the Turkish threat in eastern Europe, and the lack of resources to confront both France and the Turks militarily, caused Leopold I to anxiously agree to a partition agreement. Bérenger points out that the German emperor sacrificed the Spanish Netherlands for the security of the German Empire (p.140). The Secret Partition Treaty of 1668 gave Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Navarre, the Philippine Islands, and the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily upon the death of Carlos II.
Leopold I or one of his children would become King of Spain and rule the remaining portion of the Spanish Empire. The treaty not only would maintain a balance of power between France and the House of Habsburg, but it amounted to an alliance between France and Austria. The author purports that Leopold I's strategy was based on two premises: first, that Carlos II would soon die; and, secondly, that Louis XIV sincerely wanted peace and did not intend to misuse his military and diplomatic supremacy. In his analysis, Bérenger argues that the secret partition treaty and the promise of future annexations in the Spanish Netherlands, not the threat of the Triple Alliance, played a significant role in Louis XIV's acceptance of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (p.148). However, the rapprochement did not last long. Although pleased with the rapprochement, Louis XIV proved unwilling to preserve the peace between France and the German Empire. In 1670, the Sun King sent the French army to occupy the Imperial fief of Lorraine, and shortly thereafter declared the duchy as French territory. This action destroyed the improving relations between Austria and France. As the German emperor, Leopold I was forced to oppose French action in the Empire to maintain the support of the German princes. Within three years Leopold I had allied with the Dutch in their struggle against French aggression. This essay is rewarding for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.

Professor Jonathan I. Israel of the University of London examines the resurgence of Spanish power in the continuing war with France after the Peace of Westphalia. The author discusses Spain’s military victories in the Low Countries, Italy, Catalonia, and France during the Fronde. However, with the end of the French civil war, Israel shows how Cardinal Mazarin slowly turned the tide against the Spanish in France and the Low Countries. Mazarin’s alliance with England resulted in the defeat of the Spanish Army of Flanders at the battle of the Dunes (1658) and consequently the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). Although Spain looked to be all-powerful in 1652, the peace settlement reflected the demise of Spain’s mastery of Europe in the late 1650s.


This is a brief discussion of Spanish policy at the Congress of Nijmegen in 1676-78. The author focuses on one of three principal Spanish delegates at the peace negotiations, Don Pedro Ronquillo, who had previously served as the Spanish envoy to England (1675-76). Ronquillo and the other delegates recognized the weakness of Spain at
the congress, although many Spaniards were reluctant to view their country as a second- or third-rate power. The Spanish delegation negotiated for the best possible peace agreement in spite of Carlos II's weak diplomatic position. Ronquillo, himself, sought English diplomatic support for Spain. The author argues that Spain continued to resist Louis XIV's aggressive foreign policy despite the "despair and hopelessness" experienced at the Congress of Nijmegen (p.291). The essay is based on Spanish archival sources.


Robert A. Stradling of the University of Wales at Cardiff renders an account of the influence of the Duke of Medina de las Torres (1600-68) on the formulation and conduct of Spanish foreign policy, especially focusing on the 1650s and 1660s. Medina, the chief minister in charge of foreign affairs in the 1660s, advocated the acceptance of Spain's decline as a first-rate power, shedding territory the Spanish monarchy could no longer defend, and extricating the empire from the burden of war in the quest to acquire a stable European balance of power. Medina’s policy of compromise and appeasement, opposed by many Spaniards, was instrumental in the commercial agreement with England in 1667 and peace settlements with Portugal and France in 1668. His
ultimate aim, however, was to achieve alliances with England and Austria to deter further French aggression against the Spanish Empire.


This is a reassessment of Philip IV’s role in the government of Spain and a valuable contribution to the historiography of Spain in the seventeenth century. Stradling describes Philip IV’s reliance on Gaspar de Guzmán, the Count-Duke of Olivares, during the first half of his reign. But, the author argues that the king ruled and governed without a favorite after the downfall of Olivares in 1643. In fact, he describes Philip IV as the architect of Spain’s survival from the 1640s to the mid-1660s, stressing that Spain remained a strong military power in the 1650s. He views the king as competent, but stubborn concerning the reconquest of Portugal after 1659. The Spanish efforts against Portugal depleted the once formidable defenses in the Spanish Netherlands and made Flanders an easy target for France in the War of Devolution. The study is based on archival research in Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, and England.

In this important essay, Stradling reassesses the decline of Spain during the reign of Philip IV (1621-65). He admits the decline of Spain, mostly due to economic factors. However, the author stresses the ability of the Spanish Empire to survive despite continuous war and rebellion. He points out the Spanish difficulties of combating France, England, Portugal, and the Dutch Republic on land and sea both in Europe and abroad that taxed Philip IV's military, diplomatic, and financial power. The author argues that Spain was successful as long as the other Great Powers lacked efficient government, policies, and military systems. But, the increased governmental efficiency of Spain's competitors spelled the relative decline of Spain, especially in comparison to its greatest rival, Louis XIV's France. Stradling writes, "the survival of Spanish power and power-systems into the 1660s was . . . dependent on the inability of a much stronger neighbor to solve internal problems and to mobilize and direct resources" (pp.171-72). He points out that the humiliations of the War of Devolution, recognition of Portuguese independence, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle occurred after the death of Philip IV and during the decline of royal absolutism in Spain under the regency.
See also:


4.3. John de Witt, William III of Orange, and the Dutch Republic


Professor C.R. Boxer of the University of London provides a brief sketch of the three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-54, 1665-67, and 1672-74) in this pamphlet written for the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, England. He addresses the causes and conduct of each of the wars, noting that trade rivalries were at the root of the first two wars. The work includes thirty-two illustrations. It is valuable as an introduction to the Anglo-Dutch wars. The pamphlet contains no footnotes, but it has a valuable bibliographical essay.

In this informative essay, M.A.M. Franken addresses the complexity of the Dutch government and its effect on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The author describes the composition of the Dutch government, including the States General and provincial assemblies. He focuses on the role of John de Witt and the influence of the States of Holland, most especially Amsterdam, and the House of Orange in foreign relations. Franken points out the general tendency for Dutch foreign policy to support peace and the European status quo in order to protect the United Provinces' own leadership in finance, commerce, and shipping. The author argues that De Witt's success in acquiring control of Dutch foreign policy in the States General had much to do with his "power of persuasion and cunning" and the need for leadership during the First Stadholderless Period. However, the complexity of the Dutch government damaged the effectiveness De Witt's foreign policy. Franken points out De Witt's difficulty in formulating a foreign policy acceptable to the seven provinces, the lack of diplomatic secrecy due to the need to coordinate policy among the provincial assemblies, Amsterdam's considerable influence in the making and conduct of policy, a poorly organized diplomatic service, and Holland's refusal to
support a strong standing army. Although De Witt, for the most part, controlled foreign policy, these limitations weakened diplomatic and military efforts aimed at countering the English and French threats to Dutch security.


In this article, Professor John H. Grever of Loyola Marymount University examines the response of the Dutch provinces to the diplomatic crisis of the War of Devolution in 1667-68. He shows that although De Witt and the province of Holland held the initiative, they could only act through the States General, where they had to take into account the opinions of the other provincial assemblies (Utrecht, Gelderland, Zeeland, Overijssel, Friesland, and Groningen). The author points out the difficulties encountered between the States General and the provincial assemblies in the formulation and conduct of a Dutch foreign policy.


In this monograph, Professor Kenneth Haley of Sheffield University describes the intrigues of William III of Orange to influence the English Parliament against the French alliance during the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) and the first stage of the Dutch War (1672-78). Haley
concentrates on portraying the activities of a small group of conspirators who supplied William with secret information about the English political situation and smuggled propagandist pamphlets into England. This is an interesting work, but it does not convince one that the conspirators played an important part in the making of the Peace of Westminster (1674).


Professor Israel furnishes an account of the Dutch-Spanish struggle, focusing on the second round of the Eighty Years' War (1621-48) both in Europe and abroad. His study, highlighting the political, military, and economic aspects of Dutch-Spanish relations, includes a valuable discussion of the aftermath of the Peace of Münster (1648). Israel treats the fragile peace and failed attempts at rapprochement from 1648 to 1661. He notes the States General's reluctance to support Spain against the rising power of France.


This is a fascinating treatment of the daring Dutch naval action up the Medway River and raid on the shipyards at Chatham during the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1667. The Dutch burned the English fleet as well as captured the Royal Charles and Unity men-of-war. This bold
action, conceived by John de Witt and carried out by Admiral de Ruyter and Cornelius de Witt, provided the Dutch the major victory over England that forced Charles II to agree to the humiliating Peace of Breda (1667). The study is based on Dutch and English archival sources.


In this essay, R.J. Roorda of the University of Nijmegen stresses the political conflict between William III of Orange and the Dutch regents during the Dutch War, and he professes that the opposition of the regents greatly contributed to the Peace of Nijmegen. The author describes how William III took control of the Dutch Republic as stadholder and head of the armed forces during the crisis of 1672. To defend the United Provinces, William III created an anti-French coalition to defeat the aggression of Louis XIV. However, a select group of Dutch regents, especially from Holland, opposed William III's continual requests for funding the war effort, including heavy subsidies to Dutch allies, after the French withdrawal from the United Provinces in 1673. The Dutch opposition to William III's foreign policy disliked the cost associated with continuing the war, the concentration on military policy in the Spanish Netherlands instead of commercial policy abroad, as well as the stadholder's close ties to Stuart England. Opposition steadily
grew, and, in 1678, the province of Holland finally informed the stadholder of its refusal to further finance the war. The author argues that William III's failure to maintain support for his foreign policy caused the break up of the anti-French coalition and led directly to the Peace of Nijmegen (p.25).


The author sketches the making of the Triple Alliance of 1668. He points out that De Witt, a strong supporter of the Dutch-French alliance of 1662, at first advocated Louis XIV’s demands in the Spanish Netherlands during the War of Devolution, but later feared the prospect of acquiring a common border with France. Therefore, the Grand Pensionary hoped to limit the Sun King’s territorial ambitions by hinting at the possibility of an Anglo-Dutch alliance if France continued the war in the Low Countries. At the insistence of Charles II of England, De Witt agreed to the Triple Alliance and its provisions to impose a peace settlement on France and Spain. The alliance encouraged Spain to accept a mediated peace settlement while at the same time threatened the use of force to dampen Louis XIV’s territorial ambitions. The result was Louis XIV blaming De Witt and the Dutch Republic for instigating an anti-French coalition. However, Rowen blames Charles II for his role in the creation of the Triple Alliance. The author claims that Charles II's
real motive for founding the Triple Alliance was to break up the Dutch-French alliance to England’s benefit. This policy succeeded, and resulted in French hostility toward the United Provinces and the creation of the Anglo-French alliance against the Dutch Republic in 1670.


Professor Rowen supplies the definitive study of John de Witt (1625-72), the Grand Pensionary of Holland and one of Europe’s great statesmen of the seventeenth century, in this full-scale biography. De Witt served as the political leader and directed the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic from 1653 to 1672. His administration was marked by remarkable successes, in particular the defeat of the English during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. He maintained the predominance of the province of Holland within the United Provinces, making the complicated and cumbersome federal system of the Dutch Republic work with great effectiveness. He diplomatically maneuvered the United Provinces among the powers of Europe in the period of Spain’s fall from preponderance and France’s rise to greatness, as well as faced the bitter commercial and political rivalry of the English. His leadership managed to preserve the eminent position that the Dutch Republic had achieved after the Peace of Münster. De Witt’s stadholderless government only collapsed when the Anglo-French alliance attacked the United Provinces.
at sea and on land in 1672. Based on archival research, Rowen’s work is extremely valuable for its discussion of foreign policy as well as De Witt’s role in military and naval strategy. The study contains an extensive bibliography.


Rowen provides a shorter biography about John de Witt based on the author’s own massive study of the Grand Pensionary published in 1978 (see 4.3.9). The work lacks footnotes, but it includes a brief bibliographical essay. The study is recommended for teachers, undergraduates, and general readers.


Professor Rowen explores the origins of the Dutch War in this brief article. His thesis is that Louis XIV’s ambitions and the Spanish Question were the key factors in the origins of the Dutch War. The author argues that as early as 1648 the Dutch began fearing the prospect of having its powerful French ally rather than a weakened Spain as a neighbor, resulting in a separate peace between the United Provinces and Spain at Münster. This fear continued during the First Stadholderless Period with De Witt as Grand Pensionary. De Witt and the States General agreed to renew the Franco-Dutch alliance in 1662,
but both states failed purposely to address the future of the Spanish
Netherlands in the treaty. The States General hoped to keep a friendly
France away from Dutch borders while Louis XIV sought to acquire
territory in the Spanish Netherlands. Rowen notes that De Witt
temporarily explored the idea of France and the Dutch Republic invading
the Spanish Netherlands and dividing the spoils. However, the
possibility of Franco-Dutch cooperation failed to materialize, especially
when the French hesitated to effectively assist their Dutch ally in the
Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). French reluctance to fight the
English led to increased Franco-Dutch tension. Dutch naval victories,
however, resulted in the Peace of Breda, and Louis XIV’s War of
Devolution quickly drew the Dutch and English together to oppose
French annexation of the Spanish Netherlands. The subsequent Triple
Alliance forced the Sun King to accept the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle
(1668). Rowen believes that the Dutch and French essentially had no
clash of interests that would lead to war, but Louis XIV’s wild ambitions
in the Spanish Netherlands forced the Dutch to not only oppose, but stir
the wrath of the Sun King into planning a war against the Dutch in his
quest to take the Spanish Netherlands.
239


In this essay, Professor Rowen emphasizes the continuity of Dutch foreign policy from De Witt to William III in relation to French territorial ambitions in the Spanish Netherlands. He argues that William III’s creation of a coalition against Louis XIV to maintain the Spanish Netherlands as a buffer state between the Dutch Republic and France stems from the policy of the Grand Pensionary. In fact, the author points out that after six years of war Louis XIV’s territorial gains in the Peace of Nijmegen were essentially the same as those offered by De Witt in the 1660s. Rowen states that De Witt’s diplomatic strategy did not collapse with the break up of the Triple Alliance. Instead, De Witt’s attempt to form an anti-French coalition to include Austria, Spain, and German princes in the early 1670s was realized by William III.


This study concentrates on William III of Orange and the Dutch military response to Louis XIV’s invasion of the United Provinces in 1672-73. Mary Caroline Trevelyan, the daughter of G.M. Trevelyan, describes the French invasion, the initial breakdown of Dutch defenses, the Dutch domestic revolution that restored William III to the stadholderate, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
renewed Dutch resistance under the leadership of the stadholder which,
along with the flooding of the polders, halted the advancing French army
in the central provinces of the Dutch Republic. The study, based on
Dutch archival research, is valuable for its treatment of the Dutch
military campaigns against Louis XIV. It includes three useful maps.

See also:

1.4.1. Carter, Alice Clare. Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch
Foreign Policy, 1667-1795. Foundations of Modern History series.

1.4.3. Geyl, Pieter. The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century: Part Two,
1648-1715. Translated by Pieter and Catherine Geyl. London: Ernest
Benn, 1964. 399 pp.

1.4.4. Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall,

1.4.5. Rowen, Herbert H. The Princes of Orange: The Stadholders in the Dutch

3.1.9. Duffy, Christopher. The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the
Great, 1660-1789. Volume II in Siege Warfare. London and Boston:

3.1.11. Padfield, Peter. Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise
of the West, Volume II, 1654-1763. London, Boston, Melbourne, and

London: Ernest Benn, 1933; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,


CHAPTER V

ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER

CROMWELL AND CHARLES II, 1649-1685

England played a minor role in international relations during the Thirty Years War. In fact, the country was torn apart by civil war from 1642 to 1646.¹ Parliament's victory over Charles I (1625-49) led to the establishment of the English Commonwealth (1649-53) and finally the Protectorate (1653-59) under Oliver Cromwell. During the Interregnum, England played a major diplomatic and military role in European affairs.

Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) gained distinction as a military commander for Parliament with the New Model Army in the English Civil War.² During the


wars against Ireland (1649-52) and Scotland (1650-52) he served as the military commander for the well-disciplined army of the Commonwealth. His ruthless campaign against Ireland in 1649-50 and victories over the Scottish and Royalist armies at Dunbar (1650) and Worcester (1651) subdued the British Isles. Such victories increased the power and prestige of the Commonwealth abroad.

While still fighting in Ireland and Scotland, the English Commonwealth rushed into its first war with a European power. The First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54) began with the Commonwealth attempting to stem the dominance of Dutch commerce and shipping abroad. The English had lost markets to the Dutch, especially in the Baltic, during the English Civil War. With the desire to protect English trade and colonies from Dutch encroachment, the Commonwealth Parliament, supported by a new and powerful navy, challenged Dutch commercial dominance by passing the Navigation Act of 1651. The ordinance prohibited the Dutch from carrying English goods, and so cut them out of a lucrative freight business. Tension quickly erupted into a war fought mainly at sea over commercial rights. A string of English victories at Kentish Knock, Portland, North Foreland, and Scheveningen led to the advantageous

---

Peace of Westminster (1654).\(^3\) In the treaty, the Dutch gave the newly established English Protectorate commercial advantages, ceded the island of Pula Run in the East Indies, provided full compensation to English merchants in the Baltic and East Indies, accepted the Navigation Act, and agreed to withhold support for the House of Orange as well as salute English naval vessels in the Channel. Cromwell, who opposed the war against the Dutch,\(^4\) acquired tremendous benefits from the conflict. English naval victories greatly improved English diplomatic and military prestige abroad.

In 1653 Oliver Cromwell established the Protectorate. His foreign policy consisted of seeking a Protestant league against the Catholic powers, improving England's commercial power, and isolating the exiled Charles Stuart from foreign support. The Lord Protector quickly came to terms with the Dutch in the Peace of Westminster. He acquired commercial agreements with Sweden, Portugal, and Denmark in 1654, as well as France in 1655. He also employed the English fleet to defend the Protectorate's commercial interests against Algiers in 1654-55. At the same time, Cromwell viewed Spain, a commercial and Catholic power, as the primary threat to English security. In


support of the Protestant cause, the Protector directed the English navy to launch an unprovoked attack against the Spanish West Indies, known as the "Western Design," with the aim of capturing Santo Domingo in Hispaniola as well as damaging Spanish trade, in 1655.\(^5\) This mission failed, but the English succeeded in capturing the weakly defended island of Jamaica. However, the attack resulted in the Anglo-Spanish War of 1655-60.

England fought the war against Spain at sea and in the Spanish Netherlands. In 1657, Cromwell acquired a military alliance with Mazarin's France against Spain. The Lord Protector agreed to provide forces to capture Gravelines for France as well as Dunkirk and Mardyke for England. The Anglo-French forces captured Mardyke in 1657. This powerful alliance defeated Spanish and Royalist forces at the battle of the Dunes before capturing Dunkirk in 1658. With this defeat, Philip IV of Spain negotiated a separate peace with Mazarin in the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659). The French ignored English interests in the peace talks, but England kept Dunkirk. In summing up the Protectorate's foreign policy, one historian has stated that Cromwell had "secured England an island in the centre of the East Indies, another in the

centre of the West Indies, and the first continental European town which the English had owned for a hundred years."\(^6\)

In 1660, the English Parliament restored Charles Stuart to the English throne.\(^7\) However, the revived English monarchy under Charles II (1660-85) was dependent upon parliamentary support. The king's foremost concerns focused on the Stuart maintenance of the throne and the avoidance of prolonged domestic turmoil that would threaten this objective. Charles II lacked financial resources beyond that provided by Parliament. Hence, Parliament had much influence over the monarch's foreign and military policies.

From the start Charles II sought to avoid war, concentrate on improving his position on the throne, and gain Parliament's support by supporting commercial expansionism. He quickly ended the Anglo-Spanish War, and sought closer relations with France, the United Provinces, and Portugal. But, Anglo-Spanish relations remained poor despite the death of Cromwell (1658) and the restoration of Charles II. The English monarch refused to return Dunkirk and Jamaica to Philip IV of Spain, or end English support for Portugal. Meanwhile, Charles II renewed Anglo-French ties by agreeing to the marriage of his sister

\(^6\)Ibid., 111.

Henriette-Anne to Louis XIV's brother, Philippe, Duke of Orléans, in 1661. The English monarch hoped to acquire a defensive alliance with France, the most powerful state in Europe. He sold Dunkirk to Louis XIV in 1662. In the meantime, Charles II continued England's close commercial relations with Portugal and agreed to a military alliance in 1661, followed by his marriage to Catherine of Braganza in 1662. As part of her dowry she brought Bombay and Tangier to Charles II. England, however, was obliged to deploy forces to assist Portugal in the continuing war against Spain (1640-68). The crown planned to use Tangier as a naval base to assist in the protection of England's Mediterranean trade.

The English monarch hoped to secure friendly relations with the Dutch Republic. At a minimum he sought to avoid war with England's arch commercial rival. Charles II was successful in acquiring an alliance with the United Provinces in 1662. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Dutch mercantile communities continued their battle for commercial dominance, and the subsequent deterioration in diplomatic relations due to English aggressiveness against Dutch interests, including the seizure of Dutch merchant ships and the New Netherlands, led to the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). Charles II was drawn by the interests of Parliament and the English mercantile community into a war that he was financially and militarily unprepared to fight. The conflict included France declaring war on England in support of their Dutch ally.
in 1666. The English fleet had declined in quality, and, in spite of the victories at Lowestoft (1665) and North Foreland (1666), England experienced severe setbacks at the hands of the Dutch fleet in the Four Days' Fight (1666) and De Ruyter's surprise raid into the Thames estuary and the Medway (1667). Diplomatically isolated, with the exception of Portugal, England agreed to the Peace of Breda (1667) one month after the Medway disaster. The treaty, nonetheless, was a compromise peace. The Dutch required an English alliance to stand up to French aggression in the War of Devolution (1667-68), and therefore John de Witt, the Dutch Grand Pensionary, allowed England to retain the New Netherlands in the peace agreement.

The Second Anglo-Dutch War had illustrated the shortcomings of English diplomacy and military might. The weakness of the English monarchy led to Charles II pursuing a secret foreign policy aimed at acquiring close ties with Louis XIV as early as 1667. He hoped to secure French subsidies as well as a defensive alliance. To break up the Franco-Dutch alliance, the English monarch encouraged De Witt to create the Triple Alliance of the United Provinces, England, and Sweden to pressure France and Spain into ending the War of Devolution in 1668. Charles II's diplomacy served to increase the value of England in the eyes of Louis XIV as a possible ally. In the meantime, Kenneth H.D. Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: Sir William Temple and John de Witt, 1665-72 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 150.
England acquired a commercial treaty with Spain (1667) and mediated an end to the Spanish-Portuguese War (1668). Thus, Charles II's policy was instrumental in improving England's diplomatic and commercial position.

In 1670, Charles II and Louis XIV agreed to a secret alliance in the Treaty of Dover. The English monarch acquired the French alliance at the cost of betraying the Triple Alliance and planning a war against the Dutch Republic. Louis XIV promised Charles II annual subsidies as well as the acquisition of Zeeland in exchange for a combined Anglo-French attack on the United Provinces. The Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) served as the opening phase of the Dutch War (1672-78). However, the combined Anglo-French fleet failed to destroy the Dutch navy and invade the United Provinces from the sea, and in spite of initial success, the French land invasion ground to a halt when the Dutch flooded their polders. The lack of naval success in the battles of Sole Bay (1672), Schoonvelt Channel (1673), and Texel (1673) quickly resulted in the growth of tension among the Anglo-French alliance, and without financial support from Parliament, Charles II was forced to abandon the French alliance and the war. After the Peace of Westminster (1674), England remained neutral, hoping to avoid war, for the rest of the conflict.

With the rise of his nephew, William III of Orange, as stadholder, Charles II sought a rapprochement with the Dutch Republic in 1677-78. He also hoped to maintain close ties with Louis XIV, in spite of Orange's emergence as the
leader of the anti-French coalition. The English ruler allowed the marriage of Mary Stuart, the eldest daughter of James, Duke of York, to Orange in 1677, and agreed to an Anglo-Dutch alliance in 1678. Meanwhile, Charles II mediated the Peace of Nijmegen (Nymegen) between France and the anti-French coalition in 1678.

English involvement in European diplomacy lasted only a short time. Beginning in 1678, the English crown became extremely unstable because of domestic crises associated with the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis. Charles II disengaged England from diplomatic affairs abroad to concentrate on domestic issues. Most especially he needed to avoid war. To stay away from conflict, the king allied with Spain (1680), maintained close relations with France and the Dutch Republic, upheld commercial agreements with numerous states, and stayed out of diplomatic squabbles. England declared neutrality during the Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84. Charles II's diplomatic and military weakness reflected his lack of financial resources beyond French subsidies to pursue an active foreign policy designed to protect English interests. In fact, England abandoned Tangier to the Moors in 1684 due to such limitations. In summing up the foreign policy of Charles II, most historians believe that Restoration England lacked a consistent and clear foreign policy, and was subject to subordinating its policy to that of France, as well as prone to cut
itself off from diplomatic activity because of the political instability of the regime.⁹

As for the literature of the period, there are several valuable surveys. James R. Jones provides a good introduction with *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (1.3.3). One should consult G.M.D. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (1.3.2) and James R. Jones, *Britain and the World, 1649-1815* (1.3.4) for more detailed studies. For the ideological aspects influencing English policy, see Steven C.A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668* (5.1.5). The Anglo-Dutch commercial and maritime rivalry is explored in Ralph Davis, *English Merchant Shipping and Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Seventeenth Century* (5.1.1), Jonathan I. Israel, "Competing Cousins: Anglo-Dutch Trade Rivalry," (5.1.3), C.R. Boxer, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (4.3.1), and Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (5.1.6). The best study of the Anglo-Dutch wars is James R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (5.1.4). One should also consult Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches, *The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 1652-1674* (5.1.2) for the military side of the wars.

---

Studies concerning the diplomacy of the Interregnum are largely devoted to Cromwell and the Protectorate. The lack of a balanced and detailed study of the Lord Protector’s policy has been recently rectified with Timothy Venning’s *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (5.2.14). Charles P. Korr, *Cromwell and the New Model Foreign Policy: England’s Policy Toward France, 1649-1658* (5.2.7) focuses primarily on Anglo-French relations. Other valuable studies include Roger Crabtree, "The Idea of a Protestant Foreign Policy" (5.2.3), Michael F. Foley, Jr., "John Thurloe and the Foreign Policy of the Protectorate, 1654-1658" (5.2.5), and Menna Prestwich, "Diplomacy and Trade in the Protectorate" (5.2.9). For the influence of the English navy on policy, see John Francis Battick, "Cromwell’s Navy and the Foreign Policy of the Protectorate, 1653-1658" (5.2.1) and Bernard Capp, *Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660* (5.2.2). The origin of the First Anglo-Dutch War is addressed in Simon Groenveld’s "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652" (5.2.6). Cromwell’s Western Design is analyzed in Timothy Venning, "Cromwell’s Foreign Policy and the Western Design" (5.2.15) and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Errand to the Indies: Puritan Colonization from Providence Island through the Western Design" (5.2.8). In addition to the monographs by Venning and Korr, aspects of the Anglo-Spanish War are examined in Charles H. Firth’s "Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1661" (5.2.4), C. Eden Quainton’s
"Colonel Lockhart and the Peace of the Pyrenees" (5.2.10), and Frederick J. Routledge's *England and the Treaty of the Pyrenees* (5.2.13). For Cromwell's diplomacy in the Baltic during the First Northern War, see Michael Roberts' essay "Cromwell and the Baltic" (5.2.11) and his extremely valuable introduction to *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655-1656: The Missions of Peter Julius Covet and Christer Bonde* (5.2.12).

The diplomacy of the Restored Monarchy has also received much attention. In addition to the surveys by Jones and Howat cited above, David Ogg's *England in the Reign of Charles II* (5.3.19) and Keith G. Feiling's *British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672* (5.3.7) continue to remain useful for depicting the foreign policy of Charles II. J.L. Price, "Restoration England and Europe" (5.3.23) provides an analysis of the English monarch's relations with Europe. Ronald Hutton's *Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (5.3.16) and John Miller's *Charles II* (5.3.18) are the best recent biographies with a focus on international relations. The king's financial relationship with France is examined in Clyde L. Grose's "Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles II and the English Parliament" (5.3.9). Relations with Portugal and Spain are discussed in Gerald L. Belcher's "Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661: A Reassessment of Charles II's Foreign Policy at the Restoration" (5.3.2) and "Anglo-Spanish Diplomatic Relations, 1660-1667" (4.2.1). For the Second Anglo-Dutch War, see Paul Seaward, "The House of Commons Committee of
Trade and the Origins of the Second Anglo-Dutch War" (5.3.25), Harry de Vries, "The Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674" (5.3.6), and A.W.H. Pearsall, The Second Dutch War, 1665-1667 (5.3.21). C. Brinkmann, "Charles II and the Bishop of Münster in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-66" (5.3.3) and Henry L. Schoolcraft, "England and Denmark, 1660-1667" (5.3.24) focus on other aspects of the conflict. An outstanding examination of the origins, making, and conduct of the Triple Alliance is Kenneth H.D. Haley’s An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: Sir William Temple and John de Witt, 1665-1672 (5.3.11). Ronald Hutton’s "The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670" (5.3.17) appraises English policy that led to the breakup of the Triple Alliance, and the mistake of the Third Anglo-Dutch War is addressed in C.R. Boxer’s "Some Second Thoughts on the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674" (5.3.4). For the Anglo-Dutch rapprochement and alliance Clyde L. Grose’s "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678" (5.3.10) is still worthwhile, but Kenneth H.D. Haley’s "The Anglo-Dutch Rapprochement of 1677" (5.3.14) and "English Policy at the Peace Congress of Nijmegen" (5.3.13) are essential.

5.1. General Studies in English Foreign Policy, 1649-85


In this brief study, Ralph Davis, a professor of economic history at the University of Leiden, examines the Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry
in the seventeenth century. He argues that English success in overtaking the Dutch Republic as the major European trading power was a direct result of English naval victories in the First Anglo-Dutch War. He believes that the English capture of much of the Dutch merchant fleet significantly damaged Dutch commercial power. Davis points out that half of the English merchant fleet consisted of former Dutch flyboat or fluits in 1654. Afterwards, the mass reproduction of the Dutch flyboat catapulted England into the position as Europe's foremost trade carrying power.


Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches of the University of Adelaide furnish an account of the naval campaigns of the First, Second, and Third Anglo Dutch Wars. The authors discuss the causes of the wars, the naval battles, tactics, and the key commanders. The work should be read along with the political and diplomatic study of James R. Jones (5.1.4). It is based on published English primary and secondary sources. The study contains forty-five illustrations and eleven maps. It is highly recommended for naval enthusiasts.
Professor Jonathan I. Israel of the University of London provides a brief discussion of the Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry that resulted in three wars in the seventeenth century. He points out that tension over shipping and trade increased after the Peace of Münster (1648), which ended the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch Republic. After the conflict, the United Provinces quickly acquired commercial dominance at Baltic, Spanish, Italian, and Ottoman ports, squeezing out England's previously flourishing trade. Israel notes that only England of all the European states held the naval strength to challenge the expansion of Dutch maritime and commercial power. He writes: "England had the power to react and her [commercial] losses were simply too extensive to be accepted without a major and very aggressive response" (p.19). The author views English aggression against Dutch shipping on the high seas, not the Navigation Act of 1651, made inevitable the First Anglo-Dutch War. He accepts that England held the advantage in naval firepower in all three wars, and won most of the major engagements, but the Dutch either defeated or fought the English to a stalemate in all three wars. Israel shows that the Dutch consistently damaged English trade in the wars to the point that England
endured more trade loss than the United Provinces in the Third Anglo-Dutch War.


Professor James R. Jones of the University of East Anglia examines the political, economic, and naval aspects in his account of the Anglo-Dutch wars. He challenges Charles Wilson's thesis in Profit and Power (5.1.6) that the English mercantile community strongly influenced the government into pursuing wars with the United Provinces. Instead, Jones argues that England fought the wars to enhance the power of the ruler, not the wealth of the nation. He stresses that those in power during the Commonwealth and Restored Monarchy formulated and executed policy decisions based on the desire to increase the power of the ruling authority. Jones insists that "the crucial decisions to embark on wars, or on policies with a high risk of provoking war, were taken by ministers and politicians who cannot be said to be acting under pressure, or in direct response to mercantile calls for action" (p.8). The Dutch, on the other hand, fought to protect their trade interests. The Dutch resisted the English attempt to conquer the seas and reduce the United Provinces to a state of total submission. The study is based largely on
English and Dutch archival research as well as secondary sources. It contains a valuable chronology, maps, and bibliography.


Steven C.A. Pincus of the University of Chicago examines the causes and diplomacy of the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars. The author plays down the Anglo-Dutch economic rivalry and argues that ideology played a major role in the making of English foreign policy during the Commonwealth and early years of the Restored Monarchy. His thesis is that both England and the Dutch Republic had experienced complete ideological reversals during this period. He stresses that the Commonwealth fought the first war to prevent the establishment of a monarchy in the United Provinces, and the Restored Monarchy fought the second war in an effort to transform the Dutch Republic into an Orangist monarchy. In essence, the wars were fought over the ideological struggle between monarchy and republicanism, with religion playing an important role. The study is based on research from thirty-one archives in England and the United States, as well as contemporary newspapers and pamphlets. It is a very detailed work that stresses the role of ideology in the making of English foreign policy in the 1650s and
The work contains an extensive list of contemporary English pamphlets.


Professor Charles Wilson of Cambridge University renders an account of Anglo-Dutch relations in the seventeenth century based on English diplomatic papers and contemporary pamphlets. His brief analysis examines the first half of the century as well as the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars. The author's focus is on the economic and naval aspects of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry. He stresses English jealousy of Dutch commercial predominance and the friction between the two powers on a global scale. The rivalry led to the First Anglo-Dutch War, but Cromwell ended this conflict in 1654, hoping to form an Anglo-Dutch alliance against Catholic Spain (p.76). Although failing to achieve this alliance, the Lord Protector worked to maintain close relations with the United Provinces despite commercial and naval tension, especially concerning Dutch trade with Spain and in the Baltic. Cromwell believed that after the First Anglo-Dutch War another conflict with the Dutch over trade was neither necessary nor desirable: war interfered with commerce. Wilson explores the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, but fails to treat the third conflict because he believes that the
Peace of Breda (1667), which ended the second conflict, served as the turning point in Anglo-Dutch relations, and afterwards the Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry became less important compared to the aggressiveness of Louis XIV's France. This is a classic study now challenged by the works of James R. Jones (5.1.4) and Steven C.A. Pincus (5.1.5).

See also:


5.2. English Diplomacy in the Era of Cromwell, 1649-59


John Francis Battick concentrates on the interrelationship between Cromwell's foreign policy and the employment of the English fleet. The author professes that although the Lord Protector had the most powerful navy in Europe, he failed to successfully use this instrument in diplomatic relations with other powers. The existence of the navy influenced the English decision to attack the Spanish West Indies with the purpose of acquiring commercial concessions from Spain in addition to dominating the Caribbean. But, the expedition resulted in the Anglo-Spanish War (1655-60), which tied the English fleet to the waters off Spain and in the English Channel, limited the further use of the navy in pursuing English interests abroad, and led to the French alliance. He writes: "Preoccupation with the Spanish war led to a temporary loss of security in the Mediterranean and made it impossible for the Protector to intervene in the Baltic where Charles X sought to establish Swedish hegemony" (p.332). In the end, Cromwell achieved his objectives of preserving a balance of power in the Baltic that safeguarded English commercial interests, but England accomplished this feat through diplomacy and not by the application of sea power.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bernard Capp of the University of Warwick investigates the English navy during the Interregnum. He discusses the creation of a mighty navy after the execution of Charles I in 1649. The author stresses that the Rump Parliament built up the fleet to protect England from a possible foreign invasion in support of the Stuarts, as well as to force Europe to recognize the English Commonwealth. During the Interregnum England added 216 warships to its initial fleet of fifty ships. Over half of these ships were prizes gained against the Dutch Republic, Portugal, France, Spain, and others (p.4). From 1649 to 1652, the English ship building program added many superior warships to the fleet, and resulted in the Rump Parliament's confidence and belligerence that contributed to the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War. The strength of the English fleet earned an astounding victory against the Dutch.

Cromwell became the beneficiary of both the naval buildup, victory against the United Provinces, and increase in English military and diplomatic prestige. Capp notes that the English fleet made Cromwell feared and courted throughout Europe. The Lord Protector continued the use of the navy to protect the Commonwealth. He, however, pursued a policy of gunboat diplomacy, devised to enable the navy to
pay for itself while serving both England's interests and his own. Nonetheless, the Western Design along with the subsequent war against Spain failed to make good use of the English fleet. The author stresses the presence of political and religious zealots among the naval officer corps and their opposition to the war against Spain. The officer corps supported the idealism and interests of the English Commonwealth, not the personal policy of Cromwell. This disaffection hampered the Lord Protector's effective employment of the English navy in the Anglo-Spanish War, especially after the crisis in the Baltic divided his diplomatic and military efforts. The study is based on unpublished British archival sources.


In this important essay, Roger Crabtree of the University of East Anglia stresses that Cromwell's foreign policy was based more on political realism than religious idealism. He professes that the Lord Protector's "diplomacy in the Baltic, in the Dutch treaty, in the Spanish war and the French alliance . . . were neither anachronistic nor fanatical" (p.189). The author points out that Cromwell launched a war against Spain not for religious reasons, but to eliminate the threat of Spanish privateers from the Spanish Netherlands attacking English shipping. The capture of Dunkirk would wipe out this threat, as well as
secure England from the threat of invasion by Royalists in support of Charles Stuart. To minimize the damage to English trade during the war, the Lord Protector maintained close commercial ties with Portugal and the United Provinces. In the war, Cromwell sided with Cardinal Mazarin against Spain to ensure that Charles Stuart received no support from France. He knew Spain was too weak to provide aid to the Royalists. In his Baltic policy, the Protector dodged both Swedish and Dutch requests for aid in the First Northern War (1655-60), hoping to avoid a war England could not afford, and too close a tie with Charles X and his lost cause against the Danes, Dutch, Brandenburgers, and Poles.


Professor Charles H. Firth describes the composition and operations of the Cromwellian and Royalist armies that opposed one another in Flanders during the Anglo-Spanish War. The forces of the Protectorate augmented Marshal Turenne's army while Royalist troops fought alongside Spanish forces under the leadership of Don John of Austria and the Prince of Condé. Cromwell's forces assisted in the capture of Montmédy and St. Venant as well as the relief of Ardres in 1657. The Anglo-French contingent captured Mardyke (1657), defeated Spanish and Royalist forces at the battle of the Dunes (1658), and took Dunkirk.
The capture of Dunkirk ended the Royalist invasion threat to England. An English garrison guarded Dunkirk and Mardyke until Charles II sold them to Louis XIV in 1662. This is an interesting study of the Protectorate's military activities in the Low Countries.


Michael F. Foley, Jr., examines Cromwell's foreign policy goals and assesses the results of the Protectorate's diplomacy from 1654 to 1658. The author stresses that Cromwell and his Council of State made all foreign policy decisions. He asserts that John Thurloe, the Protectorate's secretary of state, played a key role in the conduct of diplomacy and as the director of foreign intelligence, but he held no political power or important part in the formulation of foreign policy as argued by some historians. In his examination of Cromwellian policy, Foley notes the continuity between the governments of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate. Both governments were anxious to maintain political power, sought to defend English commercial interests with a strong navy, and demonstrated indecision in choosing allies. The major difference concerned relations with the Dutch Republic.
Foley believes that Cromwell "was basically conservative in his approach to foreign policy" (p.289). The Lord Protector's main objective was to maintain his own political power in England. Thus, he diplomatically maneuvered to maintain peaceful relations with the two strongest military threats, France and the Dutch Republic, as well as focused his efforts on denying Charles Stuart foreign support for an invasion of England. As a result, the Protector kept peaceful, but strained relations with the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Denmark, while the French alliance gave England strength abroad. He avoided a costly war against the United Provinces that would have weaken his hold on political power. However, Foley admits that Cromwell, in spite of the capture of Jamaica and Dunkirk, made a mistake in waging war against Spain. The conflict strained the Protectorate's treasury and proved unpopular with the English mercantile community. Even so, the author insists that Cromwell's diplomacy and military might "restored and maintained England's position abroad and its prestige as a major European power" (p.284).


Simon Groenveld of the University of Leiden explores Anglo-Dutch relations from 1640-52, noting the clash of interests that resulted in the
First Anglo-Dutch War. He stresses the English Parliament's desire for a Dutch alliance during the English Civil War, and the Dutch response of neutrality. However, Dutch trade with the Royalists as well as William II of Orange's support of Charles Stuart stirred Roundhead sentiment against the United Provinces. The inevitable confrontation of Royalist, Parliamentarian, and Dutch ships at sea increased Anglo-Dutch tension, especially with the Commonwealth's seizure of over 300 Dutch ships thought to be trading with the enemy from 1649-52 (p.561). In the crisis, the Commonwealth's interests focused on denying the Royalists support while expanding English commerce, and Dutch interests centered on free trade. Success against the Royalists in Ireland and Scotland on land and at sea allowed the Commonwealth to turn its growing naval power and hard-line commercial policies against the Dutch rival.


Charles P. Korr of the University of Missouri at St. Louis examines English diplomatic relations with France during the Commonwealth and Protectorate from 1649 to 1658. The author's thesis is that Cromwell and his Council of State planned to attack Hispaniola and risk war with Spain for economic and territorial benefit in 1654-55, expecting Mazarin
to seek and pay for an English alliance against a common enemy if a conflict broke out between England and Spain. The Lord Protector’s foreign policy was aimed at securing the maximum benefits (subsidies, commercial benefits, and Dunkirk) from France as well as bolstering his political position in England with a war against the much hated Spain. In the ensuing conflict, Cromwell offered Mazarin the employment of the powerful English fleet and army against Spain, but the cardinal hesitated to promise Dunkirk to the English, and the talks for the creation of an alliance dragged on until March 1657. The alliance led to the English occupation of Dunkirk shortly before the death of the Protector in 1658.

The study is based on archival research and published primary sources.


In this article, Karen Ordahl Kupperman of the University of Connecticut relates the Puritan colonization of Providence Island, founded on the Mosquito Coast in 1630. She notes Anglo-Spanish hostilities in the West Indies and the Spanish conquest of the colony in 1641. Kupperman stresses the influence of Providence Island Colony investors on Cromwell’s foreign policy and his decision to launch the Western Design in 1654-55, aimed at destroying Spanish influence in the West Indies. The author emphasizes the anti-Catholic, anti-Spanish aspect of
the Puritan movement as well as the desire to fight Spanish Catholicism in the West Indies.


This is an important article that began a reevaluation of Cromwellian foreign policy. Menna Prestwich of Oxford University argues that the Lord Protector ignored English commercial interests in the pursuit of a foreign policy based on the desire for a Protestant alliance and territorial acquisition. She stresses that Cromwell sought a Dutch alliance as the cornerstone of his policy as well as aggressive action against England's traditional foe, Catholic Spain. This foreign policy damaged English commerce and shipping by cutting England's valuable trade with Old Spain, while assisting England's commercial rival, the Dutch Republic, in recovering and expanding its trade after the First Anglo-Dutch War. Moreover, Cromwell's Baltic policy, which derived little benefit for English trade, was "muddled and ineffective" because of his indecision to side with one Protestant power, Sweden, against another, the United Provinces. The author emphasizes the lack of support from the English mercantile community for Cromwell's foreign policy, especially since the war against Spain slowed England's commercial recovery from the First Anglo-Dutch War. Prestwich believes that Cromwell failed to recognize the Dutch as England's natural enemy.

C. Eden Quainton of the University of Washington addresses the diplomatic mission of Colonel Lockhart in representing the English Commonwealth in the making of the Peace of the Pyrenees. Lockhart failed to gain Cardinal Mazarin's support for English interests, or an Anglo-Spanish peace agreement. In fact, Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro ignored Lockhart's attempt to influence the Franco-Spanish talks. The English diplomatic mission was hampered by the lack of instructions after the fall of Richard Cromwell, the instability of the Commonwealth government, as well as Royalist attempts to restore Charles Stuart to the English throne.


In this essay, Professor Michael Roberts of Queen's University at Belfast appraises Cromwell's foreign policy toward the Protestant powers during the First Northern War. He argues that the Lord Protector's policy was "self-consistent, logical and conservative" (p.172). The author believes that Cromwell's primary concerns focused on the defense of English trade, not the creation of a Protestant front. Factors influencing his Baltic policy included the ongoing Anglo-Spanish War; the Stuart threat to the Protectorate; financial constraints, an
overextended navy, and the lack of naval stores; the need to maintain peace with the United Provinces; as well as the strong desire to stay out of the war in the north between Sweden, Denmark, and the Dutch. In the First Northern War both Sweden and the United Provinces sought English support. The Lord Protector, however, wanted to avoid commitments that would lead England into a costly war that would disrupt English commerce. His ultimate aim was to negotiate an agreement between Denmark, the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and England concerning Baltic trade. Cromwell sought to gain for English commerce the privileges and opportunities already enjoyed by the Dutch in the Baltic. In his policy of non-commitment, the Lord Protector employed caution and restraint in relations with the Dutch, while avoiding requests to support Charles X of Sweden's aggressive actions in the Baltic region.


This is a collection of diplomatic correspondence from Charles X of Sweden's diplomatic representatives in London during the mid-1650s. In an introductory essay, Professor Roberts reviews Anglo-Swedish relations during 1654 to 1656. He relates Charles X's efforts to acquire an offensive alliance with the English Protectorate after the Anglo-Swedish commercial treaty of 1654. The Swedish monarch sought
English subsidies, Scottish mercenaries, and naval support in his plans to launch a Baltic war. Roberts believes that Cromwell desired an offensive alliance with Sweden in 1655, but domestic crises in England hampered all efforts by both parties to negotiate such an agreement. By 1656 Cromwell had changed his mind, possibly due to the influence of his Council of State (p.13), and he now sought just a defensive alliance with Charles X as part of his plans for a Protestant League. However, Dutch-Swedish tension in the Baltic made this aim impossible. The Protector feared a Dutch-Swedish war in the Baltic, and the effect of such a conflict on English commerce. Cromwell needed peace in the north while England was engaged in war against Spain. Roberts argues that an alliance with Sweden was not in the best interest of England. The English Protectorate shared no common enemy or interests with Sweden.


Professor Frederick J. Routledge of the University of Liverpool treats the English Question in the Franco-Spanish peace of 1659. In the negotiations leading up to the peace agreement, Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro were faced with the dilemma that Charles Stuart was an ally of Spain, and the English Commonwealth an ally of France. Although Charles Stuart and Sir William Lockhart both attempted to
influence the peace settlement, the French and Spanish kings chose to ignore the English Question in the making of the Peace of the Pyrenees. Philip IV of Spain lost interest in supporting the Stuart cause while Louis XIV chose neutrality in the Stuart struggle to regain the throne of England. Routledge believes that France and Spain hesitated to commit themselves to the Royalists or Commonwealth because of the uncertain outcome of the political turmoil in England in 1659. Thus, when Parliament restored him to the throne, Charles II owed nothing to Louis XIV or Philip IV, which left the English king theoretically free to choose an independent foreign policy. However, the legacy of Cromwell’s foreign policy—Portugal, Dunkirk, and Jamaica—drew England closer to France in the 1660s. The study is based on English, Spanish, and French primary sources.


Dr. Timothy Venning, a specialist on Cromwellian foreign policy, supplies a much needed full-scale study of English policy during the Protectorate. The author views the Lord Protector as a pragmatist in foreign affairs. In his analysis, Venning sees the Franco-Spanish War as the cornerstone of English policy. He writes that at first Cromwell needed to fuel the Franco-Spanish conflict by offering the possibility of an English alliance to the belligerents to distract any possible assistance.
for Charles Stuart, the primary threat to Cromwell's regime. The author professes that Cromwell's aggressive foreign policy concerning the Western Design came from the need to employ England's powerful armed forces as well as the necessity to find money to support the almost bankrupt Protectorate. The Protector needed the expected financial rewards to pay the armed forces which kept him in power. At war with Spain, Cromwell chose to ally with the potentially more powerful France in order to prevent Mazarin's support of the Stuarts, in addition to hindering the possibility of a Franco-Spanish peace. The Anglo-French alliance, created after Mazarin met Cromwell's price, and the success of the English armed forces brought the Protectorate much fame and international prestige. However, Venning shows that Cromwell's manipulation of the Franco-Spanish War affected other aspects of his foreign policy. The Protector was forced to avoid a desired alliance with Sweden for fear that the United Provinces would ally with Spain against England. Such a combination could place his hold on English political power in jeopardy. The study is based on archival research, published primary sources, as well as secondary works. It contains a useful bibliography.

The author argues that the Lord Protector believed that an attack on the lucrative target of Hispaniola as his best option in foreign policy in 1654-55. Cromwell surmised that a successful attack on Hispaniola and the capture of a Spanish treasure fleet would play a vital role in funding his armed forces as well as maintaining his political position in England. He expected that financially strapped and war weary Spain would not wage war against England in Europe over events in Hispaniola. Venning emphasizes the importance of the Council of State in the decision to launch the Western Design as well as the military weakness of Spain against a possible Anglo-French alliance.

See also:


5.3. The Foreign Policy of Charles II, 1660-85


In this article, Christopher T. Atkinson of Oxford University addresses the contribution of Charles II's army to the French war effort in the Dutch War. The English king deployed a British contingent of about 6,000 soldiers to France to participate, under French command, in the invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672 (p.58). In the following year, in 1673, the British contingent assisted the French in the siege and capture of Maastricht. In February 1674, England and the Dutch Republic agreed to the Peace of Westminster: England became a neutral power. However, Charles II refused to recall his forces home (p.63). Instead, British forces fought under Marshal Turenne at Sinsheim (June 1674) in the Palatinate, Enzheim (October 1674) and Turckheim (January 1675) in Alsace, as well as Sasbach (July 1675) on the right bank of the Rhine. After the death of Turenne, British troops continued to support the French war effort against the Dutch until Charles II finally recalled them in January 1678 (p.170). The article includes four battle plans and one map.

Gerald L. Belcher of Beaver College addresses Charles II's diplomatic relations with Portugal and Spain at the beginning of the Restoration. He notes Philip IV of Spain's expectation of an immediate Anglo-Spanish alliance in 1660-61, based on Charles Stuart's relationship with the Spanish monarch during his exile. The English monarch, however, chose an Anglo-Portuguese alliance because of Afonso VI's offer of financial, commercial, and territorial benefits associated with a marriage alliance. The alliance not only brought such advantages, but it allowed England to keep Dunkirk and Jamaica, which Philip IV had hoped to regain as his price for an Anglo-Spanish alliance. Belcher argues that the English monarch realized Spain's inability to match Portugal's tempting offer as well as the unlikelihood of Philip IV declaring war on England because of the military weakness demonstrated in the Franco-Spanish War (1635-59). The author also stresses that Charles II pursued close relations with both Portugal and Spain, and he also notes that after the English king's marriage to Afonso VI's sister, Catherine Braganza, he continually sought to mediate an end to the Spanish-Portuguese War (1640-68).

This is a rare study of Charles II's relations with a German state. Brinkmann sketches the English alliance with Bishop Christopher Bernard von Galen in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. With both rulers having quarrels against the Dutch, the English monarch and the Bishop of Münster created the alliance to launch a two-front war against the United Provinces. To gain the alliance, Charles II agreed to pay the bishop subsidies for 18,000 troops employed against the Dutch in 1665. Galen's forces invaded and occupied the Ijssel district, capturing Groningen during the first campaign. Despite this success, the bishop was forced to withdraw from the war because of Charles II's inadequate payment of subsidies and Louis XIV's intervention in the conflict. The Sun King's army, in support of the Franco-Dutch defensive alliance, drove Galen's forces out of the Ijssel, and then invaded the bishopric of Münster. In the meantime, the German princes, desiring to avoid the expansion of French power in Germany, pressured Galen to make a separate peace with the United Provinces in early 1666. Münster's withdrawal from the conflict left England alone at war with the Dutch and their French ally. This is an interesting article, but Brinkmann fails to adequately discuss Galen's reasons for the alliance.

Professor C.R. Boxer of the University of London examines Anglo-Dutch public opinion concerning the Third Anglo-Dutch War. The author stresses that an informed public opinion was against the war. He argues that public opinion was more concerned with the rising threat of French aggression. Boxer points out that English public opinion and Parliament's lack of financial support for the conflict forced Charles II to abandon the French alliance and sign a separate peace with the United Provinces in 1674. The essay is based on a study of English and Dutch newspapers of the era.


Professor John Childs supplements the research of Christopher T. Atkinson (see 5.3.1.) concerning the presence and operations of Charles II's army in France during the Dutch War. Childs notes that Charles II had three infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment attached to the French army during the Third Anglo-Dutch War. After the Peace of Westminster the British presence in the French army declined by one infantry regiment (pp.37-38). The author points out that the British soldiers remaining in France after February 1674 were serving as mercenaries. However, Childs stresses that these mercenaries included
the Duke of Monmouth, who was the captain-general of England's standing army, and the Royal English Regiment. Charles II kept the British Brigade abroad to fulfill his Treaty of Dover commitment of supplying 6,000 soldiers to Louis XIV. Moreover, the king wanted his army to acquire valuable combat experience (p.391). Nonetheless, the British troops remaining abroad were poorly treated, armed, and equipped by the French after England pulled out of the war in 1674. Childs describes the difficulties the British Brigade had recruiting men to serve in France.


Harry de Vries examines the origins and diplomacy of the Third Anglo-Dutch War. He stresses Charles II's desire for the French alliance of 1670 as well as his hesitation to attack the Dutch Republic in 1672. De Vries argues that Charles II's pro-French ministers persuaded him to fight the Dutch. The author believes Charles II sacrificed English interests in favor of personal and dynastic concerns. He also stresses the role of William III of Orange and the English political opposition in forcing public opinion against the war and coercing the English monarch into the Peace of Westminster (1674). The study is based on research in English and Dutch archives.

In this classic study, Sir Keith G. Feiling supplies a narrative history of Charles II's foreign policy from the Restoration to the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War. He views the king as determined to encourage English trade and to maintain a mighty navy and English predominance in the channel. The author focuses on England's poor relations with its commercial rival, the Dutch Republic. He believes that Charles II became the puppet of Louis XIV after the Treaty of Dover while the monarchy should have devoted its energy to deterring the commercial and military power of France.


Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon, was Lord Chancellor of England and the chief minister of Charles II from 1660 to 1667. In this revisionist doctoral dissertation, Samuel T. Francis argues that Clarendon, not Charles II or Lord Arlington, was the formulator of English foreign policy during these years. Francis stresses that Clarendon's primary goal was to stabilize the Restoration regime, which was financially poor and politically fragile. However, his anti-Dutch diplomacy led to an unwanted war. The author stresses that despite the Medway disaster and a compromise peace settlement at Breda,
Clarendon's seven-year-hold on foreign policy achieved much success with the acquisition of Bombay, Tangier, and New York; a valuable alliance with Portugal; an improvement of England's position in the Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry as well as increased trade with Sweden and Spain; a split in the Franco-Dutch alliance; and an increase in the international prestige of Charles II's court. Francis bases his assertions on research in British archives.


Clyde L. Grose of Northwestern University investigates the financial relationship between Charles II and Louis XIV. He notes the English monarch's financial difficulties and the Sun King's willingness to provide annual subsidies in an attempt to control English foreign policy. Grose argues that French money especially played a vital role in Anglo-French relations from 1668 to 1674. French subsidies, however, did not prevent the English from abandoning the French alliance during the Third Anglo-Dutch War and the Dutch War. Nonetheless, Louis XIV continued to pay subsidies to Charles II to maintain England's neutrality in the Dutch War. Grose insists that "Charles II, although strongly French in religious, political, and personal inclinations, was seldom clay in French hands . . ." (p.204).
Grose scrutinizes the Anglo-Dutch alliance and relations with France in the diplomatic maneuvering leading up to the Peace of Nijmegen. In February 1678, England and the United Provinces created an alliance with the aim of imposing a peace settlement on Louis XIV to end the Dutch War. However, the author argues that Charles II allied with the Dutch not to risk war with France, but to increase England's value as a possible ally or neutral power in the eyes of Louis XIV. Such recognition would bring substantial French subsidies that the English monarch desperately needed. With this in mind, the English monarchy obtained the Dutch alliance, built up its military forces in the Low Countries, and encouraged the Dutch Republic and Spain to resist Louis XIV's demands. But, Charles II's Dutch ally surprised him by agreeing to a separate peace with the Sun King at the Congress of Nijmegen, leaving him without the desired French subsidies. Grose attributes the failure of English foreign policy to Charles II's insincerity with his Dutch ally as well as the tactful diplomacy of Louis XIV and French military success in 1678.

In this highly valuable monograph, Professor Kenneth Haley of Sheffield University investigates the making of the Triple Alliance of 1668. He focuses on the diplomatic activity of the English diplomat, Sir William Temple. He argues that Temple and John de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, were the main proponents of the Triple Alliance, and that contrary to the view of J.L. Price (see 5.3.23), the combination of England, the United Provinces, and Sweden influenced Louis XIV to accept the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). The study is based on research in English, French, Dutch, Spanish, and Belgian archives.

Haley begins by relating Temple’s diplomatic missions leading up to the Anglo-Dutch alliance. He notes the diplomat’s knowledge of European affairs and foreign languages. Temple served in Münster and Brussels during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. His aim was to acquire an Anglo-Spanish pact against the Franco-Dutch alliance. He failed in this aim, but he developed a working relationship with the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo. While in Brussels Temple recognized Louis XIV’s ambitions in the Spanish Netherlands as a threat to English interests and European peace. With the outbreak of the War of Devolution, Temple strongly suggested that
England support the Spanish Netherlands against Louis XIV, but Charles II preferred to nurture closer relations with the Sun King.

Temple acquired support for his anti-French stance from John de Witt. The Dutch, still at war with England, realized the growing French threat to the United Provinces as Louis XIV continued to conquer the Spanish Netherlands. Castel Rodrigo lacked the military resources to oppose France, and both Temple and De Witt sought to end the Second Anglo-Dutch War and form an alliance to block French aggression. With the English naval disaster at the Medway, Charles II agreed to the Peace of Breda, leaving De Witt the opportunity to concentrate his efforts towards creating an alliance against Louis XIV. Temple, however, found it difficult to gain Charles II's acceptance of an Anglo-Dutch alliance against France. Charles II, against his personal preference, acquiesced to the creation of the Triple Alliance only after much pressure from his own ministers and Parliament. The alliance, including Sweden, acted to protect the Spanish Netherlands against further French aggression. Haley supports the argument that the Triple Alliance forced Louis XIV to accept a truce in the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The author calls the peace a triumph for the Dutch Republic, the main instigator of the anti-French coalition, but notes the importance of Temple's part in laying the foundation of the alliance and gaining Castel Rodrigo's acceptance of
the peace proposals. Haley, however, points out that the Anglo-Dutch alliance was short-lived. Within two years Charles II had negotiated the secret Anglo-French alliance that attacked the Dutch Republic in 1672. Thus, the author declares that Temple had failed as a diplomat in influencing English policy against French aggression. Haley's study is important because it details the complex diplomacy of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Triple Alliance, and the origins of the Dutch War (1672-78).


This is a brief, but useful biographical study of Charles II. Haley sees the English monarch as a weak, opportunistic ruler whose diplomacy failed because of miscalculations. He argues that the king understood the weaknesses of the Restored Monarchy and conducted much of his own foreign policy. Haley believes Charles II miscalculated by perceiving the Dutch as the primary threat to English interests and opting for a French alliance, instead of recognizing the French threat to European security. The French alliance led to English defeat in the Third Anglo-Dutch War, which underscores the failure of Charles II's diplomacy.
Haley reemphasizes his views of English policy leading to the Peace of Nijmegen (see Haley, 5.3.12). The author believes that England lost a promising opportunity to influence European affairs during the mediation of the Peace of Nijmegen because of conflicting elements in English foreign policy as well as military weakness. Charles II sought close ties with Louis XIV while Parliament preferred a pro-Dutch policy. Although the congress met at Nijmegen beginning in 1676, the talks dragged on without much progress. For political reasons, Charles II procrastinated on the proposal of peace initiatives while seeking to maintain friendly relations with both the United Provinces and France. Finally, in 1678, he promoted the Stuart-Orange marriage alliance as a move to gain control over his nephew, William III of Orange, and Dutch foreign policy. The English monarch expected to influence the United Provinces into a peace agreement favorable to the Sun King. Unfortunately, France turned down the English peace proposal. This forced Charles II to reluctantly uphold the Anglo-Dutch alliance aimed at opposing French aggression and imposing moderate peace terms. England averted war when the Dutch Republic, fearing another betrayal by Charles II similar to the Treaty of Dover, signed a separate peace
with France. English policy had failed to influence the peace talks, mainly due to Charles II's ineffective diplomatic efforts and the ability of Louis XIV to split the anti-French coalition. Haley stresses the military weakness of England meant that neither France nor the Dutch Republic believed that English intervention in the Dutch War could change the military stalemate.


In this article, Professor Haley addresses the making of the Anglo-Dutch rapprochement in 1677. The author focuses on the foreign policy of Charles II, which aimed to maintain friendly relations with both France and the United Provinces, as well as the English monarch's efforts to mediate a moderate peace settlement to the Dutch War. To achieve these goals, Charles II gained influence over William III of Orange by way of a diplomatic marriage between the stadholder and Mary Stuart. He expected close Anglo-Dutch relations to appease the demands of the parliamentary opposition and mercantile community for closer ties with the Dutch Republic, relieve political pressure on the English government, and encourage Louis XIV to agree to a moderate peace settlement, thus avoiding a war between France and the Maritime Powers. However, Charles II's policy failed to force the Sun King to back down on his
extravagant peace demands, causing England to go to the brink of war against France in 1678.


P.H. Hardacre examines Charles II’s military commitment to Portugal during the last years of the Portuguese War of Independence (1640-68). In 1661, Charles II agreed to a marriage and commercial alliance with Afonso VI of Portugal (1656-67). One part of this agreement called for the King of England to provide Portugal with two regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry for use against Spain (p.113). To uphold his end of the agreement, Charles II deployed British forces to Portugal in 1662. Most of the British infantry came from Scotland and were former Cromwellian troops. The British forces were equipped, transported, and maintained by England. However, the Anglo-Portuguese agreement called for the British contingent to fall under the command of Portugal and receive pay from the Portuguese monarch. Hardacre describes the British contribution to a series of Portuguese victories at Degebe (1663), Ameixial (1663), Evora (1663), Valencia de Alcantara (1664), Villa Viciosa (1665), La Guarda (1665), and Thuy (1665) which turned back a Spanish invasion. The author notes that Charles II played a key role in mediating the peace settlement between Portugal and Spain. The English king recalled the British contingent
shortly after the Spanish recognition of Portuguese independence in 1668. The article includes one map.


Ronald Hutton of the University of Bristol provides a critical full-length biography of Charles II. Based on extensive research in British archives, the author stresses the king's complex character as well as his foreign policy. He notes Charles II's inability to conduct a meaningful foreign policy because of his own domestic predicament and the challenges of the international situation. He argues that Charles II was personally involved with the formulation of foreign policy, cautious in foreign affairs, and practiced the art of simultaneously pursuing several different lines of policy, which were usually contradictory, under the advice of different ministers. In his final analysis, Hutton emphasizes that Charles II was never fully committed to Louis XIV or any other foreign power during his reign. He attempted to play one power against another to increase his own international position, but the power and influence of the Sun King was overwhelming. This is an excellent biography and discussion of Charles II's foreign policy. It lacks a bibliography.
In this article, Hutton renders a revisionist account of Charles II’s secret diplomatic efforts to achieve a French alliance. The author reconstructs the king’s personal motives with the use of the Clifford papers. He argues that Charles II sought to avoid war by acquiring powerful European allies to improve England’s diplomatic position. Beginning in 1668 he pursued a two-prong policy aimed at gaining alliances with both France and the Dutch Republic. England achieved close ties with the United Provinces in the Triple Alliance of 1668. After the subsequent Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Charles II was offered the French alliance he desired. However, the Sun King’s price was an English withdrawal from the Triple Alliance and an Anglo-French war against the Dutch Republic.

Hutton stresses that the English monarch attempted to dupe Louis XIV. Charles II agreed to the French alliance with the provision that the war against the Dutch would occur only after he publicly declared himself a Roman Catholic. He planned to accept French subsidies, commercial advantages, and security against Louis XIV in exchange for an offensive alliance against the United Provinces he knew would never take place. Charles II viewed the Treaty of Dover as a personal diplomatic triumph, since he had secured an alliance with France to
complement the English alliance with the Dutch Republic. But, Hutton points out that Charles II had underestimated the diplomacy and influence of the Sun King. After the Treaty of Dover Louis XIV pressured the English monarch to gradually accept the possibility of a Dutch war without the declaration of Catholicism. The author places the blame for the Third Anglo-Dutch War on the Sun King. Charles II’s personal diplomacy had failed, and his French alliance drew England into an unpopular war against its Dutch ally.


Professor John Miller of the University of London provides a political biography of Charles II. The author concentrates on the king’s reign and foreign policy, especially relations between England and France. He views Charles II as “the most slippery of kings, a complex and evasive character” (p.xiii). Miller believes that the king vacillated between policy options and was subject to manipulation by his advisers. The biography is based on unpublished and published primary sources. It includes twenty-three illustrations. The study is highly recommended for individuals interested in English politics and foreign policy.

In the first volume of his history of the reign of Charles II, David Ogg of Oxford University furnishes a useful narrative history of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Anglo-French alliance, and the Third Anglo-Dutch War, as well as an analytical discussion concerning the English armed forces. The volume includes a valuable map depicting the battle sites of both the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars.


Richard Ollard supplies a biography of English naval captain Sir Robert Holmes (1622-92). The author narrates the military life of Holmes describing his naval exploits in the employment of the African Company, including his attacks on Dutch ships and the capture of Dutch trading forts on the West African coast in 1664. This expedition combined with the English capture of New Amsterdam (1664) resulted in the Dutch declaring war on England in 1665. In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Sir Robert Holmes served in the English navy under the command of Lord High Admiral, Prince James, Duke of York.

In this war, Holmes was one of York’s more experienced naval commanders. Holmes fought in the victorious naval battle of Lowestoft (June 1665) and in the defeat of the Four Days’ Fight (June 1666). In
July 1666, after the English victory in the battle of North Foreland (St. James’ Day), Holmes commanded the English raid on the Dutch coast. His naval detachment destroyed about 160 anchored Dutch merchantmen in the Vlie Channel, and then raided Westerschelling (p.150). Holmes reaped honors from the Second Anglo-Dutch War, but he did not acquire the senior naval command position that he and his patron, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, the Vice Lord High Admiral, believed was his due.

Five years later, England and France deliberately provoked the Third Anglo-Dutch War. Holmes provided the provocation by attacking the Dutch Smyrna convoy in the English Channel in March 1672. Even so, the armed convoy, escorted by Dutch men-of-war, escaped Holmes’ attempt to capture it. This failure resulted in the rapid decline of Holmes’ influence at the Royal court. As such, Holmes was forced to serve as a subordinate commander in his last naval battle (Sole Bay) in May 1672. The biography includes three maps, nineteen illustrations, and a battle plan of the North Foreland. The work is based on unpublished and published primary sources, but it lacks a bibliography.
This pamphlet consists mainly of transcripts of English and Dutch documents, illustrations, and a short narrative of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. It concentrates on the causes of the war, the opening of the conflict, and the campaigns of 1666 and 1667. The pamphlet contains thirty illustrations.

Pincus argues that the ideology and influence of a group of Anglican Royalists caused the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The author shows that there was a group of influential Anglican Royalist merchants and courtiers in the African Company that viewed the Dutch Republic as a major threat to English overseas trade. This group of individuals, led by such men as Sir Richard Ford, the “single most powerful merchant in Restoration London” saw the Dutch as becoming the master of world trade (p.13). This group of men believed the Dutch would shut England out of the world market (p.22). In response to this Dutch threat, the group spread anti-Dutch propaganda to stir England towards a second Anglo-Dutch war. Pincus emphasizes that this group of merchants influenced the House of Commons Trade Committee to threaten the Dutch with war in April 1664 (see Seaward, 5.3.25).
However, the author notes that the majority of English merchants were against a conflict with the United Provinces.


In this essay, J.L. Price of the University of Hull briefly considers the foreign policy of the Restored Monarchy. The author argues that English domestic difficulties resulted in an inconsistent foreign policy from 1660 to 1674. He notes the inconsistency of policy towards France and the United Provinces reflected the English oscillation between the personal policy of Charles II and the pursuit of political and economic interests, combined with the fact that England lacked clear-cut foreign policy objectives. Charles II sought a close alliance with Louis XIV while Parliament pursued political and economic interests.

Price emphasizes the diplomatic and military weakness of the Restored Monarchy. He points out Charles II's ministers' lack of diplomatic experience as well as the monarchy's poor understanding of the change in the European balance of power after the Peace of the Pyrenees. Failing to realize the rising threat of France, England provoked the Second Anglo-Dutch War, which not only ended in a humiliating defeat, but allowed Louis XIV to launch the War of Devolution. Price declares that the Peace of Breda and the creation of the Triple Alliance to oppose
French expansionism did not influence Louis XIV's decision to accept the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Instead, the author believes that Louis XIV terminated the War of Devolution when the German emperor agreed to a secret partition treaty in 1668 (see Bérenger, 4.2.2).

Although allied with the United Provinces, Charles II pursued his preferred policy of a French alliance. The English king acquired an alliance with Louis XIV against the Dutch Republic in the secret Treaty of Dover in 1670. However, England failed to achieve a decisive naval victory in the Third Anglo-Dutch War despite the fact that Louis XIV occupied most of the United Provinces in 1672-73. Under parliamentary pressure Charles II withdrew from the French alliance and agreed to the Peace of Westminster. The English monarch, nevertheless, continued to receive French subsidies to rule without the anti-French Parliament, thus allowing him to maintain a policy of benevolent neutrality towards France. Price argues that England played an inactive role in European affairs after 1674 because of diplomatic and military weakness, as well as French influence upon Charles II and James II.


In this article, Henry L. Schoolcraft relates Charles II's attempt to unite England and the Scandinavian powers in order to strike a blow at the commercial supremacy of the Dutch Republic in the mid-1660s. The
author notes the monarchy’s diplomatic efforts to woo both Denmark and Sweden into an alliance to shut off Dutch trade in the Baltic in 1664-66. England offered to act as a guarantor of the Peace of Copenhagen (1660), in addition to providing subsidies and naval support. Frederick III of Denmark and the Regency government of Charles XI of Sweden strongly considered a triple alliance against the Dutch. However, the French declaration of war against England in the Second Anglo-Dutch War froze Danish and Swedish negotiations with England, ending Charles II’s plans for a Baltic alliance. Frederick III valued close relations with Louis XIV more than the creation of a triple alliance against Denmark’s trade rival, the United Provinces. In fact, Frederick III joined the Franco-Dutch alliance against England in 1666.


Paul Seaward of Cambridge University appraises the role of the House of Commons Committee of Trade in the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. He emphasizes the committee’s arrogant anti-Dutch position and overestimation of English naval power in light of the English triumph during the First Anglo-Dutch War. With an increase in Anglo-Dutch commercial antagonism in Africa and the East Indies during the 1660s, the committee accepted the belief that English bullying and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
threat of war could browbeat trade concessions from the United Provinces. The committee had no intentions to provoke war, but Parliament’s vote to threaten war as a bluff to gain trade concessions in 1664 resulted in stiff Dutch resistance, and their willingness to fight for their fundamental strategic and commercial interests. Parliament had underestimated the capabilities of Dutch resistance. Seaward argues that the trade committee and England stumbled into an unwanted war.


Colonel Noel St. John Williams of the British Army provides a narrative study of the politics and creation of the British Army during the Restored Monarchy. The author addresses Charles II’s disbanding of the New Model Army and the establishment of his small standing army with the signing of the Royal Warrant in January 1661. Charles II needed this small permanent force, independent of Parliament, to secure his throne and restore public confidence in the Restored Monarchy. The Militia Act of 1661 gave the King the legal right to command all British land and sea forces. Consequently, Charles II appointed George Monck, the Duke of Albemarle, as captain general and commander-in-chief of the standing army. Williams addresses the costly British attempt to garrison and defend Tangier (1662-84), the temporary buildup of the
standing army during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, the use of British forces in support of Louis XIV in the Dutch War, King James II’s suppression of the Monmouth Rebellion, and the Glorious Revolution. However, the study focuses more on politics and court intrigue than the military affairs of the age. It includes twenty-five illustrations and valuable indices on British Army regiments formed in 1661-90. The study is based on primary source material, but it contains no bibliography.

See also:


CHAPTER VI

FRENCH AGGRESSION, THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE,
AND THE NINE YEARS' WAR, 1678-1697

Louis XIV (1643-1715) experienced his first lengthy conflict in the Dutch War (1672-78). In the war, a coalition of powers developed in opposition to French aggression, and forced the Sun King to accept the Peace of Nijmegen (Nymegen) (1678/79). Even so, the peace settlement was a triumph for French arms and diplomacy because of the territorial gains that enhanced the defensive nature of France's eastern frontier. The Sun King gained from Spain the Franche-Comté and about a dozen places in the Spanish Netherlands; Nancy and Longwy in Lorraine; as well as Freiburg in the German Empire.

More significant was the disintegration of the anti-French coalition. Skillful French diplomacy along with the war weariness and differing interests of the coalition partners helped to ensure that there was no single treaty ending the war. Instead, the Peace of Nijmegen was a number of settlements, principally with the Dutch Republic, Spain, and German Empire. The collapse of the

---

1See Chapter IV for the origins and conduct of the Dutch War.
coalition and the lack of strong opposition allowed Louis XIV to make further territorial gains during the post-war years.

The overwhelming characteristic of Louis XIV's policy after Nijmegen was the use of force and intimidation. The Sun King relied on France's military superiority and predominance in Europe to achieve specific strategic objectives on France's borders.\(^2\) Louis XIV had a peacetime standing army of up to 150,000 troops in the early 1680s.\(^3\) At the same time, the Marquis of Vauban was in the process of constructing a strong linear fortress system on the eastern frontier of France. This system consisted of two lines of fortresses and was designed to keep France's enemies out, while allowing Louis XIV's army access to neighboring lands. The Dutch War had shown the vulnerability of France's eastern border. In 1673, the French army in Germany was forced to fall back to the western side of the Rhine to defend the French frontier against a possible invasion. As a result of this threat, the Sun King looked to acquire more territory to *pré carré* or square-off France's eastern frontier. He wanted to create a fortress system that would block an invasion from the east. As one

---

\(^2\)For a discussion of French military might, see Chapter III.

historian has recently written about Louis XIV, "the king had more fear of
invasion than lust for conquest."\(^4\)

To acquire the desired territory, Louis XIV pursued a legalistic approach.
He employed Chambers of Reunion or special courts to claim lands in Alsace,
Lorraine, the Spanish Netherlands and Luxembourg, parts of the Saar valley,
and the duchy of Zweibrücken in 1679-82.\(^5\) His claims were backed up by the
strength of the French army. In describing the Sun King's infamous Reunion
program, John T. O'Connor has stated:

French archivists reported to French judges, who instructed French
troops to occupy what was defined as French sovereign territory. The
French did have some legal claims, but the *manner* in which they acted
led to alarm and hostility in the Spanish Low Countries, Liège, and
numerous German states, especially since there was no clear sense of
just when and where the process would end.\(^6\)

The verdicts of the courts affected many parties, including the Duke of
Württemberg, Elector of Trier, as well as the Spanish and Swedish monarchs.

---

\(^4\)John A. Lynn, "A Quest for Glory: The Formation of Strategy under Louis
Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Berstein (Cambridge and New

\(^5\)Geoffrey R.R. Treasure, *Seventeenth Century France* (London: Rivingtons,
1966), 323-27; Andrew Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy* (New

\(^6\)John T. O'Connor, "The Diplomatic History of the Reign," in *The Reign of
Press International, 1990), 150.
Before long, France had annexed more territory than it had gained in the Peace of Nijmegen.\(^7\)

In addition to the Reunion program, Louis XIV pursued other methods of territorial aggrandizement. In September 1681, the Sun King amassed French forces outside the walls of Strasbourg and forced the Imperial city to accept his sovereignty. Strasbourg was necessary to France because it controlled a vital crossing of the Rhine. During the same month, Louis XIV purchased the fortress of Casale in northwest Italy from the Duke of Mantua and installed French troops. This fortress, along with the French fortress of Pinerolo, allowed France to check the potential aggression of Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy (1675-1730),\(^8\) as well as threaten the Spanish duchy of Milan. Two months later, in November 1681, Louis XIV put military and diplomatic pressure on the Spanish fortress city of Luxembourg. The Sun King wanted to force the Spanish out of Luxembourg so that France could annex the city and control the Moselle valley, an important access route to and from northeastern France.

In annexing the Reunion lands, Louis XIV met no resistance from Spain and the minor German states. Even so, as early as 1679, Prince William III of


\(^8\)The House of Savoy ruled the principality of Piedmont, county of Nice, and duchy of Savoy.
Orange, the Dutch stadholder (1672-1702), responded by creating an alliance with the Bishop of Münster and Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel to defend the Peace of Nijmegen.\(^9\) Louis XIV’s moves on Luxembourg and claims to territory in the heart of the Spanish Netherlands in 1680-81, which threatened Dutch security, alarmed William III, causing him to urgently work towards the development of a coalition against France.\(^10\) The turning point came when the United Provinces and Sweden created a defensive alliance in the so-called Hague Association in October 1681. Charles XI of Sweden (1660-97) joined the alliance because France annexed his family’s duchy of Zweibrücken. Moreover, Louis XIV posed a threat to Sweden by his alliance with Elector Frederick William (the Great Elector) of Brandenburg (1640-88), who was hostile to the Swedish Empire. Gradually the anti-French alliance system grew to include Würzburg, Fulda, Darmstadt, Bamberg, Gotha, and the Circle of Franconia in late 1681, and more importantly Austria and Spain in early 1682. The German emperor, Leopold I of Austria (1658-1705), was slow to respond to the French threat because of limited financial and military resources as well


as the growing Turkish threat in Hungary. However, in June 1682, Austria, the Circle of Franconia, and the Circle of the Upper Rhine created the Laxenburg Alliance to defend the Rhineland. Leopold I added to this anti-French coalition a defensive alliance with Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria (1680-1726) in January 1683. The alliances were aimed at limiting Louis XIV to the frontiers agreed to in the Peace of Nijmegen. But, the anti-French coalition lacked the diplomatic and military strength to challenge the Sun King. The French army was too powerful for others to risk intervention. Louis XIV also held a strong position in Germany by buying the support of the German princes of Brandenburg, Cologne, Mainz, and the Rhineland Palatinate, as well as Christian V of Denmark (1670-99). Moreover, he encouraged the Sultan to break the Truce of Vasvár (1664) and threaten Austria in the east. Despite this dominant position, Louis XIV was forced to abandon the siege of Luxembourg when William III threatened military intervention in March 1682.

In the summer of 1683 the Turkish army, under the command of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1676-83), invaded Austria and besieged Vienna. The Sun King counted on Habsburg troubles with the Turks to allow his forces to renew


the siege on the Luxembourg fortress as well as seize several places claimed by the Reunion judgments in the Spanish Netherlands. Vienna held off the Turkish attackers until King John III Sobieski of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1674-96) and Duke Charles V of Lorraine (1675-90) led a Polish-Imperial army to victory against the Turks outside the walls of Vienna in September 1683. Although the victory served as a turning point in Leopold’s battle against the Turks, the war would continue until the Peace of Karlowitz (Carlowitz) in 1699.\textsuperscript{13}

Now it was time for Louis XIV to attack Spanish possessions along France’s eastern frontier. In September 1683, the Sun King sent French troops into Luxembourg and the Spanish Netherlands where they burned villages and captured Courtrai. Spain responded by declaring war against France in November: the Spanish counted on military assistance from Austria and the Dutch Republic. In reply to this declaration of war, the French army launched a brief, devastating campaign into the Spanish Netherlands and Catalonia in the spring of 1684. At the same time, Vauban besieged and captured the fortress of Luxembourg. Both Leopold I and William III failed to assist their Spanish ally militarily. The German emperor preferred to concentrate his efforts against the

\textsuperscript{13}The German Empire allied with Poland (1683) and Venice (1684) and had the financial backing of the Papacy in the struggle against the Turks, known as the War of the Holy League (1683-99). Poland and Russia allied against the Turks in 1686.
Turks while William III could not muster the forces to help Spain because of Amsterdam’s opposition to his foreign policy. The Franco-Spanish War ended with the Truce of Regensburg (Ratisbon) in August 1684, which recognized Louis XIV’s right to keep his Reunion acquisitions, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg for twenty years.

Despite the truce, Louis XIV continued to inflame opposition to French power. As a lesson for aiding Spain, the French fleet bombarded and destroyed two-thirds of Genoa in 1684. In addition, the Sun King put forward claims to territories in the Rhine Palatinate for his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte, the Duchess of Orleans, after her brother, Elector Karl von Simmern of the Rhineland Palatinate (1680-85), died without male heirs. Louis XIV sought to install his brother, Philippe, Duke of Orleans, in the duchy of Simmern or the Imperial cities of Kaiserslautern or Oppenheim.14 At this point, Leopold I and the German princes, including the new Elector Palatine, Philip William of Neuburg (1685-90), feared Louis XIV would embark on a war to assert his territorial claims, like he had for his Spanish bride, Maria Theresa, in the War of Devolution (1667-68). Furthermore, the Sun King’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 frightened the Protestant states and greatly assisted the efforts of Leopold I and William III in building a coalition against France. The Great Elector made defensive alliances with William III, Charles

---

XI, and Leopold I in 1685-86. In July 1686, the German emperor, Spain, Sweden, the Thuringian princes, and the Franconian and Bavarian Circles formed the League of Augsburg, which aimed to prevent further French expansion into the Rhineland. Most historians agree that the alliance had little practical significance, but it was "a sign of the changing German mood."15

In the meantime, Leopold I increased his political and military prestige among the German states when Charles V of Lorraine, commanding the Imperial army, captured Buda in 1686 and defeated the Turks at Nagyharsány (Harkány), near Mohács in 1687. By this action, the Austrian Habsburgs established control over all of southern Hungary and much of Transylvania. It was followed by the Imperial army, under Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria, capturing Belgrade in September 1688. The Imperial victories not only increased the prestige of Leopold I as German emperor, but were a factor in uniting Germany against French ambitions in the Rhineland.

By 1688, Louis XIV faced a growing anti-French coalition under the leadership of Leopold I and William III of Orange. The Sun King attempted to maintain French influence in Germany by ensuring an alliance with the electorate of Cologne. He gained the election of the pro-French Cardinal Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg as coadjutor of Cologne in January 1688.

However, after the death of Elector Maximilian Heinrich of Cologne (1650-88), a new election failed to secure the electorate for Fürstenberg against his seventeen-year-old rival, Joseph Clement of Bavaria. The decision reverted to the anti-French Pope, Innocent XI (1676-89), who chose Joseph Clement as the new elector in September 1688. The Sun King responded by deploying French forces into the electorate of Cologne to prop up Fürstenberg's hold on the territory. Louis XIV also launched an invasion force of 80,000 soldiers into the electorates of the Palatinate, Trier, and Mainz in September 1688 with the aim of intimidating the German states into a pro-French territorial settlement.16 Louis XIV planned a short campaign designed to place Fürstenberg in power in Cologne, seize the strategic fortress of Philippsburg on the Rhine, claim part of the Palatinate as the inheritance of the Duchess of Orléans, restore French influence in Germany, and convert the territorial settlement of the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent peace agreement.17 Moreover, he hoped French military action would encourage the Sultan to continue the war against Austria in the east.18 French forces quickly besieged and captured the fortresses of


17 Wolf, Louis XIV, 443-44.

Philippsburg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal; occupied Kaiserslautern, Worms, Speyer, Mainz, and Heidelberg; as well as threatened Coblenz and Frankfurt.\(^{19}\) However, French military action did not intimidate the German states into accepting Louis XIV's territorial demands. In fact, this military campaign began the lengthy conflict known as the Nine Years' War (1688-97).

French aggression in Germany quickly united Leopold I, the German states, and the Dutch Republic into armed resistance. At first, the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Hanover, and Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel formed the so-called Magdeburg Concert, with the aim of defending the middle and lower Rhine, in October 1688.\(^{20}\) They deployed troops to the middle and lower Rhine while Maximilian II Emanuel led Bavarian and Austrian forces to the Frankfurt area. Next, in January 1689, the Imperial Diet at Regensburg declared war on France.

Germany unity and the concentration of German forces along the Rhine diminished Louis XIV's hope for a quick war. The situation compelled him to withdraw his troops from forward positions in Germany. The Sun King therefore ordered the systematic destruction of villages, towns, fortresses, supplies, and livestock in the Palatinate, Trier, and Württemberg to create a


\(^{20}\)Clark, 232.
cordon sanitaire through which the German armies could not march to
counterattack France. Heidelberg, Mannheim, Heilbronn, Tübingen, Worms,
Mainz, Eslingen, Oppenheim, Kaiserslautern, Pforzheim, Speyer, Coblenz, Trier,
and Cochem were all partially or totally destroyed in the winter of 1688-89.21
George N. Clark states that the result was the growth of "fierce and
widespread indignation, fanned by able and honest propaganda, [which]
strengthened the unity of feeling in Germany and in the European coalition that
was forming."22 Imperial and Brandenburg forces, under the command of
Charles V of Lorraine, besieged and captured the fortresses at Kaiserswerth,
Bonn, and Mainz, cleared French forces from the electorate of Cologne, and
established allied dominance of the lower Rhine, in 1689. Pulling back from
forward positions in Germany, the French held their defensive stations at
Philippsburg, Freiburg, Breisach, and Kehl on the middle and upper Rhine for
the rest of the war.

While Louis XIV was busy in the Rhineland, William III of Orange carried out
an invasion of England. The leaders of the Dutch Republic feared James II
(1685-88) and English financial, naval, and military power would support Louis
XIV in the European conflict. Jonathan I. Israel has shown that the stadholder
sought to neutralize this threat by conquering England and turning British resources against France.\(^{23}\) In this endeavor, the Dutch prepared and launched an invasion force consisting of 40,000 men and 463 ships, including 21,000 crack troops, a large artillery train, and fifty-three warships.\(^{24}\) The invasion force landed at Torbay in the west of England on 15 November 1688. Once in England, William III's army, combined with English supporters, deposed James II, and established the joint rule of William III (1689-1702) and Mary II (1689-94) in the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89.

Having achieved success in England, the Dutch Republic declared war on France in March 1689. Two months later, in May 1689, William III and Leopold I, representing the German Empire, created the Grand Alliance. England and Charles V of Lorraine joined the alliance in December 1689, followed by Bavaria, Spain, and Savoy in 1690. England, under the direction of William III, joined the war against France to preserve Ireland and protect the new regime against a French supported Jacobite invasion of the British Isles. As for war aims, the Grand Alliance sought to restore the territorial and


religious settlements established in the treaties of Westphalia (1648) and the Pyrenees (1659), to reverse the Reunion annexations, restore Charles V to his duchy,\textsuperscript{25} and gain the Sun King's recognition of the Protestant succession in Great Britain. In the ensuing conflict, Portugal and the northern powers of Sweden and Denmark remained neutral.

The Nine Years' War was fought mainly in the Rhineland, Ireland, Low Countries, northern Italy, Catalonia, and at sea. In March 1689, the French fleet transported James II to Ireland to join the rebellion led by the Earl of Tyrconnell against William III. Louis XIV supported his cousin James II in the Irish War (1689-91) as a diversionary tactic to keep William III from continental affairs and prevent him from mobilizing England for the war against France.\textsuperscript{26}

The French fleet achieved victories against the Maritime Powers at Bantry Bay (1689) off Ireland and Beachy Head (1690) in the English Channel. However, William III defeated James II and Franco-Irish forces at the battle of the Boyne (1690), and ended the conflict in Ireland with the Peace of Limerick in 1691.

The destruction of the French fleet by the Maritime Powers in a six-day battle

\textsuperscript{25}Charles IV of Lorraine entered voluntary exile after French troops occupied Lorraine in 1670, and his heir, Charles V, continued to remain in exile.

\textsuperscript{26}Geoffrey W. Symcox, "Louis XIV and the War in Ireland, 1689-91: A Study of His Strategic Thinking and Decision-Making," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1967), 47.
off the north coast of France near La Hogue ended the threat of a Franco-Jacobite invasion of England in 1692.

The conflict on the French borders proved a war of attrition, focused on combat maneuvers and siege warfare. Neither side could achieve a decisive victory because of the necessity to conduct siege operations against numerous fortresses. After 1689, the French were content to maintain their fortresses on the middle and upper Rhine as a defensive barrier to prevent an allied invasion of France. Moreover, the French counted on the Turks to occupy the attention of the German emperor in the east. The Turks besieged and captured Nissa and Belgrade in 1690, as well as fought major battles at Szlankamen (1691), Lugos (1695), and Olaschin (1696), forcing the German emperor to commit substantial forces away from the Rhineland.

Leaders of both France and the Grand Alliance viewed the Low Countries as the pivotal theater of operations that could win the Nine Years' War. At first, the French, commanded by Marshal-Duke of Humières, lost a minor engagement against the allied forces under the command of Georg Friedrich, Count of Waldeck, at Walcourt (1689). But, Marshal Luxembourg responded by defeating the numerically inferior allied forces at Fleurus (1690) and Leuse (1691). The Sun King's forces also captured Mons, failed to take Liège, and bombarded Brussels in 1691. The victory at the Boyne gave William III the opportunity to transfer his Anglo-Dutch forces from Ireland to the Low
Countries, where he took command of allied forces in 1692. Under William III's leadership, the Grand Alliance lost the great fortress of Namur to the French in a siege conducted by Vauban, and suffered a defeat in combat at Steenkerk against Luxembourg in 1692. In the following campaign, in 1693, Louis XIV's army captured Huy and Charleroi, and Marshal Luxembourg defeated William III at Landen (Neerwinden), leaving the French in control of the Sambre and Meuse, and threatening both Brussels and Maastricht. Even so, the Sun King's increasing economic and financial difficulties prevented further major military efforts, forcing the French onto the defensive in the Low Countries in 1694. Allied forces recaptured Huy, and regained confidence as they gained numerical superiority over the enemy.27 In 1695, William III besieged and recaptured the great fortress of Namur at the junction of the Sambre and Meuse. Nonetheless, in 1696, the financial exhaustion of England and the Dutch Republic forced William III into defensive operations, resulting in a military stalemate for the rest of the war. The French besieged and captured Ath before the Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk) in 1697.

In Italy, Louis XIV took the initiative at the beginning of the conflict, but quickly fell back onto the defensive for the duration of the war. French forces under Marshal Catinat attacked Piedmont-Savoy and defeated Victor Amadeus II at Staffarda and captured Saluzzo and Susa in 1690, followed by the seizure

27Childs, 262.
of Nice, Villefranche and Montmélan in 1691. With Austrian assistance, the Duke of Savoy launched a raid into France, capturing Embrun, in 1692, and conducted a siege of Pinerolo in 1693. The French army, under the command of Catinat, forced Victor Amadeus II to lift the siege, and defeated the duke at Marsaglia in October 1693. The conflict in northern Italy continued with the prolonged Savoyard siege of Casale until Victor Amadeus II captured the fortress in 1695. He deserted the Grand Alliance and joined the French side, gaining his war aims of Pinerolo and Casale in the Peace of Turin (1696).

As for the Catalonian front, French and Spanish forces engaged in minor skirmishes during the first few years of the conflict. When a peasant uprising broke out in 1689, French forces, commanded by General Noailles, crossed the frontier, captured Camprodon, and stayed on Catalan soil. In 1693-94, the French army captured the seaport of Rosas and fortresses at Palamos and Gerona, in addition to defeating the Spanish army at Toroella (1694). To force the Spanish to make peace, Marshal Vendôme, employing forces previously stationed on the Italian front, besieged and captured Barcelona in August 1697.

By 1693 both Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance realized that neither side could win the war outright. As one historian has written: "The war dragged on. The allies were as tired of it as was Louis; but no combatant was strong
enough to risk a decisive stroke." The recapture of Namur by William III and Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria shook French confidence in 1695. Louis XIV needed peace because of financial and economic difficulties as well as the urgent need to settle the Spanish succession. It was believed that Carlos II of Spain (1665-1700) was near death. Like France, England and the Dutch Republic were economically and financially exhausted. The Grand Alliance was also weakened by the defection of Victor Amadeus II. Thus, the war parties agreed to the Peace of Ryswick in late 1697. In the settlement, the Sun King kept Alsace and Strasbourg, but he agreed to withdraw from the Spanish Netherlands, Luxembourg, Catalonia, and the Rhineland. French forces evacuated the fortresses at Philippensburg, Breisach, Freiburg, Kehl, and Fort Louis on the Rhine, and Mont Royal on the Moselle. The Sun King sought to gain good relations with the Spanish court, looking for a favorable settlement to the Spanish Question upon the death of Carlos II. He returned the fortresses of Luxembourg, Chimay, Mons, Courtrai, Charleroi, Ath, and Barcelona to Spain. Louis XIV also recognized William III as King of Great Britain and Ireland, as well as accepted Dutch military occupation of a row of barrier fortresses in the southern Spanish Netherlands, including Courtrai, Ath, Oudenaarde, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and Luxembourg. With an end to the conflict in the west, the German emperor was able to turn the full strength of

28Ogg, 87.
his army against the Turks. In 1697, Prince Eugene of Savoy crushed the Turkish army at Zenta, forcing the Turks to agree to the humiliating Peace of Karlowitz in 1699. Austria received all of Hungary and Transylvania except the Banat. Austria was now the predominant power in southeast Europe. However, a struggle to maintain the balance of power in western Europe between Louis XIV and the anti-French camp would erupt in another lengthy conflict upon the death of Carlos II—the War of the Spanish Succession—in 1701.

As for research on the origins and conduct of the Nine Years' War, historians have provided many new studies in the last forty years. The best introduction to the origins of the conflict is Geoffrey W. Symcox's "Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Year' War" (6.1.20). George N. Clark's "The Nine Years' War" (6.1.2) serves as a brief introduction to the conduct of the war. Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789 (3.1.9) addresses fortresses and siege warfare during the Nine Years' War. Naval campaigns are described in Peter Padfield's Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, 1654-1763 (3.1.11). Still, the historiography of the conflict is in need of a detailed general survey of the origins and conduct of the Nine Years' War.

Louis XIV's foreign policy has received much attention by Anglo-American historians. John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (1.2.11), Andrew Lossky, Louis XIV and
the French Monarchy (1.2.7), Paul Sonnino, "The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars" (1.2.9), John T. O'Connor, "The Diplomatic History of the Reign" (1.2.8), and Andrew Lossky, "'Maxims of State' in Louis XIV's Foreign Policy in the 1680s" (6.1.8) serve as good starting points.

There is no detailed study of the Sun King's policy of Reunion, but French diplomacy is depicted in Orloue N. Gisselquist's "The French Ambassador, Jean Antoine de Mesmes, Comte d'Avaux, and French Diplomacy at The Hague, 1678-1684" (6.1.4), James R. Jones' "French Intervention in English and Dutch Politics, 1677-1688" (6.1.5), and Sheldon Shapiro's "The Relations between Louis XIV and Leopold of Austria from the Treaty of Nymegen to the Truce of Ratisbon" (6.1.19). French policy in the Baltic is explored in Andrew Lossky's Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683 (6.1.7) and "La Picquetière's Projected Mission to Moscow in 1682 and the Swedish Policy of Louis XIV" (6.1.6), as well as Richard B. Bingham's "In Pursuit of Peace: The Rationale of French Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1690-1691" (A.6.1). The Sun King's diplomacy in Germany is served by Georges Livet's "Louis XIV and the Germanies" (6.6.4); John T. O'Connor's Negotiator Out of Season: The Career of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, 1629 to 1704 (6.1.12), "William Egon von Fürstenberg, German Agent in the Service of Louis XIV" (6.1.13), and "Louis XIV's Strategic Frontier in the Holy Roman Empire" (6.1.11); along with Richard Place's "Bavaria and the Collapse of Louis XIV's Germany Policy,
1687-1688" (6.1.15) and "The Self-Deception of the Strong: France on the
Eve of the War of the League of Augsburg" (6.1.17). John C. Rule, "France
cought between Two Balances: The Dilemma of 1688" (6.1.18) discusses
Louis XIV's diplomatic rivalry with Leopold I and William III. Place's "French
Policy and the Turkish War, 1679-1688" (6.1.16) stresses Louis XIV's relations
with the Sultan and the importance of the Habsburg-Ottoman struggle to
French foreign policy. O'Connor's "Louis XIV's 'Cold War' with the Papacy:
French Diplomats and Papal Nuncios" (6.1.10) addresses the French monarch's
poor relations with Innocent XI.

There is less literature on French wartime strategy and diplomacy. Richard
B. Bingham's "Louis XIV and the War for Peace: The Genesis of a Peace
Offensive, 1686-1690" (6.1.1) discusses Louis XIV's strategy in Germany and
Ireland. Geoffrey W. Symcox addresses the Sun King's failed strategy in
Ireland in "Louis XIV and the War in Ireland, 1689-91: A Study in His Strategic
Thinking and Decision-Making" (6.1.21). The lack of a detailed military study
of the war from the French perspective still exists. But, French military
strategy is discussed in John A. Lynn, "A Quest for Glory: The Formation of
Strategy under Louis XIV, 1661-1715," (3.2.8), John A. Lynn, "The Sun
King's Star Wars" (3.2.15), and F.J. Hebbert and George A. Rothrock, Soldier
of France: Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (3.2.6). The army is
discussed in Ronald Martin's "The Army of Louis XIV" (3.2.17) and John A.

Spanish foreign policy has been neglected by historians. Robert A. Stradling’s *Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720* (1.5.2) provides an overview. The Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84...
and the Truce of Regensburg (1684) await a historian. Moreover, Spain's involvement in the Nine Year's War needs to be addressed in the English language.\textsuperscript{29} However, Christopher Storrs' "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665-1700)" (6.5.5) sheds some light on Spanish operations in northern Italy during the Nine Years' War.

The best introduction to Dutch foreign policy is Jonathan I. Israel, "The Stadholderate of William III, 1672-1702" in The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (1.4.4) and Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667-1795 (1.4.1). William III of Orange's opposition to Louis XIV is addressed in Stephen B. Baxter's William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702 (6.3.2). Orloue N. Gisselquist's "The French Ambassador, Jean Antoine de Mesmes, Comte d'Avaux, and French Diplomacy at The Hague, 1678-1684" (6.1.4) is valuable for depicting the split between William III and the Dutch government over the question of Dutch opposition to Louis XIV. For Dutch policy in the Baltic, see Andrew Lossky's "Dutch diplomacy and the Franco-Russian Trade Negotiations in 1681" (6.3.19) and Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis.

\textsuperscript{29}A valuable study in the Spanish language is Antonio Espino Lopez's "El Frente Catalan en la Guerre de los Neuve Anos, 1689-1697," (Ph.D. diss., Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1994), 1,070 pp., which explores the Spanish war effort on the Catalan front during the Nine Years' War.
of 1683 (6.1.7). The anti-French alliance of William III and the Great Elector is explored in Wouter Troost, "William III, Brandenburg and the Construction of the anti-French Coalition, 1672-88" (6.6.14). For the invasion of England, see Jonathan I. Israel’s "The Dutch Republic and the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688/89 in England" (6.3.15), "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution" (6.3.16), and "Of Providence and Protestant Winds: The Spanish Armada of 1588 and Dutch Armada of 1688" (6.3.17). George H. Jones' "William III’s Diplomatic Preparations for His Expedition to England" (6.3.18), J.L. Price's "William III, England and the Balance of Power in Europe" (A.6.3), and Kenneth H.D. Haley's "The Dutch, the Invasion of England, and the Alliance of 1689" (6.3.14) are also valuable. English foreign policy during the reign of James II is discussed in John Miller, James II: A Study in Kingship (6.2.7), Robert H. George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II" (6.2.5), and James R. Jones, The Revolution of 1688 in England (6.2.6). Other important studies include Phyllis S. Lachs, The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II and James II (2.14) and John Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution (3.3.6).

For English foreign policy and the conduct of the war under William III, see Stephen B. Baxter's William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702 (6.3.2), Godfrey Davies, "The Control of British Foreign Policy by William III" (6.3.8), Graham C. Gibbs, "The Revolution in Foreign Policy" (6.3.12), and
Margery Lane, "The Diplomatic Service under William III" (2.15). Stewart P. Oakley explores the King-Stadholder's policy in the Baltic in William III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Years' War, 1689-1697 (6.3.21). Kenneth Ferguson's "The Organisation of King William's Army in Ireland, 1689-1692" (6.3.11) and John G. Simms' "Williamite Peace Tactics" (6.3.24) treat the Irish War. The Irish War is also served by Simms' Jacobite Ireland, 1685-91 (6.4.4), War and Politics in Ireland, 1649-1730 (6.4.3), and The Siege of Derry (6.4.2), as well as Piers Wauchope's Patrick Sarsfield and the Williamite War (6.4.5). The British war effort is considered in John Childs' The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries (6.3.5), "Secondary Operations of the British Army during the Nine Years' War, 1688-1697" (6.3.4), and The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (3.3.8). David G. Chandler's "Fluctuations in the Strength of Forces in English Pay Sent to Flanders during the Nine Years' War, 1688-1697" (6.3.3) addresses an important issue. William III's Dutch army of hardened combat veterans lacks equivalent studies in the English language. The English fleet is handled in John Ehrman's The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697 (6.3.9). A.N. Ryan's "William III and the Brest Fleet in the Nine Years' War" (6.3.23) and Ehrman's "William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy, 1692-94" (6.3.10) examine English naval strategy. The defeat of the French fleet at La Hogue and the end to the Franco-Jacobite invasion threat to England is
discussed in Philip Aubrey, *The Defeat of James Stuart's Armada* (6.3.1) and John Childs, "The Abortive Invasion of 1692" (6.4.1). For the trade war between the Maritime Powers and France, see George N. Clark's *The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, 1688-1697* (6.3.7) and "The Character of the Nine Years' War, 1688-97" (6.3.6). The historiography of the Maritime Powers in the Nine Years' War would benefit from naval studies focusing on the Dutch fleet.

of Savoy (7.9.18), and Nicholas Henderson, Prince Eugen of Savoy (7.9.14).

A lack of studies on the German states, the creation of the German coalition against Louis XIV, and Imperial military operations is a serious gap in the historiography of the origins and conduct of the Nine Years' War. John Gagliardo, Germany under the Old Regime, 1600-1790 (1.6.6), Ferdinand Schevill, The Great Elector (6.6.8), and Roger Wines, "The Imperial Circles, Princely Diplomacy and Imperial Reform, 1681-1714" (6.6.15) are illuminating.

After decades of neglect, the importance of Victor Amadeus II of Savoy in the Nine Years' War has received recent attention. Ralph D. Handen, "The End of an Era: Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II" (6.5.1) is a good introduction. Geoffrey W. Symcox's Victor Amadeus II: Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675-1730 (6.5.8) examines the duke's conduct in the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession. One should also consult Robert Oresko, "The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 and the House of Savoy" (6.5.4), Robert Oresko, "The Diplomatic Background to the Glorioso Rimpatrio: The Rupture between Victorio Amedeo II and Louis XIV (1688-1690) (6.5.3), Christopher Storrs, "Machiavelli Dethroned: Victor Amadeus II and the Making of the Anglo-Savoyard Alliance of 1690" (6.5.6), Ralph D. Handen, "The Savoy Negotiations of the Comte de Tessé, 1693-1696" (6.5.2), Christopher Storrs, "Diplomatic Relations between William III and Victor Amadeus II (1690-96)" (A.6.4), Geoffrey W. Symcox, "Britain and Victor Amadeus II: Or, The Use and
Abuse of Allies" (6.5.7), Derek McKay, *Prince Eugene of Savoy* (7.9.18), and Nicholas Henderson, *Prince Eugen of Savoy* (7.9.14).

6.1. French Foreign Policy, 1678-1697


Richard B. Bingham renders a study of the formation and conduct of French foreign policy in 1686-90. In his thesis, the author examines the growing tension between France and the German Empire after the Truce of Regensburg (1684) as well as Louis XIV's expectations for the invasion of the Palatinate (1688) and the failure of French diplomacy and defense strategy in 1688-90.

Bingham's thesis is that Louis XIV and his ministers made a series of miscalculations in their policy of intimidation in Germany. The Sun King had expected to frighten Leopold I and the German states into a peace settlement favorable to France with a French invasion and demonstration of military might in a brief war in Germany in 1688, similar to the quick French invasions of the Dutch Republic in 1672 and Spanish territory in 1683-84. Louis XIV took up arms not for the sake of conquest, but "to preserve what he had already conquered" (pp.90-91). However, the Sun King miscalculated in the military might needed to quickly subdue Germany, the military effectiveness of German forces,
the German will to resist continual French intimidation, and the Dutch threat to England.

The prolonged French siege of Philippsburg and quick success of William III’s invasion of England encouraged the German will to resist French intimidation. In November 1688 Louis XIV gave up hope for a quick war of intimidation, and subsequently directed his forces to assume a defensive posture in Germany. French forces destroyed German territory in the hope of depriving Leopold I and his allies any posts from which to launch a counteroffensive against France.

Like military efforts, French diplomacy failed to achieve Louis XIV’s objectives. The Sun King, employing threats and promises of concessions, sought to acquire allies and end French diplomatic isolation, in addition to deterring the creation of an anti-French coalition. Bingham stresses that William III’s quick success in England encouraged the growth of anti-French alliances as well as disrupted Louis XIV’s wartime diplomacy (pp. 153-54). French efforts to acquire alliances with Bavaria, Spain, Savoy, Genoa, Mantua, Denmark, Sweden, Hanover, and Brandenburg came to nothing. In fact, Bavaria, Spain, Savoy, and Brandenburg joined Leopold I and William III in the Grand Alliance against France in 1689-90.
Having adopted a defensive stance France continued to possess military deficiencies. The Sun King lacked sufficient military forces to defend French frontiers. Moreover, the fortress system on the German frontier was unprepared for war. Fortresses at Mont Royal on the Moselle and Belfort on the Rhine were still under construction, and Philippsburg needed repairs after French forces finally captured it in late November 1688. In fact, the French monarch directed the destruction of German territory "to compensate for the inadequacies of his army and the unfinished states of several fortresses" (p.346). But, the policy of destruction united German opposition to Louis XIV and increased the German will to resist French aggression.

French defensive strategy in Germany endured setbacks during the 1689 campaigning season. Frederick III (1688-1701) of Brandenburg captured the French fortresses at Kaiserswerth, Neuss, Rijnberg, and Bonn, while Charles V of Lorraine, in command of the Imperial army, seized the French fortress at Mainz. Bingham shows that Louis XIV hesitated until it was too late to relieve the major fortresses of Bonn and Mainz. In the meantime, Count Waldeck defeated French forces in the battle of Walcourt in the Spanish Netherlands.

Bingham stresses that with little prospect of success for the next military campaign, the Sun King and his ministers, experiencing
defeatism, embraced the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement during the winter of 1689-90 (pp.552, 699-701). He writes: "Louis came to the awful realization that he could not end the war by intimidation alone" (p.791). France lacked the military strength, finances, and allies to carry on the war against a growing coalition. French military might and diplomacy had failed to achieve a peace settlement based on intimidation in 1688-89. Furthermore, the growth of the Grand Alliance meant France would need to defend additional frontiers. Negotiations with Alexander VIII (1689-91) to enlist Papal intervention in the war to break up the Grand Alliance misfired, and attempts to create a third party in northern Europe to counter the anti-French coalition failed to materialize before the beginning of the 1690 campaigning season. Thus, French diplomatic and military efforts were disappointments. Nonetheless, as Bingham points out, Louis XIV had made the transition from a policy of intimidation, so evident in his past conduct in foreign relations, and assumed a new policy, the search for peace through negotiation, which would result in the Peace of Ryswick (1697). This is an extremely valuable study based on French archival sources. It includes discussion of French policy during the Irish War (1689-91).

Sir George N. Clark of Oxford University provides a short, straightforward account of the conduct of the Nine Years' War. It includes discussion of war in Germany, Low Countries, Ireland, northern Italy, Catalonia, North America, and at sea. The essay is highly recommended as a beginning point of study on the Nine Years' War.


This is an English translation of Janine Fayard of the University of Dijon's "Les tentatives de constitution d'un tiers party en Allemagne du Nord 1690-1694" published in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique in 1965. The author examines four years of intense French diplomatic activity in the north German states and Scandinavia focused on creating a pro-French third party that could exert pressure on the German Empire to end the Nine Years' War.

Fayard describes the failed French diplomatic efforts to gain the much desired alliance with Charles XI of Sweden as the leader of a third party in 1690-92. However, French diplomacy and generous payments of gratifications and subsidies succeeded in acquiring neutrality pacts
with Ernst August, Duke of Hanover, in 1690, Frederick Christian von Plettenberg, Bishop of Münster, and Frederick I of Sachsen-Gotha in 1691. Moreover, France gained a defensive alliance with Christian V of Denmark in 1691. Louis XIV expected the growing third party, including nonaligned Sweden, would support his war aims of granting Philippsburg to France as well as turning the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent peace settlement. However, the northern princes opposed the Sun King's ambitions in Germany. Instead, the northern princes demanded that France raze the fortress at Mont Royal on the Moselle; allow Trier, Mainz, and Cologne to join the third party; pay subsidies to the princes of Baden-Baden, Baden-Durlach, and Württemberg to ensure their neutrality; and stop levying contributions from German territory. With such demands the talks between Louis XIV and the third party were at a stalemate.

In March 1692, the German emperor gained the defection of Ernst August by granting Hanover the status of an electorate. French diplomacy now turned to create an alliance between Denmark, Saxony, Münster, and the dukes of Wolfenbüttel to oppose Hanover. A diversionary war in northern Germany would decrease the number of Imperial forces facing French troops on the Rhine. The Sun King encouraged opposition to the electoral title and Hanoverian claims to
Sachsen-Lauenberg. With a war in northern Germany imminent, the German emperor, Elector of Brandenburg, and King of Sweden threatened to take action to prevent a new conflict. Fayard notes that the north German princes and Denmark quickly backed down, resulting in a major defeat of French diplomacy in August 1693.


This is a study of the Count of Avaux’s embassy to The Hague between the Peace of Nijmegen and the Truce of Regensburg, while French power was at its height. Gisselquist examines Avaux’s failed efforts to renew the Franco-Dutch alliance of 1662 after the Dutch War (1672-78), and the subsequent cold war between Louis XIV and the William III. The author addresses Avaux’s political intrigue with Dutch republican opposition and the city of Amsterdam to stay off William III’s efforts to create an anti-French alliance as well as provide military assistance to Spain in the Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84. The French ambassador failed to prevent Dutch defensive alliances with Sweden (1681), Spain (1682), and the German Empire (1682). However, Avaux was successful in gaining Amsterdam’s opposition to William III’s anti-French foreign policy during the Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84. Such resistance forced Orange to back down from militarily supporting Spain,
and necessitated his acceptance of the Truce of Regensburg. The leading citizens of Amsterdam feared William III's hard-line against France would result in a costly war (p.256). This useful study is based on French archival sources and published primary works.


Professor James R. Jones of the University of East Anglia analyzes Louis XIV's diplomacy towards England and the United Provinces in 1677-88. The author stresses that the Sun King exploited the political divisions in England and the Dutch Republic to his advantage. He describes Louis XIV's use of subsides to maintain the support of Charles II and James II of England in spite of parliamentary opposition to France. Moreover, Jones depicts the political intrigue of the Count of Avarux with Dutch merchants and republican opposition to block William III's anti-French policy. French diplomacy achieved both English neutrality and ineffective Dutch resistance to Louis XIV's Reunion policy and intimidation of the Spanish Netherlands. The Sun King, nonetheless, committed a string of diplomatic blunders that destroyed his control over English and Dutch affairs. His persecution of the Huguenots, combined with a withdrawal of trading privileges, alienated Dutch allies, and united them behind Orange. Furthermore, he, despite accurate intelligence
from Avaux, failed to deter a Dutch invasion of the British Isles in 1688. Jones argues that Louis XIV supported the invasion, believing that the assault would enable him to carry out his own program without Dutch interference in the Rhineland. He expected William III to become embroiled in a prolonged British civil war (p.19). His misjudgment resulted in William III leading Anglo-Dutch forces and the Grand Alliance against France.

In this essay, Professor Andrew Lossky of the University of California at Los Angeles investigates Louis XIV's Swedish policy during the early 1680s. The author believes that the Sun King sought to create a French alliance with Sweden, Denmark, and Brandenburg as a counter to the threat of the Dutch Republic and German Empire. However, Louis XIV failed to acquire a renewal of the Swedish alliance while gaining ties with Denmark and Brandenburg (see Lossky, 6.1.7). The French alliance with Christian V of Denmark and Frederick William of Brandenburg cost Louis XIV subsidies in addition to his support for the anti-Swedish stance of his two new allies. The French monarch, however, used his
political and financial leverage to prevent a war between his allies and Sweden.

Lossky depicts Louis XIV’s continual efforts to acquire the much desired renewal of the Swedish alliance despite the desires of his Danish and Brandenburg allies. He states that "to help the Swedes see the light, the French king applied a regimen of blandishments and mild threats" (p.90). For a year Louis XIV warned Charles XI that France would annex the duchy of Zweibrücken. Moreover, the Sun King offered the Swedish ruler subsidies to renounce his ties with the Hague Association. The author also argues that La Picquetière’s projected diplomatic mission to Moscow in 1682 was designed to encourage a Russian attack on Swedish Livonia which might draw Charles XI closer to France (p.94). The French monarch, nevertheless, canceled the diplomatic mission because of the instability of Russia after the death of Tsar Theodore III in 1682, and the Russo-Swedish peace settlement in 1684. The regency government of Sophia Alekseevna was more concerned with waging war against the Turks and Tartars than the Swedish Empire.


Lossky examines Louis XIV’s policy in northern Europe in the early 1680s. He argues that the Baltic Crisis of 1683 played a crucial role in
the decline of French influence in the north in the mid-1680s, and left France diplomatically isolated at the outbreak of the Nine Years' War. The author investigates the foreign policies of Christian V of Denmark, Frederick William of Brandenburg, Charles XI of Sweden, the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and William III of Orange to depict the complex web of diplomatic and military concerns in northern Europe leading to the crisis. He relates the diplomatic revolution after the Peace of Nijmegen, namely the creation of French defensive alliances with Brandenburg (1679) and Denmark (1682) as well as the Dutch-Swedish alliance (1681). He stresses that Louis XIV looked to maintain Denmark and Brandenburg as key allies in his eastern barrier against the anti-French forces of Austria, the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Spain. However, Christian V and the Great Elector sought to upgrade their association with France into an offensive alliance against Sweden to capture the German lands of the Swedish Empire as well as command the Baltic. In contrast, Charles XI initiated a buildup of Swedish forces at Karlskrona and requested Dutch naval support to defend his lands in response to the growing foreign threat. Nonetheless, Christian V and Frederick William perceived the possibility of an increase in Swedish defense forces in Pomerania and Bremen as a threat to their own security. In the ensuing crisis, Louis XIV deployed a naval squadron to
protect his allies in the Baltic, but he refused to sanction an offensive action against Sweden. Without French support Denmark and Brandenburg backed away from an attack on Sweden. Lossky stresses that Louis XIV's failure to support offensive action against Sweden led to both Frederick William and Christian V becoming disenchanted with the French alliance. The monograph is based on French, German, Danish, Swedish, and Dutch sources.


In this article Lossky sketches Louis XIV's maxims of state and his change in foreign policy during the 1680s. The Sun King originally believed that his true interests were to oppose the House of Habsburg, and that French alliances with Bavaria, Sweden, and Portugal were natural in the Bourbon-Habsburg struggle for European hegemony. However, Lossky points out Louis XIV's gradual change towards a more flexible foreign policy, beginning with his renewed interest in the Spanish succession in the mid-1680s. The French monarch desired to secure the entire Spanish monarchy for a Bourbon prince. To this end, the Sun King looked to settle Franco-Spanish differences. He searched for a rapprochement with Spain, understanding that the Spanish court considered the Spanish Netherlands, Portugal, Roussillon, and Casale as
vital concerns. While slowly working towards a Franco-Spanish accommodation, his foreign policy in Germany engulfed France in the unwanted Nine Years' War. The conflict destroyed the immediate possibility of a Franco-Spanish settlement. Lossky argues that Louis XIV pursued a confused foreign policy on the eve of the Nine Years' War.


Professor Claude Nordmann of the University of Lille supplies a short account of Louis XIV's policy towards the Jacobites from 1688 to 1715. He stresses the Jacobite cause created a permanent source of discord in Anglo-French relations during the reign of the Sun King. The author describes Louis XIV's support of James II and his son, James Francis Edward Stuart, the Old Pretender, in their quest to regain the throne of Great Britain and Ireland in the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14). In 1689-90, Louis XIV backed James II's invasion, a French diversionary tactic to keep William III from the Low Countries, and attempt to take control of Ireland with French officers, 7,000 troops, arms, munitions, and naval support (p.84). But, William III defeated the Franco-Jacobite army at the Boyne and James II fled back to France in 1690. In 1692, the Sun King provided the Jacobites an army of 24,000 men for transport across the English Channel for a
second invasion attempt. However, a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet of seventy-four ships-of-the-line prevented the invasion by defeating the French fleet of twenty-four warships in a six-day battle off La Hogue (p.85). The French court continued to support the Jacobite cause, albeit with more caution, for the rest of the war. Even so, Louis XIV recognized William III as the King of Great Britain and Ireland in the Peace of Ryswick in 1697.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, with France at war with England, the Sun King recognized the Old Pretender as the British monarch. The government of Queen Anne fought to maintain the Protestant succession. Louis XIV, nevertheless, made little effort to support a major Jacobite effort to regain the British throne. In an attempt to provide a diversion in the British Isles, France gathered a combined Franco-Jacobite force of 6,000 troops at Dunkirk to sail on privateering ships to Scotland and install James III on the Scottish throne in 1708. The French aborted the mission when the ships failed to find an appropriate landing site near Edinburgh. In the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, Louis XIV abandoned the Old Pretender and recognized the Protestant succession. He made no effort to dispute the Hanoverian succession to the British crown in 1714.

John T. O'Connor of the University of New Orleans addresses the "cold war" between France and the Papacy during the era of Mazarin and Louis XIV. The author states that the conflict focused on the French crown's claim to rule by divine right and the refusal to admit the right of Papal interference in the temporal affairs of France. In fact, the Sun King began to refuse the Papacy's right to the *Régale* in the bishoprics of southern France in 1673. In response, Innocent XI (1676-89) continuously threatened Louis XIV with excommunication, resulting in heightened Franco-Papal tension. O'Connor describes numerous incidents of poor relations between Louis XIV and Innocent XI, and argues that the Franco-Papal tension led to the Pope's decision in favor of Joseph Clement of Bavaria over the pro-French Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg as the new Elector of Cologne in September 1688.


O'Connor briefly examines Louis XIV's strategic frontier in Germany. He points out that Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin developed the concept of a strategic frontier during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) and Franco-Spanish War (1635-59). In fact, Mazarin nurtured ties with
German princes leading to the creation of the League of the Rhine (1658) aimed against the Habsburgs and designed to uphold the Peace of Westphalia. Mazarin's German policy focused on using the league as a defensive buffer zone in relations with the Habsburgs. O'Connor stresses Mazarin's more tactful relations with the German states compared to the aggressive nature of Louis XIV's German policy. The Sun King's aggression in the Spanish Netherlands during the War of Devolution led to the dissolution of the League of the Rhine in 1668. Afterwards, Louis XIV had to use subsidies, military intimidation, and promises of territorial aggrandizement to maintain bilateral alliances with German states. However, French intimidation in the Reunion annexations as well as the occupation of Strasbourg gradually turned the German princes, with the exception of Cologne, against France. Attempting to maintain influence in Germany, Louis XIV launched a preventive war in Germany in 1688. The author stresses that "Louis XIV succeeded in alienating most of the Germanies and did more than Emperor Leopold to bring about German unity" (p.114).


Based on his doctoral paper (see A.6.2), O'Connor addresses the Cologne factor in Louis XIV's diplomacy. He examines the diplomatic
career of the German Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg in the service of France, arguing that Louis XIV employed Fürstenberg as the foundation to French policy in Germany. This outstanding monograph is based on research in French, Papal, Austrian, and Bavarian archives.

O'Connor begins by describing how Wilhelm and his brother Franz Egon von Fürstenberg became close friends of Maximilian Heinrich of Bavaria when they were young men. Eventually Maximilian became Elector of Cologne in 1650, and the Fürstenberg brothers rose to important positions in the electoral government. In fact, O'Connor stresses that the brothers became the real rulers of Cologne and the other lands belonging to Maximilian Heinrich, including the Liège and Hildesheim bishoprics (p.5). Franz served as the chief minister and Wilhelm as the leading diplomat. In the 1650s, the Fürstenbergs allied with Cardinal Mazarin, realizing that France, not Austria, was Europe’s strongest power. Mazarin, and later, Louis XIV employed Wilhelm as their key negotiator with the other German states.

In the service of Louis XIV, Wilhelm acquired for France the support of Cologne and an invasion route through Liège against the United Provinces in the Dutch War (1672-78). He also negotiated neutrality pacts and alliances with Münster, Osnabrück, Paderborn, and Bavaria. However, Wilhelm paid the price once Leopold I entered the Dutch War.
and the electorate of Cologne was occupied by Imperial forces. The German emperor held Wilhelm in a Viennese prison for six years. He gained his release as part of France's demands in the Peace of Nijmegen.

In the next three years, Wilhelm and his brother quickly regained domination over Maximilian Heinrich. In the meantime, Louis XIV pressed Wilhelm back into the French diplomatic service. The Sun King needed his services to keep the minor German states in line while France took over Strasbourg and Casale (1681), attacked Luxembourg and Catalonia (1684), and bombarded Genoa (1684). For his loyalty and devoted service Wilhelm had the support of Louis XIV in his election as bishop of Strasbourg and chief minister of Cologne after the death of his brother in 1682. However, the aggressive actions of Louis XIV slowly began to unite Europe against further French expansionism. The German Empire, nevertheless, offered little resistance against French aggression until Austria could turn back the Turkish threat in 1683-88.

While Leopold I was busy with the Turkish threat, Louis XIV pursued French policy in Germany. First, he became involved in a dispute over the succession to the Rhine Palatinate (1685-88). Wilhelm and Cologne supported the French in their quest to acquire the Rhine Palatinate. To ensure the continued support of Cologne for French policy in Germany,
Louis XIV acquired the election of Wilhelm as the coadjutor of Cologne in January 1688, and hoped to acquire his election as the next archbishop of Cologne. The crisis came when Maximilian Heinrich died in June 1688. The election of a new elector became the focal point in the Bourbon-Habsburg struggle. Louis XIV supported Fürstenberg and Leopold I promoted the seventeen-year-old Joseph Clement of Bavaria as the next elector. With Austria and Bavaria uniting against France, and Wilhelm's position in Cologne threatened, Louis XIV decided to deployed French troops into Cologne to safeguard Fürstenberg's hold on the electorate as well as France's strategic frontier against Austro-Bavarian action. France had the upper hand until the Imperial victory against the Turks at Belgrade in September 1688 allowed Leopold I to turn his attention westward to the French threat. Moreover, with the Austrian victory, Pope Innocent XI supported the election of Joseph Clement as the next archbishop of Cologne.

With these setbacks, the Sun King launched an invasion of the Rhine Palatinate in September 1688. Louis XIV's forces conquered, terrorized, and destroyed much of the Palatinate as well as occupied the electorate of Mainz. Such brutal action in German lands hardened Austria and the German states against France, and began the Nine Years' War. In the ensuing conflict Fürstenberg was forced to flee Cologne and spend his
remaining days in Paris. The study includes a useful bibliography of secondary sources published in the French and German languages.


In this article, O'Connor sketches the diplomatic career of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (1629-1704), who played a leading role as a French agent in Germany. Fürstenberg served both Elector Maximilian Heinrich of Cologne and Louis XIV. He was elected bishop of Strasbourg and made the chief minister to Cologne in 1682, promoted to cardinal in 1686, and elected as coadjutor of Cologne in 1688. However, Louis XIV failed to influence the election of Fürstenberg as archbishop of Cologne in support of French interests in 1688, resulting in the outbreak of the Nine Years' War. This is a valuable article for depicting the Cologne Question.


Serving as secretaries of the navy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1661-83) and his son the Marquis of Seignelay (1683-90) built up a powerful French fleet and initiated naval reforms in the 1670s and 1680s. The fleet consisted of 116 ships-of-the-line in 1688, and Seignelay expected to control the seas at the outbreak of the Nine Years' War. Naval historians have pointed to the resounding French victory at Beachy
Head, in which the English and Dutch fleets were driven from the English Channel in 1690, as proof of France's naval might. However, Donald Pilgrim of York University describes shortcomings that led to the rapid decline of the French fleet. He argues that administrative weaknesses and structural flaws in the French navy, combined with the stress of wartime conditions, caused the swift downfall of French naval power by 1692. Seignelay's navy looked good on paper, but the fleet lacked financial resources, as well as adequate supplies of naval stores, trained sailors, skilled craftsmen, rations, gunpowder, and artillery pieces to fully man and maintain the fleet. Administrative and organizational deficiencies resulted in a slow mobilization and late launch of the fleet in each campaign. In fact, Seignelay had only three-quarters of his first-line fleet in sailing condition and lacked 1,600 pieces of artillery in 1689-90 (p.243). The author attributes the navy's shortcomings to inadequate funding to carry out the naval reforms in the 1680s.


In this article, Richard Place of Wayne State renders an account of the role of Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria (1680-1726) in the Bourbon-Habsburg struggle for power in Germany during the 1680s. Although the elector joined the anti-French Hague Association in 1682,
an alliance with the German emperor in 1683, and the League of Augsburg in 1686, the author argues that Louis XIV's attempt to woo Maximilian II Emanuel into the French camp had a chance to succeed until the last moment in September 1688. The elector was disappointed with his Imperial alliance: Leopold I continuously passed him over for command of the Imperial army in the war against the Turks and failed to pay the promised subsidies. On the other hand, Louis XIV offered the elector the hope of achieving his goal of becoming governor of the Spanish Netherlands; installing his brother, Joseph Clement, as coadjutor and successor of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg at Cologne; as well as the payment of subsidies. In addition to Cologne, the Sun King saw Bavaria, especially after the defection of Brandenburg, as the key to his German strategy. The close relationship between the Marquis of Villars, the French envoy to Bavaria, and Maximilian II Emanuel indicated the strong possibility of a Franco-Bavarian alliance. However, Leopold I intervened by giving command of the Imperial army to the elector during the 1688 campaign besides supporting Joseph Clement against Fürstenberg in the Cologne election. At the outbreak of the Nine Years' War, Maximilian II Emanuel sided with the German Empire.

Place provides a valuable study of French foreign policy and its relationship to the Austro-Turkish War (1683-99) based on French primary sources. His thesis is that Louis XIV launched a preventive strike into the Rhineland in 1688 to encourage the Turks to remain at war with the German Empire. The Sun King needed to keep Leopold I and the German princes occupied with the Turks in the east in order to prevent a German attack on France in the west. In fact, the author stresses the French king's encouragement of a Turkish invasion of Austrian territory in 1682-83. The war with the Turks tied down the German emperor and allowed France to invade the Spanish Netherlands and besiege Luxembourg in 1683-84. Place stresses that Leopold I agreed to Louis XIV's truce proposal because of pressure by the German princes to conduct an all out war against the Turks after the relief of Vienna. The Truce of Regensburg (1684) allowed German contingents to march from the Rhine to serve in the east, with the result that the large-scale Imperial army achieved a string of military victories that threatened to force the Turks into a peace settlement by 1687-88. With France rapidly losing influence in Germany, and the threat of the entire Imperial army turning against France after a possible peace settlement in the east, Louis XIV decided to launch a preventive strike to achieve
military superiority in the Rhineland as well as encourage the Turks to continue a two-front threat to Germany in September 1688 (p.178). Place emphasizes Louis XIV’s mistake in the Truce of Regensburg, which guaranteed his Reunion annexations for twenty years, but allowed the German forces to concentrate and diminish the Turkish threat in the east, thus upsetting the European balance of power in favor Austria. The success of the Imperial army and the German intention to reverse French influence in Germany forced the Sun King to take the action which began the Nine Years’ War.


In this article, Place discusses the French decision to conduct a brief and brutal demonstration of military might in the Rhineland in 1688-89. The Sun King expected the display of power to force the Germans to quickly accept French peace terms. The author, however, argues that Louis XIV miscalculated the military strength and unity of Germany to fight France in the west and the Ottomans in the east simultaneously. French military intelligence ignored the growing military strength of Leopold I and the increasing German support for the Habsburgs after 1683. The German emperor had an army of 85,000 combat veterans who had routed the Turks by 1688 (p.460). Place blames the
miscalculation of Imperial military strength on Louis XIV's preconceived notion of Austrian weakness and poor military intelligence, in addition to an overestimation of French military might.


Professor John C. Rule of Ohio State University briefly examines the breakdown of Louis XIV's alliance system in the 1680s and the strengthening of two anti-French alliance blocs: one centered on Leopold I of Austria and the other on William III of Orange. The author shows that France was unprepared to fight a war on two fronts in 1688. Taking the advice of his ministers, the Sun King deployed his forces against the perceived greater threat of Austria and the German states. The French underestimated Orange's chances of success in an invasion of England. Rule argues that Louis XIV's inaction against William III allowed the creation of the Maritime Powers alliance and resulted in the emergence of a new European balance of power centered on three great blocs: the Anglo-Dutch, Bourbon, and Habsburg.


This is a valuable study that examines the struggle between Louis XIV and Leopold I from 1679 to 1684. Sheldon Shapiro argues that the
relationship was based on mutual misunderstandings, beginning with the interpretation of the ambiguous clauses concerning Alsace in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). In his discussion of the Reunion of Alsace, the author stresses that the Sun King imposed his sovereignty over Alsace believing that the German Empire conceded the territory to France in the Peace of Westphalia. The French monarch needed to occupy and control Alsace to strengthen the kingdom’s eastern defenses which were vulnerable in the Dutch War (1672-78).

Leopold I and the German princes protested the French Reunion of Imperial lands. Leopold I disagreed with Louis XIV’s interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia. He believed that the Reunion actions as well as French moves against Spanish lands in the Netherlands and Luxembourg indicated the Sun King’s unlimited ambitions in Germany, and an attempt to undermine the status of the Habsburgs. Leopold I responded to French actions by mobilizing defensive alliances to deter further moves by Louis XIV to annex German lands. He believed a Franco-Imperial war was imminent. Austria joined the Association of The Hague and the Laxenburg Alliance in 1682, as well as began the creation of a large Imperial standing army to defend the German Empire.

The Sun King viewed the actions taken by the German emperor as hostile to France. He had fulfilled his territorial ambitions in Alsace, and
now aimed to gain Imperial recognition of the Reunion acquisitions while avoiding a war with the Empire. Shapiro professes that Louis XIV had limited territorial objectives for French defensive purposes and was willing to compromise to avoid a war (p.52). The author also points out that the French monarch promoted a Turkish attack on Austria in 1682-83 as a way to defend France against an expected Imperial attack.

The Turkish invasion of Austrian lands and siege of Vienna (1683) caught Leopold I by surprise. He had ignored the Turkish threat, concentrating Imperial forces in the west against the French menace. The Empire was unprepared to fight on two fronts. Louis XIV benefitted from the initial phase of the Austro-Turkish War (1683-99) by acquiring Leopold I's acceptance of the Truce of Regensburg (1684), which recognized the French Reunion acquisitions for twenty years. Shapiro investigates Leopold I's decision to accept the truce and pursue the war against the Turks with hopes of vast territorial gains in southeast Europe, instead of turning his forces against France after the Imperial-Polish victory at Vienna (1683). The study is based on research in French and Austrian archives.

Professor Geoffrey W. Symcox of the University of California at Los Angeles renders an outstanding brief analysis of the Sun King's foreign policy and the origins of the Nine Years' War. He stresses the defensive nature of Louis XIV's policy in Germany after 1684, the shift in the balance of power in favor of anti-French forces, and the Sun King's miscalculations that drew France into an unwanted major conflict. The author argues that Louis XIV, fearing the formation of a hostile league against France, launched a preventive war in the Rhineland to secure Cologne as an ally, occupy the strategic fortress of Philippsburg to enhance French security, relieve the Turks from Imperial military pressure in Hungary, and maintain French prestige in Germany. The French king sought to use force to secure these limited objectives as well as a conversion of the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent peace settlement. However, Louis XIV and his advisers miscalculated the impact of French military strength and the will of the anti-French forces to fight back. First, they failed to increase the French army from its peacetime strength before launching the preventive war. Next, they ignored the growing military strength of Leopold I and the support of the German states for the emperor. Moreover, Louis XIV, concentrating his
forces in the Rhineland, took no action to prevent the Dutch invasion of England and the growth of William III's power to fight France. As a result, the Sun King was forced to fight a lengthy war against a powerful coalition of European states.


In this dissertation based on French archival research, Geoffrey W. Symcox renders an account of Louis XIV's strategy and military action in the Irish War (1689-91). He argues that Louis XIV used the Irish War as a secondary area of operation to distract William III from the war in the Low Countries and deprive the Grand Alliance of 20,000 Anglo-Dutch forces (p.343). In fighting this war, the author believes that the Sun King and his advisers made a poor decision to conduct a land war in Ireland while France maintained naval superiority over the Maritime Powers in 1689-90. He points out that France missed the opportunity to establish naval supremacy in Irish waters, which would have prevented the crossing of William III and Anglo-Dutch forces to Ireland, and made the deployment of French troops to Ireland unnecessary (pp.64, 126). Instead, Louis XIV sent French forces to conduct a land war in Ireland. The French lost hope for victory after the Maritime Powers had achieved naval superiority in Irish waters by mid-1690.
Symcox stresses the Sun King's failure to think in terms of maritime strategy over a land war. Louis XIV viewed the fleet as an auxiliary force designed to support land forces in Ireland. The dissertation includes a detailed discussion of French military operations in the Irish War.


In this brilliant monograph Symcox examines the decline of French naval power in the Nine Years' War. Basing his thesis on research in French archives, the author argues that the powerful French fleet which defeated a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet at Beachy Head in 1690 had serious flaws. Deficiencies in leadership, port locations, supplies, and manning became evident under the stress of combat. Moreover, the massive growth of Anglo-Dutch naval strength quickly forced the French onto the defensive. Symcox points to the deteriorating French finances, which especially became critical during the famine of 1693-94, and not the defeat at La Hogue (1692), as the turning point in French maritime strategy. Financial shortcomings made it impossible for France to maintain a great fleet in competition with the combined strength of the Maritime Powers. By 1694 most of the great French warships were laid up at dock, leaving Louis XIV and the naval secretary, Louis de
Plélypeaux, Count of Pontchartrain, with no alternative but to make a radical change in strategy from attempting to control the sea by a means of a great battle fleet, known as the guerre d'escadre, to the guerre de course, the capturing and destroying of enemy merchantmen by detached cruisers and squadrons of privateers. French naval efforts in the later half of the war concentrated on commerce raiding by a combination of public and private ships. Symcox's appraises the capabilities of the French navy as well as provides a description of naval campaigns leading up to the change in naval strategy. He notes the inconclusive results of the guerre de course (p.224).


In this essay, Professor Mark A. Thomson of the University of London focuses on the relationship between Louis XIV and William III during the Nine Years' War. He emphasizes the personal battle between the two monarchs over French recognition of William III as the rightful King of England. Thomson notes that after the Glorious Revolution one of William III and England's chief war aims was the unconditional recognition of the new regime by Louis XIV. The Sun King, however, supported his Catholic cousin James II and a restoration of the Stuarts.
to the English throne. The French monarch saw James II as the rightful ruler and William III as an usurper. Louis XIV sought assistance for James II from Catholic monarchs, including Carlos II and Leopold I. In fact, Thomson shows that the German emperor was willing to abandon William III in favor of the Stuarts to gain an acceptable peace settlement after 1692. Leopold I suggested that James II’s son should be the heir to the English throne after the deaths of William III and Mary II, or France and the Maritime Powers should conquer the Barbary States or Egypt as a kingdom for James II. Desperate for peace, Louis XIV considered recognizing William III as early as 1693. But, the stubbornness of James II, the Sun King’s commitment to the Stuart cause, and the mutual mistrust between Louis XIV and William III delayed a settlement between France and England. The Sun King finally deserted the Stuart cause after James II refused to accept a compromise solution making his son heir to William III as well as turning down the Polish crown in 1696. In the Peace of Ryswick, Louis XIV unconditionally recognized William III as King of Great Britain and Ireland, leaving both James II and his son as exiles in France.


In this thesis, Lester N. Wilson renders an account of François de Callières' diplomatic activities during the Nine Years' War based on
French archival sources. The French envoy served as Louis XIV's negotiator in peace talks with the Dutch at Maastricht in 1694, Utrecht in 1695, Delft in 1696, and finally at Ryswick in 1697. Callières, under the direction of the Sun King, sought to separate the United Provinces, the cornerstone of the Grand Alliance, from the anti-French coalition. French diplomacy played on the fact that Amsterdam merchants and bankers were weary of the high cost of war by 1694-. But, William III withstood domestic pressure for a peace settlement until Louis XIV, under the strain of economic and financial troubles, presented an acceptable peace proposal. Callières not only kept the Franco-Dutch line of diplomatic communications open, but he negotiated the preliminary peace agreement at Delft, followed by the final settlement at Ryswick in September 1697. The peace between the Maritime Powers and France forced the German emperor to accept Peace of Ryswick in October 1697. The thesis also includes a discussion of Callières' diplomatic manual, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*, published in 1717.

**See also:**


364


6.2. English Foreign Policy under James II, 1685-1688


This is a full-scale biography of James II by Maurice Ashley, a well-known Stuart historian. The author describes the Duke of York's military and naval career as well as his reign as king. He professes that James II pursued an independent foreign policy from Louis XIV, noting the monarch's renewal of the Anglo-Dutch defensive alliance in 1685 (p.193). The king, according to Ashley, sought peaceful relations with other European states, namely because of his domestic problems. James II attempted to maintain neutrality in the struggle between Louis XIV and the United Provinces (p.232), although he suspected William III supported the Monmouth Rebellion. In addition to domestic reasons, he built up the English army and fleet to increase English prestige abroad as well as to strengthen his independent foreign policy. This is a useful study, but the focus is on domestic politics.

Professor Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter makes a staunch defense of James II's foreign policy. The author stresses the king's attempt to maintain an independent policy aimed at maintaining peace in Europe. He believes that James II's foreign policy benefitted England more than William III's or Queen Anne's wars against France after the Glorious Revolution. He writes:

The cost of William's invasion was not only a civil war that brought much suffering to Scotland and Ireland, but also a foreign war that created considerable stresses within Britain and brought her into a dangerous international position. The Revolution divided and weakened Britain and her institutions, far more than James had done, and precipitated them into a conflict that was "necessary" only in light of William's views and because of the Revolution (pp.153-54).


Professor David G. Chandler of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst furnishes an account of the Monmouth Rebellion and battle of Sedgemoor. The battle tested the Restored Monarchy's standing army in a full-scale national emergency. In June 1685, James Scott, the Duke of Monmouth, sailed from the Dutch Republic and landed a small invasion force in the West Country. Gathering rebel support, Monmouth sought to depose his uncle James II from the throne. However, the
English army under the Earl of Feversham and Lieutenant General John Churchill (later, the Earl of Marlborough) smashed Monmouth’s rebel forces near Bridgwater in Somerset in July 1685. The rebellion led to James II increasing the size of the English army. The study includes useful maps showing military movements and the battleground.


Ruth Clark renders an account of Sir William Trumbull’s diplomatic mission to France from December 1685 to September 1686. As the English envoy extraordinary to Paris, Trumbull was forced to deal with the immediate consequences of Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. The author relates the diplomat’s failed struggle to assist English Protestants living in France against religious persecution, as well as supporting Huguenots attempting to flee to England. She argues that religious persecution contributed to the growing English hostility to Louis XIV and the Catholicism of James II. The study is based on archival research in England and France. It has limited value to students of diplomatic and military history.


In this article, Robert H. George of Brown University scrutinizes the financial relationship between James II and Louis XIV. He notes the
similarity between the reigns of Charles II and James II in monetary troubles and French promises of financial aid. Immediately upon ascending to the throne in 1685, James II sought a subsidy from the Sun King in order to maintain his independence from Parliament. However, Louis XIV hesitated to provide financial assistance to the English monarch, waiting, instead, to see what political course James II would pursue. As a result, James II followed a foreign policy that Parliament was willing to fund, a defensive alliance with the United Provinces (1685). With this setback, Louis XIV sought to improve relations with England by paying James II what he still owed to Charles II in subsidies. The English ruler received no new French subsidies until he withdrew English infantry troops from Dutch service in the United Provinces. Even so, James II turned down the Sun King's offer of a considerable subsidy to deploy the English fleet into the English Channel to protect Danish ships against Sweden and the Dutch in a possible war in 1688. The English king sought to avoid war and maintain an independent foreign policy. George concludes that there was little Anglo-French cooperation in politico-military affairs in 1685-88, and "the sums actually paid [to] James were small in comparison . . . with the amount of financial aid given by Louis to Charles II" (p.413).

This monograph by Professor Jones of the University of East Anglia serves as an outstanding study of the reign of James II and the Glorious Revolution. The author describes James II's attempt to strengthen the powers of the crown, influence the composition of Parliament, and establish religious freedom. He argues that the English king's concentration on domestic politics diverted his attention away from foreign policy and the threat posed by William III's preparations to invade England (p.255). Jones relates the relationship between James II and William III, the Dutch invasion of England, and the Glorious Revolution in its full European context. He stresses that the Prince of Orange sought to gain control over English foreign policy and employ England in the struggle against Louis XIV (p.190). He downplays the dynastic motive for the invasion. The study is based on English, Dutch, and French sources.


Professor John Miller provides a valuable biography focused on the politics and religion of James II. He stresses the English king's foreign policy aimed to preserve peace and the European balance of power. James II attempted to maintain good relations with France and the Dutch
Republic. However, he was drawn into the cold war between Louis XIV and William of Orange on the side of France as the stadholder worked to provoke a war against the Sun King from 1686 on (p.161). James II believed Louis XIV sought to avoid a conflict, and support for France might deter Orange and preserve the peace. Nonetheless, the perception of a strong Anglo-French Catholic alliance aimed against Protestant Europe, combined with the aggressive nature of French foreign policy in the past, assisted Orange in his quest to gain support from the States General in arming for and launching an invasion of England to break up the English threat and secure his wife’s rights to the English crown. Miller shows that James II, still hoping to maintain the European peace, failed to adequately prepare for the invasion. The king sought to avoid warlike actions, but he also failed to appreciate Dutch determination to carry out the invasion. Miller briefly describes James II’s reaction to the invasion, flee from England, and the Irish War. The study is based on archival research.

See also:


**6.3. The Maritime Powers to 1697**


Philip Aubrey provides an account of the naval battle of La Hogue in May 1692. Using archival research in England, the author gives a description of naval operations between France and the Maritime Powers in 1688-93, with La Hogue serving as the climax. The battle took place after Louis XIV had decided to assemble 24,000 Franco-Irish troops in Normandy in preparation to invade England and restore the exiled James II to the English throne. The French fleet, however, was engaged in a six-day battle off Barfleur and La Hogue by a superior Anglo-Dutch fleet. In the battle, the Maritime Powers emerged victorious by destroying fifteen French warships and many of the invasion barges. The decisive
action ended the threat of an invasion to England. Aubrey considers the battle from the English and French viewpoints, but fails to examine Dutch naval operations. The study includes six maps depicting naval operations during the six-day battle and five appendices listing details of the English, Dutch, and French fleets. It is recommended for specialists in naval history.


Professor Stephen B. Baxter of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill renders the best available biography of William III, Prince of Orange (1650-1702), published in the English language. The author describes William III's rise to political power as stadholder and captain-general of the Dutch Republic during the revolution of 1672. Thereafter, Baxter focuses on describing William III's resistance to French aggression and expansionism in the Dutch War (1672-78), Reunion policy, Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84, and Nine Years' War. The stadholder's efforts eventually led to the containment of French aggression in the 1690s. As for the invasion of England, the author stresses Orange's fear that James II would join Louis XIV in a war against the Dutch Republic in the late 1680s (p.229). This belief, combined with encouragement from Englishmen and Scots, drove
William III to invade England in an attempt to influence the kingdom into an Anglo-Dutch alliance against Louis XIV in 1688-89. As the ruler of the Maritime Powers, William III directed the forces of two states in the war against France in the Low Countries, Ireland, North America, and at sea. The biography is an excellent study of William III's diplomatic and military activities in the Dutch War and Nine Years' War. The work is based on research in Dutch and English archives. It includes two maps and eight illustrations, but lacks a bibliography.

6.3.3. Chandler, David G. "Fluctuations in the Strength of Forces in English Pay Sent to Flanders during the Nine Years' War, 1688-1697." War and Society 1 (September 1988): 1-19.

Professor David G. Chandler of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst analyzes the considerable fluctuations in troop strength of the forces in English pay deployed to the Low Countries in the Nine Years' War. He finds the fluctuations resulted from Parliament's limited financial contributions to support the war in the early years as well as financial commitments to allies. In addition, the British army was small and inexperienced in 1689, and William III needed to maintain forces in Ireland and Britain to safeguard against the Jacobite threat. Chandler points out that William III's successful capture of Namur (1695) resulted in Parliament's firm commitment to ensure Allied military superiority in
the Low Countries. In 1696, England supplied half of the Allied contingent of 90,172 troops facing Louis XIV in the Netherlands (p.16).


Professor John Childs of the University of Leeds briefly addresses British army activities in secondary areas of operation to supplement his extensive study on military campaigns in the Low Countries during the Nine Years' War (see Childs, 6.3.5). He stresses that the British primarily concentrated their military operations against the French in Ireland and the Low Countries. Even so, British forces supported Victor Amadeus II of Savoy's efforts in northern Italy, combined English naval-land operations against French forces in Catalonia, and the war effort against the French in the West Indies and North America. As for the war across the ocean, Childs states:

The eastern seaboard of North America and the West Indies played some role in the land campaigns of the Nine Years' War. However, the contest was neither won nor lost in the Americas and the minuscule scale of the fighting in those theatres was a thousand times subordinate to the main operations in the Low Countries, Germany, northern Italy, and Spain" (p.80).

In fact, the author shows that the few troops Britain committed to the war across the ocean were poorly led; lacked adequate supplies of food, arms, and timely pay; and died in great numbers from disease. He relates several military operations in the West Indies and North America,
noting "the expansion of European war into the colonies demonstrated that the English army and navy needed to devise and develop a corresponding set of strategic, tactical and administrative principles" to effectively conduct military operations abroad (p.98).


Childs discusses the employment of the British army in the Nine Years' War, or what he likes to call "The War of the English Succession," a war fought to protect the new political order in England (p.26). His study of William III's military campaigns is based on archival research in England, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland. Childs focuses on William III's military campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands. He emphasizes that the British contingent of the Grand Alliance was small and mostly ineffective. William III had lost the nucleus of James II's standing army in the purges of the Glorious Revolution. Thus, the British contingents he deployed to Ireland and the Low Countries consisted of inexperienced and ill-equipped forces in 1689. After the Irish War, William III took over personal command of the Grand Alliance, including the British corps in the Low Countries. He slowly ensured that the British troops acquired training, combat experience, modern arms and equipment, as well as improved logistics. The British army, small
in comparison to the Dutch army, increased from 6,000 in 1689 to 43,000 in 1696 (p.73). To effectively employ these inexperienced troops, William III divided them among the other forces of the Grand Alliance.

The Spanish Netherlands served as the main theater of operations for the Nine Years' War. The conflict quickly became a war of attrition in a region studded with fortified towns and well-defended fortresses. British contingents fought at Walcourt (1689), Fleurus (1690), Steenkirk (1692), and Landen (1693). They also participated in the great sieges of the era, including William III's great victory, the recapture of Namur, in 1695. Childs points out that the English king built his reputation on his diplomatic efforts as the leader of the Grand Alliance, not as a military commander who could defeat Louis XIV's greatest generals. He also notes William III's advantage with the naval and economic strength of the Maritime Powers in the war of attrition against France. The Maritime Powers achieved naval supremacy over France in 1692, ending the threat of a French invasion to the British Isles. The economic, naval, and military strength of the Maritime Powers, combined with military assistance from other members of the Grand Alliance, kept France from achieving the decisive victory demanded by Louis XIV in the Nine Years' War. Childs calls the Peace of Ryswick a major victory for the Grand
Alliance because William III not only acquired Louis XIV's recognition as King of England, but the alliance served the Sun King his first military setback.

Childs' study is a rare account of military operations in the Nine Years' War. He shows that the British army remained insignificant and achieved little success in the Nine Years' War. The military efforts of the Grand Alliance, especially the Dutch army, contributed much more towards winning the War of the English Succession. The strength of the English economy and navy played a more important role than the army in England's first war against Louis XIV. The study lacks a bibliography.


In this article, Sir George N. Clark continues to stress the trade war aspect of the Nine Years' War (see Clark, 6.3.7). He argues that both the Grand Alliance and France pursued every means, including commercial warfare, to cause damage to the other side. He professes that the trade war "imposed a severe economic strain [on European countries] and that this was one of the factors which made the powers willing to make peace in 1697" (p.179).

This monograph by Clark is a pioneering effort in the treatment of the Nine Years' War as a trade war between the Maritime Powers and France. The author argues that the primary motive for the Maritime Powers pursuing a war against France focused on the suppression of French trade and the acquisition of commercial advantages from France in a peace settlement. He notes the significant growth of seaborne commerce and the development of large navies designed to protect trade routes in the late seventeenth century. The author addresses the Anglo-Dutch trade war with France, privateering, and the problem of neutral commerce. He concludes that the trade conflict seriously disrupted European commerce and contributed to severe economic depressions during the Nine Years' War. The study is based on English and Dutch sources.


Godfrey Davies of the Huntington Library examines William III's control of English foreign policy. He stresses Orange's primary motive for invading England was to enlist England in the war against Louis XIV. To this end, William III directed English policy towards joining the Grand Alliance and conducting military operations against France in the Nine
Years' War. The author shows that William III grabbed control of English policy and kept his English ministers and Parliament ignorant of his conduct of the conflict, war aims, peace talks, and the partition treaties. In fact, his secret diplomacy kept English ministers and Parliament unaware of England's formal involvement in the Grand Alliance (pp.96-99). The English had declared war on France because of Louis XIV's support for James II in Ireland. Parliament sought the reconquest of Ireland, not involvement in a continental war. The author emphasizes that England blindly followed William III's lead to secure the Protestant succession, protect the Low Countries, and maintain a balance of power in favor of the Maritime Powers. Davies argues that William III kept control of English foreign policy and support for his continental policy by employing ministers with little knowledge of foreign affairs; formulating and carrying out policy in secrecy; using Dutch advisers like Hans Willem (William) Bentinck, the first Earl of Portland; and informing English ministers and Parliament of policy decisions and treaties after the fact. William took no chance on English opposition to his war with Louis XIV.


John Ehrman of Cambridge University furnishes a detailed study of the English navy during the reign of William III. He concentrates on both
naval administration and the conduct of naval operations in the Nine
Years' War. The author notes that at the accession of William III
England was one of three leading European naval powers. In the early
stages of the conflict, when the war at sea was in the balance, the
English navy rebounded from a defeat by a superior French fleet at
Beachy Head (1690) in the English Channel to achieve a decisive naval
victory at La Hogue (1692), ending the possibility of Franco-Jacobite
invasion of England. For the rest of the war the fleet was tasked to
maintain English supremacy of the seas and protect merchant shipping
against French privateering. Ehrman traces the growth of English naval
strength, including operations in the Mediterranean. The navy increased
from 173 ships with a tonnage of 101,892 tons and 6,930 guns in 1688
to 323 ships of over 160,000 tons and 9,912 guns in 1697 (p.xx). He
also notes the slow growth of William III's involvement with the
administration and operations of the English fleet. At first the monarch
let his English ministers control the navy. However, the fleet became
increasingly important to William III and his Mediterranean policy in
1692, and having become contemptuous of his English ministers, the
king took over control of the fleet in 1696 (p.608). The study is based
on British archival research. It contains twelve illustrations, six plans of
naval dockyards, and fourteen appendices depicting ship, financial, and
naval leadership details. The study includes a valuable bibliography of primary source manuscripts.


The author explores the beginnings of William III's Mediterranean policy, the use of the Anglo-Dutch fleets to conduct naval operations against the French in the Mediterranean. When the Maritime Powers defeated the French fleet at La Hogue in 1692, the King-Stadholder recognized a window of opportunity to employ the Anglo-Dutch fleet to strengthen the southern flank of the Grand Alliance. He planned for the presence of the fleet in the Mediterranean to encourage Spain and Savoy to continue the struggle against Louis XIV, as well as pressure the Sultan out of the war with the German Empire. The English admiralty, however, hindered William III's immediate plans for large-scale naval operations in the Mediterranean in 1693-94. Ehrman discusses the King-Stadholder's attempts to influence the admiralty by suggesting the concept of commerce protection in the Mediterranean, and relates the initial attempts by the Maritime Powers to conduct operations in the south in 1693-94. The author fails to address adequately the role of the Dutch fleet.
In this article, Kenneth Ferguson scrutinizes the makeup of William III's army that fought James II in the Irish War. He addresses the Williamite military buildup in Ireland, noting the severe logistical problems of General Frederick Hermann von Schomberg's forces in 1689. The Williamite army of French Huguenot, Dutch, and English troops suffered from a lack of food, clothing, and supplies which contributed to poor morale and a decimation of the army from disease. Ferguson shows that Schomberg lost thirty percent of his army of nearly 19,000 from disease during the winter of 1689-90 (p.67). The author points out that England had never deployed such a large-scale army to Ireland in such short notice in the past, and was unprepared to do so in 1689. The English military administration, however, quickly improved the standing of the army in Ireland by ensuring the transport of adequate supplies of food, medical supplies, artillery, horses, and fodder before William III himself landed in Ireland in June 1690. The King-Stadholder brought Dutch, Danish, and English troops with him. Ferguson estimates that William III's army at the Boyne consisted of 37,000 troops, including veteran Dutchmen, Danes, Germans in Danish uniforms, and French Huguenots in English uniforms, as well as inexperienced Englishmen and Protestant Irishmen (pp.60, 70).
stresses William III's urgency to withdraw forces from Ireland for employment on the continent in 1691. The article includes an appendix depicting the deployment of William III's forces to Ireland in 1689-90.


Professor Graham C. Gibbs of the University of London analyzes the changes in English foreign policy after the Glorious Revolution. He stresses that with the accession of William III in 1689, England's relations with the European powers changed dramatically. The immediate sharp break with James II's foreign policy was England joining the Grand Alliance and the declaration of war against France. Under William III, England quickly moved away from diplomatic inactivity and became a European power. William III's influence inspired Englishmen to concern themselves with the European balance of power. Moreover, English foreign policy began to focus on the maintenance of the revolution settlement and the Protestant succession, as well as the traditional concerns of security and economic interests. In fact, Gibbs argues that the security of the Protestant succession was the primary interest of Britain in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Gibbs also points out that William III, like James II, formulated and conducted his own foreign policy. He stresses that Parliament had little
control over foreign affairs until the Act of Settlement (1701). In theory and practice William III had complete freedom to make war, declare peace, and to conclude treaties. The king acted as his own foreign minister and employed Dutch diplomats to carry out English diplomatic affairs. Gibbs notes that England’s entrance into the Grand Alliance was the decision of William III, not Parliament or English ministers. In fact, the king kept ministers and Parliament ignorant of his diplomatic activity (p.68). English ministers, diplomats, and Parliament had nothing to do with the Peace of Ryswick (1697) or the Spanish partition treaties of 1698 and 1700. Nevertheless, William III’s monopoly on diplomacy hampered his efforts to convince England of the need to form another Grand Alliance against Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession. Parliament was ignorant of the Sun King’s ambitions and the threat to the European balance of power (p.71). Thus, William III needed to educate his English ministers and Parliament of the French threat and enlist their aid in the fight to maintain the European balance of power. Gibbs argues that this episode resulted in the rise of Parliament’s influence in foreign affairs in the eighteenth century.

This is a biography of Hans Willem Bentinck, the first Earl of Portland (1649-1709), one of William III’s most trusted agents. He served as the Prince of Orange’s personal representative to Charles II and James II, assisting in the conclusion of the Anglo-Dutch alliance of 1678. After the Glorious Revolution, William III employed Portland as a key advisor in the war against Louis XIV. Portland acted as William III’s negotiator in the Peace of Ryswick (1697). He also served as William III’s ambassador to France in 1697-98, and negotiated the Spanish partition treaties in 1698 and 1700. This is the only study of Portland available in the English language. It is based on correspondence between Bentinck and William III preserved at Welbeck Abbey in England.


Professor Kenneth H.D. Haley of the University of Sheffield agrees with Jonathan I. Israel (see Israel, 6.3.15 and 6.3.16) that William III had the complete support of the States General, States of Holland, and Amsterdam for the invasion of England in 1688. The author notes the expense and risk of the venture, and stresses the strategic reasons for
Dutch support of Orange's invasion plans. He argues that the Dutch chose to support William III against Louis XIV as France gradually began to threaten Dutch national security. In 1688, the Sun King threatened to invade and take control of the electorates of the Palatinate and Cologne. The Elector of Cologne controlled the bishoprics of Liège, Münster, and Hildesheim. The Dutch viewed Louis XIV's threats and actions as renewed French aggression, and remembered the Sun King's use of Liège and Cologne in the French invasion of the United Provinces in 1672. Moreover, they realized that French domination of the Rhineland would block Austrian assistance to the Dutch Republic and Spanish Netherlands in the event of renewed hostilities in the Low Countries. The States General also expected an alliance between Louis XIV and James II, and an Anglo-French attack on the United Provinces similar to the one in 1672. Haley stresses that the Dutch sought to counter the French threat on the Rhine by invading England, establishing control over the monarchy, and creating an Anglo-Dutch alliance against Louis XIV. Such an alliance, so hoped the Dutch, would determine the contest in the Rhineland.

In this provocative essay, Professor Jonathan I. Israel of the University of London disputes the notion that William III, with the prompting of English conspirators, assembled a military force from his own resources, invaded, and conquered England in pursuit of Orangist and Protestant English interests in 1688. Instead, the author suggests that the Prince of Orange, with the full support of the United Provinces, assembled a large Dutch military and naval force, and carried out the invasion of England to take control of the kingdom to defend the commercial interests of the Dutch Republic. The States General, in a trade war with France beginning in 1687, feared that James II would support Louis XIV, and possibly join in an attack by land and sea on the United Provinces, similar to the attack at the start of the Dutch War in 1672. Therefore, the Dutch government made the risky decision to support William III's invasion of England to neutralize James II as a potential French ally, gain control of English forces and resources, and draw England as quickly as possible into the struggle against France on the continent. The Dutch regents believed a military victory as the best way to protect their vital commercial interests (pp.36-38).
In this endeavor, the States General supplied William III with an invasion force of 400 ships, carrying 14,350 highly experienced Dutch troops, 6,000 horses, and an exceptionally large artillery train (p.33). The Dutch stripped their stores and arsenals bare of provisions, powder, and ammunition to support a large army in the field for many months. Israel writes:

The fleet consisted of some sixty warships (including the fireships), ninety *fluits* just for the horses which were loaded roughly sixty per ship, thirty-six of the largest Dutch whaling ships carrying sufficient powder and ammunition to keep 50,000 men in the field for several months, and then the dozens of transports for the troops and a mountain of supplies, including large quantities of meat, wine and brandy for the men . . . (p.33).

In addition, the States General hired 13,400 German troops from Brandenburg, Brunswick, Hanover, and Württemberg to replace Dutch troops, who became part of the invasion force, in fortresses on the Lower Rhine. Israel is convincing in his argument that the Dutch government gave full support to William III’s invasion and conquest of England in 1688.


Professor Israel provides an outstanding analysis of the Dutch role in Britain's Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. Building on his earlier work (see Israel, 6.3.15), the author stresses the creation of a massive Dutch
invasion fleet aimed at seizing control of England for economic and strategic reasons. He describes the alliance of William III and the Dutch regents in the quest to neutralize James II as a possible ally of Louis XIV in a French attack on the United Provinces. They assembled a large invasion force, consisting of 21,000 crack troops in an armada that included about 500 warships and transport vessels, in the gamble that William III could quickly crush James II's power before Louis XIV responded with an invasion of the Dutch Republic (pp.106-9). Israel argues that William III set out to conquer England (p.121).

After landing at Torbay, William III's superior military forces forced the English king to back away from a pitched battle. Israel states that James II knew his forces were outnumbered and outclassed. The Dutch army quickly took London, and William III deposed his father-in-law. Israel emphasizes the importance of the Dutch military occupation of London until the spring of 1690. William III maintained a large concentration of his Dutch army in London and its outskirts to secure his hold on British politics, while keeping the English army scattered and far away from the seat of power. This military power gave the Prince of Orange significant influence in English politics, allowing him control of the administration and finances. The author shows that William III's military power acquired him the British crown and England's participation
in the war against France (pp. 129-33). Israel writes that "between November 1688 and the autumn of 1691 the course of the Glorious Revolution was to a great extent shaped by Dutch calculations and interests" (p. 160). He, nevertheless, notes William III's gradual loss of political power in England after he joined his army to fight Louis XIV in the Low Countries in 1691. In fact, the English worked quickly to subordinate the king to Parliament after 1692. The essay is based on Dutch and English sources. He criticizes historians for ignoring the Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution. The essay includes six illustrations and two maps.


In this essay, Professor Jonathan I. Israel of the University of London and Professor Geoffrey Parker of Yale University compare the Spanish and Dutch attempts to invade England in 1588 and 1688. Parker discusses the failed Spanish invasion while Israel renders an account of the successful Dutch invasion of England. Israel addresses Dutch strategy, the military and naval buildup, logistics, and the decision to land in southwest England. He stresses that William III waited until the last second to decide upon a landing site in England. This forced James
II to concentrate most of his army in the southeast as well as scatter troops as far north as Yorkshire to defend the English coastline. Moreover, the English king placed his navy at the Gunfleet off Essex to intercept the Dutch armada. Israel places the strength of the Dutch invasion force at 40,000 men and 463 ships, including 10,692 regular infantry, 3,660 regular cavalry, gunners of the artillery train, and about 5,000 volunteers. In addition, 9,154 sailors manned fifty-three warships and ten fireships, and approximately 10,000 men operated 400 transport vessels (pp.337-38).

Israel relates the launch and journey of the Dutch armada in November 1688. A first attempt to sail had been driven back by bad weather in late October. He notes that in the second attempt the same strong easterly wind which allowed the armada to swiftly sail to southwest England and land at Torbay in Devon pinned the English fleet to its anchorage at the Gunfleet. He emphasizes that the size and quality of the Dutch forces as well as the location of the landing site caught James II completely off guard, greatly contributing to the success of the invasion. Israel's portion of the essay is based on Dutch and English sources.

George H. Jones of Eastern Illinois University sketches Dutch diplomacy prior to the Dutch invasion of England. He describes Hans Willem Bentinck's diplomatic missions that led to agreements with the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, as well as the Dukes of Celle, Württemberg, and Wolfenbüttel to defend the Dutch frontier on the middle and lower Rhine against a French attack in 1688-89. The author argues that the success of Dutch diplomacy allowed the Prince of Orange to launch his invasion of England with the support of important German rulers, including the Duke of Hanover, once Louis XIV had attacked the Rhineland. When the Sun King declared war on the United Provinces in November 1688, the Dutch Republic's forces under the command of Count Waldeck were seventy-five percent German (p.245).


In 1680-81, Tsar Theodore III of Russia sought to develop close relations with France. His purpose was to gain Louis XIV's influence over the Polish king, John III Sobieski, in the quest for a Russo-Polish peace settlement and alliance against the Turks. To acquire these goals,
Theodore III was willing to offer France commercial advantages that would threaten Dutch dominance of Russian trade. Professor Lossky analyzes the Franco-Russian trade negotiations and the impact of Dutch diplomacy to hinder such an agreement. He describes the impact of a diplomatic despatch by Baron Willem van Keller, the Dutch resident in Moscow, to the States General in The Hague in 1681. An inaccurate French version of the note was passed to the Count of Avaux, the French ambassador at The Hague, and he forwarded the document to the court of Louis XIV. The despatch purposely stressed Russia's lack of interest in a trade treaty with France. Lossky writes that "obviously, the aim of this concoction was to dissuade the French from taking their trade negotiations with the Russians seriously" (p.35). The author credits the report for influencing French policy, but he shows that improved Russo-Polish relations as well as Louis XIV's request for French merchants in Russia to be allowed to exercise the Catholic religion freely made a Franco-Russian agreement doubtful.


In this doctoral thesis, Robert D. McJimsey examines William III's war against Louis XIV's France and English public opinion. The author stresses William III's use of his ministers and the press to manipulate
English support for the long, indecisive Nine Years' War. The Williamite press emphasized the need for the Maritime Powers to restore a satisfactory balance of power in Europe. McJimsey points out that the Williamite press convinced most Englishmen to support the war effort despite William III's failure to fully inform them about his foreign policy. Even so, the author shows that there was much debate about the course of the war. The study is based on English archival sources. It contains a valuable bibliography of contemporary sources.


Stewart P. Oakley of the University of East Anglia examines William III's policy and diplomatic relations with Sweden and Denmark during the Nine Years' War in his published thesis, originally produced at the University of London in 1961. He states that William III initially aimed to enlist both Sweden and Denmark into the Grand Alliance. However, poor relations between Charles XI and Christian V over Holstein-Gottorp and Saxe-Lauenberg threatened to erupt into a war in 1689 and 1693. The King-Stadholder responded by threatening intervention in the impending conflicts, which deterred Christian V in his designs in northern Germany, and preserved peace in northern Europe. Oakley stresses that William III sought to maintain peace in the Baltic at all cost.
William III's Northern Policy quickly turned from gaining offensive alliances with the Scandinavian powers to maintaining friendly relations with both states without drawing either one into the Grand Alliance. William III realized that if one power joined the alliance the other would most likely side with France.

William III encouraged friendly relations between the Maritime Powers and the Scandinavian states. He added a defensive alliance with Denmark in 1690 to the Dutch-Swedish defensive alliance of 1682. Moreover, he hired Danish troops for the war in Ireland in 1689. But, the Anglo-Dutch Convention of 1689 caused much tension between the Maritime Powers and Scandinavia. William III proclaimed a blockade of commerce, including neutral trade, with France. Both Charles XI and Christian V reacted by challenging the ban on neutral commerce. The author shows that William III gradually backed down to the demands of the Northern Crowns.

Oakley argues that William III had relatively little success in his Northern Policy. The ruler failed to gain Sweden's belligerency, troops, and ships as stipulated in the defense treaty of 1682, as well as Swedish participation in the ban on French trade. Moreover, he did not persuade Denmark to join the anti-French alliance, provide more troops after 1689, or accept the ban on commerce with France. However, the
author credits the King-Stadholder for taking a firm stand against Danish territorial ambitions to maintain peace in northern Germany. William III also yielded to Scandinavian commercial demands before Charles XI and Christian V drew closer together into an alliance, and possibly created a third party in northern Europe which might intervene in the Nine Years' War. Oakley stresses that William III's policy with the Northern Crowns was affected by his inability to afford large subsidies to more effectively influence Scandinavian actions, the military stalemate in the Low Countries, and the naval setback at Beachy Head (1690).

The study is highly valuable for its consideration of William III's diplomacy in northern Europe as well as Swedish and Danish foreign policy. He appraises Danish and Swedish interests in northern Germany and commercial interests. Sweden's mediation of the Nine Years' War is also discussed. The thesis is based on archival research in England, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. It contains two maps and a useful bibliography of non-English secondary sources.


This is a classic study of England from 1685 to 1702. In this sequel to *England in the Reign of Charles II* (see Ogg, 5.3.19), David Ogg of Oxford University provides a narrative history of the period in which England emerged from dependency on the Bourbon monarchy to become
a European power. The author includes a discussion of relations between James II and the Prince of Orange, the Glorious Revolution, Nine Years' War, the First and Second Partition Treaties, and the creation of the Grand Alliance. The study is based on primary sources. It lacks a bibliography.


A.N. Ryan of the University of Liverpool addresses William III's attempts to cope with the problem of the French fleet stationed at Brest in the Nine Years' War. He stresses England's unpreparedness to fight a naval war against France. The poor location of naval bases on the east coast of England, built for security and protecting trade against the Dutch threat, hindered English fleet actions against French naval operations from Brest. France had the advantage of initiating naval operations in the western approaches of the English Channel. Ryan notes the failure of William III's navy to prevent the French fleet from supporting the Jacobites in Ireland in 1689-90. The author explores English naval options against the Brest fleet, including blockade and a combined land-sea attack. However, William III failed to destroy the threat of the Brest fleet because of the inability of the English fleet to maintain a blockade off Brest, or carry out a successful raid on the naval
installation. The Brest fleet remained a threat to English security and commerce throughout the conflict.


In this article, Professor John G. Simms of Trinity College, Dublin, stresses William III's desire to end the war in Ireland as quickly as possible in order to redirect his forces to the struggle in the Low Countries. With this purpose in mind, the King-Stadholder sought a negotiated peace settlement in Ireland after the battle of the Boyne (1690) and during the prolonged siege of Limerick (1690-91). The Jacobites agreed to William III's liberal peace offer after military setbacks at Athlone and Aughrim in 1691. The Peace of Limerick (1691) granted the Irish Catholics both religious and territorial concessions.

See also:


6.4. James II, the Irish War, and the Jacobite Threat to England. 1689-97


Professor Childs analyzes Louis XIV’s purpose and the prospect of a successful Franco-Jacobite invasion of England in 1692. He argues that the Sun King supported James II’s invasion attempt to weaken the Grand Alliance by either placing the exiled monarch on the English throne, or diverting William III’s forces from the Low Countries to defend his position in Britain in a civil war. Either situation would tie up coalition forces, assist French operations in Flanders, and might lead to a peace settlement based on the Truce of Regensburg (pp.65-66). The author believes the invasion force had little chance of a successful landing and military victory in England. He estimates the expeditionary corps at 14,000, instead of the 24,000 troops normally cited by historians (p.64). He stresses William III’s determination and control of English military resources in the defense his realm in 1692, compared to James II, who "dallied, lost his nerve and collapsed under the nervous strain as his troops began to desert to the invader" in 1688 (p.62). Childs shows that the British army would support William III against the Jacobite threat. Moreover, the British army, when reinforced from the Low Countries, Ireland, and garrisons in the north and east of England
would have outnumbered the invaders in battle after the landing. Childs concludes:

From the French point of view, given the strategic situation in the European war, it was worth risking a small corps, most of whom were expendable Irish, on the venture. It might have helped the siege of Namur, it might have fomented civil war in England, it might just have detained sufficient troops in England to affect materially the balance of military force in Flanders. If James could have been restored as well then that would have represented a huge bonus but Louis XIV was prepared to settle for a great deal less. Whatever the end result, any landing in England would have greatly affected the confederate war effort in the Low Countries and Germany. Namur was far more important than England (p.72).

However, the invasion force never sailed for England. The French fleet failed to achieve command of the English Channel, and after its defeat at La Hogue, Louis XIV dropped plans to invade England in 1692.


Professor Simms assesses the importance of the siege of Londonderry in 1689. He relates the siege of Derry by James II and his Franco-Jacobite army as well as the resistance of the garrison and inhabitants of Protestant stronghold. Simms stresses that James II lacked heavy siege guns to pound the fortified city into submission. In addition, he was forced to divert his forces from the siege to carry out operations at Enniskillen and the Foyle and Swilly areas. As a result, the Franco-Jacobite army needed to reduce the city by blockade and starvation. The Protestants, nevertheless, withstood the siege by keeping the river
access to the city open until the Williamite army forced James II to withdraw from the area. Simms argues that "Derry's resistance was of major importance for Ireland, Britain and Europe. It led on to the Boyne and the thwarting of Louis XIV" (p.28). The study includes a map depicting the siege of Derry.


This is a collection of twenty-three works by Professor Simms which were originally published during the early 1950s to the late 1970s. The assortment includes Simms' articles on General Frederick Hermann von Schomberg at Dundalk in 1689, the battle of the Boyne (1690), the Earl of Marlborough's siege and capture of Cork (1690), an examination of Williamite peace tactics in 1690-91, and the Treaty of Limerick (1691). Simms stresses William III's anxiety over settling the Irish War or Williamite War, to allow the transfer of British forces from Ireland to the Low Countries to support the war effort of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV.


Simms traces the course of events in Ireland from the beginning of James II's reign to the Peace of Limerick. He discusses the Irish rebellion against the Williamite regime, the leadership of Tyrconnell and
James II in the Irish War (1689-91), and the struggles at Londonderry, Enniskillen, Newtownbutler, Cork, Kinsale, Athlone, Aughrim, as well as the Peace of Limerick. The author stresses the importance of the Irish War in the struggle between Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance. The study is based on research in Irish, British, French, Dutch, Austrian, and Danish archives. It includes maps depicting the siege of Londonderry (1689), battle of the Boyne (1690), sieges of Limerick (1690-91), siege of Cork (1690), battle of Aughrim (1691), and the movements of William III's army in Ireland (1689-91). The work contains a valuable bibliography of contemporary materials and listing of secondary works on Irish history. It is the best study available on the Irish War.


Piers Wauchope supplies a study on the Irish military leader, Patrick Sarsfield (1655-93), who played an important role in support of James II in the Irish War. He had served in Louis XIV’s army during the Dutch War (1672-78), and later assisted the Earl of Tyrconnell in the purge of Protestant soldiers from the Irish army during the reign of James II. He accompanied the deposed king to France in 1688. In the Irish War, Sarsfield served as a cavalry commander, rising to the rank of major general. After the defeat at the Boyne (1690), Sarsfield rallied the Irish army and organized the defense of Limerick. He negotiated the final
Jacobite surrender at Limerick in October 1691. Sarsfield, now the Earl of Lucan, and his Irish troops were part of the French force expecting to invade England in 1692, and later fought for Louis XIV in the Low Countries and Savoy. Sarsfield was mortally wounded in the French victory over William III at Landen in 1693. This is a useful study of the Irish War based on English, French, and Irish sources. It includes five maps and twenty illustrations.

See also:


6.5. Victor Amadeus II, the Savoyard Alliance, and Spanish Italy


In this valuable essay, Ralph D. Handen of the University of California at Riverside examines the foreign policy of Victor Amadeus II and his relations with Louis XIV during the Nine Years' War. He stresses the Duke of Savoy's break with the Sun King in 1690. The split in the traditional Bourbon-Savoyard alliance developed from the growing French threat to Italy, including the French purchase of Casale from the Duke of Mantua (1681), stationing of French infantry and cavalry in Piedmont (1682), bombardment of Genoa (1684), military campaign against the Savoyard Waldensians (1685), as well as Louis XIV's demands for Savoyard forces to fight the Grand Alliance (1689) and for
Victor Amadeus II to turn the citadel of Turin and fortress of Verrua over to France (1690) during the Nine Years' War.

Victor Amadeus II joined the Grand Alliance in 1690. However, the French army defeated the duke at Staffarda and occupied the whole of Savoy, except the fortress of Montmérian, along with the key Alpine fortress of Susa in western Piedmont in 1690. French forces also took over the county of Nice in 1691. Such setbacks encouraged the duke to seek a negotiated settlement with the Sun King. Victor Amadeus II, nevertheless, would not agree to Louis XIV's peace proposals in the secret talks that began in 1691. The duke sought to regain all of his lost possessions, and achieve a French withdrawal from Casale. Although the French defeated the duke at Marsaglia (1693), the Sun King's army failed to follow up the victory, and before long the conflict in northwest Italy settled into a military stalemate. However, in 1693, Louis XIV decided to seek a separate peace with Victor Amadeus II, hoping that the desertion of Savoy would lead to the break up the Grand Alliance. The Count of Tessé conducted secret talks with Savoyard representatives beginning in 1693. These negotiations culminated in an agreement for Savoy to leave the Grand Alliance and ally with France in the Peace of Turin (1696). By deserting the Grand Alliance, the duke
regained Pinerolo, achieved the removal of French forces from Casale, and acquired the marriage of his daughter to the grandson of Louis XIV.


This is the first detailed account of Franco-Savoyard relations during the Nine Years' War and the secret negotiations which led to the Peace of Turin. Handen's research and the diplomatic talks between Mans Jean Baptiste René de Froullay, Count of Tessé, Louis XIV's military governor at Pinerolo, and Giovanni Battista Gropello, Conte di Borgone, Victor Amadeus II's diplomatic representative, is concisely reviewed in his article "The End of an Era: Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II" (see 6.5.1). His thesis is that French economic difficulties after 1693 along with the need to break up the Grand Alliance to achieve an acceptable peace influenced Louis XIV to concede Casale and Pinerolo to Victor Amadeus II in 1696. At the same time, the failure of coalition military operations against France in northwest Italy convinced the Duke of Savoy that an agreement with the French monarch was the only way for him to achieve his main war aims of Casale and Pinerolo. The study is based on French archival sources. It is a valuable depiction of seventeenth-century diplomacy.

Robert Oresko, a research fellow at the Institute of Historical Research in London, addresses Victor Amadeus II's break with the French alliance in 1690. The author stresses the duke's desire to pursue a role in international politics independent of Louis XIV. The Sun King, however, sought to make Savoy a French protectorate, having little faith in the duke's loyalty to the Franco-Savoyard alliance. As war approached in 1688-89, Louis XIV pressured Savoy for troops. In 1690, Victor Amadeus II attempted to block increasing French influence in his lands by pursuing neutrality, but this policy failed when Louis XIV demanded the unconditional French military occupation of the fortresses at Turin and Verrua. The duke responded by turning to his close relatives, Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, and joining the anti-French coalition in June 1690.
Oresko explores Victor Amadeus II's relations with England in the late 1680s and early 1690s. He notes the duke's support for James II during his short reign. Although opposing the Dutch invasion of England in 1688, the Duke of Savoy slowly adjusted to the regime of William III and Mary II in 1689-90. At first, he had to support James II because of the Savoyard alliance with Louis XIV. He, nevertheless, sought to distance himself from the Stuart cause. The duke planned to desert his alliance with Louis XIV because of French intervention against the Savoyard Waldensians. He established indirect relations with William III in 1689. The King-Stadholder strongly desired a Savoyard alliance, hoping to launch an offensive against France from northwest Italy. Oresko stresses that Victor Amadeus II's break with the Sun King was emphasized by his alliance with William III in October 1690. He also notes the agreement between Victor Amadeus II and William III to protect the Waldensians as well as discusses the Savoyard claim to the British throne through the Duchess of Savoy, the granddaughter of Charles I.

Christopher Storrs of the University of Dundee examines the Spanish system in the Mediterranean as well as the Spanish Army of Lombardy in the late seventeenth century. The author investigates the composition, organization, logistics, finances, discipline problems, and naval support associated with the Army of Lombardy. He shows that the army was as large as 25,000 men during the Nine Years’ War (p.387). This army included up to six *tercios*, totaling 4,214 Spaniards (p.395). The rest of the army included Italian, Swiss, and German soldiers. As for its role in Spanish strategy, the Army of Lombardy had the mission of protecting and maintaining Spanish prestige and influence in Spanish Italy (the duchy of Milan, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, the Tuscan *presidio* ports, and Finale).

Storrs argues that Spain was still a major European power in the 1690s (pp.373-74). As such, the Spanish army in Italy played a key role in defending northern Italy against French aggression in the Nine Years’ War. The author relates the Spanish army’s success in capturing the fortress of Guastalla from Louis XIV’s ally, the Duke of Mantua, in 1689. This victory encouraged Victor Amadeus II of Savoy to abandon the French alliance in 1690. In the following year, 1691, the Spanish
army forced the Duke of Mantua out of the war. Afterwards, the Army of Lombardy fought Louis XIV’s army in Piedmont. The Spanish army played a key role in the capture of Casale (1695) shortly before the Peace of Turin (1696). Storrs points out that the peace settlement ended French control over the fortress of Pinerolo, leaving Spain as the strongest force in northern Italy.


In this article, Storrs argues that Victor Amadeus II, the ruler of the minor power of Piedmont-Savoy, was caught in the middle of the power struggle between Louis XIV and the anti-French coalition. At the beginning of the Nine Years’ War, the duke sought to declare neutrality. However, circumstances dictated the Victor Amadeus’ policy and course of action in 1690. Storrs stresses that the duke had little control over the events of 1690 (p.351).

As the Nine Years’ War broke out, Victor Amadeus II realized that his territory would quickly become a battleground between French forces on one side and Imperial, Spanish, and Waldensian forces on the other. In March 1690, Louis XIV’s army marched into Piedmont to pressure the duke into declaring himself for France. This forced Victor Amadeus II to look for military and financial assistance from the anti-French alliance.
He immediately opened up secret negotiations with Spain and the German emperor. He quickly signed treaties with Spanish Milan and the German Empire in June 1690, broke off relations with Louis XIV, as well as sought military and financial assistance from William III and the Maritime Powers. His treaty with Spain resulted in 10,000 troops from the Army of Lombardy marching to Piedmont to support the duke (p.359). But, the promised 6,000 Imperial troops were slow to arrive. In the meantime, Savoyard diplomatic representatives tried to gain William III’s support. However, contrary of Robert Oresko’s view (see 6.5.4), Storrs believes that William III placed little value on a Savoyard alliance (p.354). In fact, William III was reluctant to provide a financial subsidy to Victor Amadeus II (p.356). The author relates the complex negotiations between Victor Amadeus II’s representatives and the Maritime Powers. He discusses the issues of the duke’s increasing demands for financial subsidies, William III’s demands for the duke’s toleration of the Waldensians, as well as the military situation after the Spanish-Savoyard loss at Staffarda. Storrs shows that the duke declared for the Grand Alliance in June 1690. But, Victor Amadeus II had to compromise on the Waldensian issue to achieve a treaty with the Maritime Powers in October 1690 (p.375). Afterwards, the duke was disappointed in his relationship with the Grand Alliance because his allies
failed to provide adequate subsidies for Savoy to fight an effective war in northwest Italy.


Professor Symcox analyzes the relationship between Britain and Victor Amadeus II of Savoy from 1690 to 1720. He stresses the British use of subsidies to enlist and maintain the duke in the Grand Alliance during the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession. The Savoyard alliance served as the cornerstone of British policy in the Mediterranean in both wars. In the first conflict, William III wanted Victor Amadeus II to militarily threaten Louis XIV in southeastern France, forcing the Sun King to divert forces from the Spanish Netherlands and Rhineland to Savoy-Piedmont. In addition, the King-Stadholder hoped Savoy and Spain would launch invasions into France supported by a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Mediterranean (p.159). However, Louis XIV's army quickly overran Savoy and Nice in 1690-91 and forced Victor Amadeus II into a defensive war in Piedmont. In the War of the Spanish Succession, the British government, despite Savoy's defection in the previous conflict, subsidized Victor Amadeus II's war effort against France from 1704 to 1713. The money kept Savoy in the war as well as tied down French forces on the Italian front. As for Victor
Amadeus II, the British alliance provided him the money to assert his independence from Louis XIV's France in both conflicts. Symcox believes that Britain gained the most from the Anglo-Savoyard alliance. However, he notes Victor Amadeus II's acquisition of the Kingdom of Sicily in the Peace of Utrecht (1713), which he later traded for Sardinia (1720), and his rise in political and military power within the European balance of power (p.152).


This is an important contribution to the historiography of Europe in the Age of Louis XIV. Symcox provides the only full-length study of Victor Amadeus II of Savoy in the English language. The author focuses on the duke's domestic and foreign policies. He shows that Victor Amadeus II was the creator of a highly centralized and efficient system of absolutism. Savoy under Victor Amadeus II also played a key role as a minor power in the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession against Louis XIV. Symcox stresses that:

In external affairs . . . his reign was a watershed. In two grueling wars between 1690 and 1713, Victor Amadeus broke free from the domination of France, conquered significant territorial additions to his state and established himself as a valuable ally courted by the great powers (p.8).
The author renders a highly valuable account of the diplomacy and conduct of both wars on the Italian front based on research in Italian and French archives as well as secondary sources. The study contains two useful maps, thirty-five illustrations, and a genealogical diagram of the House of Savoy.

See also:


6.6. Leopold I, the German States, and the Contest with Turkey and France


Professor Thomas M. Barker of the State University of New York provides a detailed monograph on the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. The author places the siege in its historical context by providing a summary of events from 1648 leading up to the Turkish attack on Leopold I's capital city. He describes the major political and military figures, diplomatic negotiations, military organizations, field operations,
as well as the siege. Barker stresses that the Turks were logistically overextended and no match for the fire and shock tactics of the German and Polish military forces. He downplays the role of John III Sobieski, arguing that the real heroes were the common soldiers of the Habsburg army. The study is based on Austrian, German, Spanish, and French sources. It is an excellent reference source which complements the narrative history of the siege by John W. Stoye (see 6.6.13).


Professors A.N. Kurat of the University of Ankara and John S. Bromley of the University of Southampton discuss the series of military defeats after the failed siege of Vienna (1683) that led to the forced withdrawal of the Turks from much of southeastern Europe. The coalition of Austria, Venice, Poland, and Russia drove the Turks back in the War of the Holy League (1683-99). The authors note the string of Imperial victories at Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel) (1685), Buda (1686), Nagyharsány (Berg Hasan) near Mohács (1687), Eger (Erlau) (1687), Peterwardein (1688), Belgrade (1688), Nish (Niš) (1689), and Vidin (1689) before Leopold I was forced to concentrate his forces in the west against Louis XIV. While the Imperial army fought wars on two fronts the Turks were able to defeat a combined Habsburg-Transylvanian army at Zemysts,
and then recapture Nish and Belgrade in 1690. However, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden, nicknamed "Türkenlois," defeated the Turkish army and Hungarian rebels at Zalánkemén (Szalánkemen) in Transylvania in August 1691. Kurat and Bromley stress that the Austro-Turkish war dragged on with inconclusive military campaigns until Prince Eugene of Savoy destroyed the Turkish army at the battle of Zenta in 1697. In the Peace of Karlowitz (Carlowitz) (1699), the Turks lost vast territories to the German Empire, including Hungary and Transylvania. Venice gained Dalmatia and the important Montenegrin harbor of Cattaro (Kotor), Santa Maura, the Morea and Aegina, while Poland acquired Podolia. In the meantime, Peter I of Russia had conquered Azov (1696) and forced the Turks to accept this loss in the Peace of Constantinople (1700). The authors stress that "these treaties mark the beginning of the Turkish retreat from European soil" (p.627).

In addition to the War of the Holy League, Kurat and Bromley discuss Turkish military victories in the war with Russia (1710-11) and Venice (1715-18), as well as the disastrous conflict with Austria (1716-18). The Turkish army was defeated by Prince Eugene of Savoy at Peterwardein, Temesvár, and Belgrade in 1716, and lost additional territory in the Peace of Passarowitz (1718). The authors blame the Turkish military defeats in their wars against Austria on incompetent
military leadership as well as the failure to effectively supply combat forces, poor handling of cavalry and field guns, and inadequate reconnaissance. More importantly, the Ottomans failed to keep up with the Military Revolution in firearms, mobile artillery, and tactical formations (p.642).


In this article, Professor Walter Leitsch at the University of Vienna briefly sketches the origins of the Turkish attack on Vienna in September 1683. He attributes the cause of the attack to the Sultan's belief that Austria was militarily weak, having noted Leopold I's failure to suppress the Hungarian rebellion and deter French aggression in the German Empire. The Sultan and his grand vizier expected a military victory and an advantageous peace settlement with the German emperor. They never anticipated cooperation between the German states and Poland to defend Vienna. Leitsch believes the intervention of John III Sobieski turned the war against the Turks in favor of Leopold I. He explains Sobieski's participation against the Turks as an attempt to restore Polish pride after the disasters of the First Northern War (1655-60) and Polish-Turkish War (1671-76) as well as to increase Poland's international status with a significant military victory. The author stresses the Polish king's importance in the Imperial-Polish victory at Vienna, noting
Sobieski's vast experience in fighting the Turks and his decisive military actions as supreme commander of the combined Christian forces.


Professor Georges Livet of the University of Strasbourg addresses the Sun King's relations with the German states in the late seventeenth century. The essay was originally published as "Louis XIV et Allemagne," in XVIIe Siècle in 1960. Livet emphasizes that at first French policy aimed to divide the German states from the leadership of the German emperor. He describes Cardinal Mazarin's creation of the League of the Rhine in 1658, including France, Sweden, the Electors of Mainz and Cologne, and several German princes, such as Philip Wilhelm of Neuburg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg. The league expanded to include Württemberg, Münster, and Trier in 1661, as well as Hesse-Darmstadt, Zweibrücken, Strasbourg, Basel, and Brandenburg by 1665. The author stresses Mazarin's ability to convince the German princes of their need for French protection against the German emperor. Livet shows that Louis XIV, on the other hand, failed to keep Germany divided because of his overt policy of domination. The Sun King's naked aggression, evident in the War of Devolution, resulted in the dissolution of the League of the Rhine.
in 1667. His continued territorial ambition displayed in the Dutch War, the Reunion of Alsace and other Imperial lands, as well as his anti-Protestant actions encouraged the German princes to side with Leopold I, marking the complete collapse of Mazarin's policy and the gradual creation of an anti-French coalition in Germany. Moreover, Livet points out Louis XIV's aggressive moves in Cologne and the Palatinate resulted in the outbreak of war against a Germany united under the leadership of a German emperor who had defeated the Turkish threat in Hungary. Livet, however, is hesitant to condemn Louis XIV's German policy.


This is the best study available on Frederick William of Brandenburg's foreign policy. Derek McKay of the University of London provides a brilliant analysis of the Great Elector's policy, aimed at raising Brandenburg from small power status to the rank of a Great Power. McKay indicates that the creation of Frederick William's army and his policy of exploiting the differences between the Great Powers stemmed from his humiliation at the hands of Austria, France, the United Provinces, and Spain in the "Cow War" of 1651. The Great Powers forced him to withdraw from Berg after his army had occupied the
territory. As a result, Frederick William sought to establish an independent role for Brandenburg in international politics.

McKay relates Frederick William's failure at becoming both independent and a Great Power. Louis XIV's France remained too powerful a threat to Germany. The Great Elector therefore acquired an alliance with the Sun King to obtain much needed subsidies to support a standing army, which increased his influence with Louis XIV and Brandenburg's status in European politics.

The author argues that Frederick William preferred the anti-French camp at heart despite his alliance with the Sun King. Unfortunately, Austria, Spain, and the Dutch Republic were not in a political or military position to oppose the might of France. Even so, the elector deserted the French alliance twice in the Dutch War (1672-78). In the first instance, Frederick William allied with the United Provinces and Austria in 1672. The inaction of Leopold I and lack of Dutch subsidies to support the Brandenburg army, combined with the French occupation of Cleves, forced the elector to back out of the conflict in the Peace of Vossem (1673).

In the second case, the elector deserted the French alliance to side with the Dutch Republic, Spain, and the German emperor in 1674. However, Charles XI of Sweden's invasion of Brandenburg diverted
Frederick William's military efforts away from France toward the conflict in northern Germany. Frederick William quickly defeated the Swedes at Fehrbellin (1675), earning his nickname "the Great Elector," captured Stettin (Szczcin) in 1677, and continued to mop up Swedish enclaves in Pomerania. His allies deserted him in the Peace of Nijmegen (1678/79), leaving Brandenburg alone to face the French army supporting its Swedish ally in northern Germany. The French siege of Minden forced the elector to agree to the unfavorable Peace of St. Germain (1679). At that point Frederick William realized he needed to renew his alliance with Louis XIV, increase the size of his standing army with the use of French subsidies, and play a cautious diplomatic game between France and the German Empire.


Ivan Părvev of the University of Sofia investigates Habsburg relations with the Ottoman Empire from the early 1680s to Peace of Belgrade (1739). The author devotes over a third of the study to the War of the Holy League. He concentrates on the war in southeast Europe while relating the impact of events in western Europe on Habsburg-Ottoman relations. Părvev also discusses the military and diplomatic contributions of the various German states, Poland, Russia, and Venice in the conflict.
The study should have been better edited to avoid spelling mistakes and difficult passages. It is based on research in Bulgarian, German, Italian, and Austrian archives. It includes a valuable bibliography of foreign titles.


Professor Karl Roider of Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge briefly discusses the causes of the twelve Turkish wars in the Balkans during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These included five wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Habsburgs (1663-64, 1683-99, 1716-18, 1737-39, and 1788-91), three between the Turks and the declining power of Venice (1665-69, 1684-99, and 1715-18), and four between the Ottoman Empire and the rising power of Russia (1710-11, 1736-39, 1769-74, and 1787-92). In his analysis of the Austro-Turkish wars of 1663-64 and 1683-99, the author cites the causes as Austrian resistance to Ottoman expansionism, Moslem-Christian antagonism, disputes along the borderlands and in the tributary states separating the Great Powers, and the threat of Turkish military power.

The war of 1663-64 resulted from the Turkish invasion of Transylvania and reestablishment of Ottoman rule in the principality. The Sultan
followed this action by directing an invasion force against Habsburg lands to disrupt Leopold I's influence in Transylvania. A Habsburg army, however, defeated the Turks at St. Gotthard on the Raab River in western Hungary, leading the Truce of Vasvár in 1664.

The second war had its origins in the revolt of the nobility in Habsburg Hungary as well as Turkish aid to these rebels. Roider points out that the Turkish grand vizier, Kara Mustafa, was eager to make war on the Habsburgs while Leopold I was busy with Louis XIV's Reunion program. An army of about 200,000 Turks invaded Austria and besieged Vienna (1683). Nevertheless, a combined Polish-Imperial army defeated the Turks outside Vienna, and in the continuing war Austria acquired Ottoman Hungary (except an area in the south known as the Banat of Temesvár or Timișoara) and Transylvania in the Peace of Karlowitz (1699). Roider stresses that the Peace of Karlowitz marked the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Further deterioration of the Turkish Empire was notable for the long series of wars in the Balkans; the loss of more territory, population, and resources; and the weakening of the central authority of the Porte during the eighteenth century.

This is the best biographical study of Frederick William of Brandenburg, the Great Elector (1640-88), available in the English language. Professor Ferdinand Schevill of the University of Chicago describes the Great Elector's creation of the Brandenburg army, diplomatic relations, and involvement in the First Northern War (1655-60) and Dutch War (1672-78). He notes Frederick William's shifting alliances between Louis XIV and William III. The Great Elector sided with the anti-French camp during the Dutch War, allied with Louis XIV after the Peace of Nijmegen, and once again joined the cause of the Dutch stadholder when the Sun King revoked the Edict of Nantes (1685). The study lacks footnotes and a bibliography, and needs to be replaced with a scholarly work that incorporates the latest research on the Great Elector's diplomatic and military activities.


Professor Kenneth M. Setton of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton explores the relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He discusses the Candian War (1645-69) which resulted in the Venetian loss of Crete, most of the Aegean islands, and much of Dalmatia to the Turks. In the
War of the Holy League (1683-99), the Venetians allied with Austria against the Turks and conquered the Peloponnesus (the "Morea") in 1684-87 as well as temporarily occupied Athens in 1687-88. Setton stresses that Venetian military success against the Turks was the consequence of Leopold I's victories against the Turks in eastern Europe, where the Sultan deployed his strongest forces against the more significant Austrian threat. In the Venetian-Turkish war of 1715-18, the Ottomans conquered the Morea in 1715, but failed to capture Corfu in 1716. Austrian support of Venice and Prince Eugene of Savoy's defeat of the Turks at Peterwardein (1716) resulted in the Peace of Passarowitz (1718). The study is based on research in Venetian and Papal archives and does not take into consideration Austrian and Turkish sources. The work lacks a bibliography.


This is the only biography of Leopold I available in the English language. Professor John P. Spielman of Haverford College in Pennsylvania relates the contested election of Leopold I as Holy Roman Emperor in 1658, relations between the Habsburg monarchy and the German Empire, the German emperor's struggle to defend Austrian and Spanish interests against Louis XIV, and the Turkish wars in the east. The study is an excellent introduction to the Habsburg monarchy under
Leopold I stressing dynastic politics, diplomacy, and war based on research in Austrian and Spanish archives. It includes forty-four illustrations, two maps, a useful bibliography, and lineage diagrams of the Austrian Habsburgs, Spanish Habsburgs, and family of Leopold I.


John W. Stoye of Oxford University provides an interesting biography of Count Luigi Marsigli (1658-1730), a nobleman and soldier, who lived throughout the Age of Louis XIV and witnessed the siege of Vienna and subsequent war against the Turks, including spending time as a prisoner of war in a Turkish camp. He rose to the rank of general in the Habsburg army before being dismissed from service in 1704. The work is based on research in Austrian, Swiss, Italian, and British archives.


In this essay, Stoye addresses the Austrian Habsburg monarchy from the 1680s to 1720. He considers the Habsburg government, growth of Imperial power and prestige in the German Empire, Austrian economy, Hungarian rebellion, war against the Turks, Nine Years' War, and the War of the Spanish Succession in his brief narrative. The essays serves as an excellent introduction to Austrian history after the siege of Vienna.

Stoye provides the first modern account in the English language of the origins of the Ottoman attack on Vienna, Austrian foreign policy, the conduct of the siege, and defeat of the Turks at Vienna in 1683. An excellent narrative history using Austrian, German, Polish, and Italian sources. The author stresses Leopold I's neglect of the defenses on Austria's eastern frontier and poor military intelligence warning of the impending attack. He details the siege and relieving actions of the armies of John III Sobieski of Poland and John George of Saxony to the Danube, and their defeat of the Turks before Vienna. The victory marked the end of Turkish expansionism in Europe.


In this essay, Wouter Troost explores relations between the Dutch Republic and Brandenburg from the beginning of the Dutch War to the outbreak of the Nine Years' War. The author notes Frederick William of Brandenburg's support for his nephew, William III of Orange. Both men feared Louis XIV and French aggression. In the Dutch War, Orange built up a European coalition, including Brandenburg, against France. Despite the aggression of France and its Swedish ally, Frederick William supported the United Provinces in the Dutch War. However, the Dutch
deserted Frederick William at the Peace of Nijmegen. The Dutch and the anti-French coalition left Brandenburg at the mercy of French threats which forced the elector to accept the humiliating peace settlement of St. Germain (1679). The Great Elector, having consistently defeated France's Swedish ally, was required to return his war gains of West Pomerania and Stettin to Charles XI. Consequently, the Great Elector joined the French camp in 1679 because he was upset over the desertion of his allies. Moreover, he sought to gain French subsidies for strengthening his standing army, acquire French protection for his lands against the ambitions of other German princes, as well as gain Louis XIV's support for Brandenburg's reacquisition of Stettin. Troost argues that Frederick William perceived no other clear, safe option than to ally with the most significant threat to Brandenburg, Louis XIV. The Great Elector remained a staunch ally of Louis XIV until the Truce of Regensburg (1684) ended the immediate French threat to Germany, and Imperial victories against the Turks enhanced the power and prestige of the German emperor. He allied with the United Provinces, Sweden, and Austria in 1685-86. His successor, Frederick III, provided the military cover for the Dutch on the Rhine against the French army in 1688-89 which allowed William III to invade and conquer England. Despite this
cooperation, Troost stresses the tension between Brandenburg and the United Provinces during the interwar period.


In this article, Roger Wines of Fordham University examines the politics and diplomacy of the German Empire, concentrating on the Imperial circles and German princes, from the French annexation of Strasbourg (1681) to the Peace of Rastatt (1714). The author discusses the cooperation in the German Empire which led to the creation of an Imperial war chest and army to protect Germany against the French and Turkish threats. He argues that "the Imperial circles developed into workable organs of princely collaboration and played an important role in the post-Westphalian empire" (p.3). He, nonetheless, notes serious divisions among the German states, including differences between Catholic and Protestant states, opposition to Hanover's new electoral rank after 1692, and the intrigues of pro-French and pro-Austrian princes. Even so, Wines concludes that the Imperial circles played a necessary role in German politics, giving minor princes, such as the Elector of Mainz and Duke of Württemberg, a say in Imperial politics. They were also vital in keeping most of the German states united and
loyal to the Habsburg ruler, making an Imperial war effort possible in the struggle against Louis XIV.

See also:


WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV:
A HISTORICAL STUDY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
VOLUME II

by

William Anthony Young
Master of Arts, University of North Dakota, 1993
Master of Arts, University of Southern California, 1985
Bachelor of Arts, University of the State of New York, 1990
Bachelor of Science, University of Maryland, 1982

A Research Project
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
December 2000
CHAPTER VII

THE PARTITION TREATIES AND THE WAR

OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1697-1714

Louis XIV's attempt to expand French influence in Germany and the Low Countries in the 1680s resulted in the creation of an anti-French Grand Alliance and a lengthy conflict, the Nine Years' War (1688-97). In this conflict the military situation quickly turned into a stalemate and a war of attrition. As both sides became war weary, the conflict ended with the Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk) in 1697. In the peace settlement, Louis XIV returned the Spanish lands that the French army had captured, hoping to win favor for the Bourbons at the court of the dying Spanish king, Carlos II (1665-1700).

After the Peace of Ryswick, Louis XIV and other European leaders focused on the question of the Spanish succession. Carlos II's health, which had troubled Europe for over thirty years, was rapidly deteriorating. The Spanish monarch was afflicted with physical and mental shortcomings, and he had no children of his own. He was the last male in the Spanish Habsburg line. Both

1See Chapter VI for the origins and conduct of the Nine Years' War.
Louis XIV (1643-1715) and the German emperor, Leopold I (1658-1705), had legitimate claims to the Spanish Empire. European leaders, including the Sun King and William III of England (1689-1702), realized the possibility of a European war over the Spanish succession.

While the health of Carlos II declined, Louis XIV and William III devoted great attention to resolve the Spanish succession by negotiation. Neither ruler wanted nor could afford another war, and the looming crisis over the Spanish succession threatened to overturn the new balance of power in the west established by the treaties of Turin (1696) and Ryswick (1697). The Sun King realized that his chief nemesis, William III, had to be involved in an agreement on the Spanish succession. The Maritime Powers had significant commercial and defense interests associated with the future of the Spanish Empire. To achieve a satisfactory settlement, Louis XIV knew he would need to make substantial concessions to the Maritime Powers to achieve a peaceful settlement. William III's main concern was to prevent the Spanish Empire from passing entirely to either France or Austria, and thus threatening the security of the Maritime Powers as well as Europe.

Louis XIV and William III considered the complex claims of the three principal candidates to the Spanish succession. The candidates were the Sun King's grandson, Philip of Anjou; Leopold I's second son, Archduke Charles; and the young electoral prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand. The electoral
prince was the son of Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria (1680-1726), grandson of Leopold I, and great grandson of Philip IV of Spain (1621-65). The monarchs agreed that the best solution to the Spanish succession was a partition of the empire. In the First Partition Treaty, signed in October 1698, Louis XIV and William III agreed that most of the Spanish inheritance, including Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, Sardinia, and America, would go to Joseph Ferdinand. But, France would gain Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan presidio ports, as well as Guipúzcoa, while Archduke Charles acquired Milan. Carlos II rejected the treaty, naming Joseph Ferdinand as his sole successor. The ruling officials in Spain sought to hold their empire together. Leopold I also rejected the treaty, demanding the entire Spanish Empire pass to the Archduke Charles.

The question of the Spanish succession took another turn when Joseph Ferdinand died suddenly in February 1699. As a result, the Sun King and William III renewed their negotiations to find an alternative solution. Nevertheless, as Andrew Lossky has stated, "their task was more difficult this time, for in splitting the bulk of Carlos's inheritance between the two possible claimants, . . . [Philip of Anjou] and Archduke Charles, it was impossible to avoid the prospect of seriously affecting the states system of western Europe."² In fact, William J. Roosen argues that "the real importance of

Joseph Ferdinand's death was that it made war inevitable by removing the last viable candidate who was not a Bourbon or an Austrian Habsburg."³ Even so, Louis XIV and William III concluded the Second Partition Treaty on 25 March 1700. In this agreement, the monarchs dispensed Spain, America, and the Spanish Netherlands to Archduke Charles while Philip of Anjou would receive Naples, Sicily, and Lorraine. The treaty gave Milan to the Duke of Lorraine in exchange for his duchy.

Neither Leopold I nor the Spaniards accepted the Second Partition Treaty. The German emperor planned for his eldest son, Joseph, to have Austria while his youngest son, Charles, would have the Spanish lands. Leopold I was especially determined that the Austrian Habsburgs should have the Spanish territory in Italy.⁴ "Expansion in Italy," so writes Derek McKay and Hamish Scott, "had been a constant aim of the Viennese court in the 1690s and they tried to insist that several of the Italian states, including Milan, were Imperial


fiefs.\textsuperscript{5} However, Austria lacked the diplomatic and military power to achieve an acceptable solution.\textsuperscript{6}

Both the Second Partition Treaty and Leopold I's refusal to accept it were rendered meaningless in October 1700. The Spanish court was determined to prevent the partition. Cardinal Portocarrero of Spain, who controlled the Spanish government, believed that the Bourbons were the only power that could save Spain from partition. He urged Carlos II to will the Spanish Empire to Philip of Anjou.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, Carlos II wrote a new will naming Philip as his sole heir on 2 October. He chose Anjou on the condition that Philip renounce his claims to the French throne, and, if Louis XIV declined the offer, the crown was to pass in its entirety to the Austrian Habsburgs. Carlos II died on 1 November 1700.

After some hesitation, on 16 November, Louis XIV accepted Carlos II's will in the name of his grandson. This action broke the Second Partition Treaty between France, England, and the Dutch Republic. The Sun King knew that by accepting the Spanish inheritance France faced war with Austria. He also


realized that if he rejected the will, France would need to fight a war with Austria and Spain to acquire a partition of the Spanish inheritance.\textsuperscript{8} In this war France could not count on the support of the Maritime Powers.\textsuperscript{9} The decision was made easier knowing that if war came Spain would be on the French side.

Despite the situation, Louis XIV sought to avoid war over the Spanish inheritance. He acquired Dutch recognition of Philip V (1700-46) as the lawful sovereign of Spain in February, and England followed suit in April 1701. The Maritime Powers accepted Louis XIV's grandson as the Spanish king as long as Anglo-Dutch commerce was not molested and the crowns of France and Spain remained separate.\textsuperscript{10} In fact, as Jeremy Black suggests, there was even the possibility of an Anglo-Dutch-French triple alliance.\textsuperscript{11} Louis XIV knew that such cooperation might deter Austrian aggression. However, the Sun King committed a series of blunders which antagonized the Maritime Powers. Louis XIV sent French troops to accompany Philip to Madrid in January, followed by his sending French troops to force the Dutch garrisons out of the barrier


\textsuperscript{9}Lossky, 261-62.

\textsuperscript{10}Wolf, \textit{The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715}, 62.

fortresses in the southern Spanish Netherlands in February 1701. France also threatened to supplant the Maritime Powers' dominant position in the important trade connection with Spain and Spanish America. In March, a Franco-Spanish naval force was despatched to the West Indies. Seven months later, in October, a French company acquired the asiento, the exclusive right to the lucrative trade in slaves from Africa to the Spanish colonies. In addition, Louis XIV failed to renounce Philip V's rights to the French throne, thus reviving the specter of a union of the two crowns. The Sun King's final error, which completed the disillusionment of the Maritime Powers and broke the Peace of Ryswick, was to recognize James Francis Edward Stuart as the rightful King of Great Britain, following the death of the exiled James II in September 1701.

In addition to these blunders, the French monarch further upset the balance of power in Europe by adding alliances with Bavaria, Cologne, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Saxe-Gotha, Holstein-Gottorp, Savoy, and Portugal to the

---


13McKay and Scott, 57.
Franco-Spanish bloc in 1701. Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria, who had served as the Imperial commander in the war against the Turks, allied with Louis XIV in hopes of acquiring kingdom status for Bavaria, or the permanent acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands for the Wittelsbachs in February 1701. His brother, Joseph Clement, the Elector and Archbishop of Cologne (1688-1723), supported Louis XIV to the point where he turned over all the military fortifications in the electorate of Cologne and bishopric of Liège to the Sun King. The French army took up positions along the Rhine and Meuse at Bonn, Kaiserswerth, Rheinberg, Liège, and Huy. On the other hand, Victor Amadeus II of Savoy (1675-1730) allied with Louis XIV because of French dominance in northern Italy. Likewise, Pedro II of Portugal (1683-1706), fearing the Franco-Spanish alliance, became an ally of the Sun King in order to

---


15 Maximilian had also served as the governor of the Spanish Netherlands since 1691. He was the individual who allowed French forces to occupy the barrier fortresses.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
secure his kingdom in June 1701. The Sun King believed that the Franco-
Spanish bloc would deter Austrian aggression as well as a renewal of a
powerful anti-French coalition. In both cases he was wrong.

Leopold I, of course, denounced the Spanish will and the succession of the
Duke of Anjou to the Spanish throne as Philip V. In May 1701, Leopold I sent
an expedition of 30,000 men, under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy,
to seize the Spanish duchy of Milan. The first shots of the War of the
Spanish Succession were fired in northern Italy. Thus, Louis XIV was at war
with Austria in Italy.

In addition to the conflict with Leopold I, the Sun King's diplomatic blunders
made war with the Maritime Powers inevitable. In fact, William III began
negotiations with Leopold I to rebuild the Grand Alliance as early as July 1701.
The coalition, including Austria, England, and the Dutch Republic, was renewed
at The Hague on 7 September 1701. The coalition agreed to prepare for a war
to force a partition of Spain. While the Grand Alliance would allow Philip V to
keep Spain and its colonies, the Spanish and French thrones were to be kept

17 Andrew S. Szarka, "Portugal, France, and the Coming of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1697-1703," (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University,

18 Derek McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy, Men in Office series (London:
Thames and Hudson, 1977), 58.
The Grand Alliance gained the support of Brandenburg-Prussia, Münster, Hanover, the Palatinate, Hesse-Cassel, Baden, and numerous smaller states during the winter of 1701-2.\textsuperscript{20} Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg-Prussia (1688-1701) allied with the German emperor in return for his recognition as King Frederick I, King in Prussia (1701-13). Georg Ludwig, the Elector of Hanover (1698-1727), became an ally of the anti-French coalition in order to protect his rights in the Protestant succession to the British throne that had been established in the Act of Settlement in June 1701. The smaller German princes joined the coalition because of the German emperor's diplomatic efforts as well as their fear of France.

Despite creating the anti-French coalition, the Grand Alliance did not declare war against France and Spain until 15 May 1702. One reason for this delay was the accession of Queen Anne (1702-14) after the death of William III in March 1702. His death, however, did not end the close relationship between England and the Dutch Republic. The Earl of Godolphin, who served as Lord Treasurer and virtual head of the government for Queen Anne from


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{20}Veenendaal, 410-11.}
1702-10; John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, who served as captain-general of the British army from 1702 to 1712; and Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland from 1689 to 1719, worked together to maintain the Anglo-Dutch alliance and manage the Grand Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession. Besides the change in government, England had to rebuild its army for war. Parliament had drastically reduced the size of the army after the Peace of Ryswick. In addition, the delay allowed the Grand Alliance to observe the developments of the Great Northern War (1700-21), which concerned the interests of the Maritime Powers and German states, especially Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia.

At the very beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Grand Alliance was based on political expediency. The allies needed to join together to restore the European balance of power. However, the overall aims of the Grand Alliance were decided by the Maritime Powers who provided the naval forces and most of the troops, as well as heavily subsidized Austria and the other allies with loans and the direct payment for soldiers in their armies. Even so, as the war progressed, the differing goals and military strategies of the allies became increasingly apparent and crippled the joint war effort. England's objectives were the maintenance of a weak and independent Spain, French recognition of the Protestant succession in England, an end to French expansionism, and the creation of an acceptable European balance of power.
The Dutch Republic, who quickly became the lesser partner in the Anglo-Dutch relationship, was mainly interested in reacquiring a line of fortresses in the southern Spanish Netherlands to safeguard itself from the French threat, as well as preserving its commercial interests in the Spanish Empire. As for Austria, Leopold I, and later, his son, Joseph I (1705-11), hoped to procure the entire Spanish inheritance for Archduke Charles. But the German emperor had agreed to the Grand Alliance's war aim of partitioning the Spanish Empire because Austria was dependent on the Maritime Powers for financial and military support which made it necessary to accept Anglo-Dutch leadership.21

As for French war aims, Louis XIV fought the war to preserve the Spanish inheritance for his grandson as well as maintain French influence over Spain. The Sun King had hoped to avoid war, but he made the necessary preparations to defend the Bourbon states in the event of a conflict. The French army controlled the fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, Liège, and Cologne.22 Louis XIV held alliances with Spain, Portugal, Savoy, Bavaria, and Cologne. In addition, he hoped to negotiate the withdrawal of Brandenburg-Prussia from the Grand Alliance. His army was larger than the combined strength of the


22 One historian has noted that these were inferior fortresses that were "weak and often poorly designed" (John B. Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620-1715 [Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970], 161).
Grand Alliance, and his network of fortresses designed by Vauban protected the French frontiers.23

England dominated the Anglo-Dutch partnership and the strategy of the Grand Alliance. On the whole the Maritime Powers continued to cooperate closely. The English provided the majority of naval forces while the Dutch maintained the largest army.24 Both England and the United Provinces spent heavily to finance the war effort of the Grand Alliance. The Duke of Marlborough served as the commander of the allied forces. However, allied military strategy differed among the three Great Powers. English strategy consisted of engaging France on as many fronts as possible to divide and weaken French forces in order to achieve England's war aims. To carry out this strategy, the English contributed subsidies, naval operations, and troops to the Grand Alliance.25 The Dutch supported English strategy. Even so, the United Provinces preferred to concentrate the war effort in the Low Countries. The Dutch were more concerned with ending the French threat to their

23The French army consisted of 220,000 men in 1702 (Lossky, 265). Nevertheless, the army increased to a maximum of only 255,000 soldiers during the war. Louis XIV had possessed a much larger army in the Nine Years' War (John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 54).

24Veenendaal, 411.

homeland, and reestablishing a line of barrier fortresses to protect their interests.\textsuperscript{26} On the other hand, the Austrians urged the Maritime Powers to fight the war in support of Habsburg interests, concentrating on the Italian theater of operations, and not the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, Habsburg troubles in Hungary severely distracted Austria from the war effort with the advent of the Rákóczi rebellion in 1703. The different interests of England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria would gradually tear the coalition apart.

The major campaigns of the War of the Spanish Succession were fought in northern Italy, Germany, the Low Countries, and Spain. The war began with Prince Eugene crossing the Alps and entering northern Italy in May 1701. Leopold I claimed Spanish Italy for the Austrian Habsburgs, and sought to seize Milan. The Austrian army crossed the Adige River, and in the first battle forced a much larger French army under Marshal Nicolas of Catinat to retreat from Carpi in July. Eugene drove the French back across the Oglio River. The new French commander, the aging Marshal François of Villeroi, failed in his attack on Eugene's position at Chiari in September. Four months later, in January 1702, Eugene captured Villeroi during a daring nighttime attack on Cremona.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{27}Frey and Frey, \textit{A Question of Empire}, 64.

\textsuperscript{28}Villeroi spent six months as a prisoner of war at the Austrian fortress of Gratz. Afterwards, he served in the Low Countries.
But, the Sun King sent the skillful Marshal Louis-Joseph, the Duke of Vendôme, to replace Villeroi. Vendôme at once took the offensive. He fought the Austrians at Ustiano and Santa Vittoria, chased them from Parma, and outmaneuvered them at Mantua, forcing Eugene to end his siege of the fortress. At this point, the outnumbered Austrian army in northern Italy lacked adequate supplies, arms, and reinforcements. In desperation, Eugene launched an attack against Vendôme's position at Luzzara in August 1702. The French commander repulsed the attack, and pushed the Austrians back to Trent in 1703.

Under Vendôme, French power increased steadily in northern Italy. Fearing French domination over his duchy, Victor Amadeus II deserted his alliance with Louis XIV. For months, the duke had kept secret contacts with the Grand Alliance and bided his time until the coalition offered him terms attractive enough to detach himself from the French alliance. In October 1703, the duke deserted Louis XIV after Leopold I offered him territory in the Milanese and Montferrat, and the Maritime Powers promised him subsidies. He joined the Grand Alliance one month later. The result was an embarrassment for the duke because the French army quickly captured Savoy and part of Piedmont. Leopold I made little effort to assist Victor Amadeus II.

\[\text{\footnotesize{Holborn, 103.}}\]
The French army under Vendôme dominated the military situation in northern Italy. In 1704, the French captured Verulli. In 1705, Vendôme captured Nice and defeated Eugene in battle at Cassano d’Adda, near Milan. Next, Vendôme defeated the Imperialist forces at Calcinato in April 1706. However, at this point, Vendôme was transferred to the Low Countries to regroup the French army after the disaster at Ramillies (May 1706). After the departure of Vendôme, the French commanders in Italy were no match for Eugene, who now had money and reinforcements. With these resources, Prince Eugene and Victor Amadeus II routed the French in a battle outside the walls of Turin in September 1706. The allied forces quickly swept the French army from Piedmont, but failed to retake Savoy and Nice. In 1707, the Austrians forced the French out of Milan (March), and then conquered Naples (July), while the Savoyard army occupied Montferrat (March). Afterwards, in the summer of 1707, Prince Eugene and Victor Amadeus II led an allied army into France. The allies, backed up by Anglo-Dutch naval support, hoped to destroy the French naval threat at Toulon as well as recover Nice for Victor Amadeus II. However, a French army, under Marshal Mans Jean Baptiste Réne de Fromlay, Count of Tessé, forced the allies to abandon their siege of Toulon and retreat to Piedmont in August 1707. Even so, Eugene captured Susa (1707), while the duke captured the fortresses of Exilles and Fenestrelle and cleared the French out of the Vaudois valleys in 1708. Victor Amadeus II concentrated his
military efforts on the eastern side of the Alps during the rest of the war. But he had to wait until the Peace of Utrecht to regain Savoy and Nice from the French.

In the Low Countries, the Duke of Marlborough commanded the allied war effort against the French. He was placed in charge of the forces despite his limited combat experience compared to Dutch generals. The Dutch generals had a tremendous amount of combat experience against the French from previous wars while Marlborough had fought in only one campaign during the Nine Years' War. As for his approach to the war, Marlborough believed in the "strategy of annihilation" or the pursuit of a decisive military victory against the French.\textsuperscript{30} The Dutch States General, however, placed rigid controls over Marlborough. All major decisions had to be approved by Dutch field deputies, who represented the States General, in consultation with Dutch generals who preferred to avoid risky military actions. The Dutch opposed Marlborough's suggestion of striking deep into enemy territory, and embraced a defensive military strategy. The States General insisted that the allies fight the war with a strategy similar to the Nine Years' War, by slowly removing the French from the fortresses along the lower Rhine and Meuse. Thus, in the spring of 1702, Dutch and Brandenburger troops began the siege of Kaiserswerth on the lower

Rhine. After a fifty-nine day siege the allies captured the fortress. This success was followed by the capture of Venlo, Stevensweert, Roermond, Liège, Huy, and Limburg on the lower Meuse as well as Rheinburg and Bonn on the lower Rhine under the leadership of Marlborough and the Dutch engineer, Menno van Coehoorn, in 1702-3. The victory at Bonn knocked the Elector of Cologne out of the war. But, while Marlborough achieved this success, the French commander, the Duke of Boufflers, defeated the Dutch army at Ekeren, and turned back the allied attempt to capture Antwerp in June 1703.

The French army and its Bavarian ally were still a major threat to the German Empire despite the loss of Cologne and several important fortresses. In June 1702, the Sun King had agreed to the increasing demands of Maximilian II Emanuel for an offensive alliance. In addition to subsidies, the French monarch agreed to support the elector's war aims of creating a Kingdom of Bavaria; the annexation of the Rhine Palatinate and Palatinate of Neuberg, or hereditary governorship of the Spanish Netherlands and full sovereignty of Spanish Gelderland and Limbourg; and the conquest of the Free Imperial Cities

31In March 1701, Maximilian II Emanuel had become an ally of France by promising to declare Bavaria as neutral in the French war against Austria. The Elector of Bavaria would not allow Austrian forces to cross Bavaria and attack France. Even so, the elector maintained negotiations with both Louis XIV and Leopold I in hope of acquiring royal status in Bavaria or hereditary rule over the Spanish Netherlands. Leopold I, however, was unwilling to give up Habsburg claims to Spanish lands in the Low Countries.
of Ulm, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Rothenburg, and Regensburg.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, while Imperial forces under Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden were busy capturing the French-held fortification of Landau in September 1702, Maximilian II Emanuel declared war and seized the fortified Imperial cities of Ulm in September and Memmingen in October. This Bavarian success was followed up by the victory of French Marshal Claude Louis Hector, Duke of Villars, over Baden’s forces at Friedlingen in October. After this success, Louis XIV directed Villars to join Maximilian on the Danube, and then march to capture Vienna. To ensure Maximilian’s loyalty, the Sun King promised the elector control of the Rhine Palatinate as well as full sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands in November 1702.\textsuperscript{33} Marshal Villars’ capture of the fortress at Kehl in March allowed the French to advance into Germany and join up with the Bavarian forces in May 1703. Villars stressed the importance of attacking Vienna, especially since Austria was weakened by the outbreak of the Rákóczi insurrection in Hungary. Maximilian, nonetheless, refused to support a move on Vienna.\textsuperscript{34} Instead, the elector preferred to defend his position against the Imperial army nearer Bavaria. This disagreement gave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden and Count Styrum of Austria the opportunity to strike at the Franco-

\textsuperscript{32}Dale A. Gaeddert, "The Franco-Bavarian Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession," (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1969), 65-66.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{34}For the disagreement in strategy, see Gaeddert, 95-116.
Bavarian position on the Danube. Villars, however, defeated Baden at Munderkingen, near Augsburg, in July. Then, in collaboration with Maximilian, Villars decisively defeated Styrum at Höchstädt, forcing the Imperialists to abandon Augsburg in September. In spite of these victories, Villars was replaced by Ferdinand, Count of Marsin, in October. In the meantime, the French position in Germany was strengthened by the success of Marshal Vauban in the capture of the fortress city of Alt-Breisach on the right bank of the Rhine in September, and Marshal Camille Count of Tallard in the victory over the Imperialists at Speyer and the recapture of Landau in November 1703.

The conjunction of French and Bavarian forces in southern Germany threatened the collapse of an Austria that was seriously weakened by the Rákóczi insurrection. Louis XIV had supplied money and promises to the Hungarian rebels.\(^{35}\) The Austrian army defeated the rebels at Eisenstadt in March, but suffered a setback at Schmöllnitz in May 1704. Leopold I was forced to divide his army to fight the Hungarians in the east and Franco-Bavarians in the west. In The Hague, Marlborough realized the need to relieve Austria from the Franco-Bavarian threat in order to keep Leopold I in the Grand Alliance. Without informing the States General of his plan, the duke led the English army up the Rhine and joined with Prince Eugene and Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden at Mondelsheim, near Ulm, in June. From there, Marlborough and Baden

\(^{35}\)Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715, 68.
continued toward the Danube, while Eugene marched his forces to the Lines of Stollhofen in the Black Forest to prevent Tallard and Villeroi from reinforcing Maximilian and Marsin. In July, Marlborough attacked the fortified Schellenberg overlooking Donauwörth, and despite heavy losses, captured the hill and then the city. Three weeks later, Eugene left Stollhofen to join Marlborough in southern Germany. The combined allied force attacked the Franco-Bavarian army, commanded by Tallard, Marsin, and Maximilian, at Blenheim on the Danube in August 1704. The allied army under Marlborough and Eugene shattered the Franco-Bavarian forces. This was followed by the quick retreat of the French from southern Germany, leaving Bavaria in allied hands. The victory saved Vienna and forced Bavaria out of the war.36

The conflict in the Low Countries remained a stalemate war of maneuver and siege in 1704 and 1705. The cautious Dutch would not allow Marlborough to launch an offensive after his return from southern Germany. The allies, however, besieged and captured Antwerp in 1705. In the following year, Louis XIV decided to launch an all-out offensive, hoping to force an end to the war. He ordered Villeroi to attack in the Low Countries, Villars to invade Germany, Vendôme to clear north Italy, and the Duke of Berwick to defeat

36In the meantime, the Austrian army had defeated the Hungarians at Raab (Györ) in June, Pata in October, and Tyrnau in December 1704. The Imperial victory at Trenčín in 1708 would lead to the end of the Hungarian insurrection with the Peace of Szatmár in 1711.
allied forces in Spain. The Sun King's optimism was quickly destroyed when Villeroi lost to Marlborough at Ramillies in May 1706. Marlborough drove the French army from the Spanish Netherlands. The allied forces captured Ostende, Dunkirk, Ath, Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde, Dendermonde, and Menin in 1706. Louis XIV soon canceled the offensives planned in Germany and northern Italy. Next, the Sun King replaced Villeroi with the highly successful Vendôme, which, in turn, allowed Prince Eugene and Victor Amadeus II to defeat French forces in northern Italy.

With this success, Marlborough urged the allies to launch a final decisive campaign in 1707. However, the Dutch remained cautious, war weary, and lacked the finances to carry out a major offensive. Moreover, Joseph I of Austria still had problems with the Hungarian rebels. The lack of an offensive allowed the Sun King to rebuild the French army in 1707. The French army under Vendôme and the Duke of Burgundy invaded the Spanish Netherlands in May 1708. They quickly captured Ghent and Bruges, and then turned south to threaten the allied garrison at Oudenarde. In July, Marlborough and Prince Eugene attacked and defeated the French at Oudenarde. Even so, the French held west Flanders. Instead of attacking Vendôme's position at Ghent, the

---

37 The States General encouraged the Dutch generals to put their faith in Marlborough after England had threatened to terminate subsidies (James R. Jones, Marlborough, British Lives series [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 110).
allies surprised the French by conducting a successful, albeit four-month-long, siege of Lille, one of the strongest frontier fortresses in France, while Marlborough's field army kept the French army at bay. Marlborough refused to end the campaign for winter, and captured Ghent and Bruges in January 1709. The French immediately withdrew to their own borders, and both sides went into winter quarters.

In early 1709, Louis XIV directed Villars and Boufflers to avoid battle in the Low Countries. The poor harvest of 1708 followed by a severely cold winter had devastated France. The Sun King realized the French nation could not pursue war much longer, and he began to search for a peace settlement. The allied army under Marlborough and Eugene occupied most of the Spanish Netherlands. The allied commanders planned to break through the fortified French line, or entice the French to leave that line for battle on conditions favorable to the allies, and achieve a decisive victory. During the spring and summer of 1709 the allies conducted a series of maneuvers which failed to achieve their goals. The allies, however, captured Tournai in July, and began a siege of Mons in September. With the threat to Mons, Villars now received orders from Versailles to fight the allies and save the fortified city. The French marshal concentrated his army at Malplaquet, knowing that this threat to the

---

besieging forces would attract them to attack his position. Marlborough and Eugene marched south and attacked the French at Malplaquet in September. In the battle both sides suffered heavy casualties. The allies claimed victory when the French withdrew from the field. Marlborough and Eugene followed this success with the capture of Mons in October 1709. Even so, the commanders had failed in their mission of achieving a decisive victory and forcing Louis XIV to accept their peace terms. The task became more difficult because the French built up a strong line of fortifications along the frontier in 1709-10, known as the *Ne Plus Ultra* lines, to defend France, as well as reinforce Louis XIV's strategy of avoiding a pitched battle. In fact, the allies accomplished little in the next two campaigns other than capturing Douai and Bethune in 1710 as well as Bouchain in 1711. In spite of this failure to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield, the Grand Alliance had conquered the Spanish Netherlands. However, the Grand Alliance had less success in Spain.

At the beginning of the war, the Grand Alliance faced a powerful Bourbon bloc on the Iberian front. Louis XIV had secured the Iberian peninsula by making a Franco-Spanish alliance with a reluctant Portugal in June 1701. Even so, Bourbon control of Spain was quickly challenged by the Maritime Powers. In September 1702, Spanish forces repulsed an Anglo-Dutch attempt to land 15,000 troops and capture Cádiz in southern Spain. However, on the way
home, the allied force, under Admiral George Rooke, discovered and destroyed the Spanish treasure fleet in Vigo Bay in October. This daring exhibition of sea power convinced Pedro II of Portugal to abandon his alliance with the Bourbons and join the Grand Alliance in May 1703. By the Methuen Treaty, the Maritime Powers gained a naval base at Lisbon that would allow the allies to dominate the Strait of Gibraltar and cripple French action in the Mediterranean. In return, the Grand Alliance promised Pedro II territorial gains in Spain as well as the placement of Archduke Charles of Austria on the Spanish throne.39 The Portuguese monarch viewed the Habsburgs as less threatening to his country than the Bourbons. This condition meant that the Grand Alliance was forced to change its war aims to include the removal of Philip V from Spain.

Archduke Charles accompanied a Maritime Powers' expedition to the Iberian peninsula in 1704. The Anglo-Dutch fleet attacked and captured the strategic fortress of Gibraltar in July. In the following month, the allied fleet under Admiral Rooke defeated the French navy at Málaga. In August, Louis XIV had Franco-Spanish forces besiege Gibraltar which was defended by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. However, the French commander, Marshal Tessé, raised the siege after the English fleet destroyed a French naval squadron carrying reinforcements and supplies at Marbella in March 1705. This success

led to the Pact of Genoa, an alliance between England and Catalonia, in June. England quickly sent Archduke Charles and troops to Catalonia. The English besieged and captured Barcelona in October. In the meantime, an English army under the Huguenot Henri Massue, Earl of Galway, invaded Spain from Portuguese territory. Galway’s forces seized the Spanish capital of Madrid and proclaimed Charles as King of Spain in June 1706.

The Sun King responded quickly to the allied success in Spain. He gave command of the Franco-Spanish forces in Spain to the Duke of Berwick. In October 1706, Berwick, accompanied by Philip V, forced the Grand Alliance to abandon Madrid. Lord Galway and the Anglo-Portuguese forces retreated to Portugal while Charles and other allied contingents retreated to Valencia. In the following spring, the Grand Alliance, led by Galway, marched from Valencia toward Madrid. The French commander, Berwick, ended the threat to the Spanish capital by routing the allies at Almanza in April 1707. Galway retreated to Valencia, and then to Catalonia. The victory gave the French effective control over most of Spain. Even so, the war in Spain became a stalemate during the next two years. The English, however, captured Sardinia and Minorca in 1708.

Despite previous setbacks, the Grand Alliance planned a major offensive in Spain in 1710. Allied forces under the command of General James Stanhope left Catalonia to march on Madrid in April. The British commander,
accompanied by Archduke Charles, defeated the Spanish forces at Almenara in July, followed by victories at Lérida and Saragossa in August. The allied army captured Madrid for the second time in September. Nevertheless, Archduke Charles, supported by a Protestant Anglo-Dutch army, found little support for his rule in Madrid. The allied force abandoned the capital and retreated toward Valencia when a French army under Vendôme threatened its line of communications. The French army caught up with the allies and defeated Stanhope at Brihuega as well as General Guido von Starhemberg at Villa Viciosa in December 1710. The Grand Alliance had suffered another major setback in the Iberian peninsula.

Philip V's control of Spain, combined with the great victories of the Grand Alliance in the Low Countries and northern Italy, should have led to a general peace settlement in 1709-10. France was bankrupt and devastated by a savage winter in 1708-9 and desperate for peace. Louis XIV also feared an allied invasion of France from the Low Countries. In May 1709, the Sun King sent his secretary of state for foreign affairs, the Marquis of Torcy, to The Hague to negotiate a preliminary peace settlement. In the talks, the French agreed to cede the entire Spanish Empire to Archduke Charles as well as return lands in Alsace and Flanders. But, in the negotiations, the allies insisted that Louis XIV should militarily assist them in ousting his own grandson, Philip V,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{40}}\text{Lossky, 270.}\]
from Spain. The allies were unable to win the war in Spain and eject the Spanish monarch themselves. Louis XIV rejected these peace terms. Further peace talks at Gertruydenberg (Geertruidenberg) in 1710 failed over the allied insistence on the French, without any assistance from the allies, expelling Philip V from Spain.

Shortly thereafter, the Tory party came to power in Britain. The new ministry, dominated by Robert Harley (later Earl of Oxford) and Henry St. John (later Viscount of Bolingbroke), was determined on peace, whatever the cost to its allies. Harley and St. John were bent on destroying Marlborough, abandoning the expensive continental war, and casting off the policy of "no peace without Spain." In the summer of 1710, the new British government began secret talks with the French. In the midst of these negotiations the German emperor, Joseph I, died in April 1711. Joseph I was succeeded by his brother, Charles VI (1711-40), who the allies were trying to install as the Spanish king. At this point, the Tories dropped their support for Charles in Spain, and accepted Philip V's rule in Madrid. "The English government," as Andrew Lossky has written, "was unwilling to fight a war to resurrect the far-flung empire of Charles V." British policy therefore reverted to the original war aim of the Grand Alliance: the partition of the Spanish Empire. In October 1711, the English government and French diplomats agreed to the preliminary

---

41 Ibid., 275.
articles of peace in London. In them, Louis XIV acquiesced to recognize Queen Anne as sovereign of Great Britain as well as to keep the crowns of France and Spain separate. This agreement led to the opening of the general peace congress at Utrecht in January 1712.

In the spring of 1712, the military situation looked grim for the Sun King. His army faced a much larger allied force on the northeastern frontier. French diplomacy, nevertheless, persuaded the English to desert the Grand Alliance in May. In fact, the English government secretly ordered James Butler, the Duke of Ormonde, who had succeeded Marlborough as commander of the British forces in Flanders, to refrain from hostile actions against the French army. The armistice between England and the Franco-Spanish bloc was formalized in August 1712. The withdrawal of English forces from the conflict allowed Marshal Villars to launch an offensive into the Spanish Netherlands. In July 1712, Villars achieved victories against Prince Eugene and the Dutch at Denain and Marchiennes. Villars now advanced, besieging and recapturing a number of fortresses the French had lost in previous years, including Douai, Le Quesnoy, and Bouchain.

A combination of factors swayed most of the warring parties to end the conflict in the spring of 1713. War weariness was perhaps the most significant. In the Treaty of Utrecht, Louis XIV agreed to partition the Spanish Empire. Philip V was to keep Spain and the overseas empire. England
acquired Gibraltar and Minorca. As for Austria, Charles VI was offered Milan, Naples, Spanish enclaves on the coast of Tuscany, as well as the Netherlands. Fortresses in the "Austrian" Netherlands would be garrisoned by the Dutch army. Victor Amadeus II acquired Sicily with a royal crown. In addition to these agreements, Louis XIV accepted the loss of a few towns in Flanders, including Furnes, Ypres, Menin, and Tournai, to the Austrian Netherlands in exchange for Lille. In Germany, Louis XIV promised to return Imperial lands on the right bank of the Rhine. He planned to keep the lands on the left bank, including Alsace and Strasbourg. Moreover, the French monarch agreed to accept the Protestant succession in Great Britain. Such were the major conditions in the agreement between France and England, Portugal, Savoy, Prussia, and the Dutch Republic signed in April 1713.

Disappointed with the peace conditions, Charles VI, Georg Ludwig of Hanover, and several minor German princes in the Rhineland remained at war with France. The German emperor was unwilling to abandon his claims to Spain, where he still held Barcelona and Majorca. Louis XIV therefore sent the French army under Villars to the south. The French marshal captured the fortress of Landau in August and Freiburg-im-Breisgau in November 1713. French military success led to peace negotiations between Villars and Prince Eugene at Rastatt (Rastadt). The renewal of the Franco-Bavarian alliance in February strongly encouraged Charles VI to agree to the Treaty of Rastatt in March 1714. In this
treaty, Charles VI accepted the provisions of the Utrecht settlement with some
minor modifications. France gained Landau on the left bank of the Rhine and
Charles VI received Sardinia. The German Empire acquiesced to these
provisions in the Treaty of Baden in September 1714. Thus, the so-called
Peace of Utrecht ended the War of the Spanish Succession with a partition of
the Spanish Empire, and the establishment of a new European balance of
power.

As for the literature regarding the conflict, historians have paid much
attention to the origins, the conduct of the war, and the peace settlement. In
fact, Linda and Marsha Frey recently edited The Treaties of the War of the
Spanish Succession (7.1.2), a highly valuable encyclopedia of knowledge
concerning the conflict. Moreover, William Calvin Dickinson and Eloise R.
Hitchcock's The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713: A Selected
Bibliography (7.1.1) lists most primary and secondary sources regarding the
war. The origins of the war are considered in Mark A. Thomson, "Louis XIV
and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession" (7.2.5), Sir George N.
Clark, "From the Nine Years' War to the War of the Spanish Succession"
(7.2.1), and William J. Roosen, "The Origins of the War of the Spanish
Succession" (7.2.4). John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers,
1685-1715 (1.1.16), Andrew Lossky, Louis XIV and the French Monarchy
(1.2.7), John B. Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620-1715
(1.1.17), Derek McKay and Hamish M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (1.1.9), and Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 1679-1793 (1.1.1) are also valuable.

As for French foreign policy during the negotiation of the partition treaties and the War of the Spanish Succession one should consult John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (1.2.11), Pierre Goubert, Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen (1.2.3), and Andrew Lossky, Louis XIV and the French Monarchy (1.2.7) for an overview. The making and conduct of policy is treated in John C. Rule, "King and Minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy" (7.3.9) and "Colbert de Torcy, an Emergent Bureaucracy and the Formulation of French Foreign Policy, 1698-1715" (7.3.7), as well as Ben S. Trotter, "Vauban and the Question of the Spanish Succession" (7.3.11). Torcy's manipulation of public opinion is addressed in Joseph A. Klaits' "Diplomacy and Public Opinion: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy and French War Propaganda, 1700-1713" (7.3.6). For the Sun King's relations with his ally Elector Maximilian II Emanuel, see Dale A. Gaeddert's "The Franco-Bavarian Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession" (7.3.5). Andrew S. Szarka, "Portugal, France, and the Coming of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1697-1703" (7.6.11) relates the ties between Louis XIV and Pedro II. Studies of the Sun King's relations with Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, Charles XII of Sweden, as well as the Ottoman Turks are left for future historians. However, Eugene L. Asher's "Louis XIV,
William III, and the Holstein Question, 1697-1700" (7.3.1) considers the Sun
King’s relations with the Northern Powers before the outbreak of the War of
the Spanish Succession. Literature about Louis XIV’s relations with the
Maritime Powers, Austrian Habsburgs, and other members of the Grand
Alliance are few. The Sun King’s relations with Frederick I of Prussia are
considered in Linda Frey, "Franco-Prussian Relations, 1701-1706" (7.3.3) and
"Le Roi Soleil et Le Singe, Louis XIV and Frederick I: Franco-Prussian Relations,
1707-1713" (7.3.4). French peace negotiations are the subject of Mark A.
Thomson, "Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance, 1705-1710" (7.3.10) besides
John C. Rule, "France and the Preliminaries to the Gertruydenberg Conference,
September 1709 to March 1710" (7.3.8) and "The Preliminary Negotiations
Leading to the Peace of Utrecht, 1709-1712" (A.7.5).

Surveys of British policy during the War of the Spanish Succession are
found in James R. Jones, Britain and the World, 1649-1815 (1.3.4), Paul
Langford, The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815 (1.3.5), and Jeremy Black, A
System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy, 1660-1793 (1.3.1). Dutch policy
is addressed in the works of Pieter Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth
Century: Part Two, 1648-1715 (1.4.3), Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or
Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667-1795 (1.4.1), and
Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-
1806 (1.4.4). William III’s foreign policy, the downsizing of the British army
after the Nine Years' War, the king's negotiation of the partition treaties, and the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession are considered in Stephen B. Baxter's *William III and the Defense of European Liberty* (6.3.2), Godfrey Davies' "The Reduction of the Army after the Peace of Ryswick, 1697" (7.4.4), Lois G. Schwoerer's "The Role of William III of England in the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1699" (7.4.27), David Francis' "The Grand Alliance in 1698" (7.2.2), and Douglas R. Bisson's "Public Opinion, Parliament and the Partition Treaties: England's Entry into the War of the Spanish Succession, 1698-1702" (7.4.1).

The formulation of British foreign policy under Queen Anne is examined in Henry L. Snyder, "The Formulation of Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Reign of Queen Anne" (7.4.28) and David H. Wollman, "Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1697-1714" (7.4.36). The British concern to secure the Protestant succession is scrutinized in Mark A. Thomson, "Safeguarding the Protestant Succession, 1702-1718" (7.4.33) and Edward Gregg, *The Protestant Succession in International Politics, 1710-1716* (7.4.16). For biographies of key British leaders, see Edward Gregg's *Queen Anne* (7.4.15), Roy A. Sundstrom's *Sidney Godolphin: Servant of the State* (7.4.32), James R. Jones' *Marlborough* (7.4.25), H.T. Dickinson's *Bolingbroke* (7.4.5), and Brian W. Hill's *Robert Harley: Speaker, Secretary of State and Premier Minister* (7.4.23). Important studies on the making and conduct of British grand strategy are John
B. Hattendorf's, "The Machinery for the Planning and Execution of English Grand Strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713" (7.4.20), "Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition: British Grand Strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713" (7.4.17), "English Grand Strategy and the Blenheim Campaign of 1704" (7.4.19), and England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (7.4.18), as well as T.J. Denman's "The Debates over War Strategy, 1689 to 1714" (A.7.2). The close cooperation between Marlborough and Godolphin is stressed in Henry L. Snyder's The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence (7.4.29).

Curtis W. Wood, Jr., stresses close Anglo-Dutch cooperation in "A Study of Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Grand Alliance, 1701-1706" (7.4.37). However, the uneasy partnership and gradual split between the Maritime Powers is the subject of Roderick Geike and Isabel A. Montgomery, The Dutch Barrier, 1705-1719 (7.4.14), Douglas S. Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession (7.4.3.), Marsha Frey, "Charles Townshend's Mission at The Hague, 1709-1711" (7.4.13), Linda Frey, "Thomas Wentworth's Mission at The Hague, 1711-1712" (7.4.10), Douglas S. Coombs, "The Augmentation of 1709: A Study in the Workings of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance" (7.4.2.), and Johanna G. Stork-Penning, "The Ordeal of the States: Some Remarks on Dutch
Politics during the War of the Spanish Succession" (7.4.31). The published documents in B. van 't Hoff's *The Correspondence of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1701-1711* (7.4.24) illuminates the close cooperation between the Dutch Republic and England during the war. More study on the Dutch viewpoint of foreign policy and strategy, as well as a political biography of Heinsius would fill important historiographical gaps in studies on the War of the Spanish Succession.

The British government dominated the Anglo-Dutch partnership and relations with other European states. In regards to the Maritime Powers' relations with Austria there are only a few studies available in the English language. Marsha Frey's "Austria's Role as an Ally of the Maritime Powers during the Early Years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1706" (7.5.6) considers Anglo-Austrian relations during the first half of the war. Moreover, the Anglo-Dutch attempt to mediate the Rákóczi insurrection and strained relations with the German emperor are noted in John B. Hattendorf's "The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703-1711" (7.4.21) in addition to Linda and Marsha Frey's "Rákóczi and the Maritime Powers: An Uncertain
Friendship" (7.4.11). But, the historiography of the war lacks a study of Anglo-Austrian relations during the reigns of Joseph I and Charles VI.42

Geoffrey W. Symcox's, "Britain and Victor Amadeus II: Or, The Use and Abuse of Allies" (6.5.7) and Victor Amadeus II: Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675-1730 (6.5.8) addresses Anglo-Savoyard relations. David Francis' "John Methuen and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1703" (7.4.7), The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708 (7.4.8), and The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713 (7.9.12), as well as Mary Turner's "Anglo-Portuguese Relations in the War of the Spanish Succession" (A.7.8) focuses on the making of the Methuen treaties and the conduct of the war in the Iberian Peninsula. English relations with Frederick I of Prussia are treated in Linda Frey, "Anglo-Prussian Relations, 1703-1708: Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby's Mission to Berlin" (7.4.9) besides Linda and Marsha Frey, "The Anglo-Prussian Treaty of 1704" (7.4.12). British relations with the Northern Powers are considered in Preben Torntoft, "William III and Denmark-Norway, 1697-1702" (7.4.34), June Milne, "The Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697-1709" (7.4.26), A.E. Stamp, "The Meeting of the Duke of Marlborough and Charles XII at Altranstädt, April 1707" (7.4.30), and Andrew Rothstein, 42Derek McKay's Allies of Convenience: Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and Austria, 1714-1719 (New York and London: Garland, 1986) begins after the Peace of Utrecht.
Peter the Great and Marlborough: Politics and Diplomacy in Converging Wars (8.3.20).

The foreign policy of the Austrian Habsburgs during the War of the Spanish Succession has received little attention from historians. Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815 (1.6.8) and John W. Stoye, "The Austrian Habsburgs" (6.6.12) provide fine overviews of the Habsburg struggle against Louis XIV. John P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (6.6.10) considers the policy of Leopold I during the conflict. However, a more detailed examination of Leopold I's policy can be found in Marsha Frey's "Austria's Role as an Ally of the Maritime Powers during the Early Years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1706" (7.5.6) and "A Boot of Contention: Franco-Austrian Conflict over Italy during the Early Years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1705" (7.5.5), in addition to Linda and Marsha Frey's "A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1705" (7.5.1), "The Latter Years of Leopold I and His Court, 1700-1705" (7.5.3), and A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1705 (7.5.2). For Leopold I's strategy in the Rákóczi insurrection, see Linda and Marsha Frey, "The Rákóczi Insurrection and the Disruption of the Grand Alliance" (7.5.4). Charles W. Ingrao's In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy (7.5.7) considers the foreign policy of Joseph I. Unfortunately, Charles VI requires the attention of historians. The studies on
Prince Eugene of Savoy by Derek McKay (7.9.18) and Nicholas Henderson (7.9.14) are valuable for Austrian policy.

In addition to studies on the foreign policies of the Great Powers there are several important works that consider the Minor Powers during the conflict. The foreign policy of Pedro II of Portugal is treated in Andrew S. Szarka, "Portugal, France, and the Coming of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1697-1703" (7.6.11) and David Francis, "Portugal and the Grand Alliance" (7.6.3). For Prussia, see Linda and Marsha Frey's Frederick I: The Man and his Times (7.6.5) and "The Foreign Policy of Frederick I, King in Prussia, 1703-1711: A Fatal Vacillation?" (7.6.6), as well as Linda Frey's "Frederick I and His Court: A Fatal Indecision?" (7.6.4). Georg Ludwig of Hanover is the subject of Ragnhild M. Hatton's George I: Elector and King (7.6.7). Other German states are examined in Roger Wines, "The Franconian Reichskreis and the Holy Roman Empire in the War of the Spanish Succession" (7.6.13) and "The Imperial Circles, Princely Diplomacy and Imperial Reform, 1681-1714" (6.6.15), besides Richard H. Thompson, Lothar Franz von Schönborn and the Diplomacy of the Electorate of Mainz: From the Treaty of Ryswick to the Outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (7.6.12). John Gagliardo's Germany under the Old Regime, 1600-1790 (1.6.6) and Hajo Holborn's A History of Modern Germany, Volume II: 1648-1840 (1.6.7) are useful surveys of German history. Ferenc II Rákóczi's rebellion is examined in Kálmán Benda, "The Rákóczi War
of Independence and the European Powers" (7.6.1), Peter Pastor, "Hungarian-Russian Relations during the Rákóczi War of Independence" (7.6.8), and Géza Perjés, "Reflections on the Strategic Decisions of Ferenc II Rákóczi's War of Independence" (7.6.9). Laurence H. Boles, Jr., "The Huguenots, the Protestant Interest, and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1714" (7.6.2) evaluates the importance of religion in the conflict.

There are numerous military studies of the War of the Spanish Succession. Even so, the historical literature lacks a full-scale balanced study of the conflict. August J. Veenendaal, Jr., "The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe" (7.7.5) serves as an adequate brief introduction to the war. General military studies include Christopher T. Atkinson's "The War of the Spanish Succession: Campaigns and Negotiations" (7.7.2), David G. Chandler's The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (3.1.3), Anthony Kemp's Weapons and Equipment of the Marlborough Wars (7.7.3), Christopher Duffy's The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789 (3.1.9), and Brent Nosworthy's The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics, 1689-1763 (3.1.10). Naval operations are discussed in John H. Owen, War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1702-1708 (7.7.4), John S. Bromley, "The French Privateering War, 1702-13" (7.3.2), Baron Armel de Wismes, "The French Navy under Louis XIV" (3.2.26), Stephen F. Gradish, "The Establishment of British Seapower in the Mediterranean, 1689-1713" (7.9.13), and Peter Padfield, Tide of Empires:
Eversley Belfield's *Oudenarde, 1708* (7.8.7). The British army under Marlborough is the subject of Michael Barthorp, *Marlborough's Army, 1702-1711* (3.3.2), Major R.E. Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne* (3.3.11), and John M. Stapleton, Jr., "Importing the Military Revolution: William III, the Glorious Revolution, and the Rise of the Standing Army in Britain, 1688-1712" (3.3.12). Unfortunately, there is a distinct lack of studies on the Dutch and Imperial armies as well as their commanders. Nicholas Henderson, *Prince Eugen of Savoy: A Biography* (7.9.14) and Derek McKay, *Prince Eugene of Savoy* (7.9.18) are notable exceptions. However, Louis XIV's army is discussed in John A. Lynn's *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (3.2.11). French commanders have been largely ignored by historians with the exception of Claude C. Sturgill, * Marshal Villars and the War of the Spanish Succession* (7.8.20) and Charles Petrie, *The Marshal Duke of Berwick: The Picture of an Age* (7.9.19).

The war in northern Italy and the Iberian Peninsula has also received the attention of historians. For the war in Italy, Nicholas Henderson's *Prince Eugen of Savoy: A Biography* (7.9.14), Derek McKay's *Prince Eugene of Savoy* (7.9.18), and Geoffrey W. Symcox's *Victor Amadeus II: Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675-1730* (6.5.8) are essential. The war in Spain is the focus of David Francis, *The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713* (7.9.12) and J.A.C. Hurgill, *No Peace Without Spain* (7.9.15). Both studies examine the

Nonetheless, Christopher T. Atkinson, "The Peninsular 'Second Front' in the Spanish Succession War" (7.9.3) and Ivor F. Burton, "The Supply of Infantry for the War in the Peninsula, 1703-1709" (7.9.4) question the decision to deploy forces to Spain with the result of overextending British military capability. For specific military campaigns in Spain, see Henry Kamen’s "The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702" (7.9.16); L.G. Carr Laughton’s "The Battle of Vélez Málaga, 1704" (7.9.5); H.T. Dickinson’s "Peterborough and the Capture of Barcelona, 1705" (7.9.8), "The Earl of Peterborough’s Campaign in Valencia, 1706" (7.9.9), and "The Capture of Minorca, 1708" (7.9.7); Charles Petrie’s *The Marshal Duke of Berwick: The Picture of an Age* (7.9.19); David G. Chandler’s "The Siege of Alicante" (7.9.6); and Basil Williams' *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth Century War and Diplomacy* (7.9.21).

The negotiations leading to the peace settlements at Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden have received less attention than the study of military campaigns during
the War of the Spanish Succession. H.G. Pitt, "The Pacification of Utrecht" (7.10.4) is a brief survey. French policy is discussed in John C. Rule's "France and the Preliminaries to the Gertruydenberg Conference, September 1709 to March 1710" (7.3.8) and "The Preliminary Negotiations Leading to the Peace of Utrecht, 1709-1712" (A.7.5). For British policy, see A.D. MacLachlan, "The Road to Peace, 1710-1713" (7.10.3), Mark C. Herman, "Sir Thomas Wentworth, Third Earl of Strafford, and the Treaty of Utrecht, 1711-1713" (7.10.1), Brian W. Hill, "Oxford, Bolingbroke, and the Peace of Utrecht" (7.10.2), and A.D. MacLachlan, "The Great Peace: Negotiations for the Treaty of Utrecht, 1710-1713" (A.7.3). Dutch concerns are addressed in Roderick Geike and Isabel A. Montgomery's The Dutch Barrier, 1705-1719 (7.4.14) and Johanna G. Stork-Penning's "The Ordeal of the States: Some Remarks on Dutch Politics during the War of the Spanish Succession" (7.4.31).

7.1. Reference Works on the War of the Spanish Succession


William Calvin Dickinson and Eloise R. Hitchcock of Tennessee Technological University supply a bibliography on the War of the Spanish Succession. The work is divided into nine chapters including bibliographies and reference works, background works and general histories, administration histories, diplomatic histories, campaigns in
France and Germany, Duke of Marlborough, Eugene of Savoy, campaigns in Spain and Italy, as well as trade and naval warfare. The bibliography is 118 pages in length, and contains 808 sources, some of them cited more than once. The work is useful for referring to primary and secondary sources written in foreign languages, mainly French, German, Dutch, Spanish, and Italian. However, the bibliography contains many incomplete and inaccurate citations. It contains a twenty-two page index. The bibliography should be used with caution.


Professor Linda Frey of the University of Montana and Professor Marsha Frey of Kansas State University provide a highly valuable dictionary on the War of the Spanish Succession. The reference study includes 359 entries written by forty-two notable contributors, including the Frey sisters. Entries include descriptions of rulers, diplomats, military leaders, battlefields, sieges, and treaties. The work also contains a brief introduction, chronology, bibliography, and index. The twenty-five page bibliography is useful for its citations of primary and secondary works published in French, English, Dutch, German, Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian. The title of the work, however, is misleading.
The editors do not include reprints of the major treaties or conventions associated with the War of the Spanish Succession.


Professor Edgar Prestage of the University of London supplies a brief bibliography of sources addressing Portugal's involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession. The bibliography consists of fifty-six citations listing published primary and secondary sources, as well as locations of unpublished manuscripts in Portugal, England, and France. The published material is written in French, Portuguese, and English. Prestage lists only nineteen published works printed in the English language. The bibliography has limited value for the specialist. The study includes six appendices.

7.2. The Partition Treaties and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1697-1701


Sir George N. Clark of Oxford University examines European diplomatic and military events from the Peace of Ryswick to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. He focuses on the question of the Spanish succession, the partition treaties, Louis XIV's acceptance of
Spanish inheritance, as well as the subsequent actions of France, Austria, and the Maritime Powers that led to war. The author, like Mark A. Thomson (see 7.2.5), stresses that in early 1701 the Sun King believed he could "carry out the policy of the will without provoking a war and without having to meet any armed resistance except such as the [German] emperor might maintain in Italy" (p.397). With such confidence, he began to build up his army; moved troops into position to intimidate French opposition, including occupying the Spanish Netherlands; and gained alliances with the Wittelsbachs in Bavaria and Cologne. However, French actions increased the diplomatic tension in Europe, resulting in Austria and the Maritime Powers making counter-preparations for war. Austrian military success in Italy encouraged the Maritime Powers to renew the Grand Alliance with Leopold I in September 1701, and declare war against France eight months later. Clark's essay is an excellent introduction to the Spanish Question and outbreak of war.


In this article, David Francis of the British Foreign Office explores the state of the Grand Alliance after the Peace of Ryswick. The author shows Leopold I's interest in renewing the alliance in 1698. He also indicates Pedro II of Portugal's eagerness to join the renewed alliance.
As for the Maritime Powers, William III suggested that he was willing to renew the alliance. However, Francis argues that the British monarch was only paying lip service to the idea. Instead, William III preferred to concentrate his diplomatic efforts on secret talks with Louis XIV concerning the Spanish succession and the making of the First Partition Treaty. The British monarch avoided a renewal of the Grand Alliance. He wanted to steer away from commitments to the German emperor in the partition talks. The author notes that William III's deviousness resulted in Leopold I losing trust in him. This tension between Austria and the Maritime Powers hindered the renewal and confidence of the Grand Alliance in 1701.


Professor Wolfgang Michael of the University of Freiburg considers the concern of European statesmen over the reign of Carlos II and the question of the Spanish succession. Michael narrates the history of the crisis focusing upon the making of the partition treaties, the will of the Spanish king, Louis XIV's acceptance of the Spanish inheritance for his grandson, and the creation of the Grand Alliance. This is a dated, but still useful essay.

Professor William J. Roosen of Northern Arizona University provides an analytical study on the origins of the War of the Spanish Succession. He is critical of the traditional view that Louis XIV was to blame for the outbreak of the conflict. Instead, Roosen argues that the international states system, not one individual or any particular state, was at fault for the war. He stresses that the origins of the war had to deal with the Habsburg-Bourbon marriages and births in the seventeenth century that created conflicting claims to the Spanish succession, the clash of dynastic interests, and the threat to the European balance of power.

Roosen begins his argument by stressing that Louis XIV and other European rulers wanted peace after the Nine Years' War. To avoid a future confrontation over the Spanish inheritance, Louis XIV and William III agreed to the appointment of Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria as the successor to Carlos II and most of the Spanish Empire in the First Partition Treaty (1698). The Spanish, however, did not want to partition their empire. The partition treaty prompted Carlos II to make a will and leave his entire empire to Joseph Ferdinand. Roosen believes that:

Had Carlos died immediately, the Spaniards and the rest of Europe would probably have welcomed the accession of the electoral prince as the solution to the problem. Since he was a prince of a minor dynasty who nevertheless had a good hereditary claim,
Louis XIV, Leopold I, and other rulers could have accepted him as king of Spain without doing much damage to their own sense of rightfulness and legitimacy. Even more important, such a new dynasty in Spain would not substantially change the status quo (p.160).

However, the young Joseph Ferdinand died in February 1699. His death, according to Roosen, "made war inevitable by removing the last viable candidate who was not a Bourbon or an Austrian Habsburg" (p.160). Both the Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs believed they had the best claims to the Spanish inheritance. In 1700, the Sun King and William III created the Second Partition Treaty. Once again, however, they failed to consider the claims and interests of the Austrian Habsburgs and Spain.

Carlos II responded to the partition treaty by drawing up a will that left the entire Spanish inheritance to Louis XIV's grandson, Philip of Anjou, or his younger brother, the Duke of Berry. If the Sun King did not accept, the whole undivided Spanish Empire was to be offered to Archduke Charles of Austria. Roosen believes that the will surprised Louis XIV. In fact, the author states that the Sun King accepted the will without having a well-thought out plan for executing it (p.162). In any event, the French monarch sought to peacefully install his grandson in Madrid and keep the French and Spanish thrones separate. Unfortunately, the rest of Europe was suspicious of Louis XIV's motives,
fearing the creation of a united Franco-Spanish empire that would establish a hegemony over Europe (pp.163-65). The author views the war as inevitable. There was no room for a compromise settlement because of clashing Spanish, French, Austrian, English, and Dutch interests as well as the lack of a viable alternative candidate for the throne. Roosen professes that "no human being could stop relations between the major powers from deteriorating into war. It was only a question of when they would start fighting" (p.167).


In this essay, Professor Mark A. Thomson of the University of London examines the Sun King's foreign policy after the death of Carlos II. He stresses the eighteen-month delay between Louis XIV's acceptance of the Spanish king's will and the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. During this period, the French monarch sought to consolidate Philip V's hold on the Spanish Empire as well as avoid a European war. He knew that the acceptance of the entire Spanish inheritance had upset Leopold I and William III. However, diplomatic negotiations in The Hague failed to calm the fears of William III and the Maritime Powers in 1701. William III had sought an agreement that
would ensure the security of the Dutch Republic as well as provide
Leopold I compensation in Spanish Italy. The Sun King, nevertheless,
refused to upset the Spanish court and interfere with Philip V’s hold on
the Spanish throne by giving away territory in Italy, or removing French
troops from the Spanish Netherlands (p. 151). At this point the Sun King
realized that the Maritime Powers, especially the Dutch Republic, were
inclined towards war (p. 159). Thomson argues that Louis XIV should
have invaded the Dutch Republic in 1701 before the country had
completed its preparations for war. However, the Sun King did not want
to appear as an aggressor against the United Provinces and encourage
the creation of another anti-French coalition. The author stresses that
this policy allowed the Maritime Powers to slowly prepare for and
declare war against Louis XIV when circumstances were less favorable
for France in 1702 (p. 161).

See also:


1.1.9. McKay, Derek and Hamish M. Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers,

1.1.15. Symcox, Geoffrey W., editor. War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618-
1763: Selected Documents. The Documentary History of Western


7.3. French Foreign Policy, 1697-1715


Eugene L. Asher of the University of Wichita examines the policies of Louis XIV and William III concerning the Northern Powers and the Holstein Question. He argues that both rulers considered the Danish challenge to the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp and its Swedish ally as important to their foreign policy in 1697 to 1700. Louis XIV and William III sought to maintain peace in the north while they negotiated the Peace of Ryswick and the partition treaties. In the case of French policy towards the Northern Powers, the Sun King attempted to mediate the Danish dispute with Holstein-Gottorp, while renewing the Franco-Swedish defense alliance in order to gain influence at all three courts. The French king hoped to acquire Charles XII of Sweden as a guarantor of the partition treaties. However, this policy failed when Frederick IV of Denmark invaded Holstein-Gottorp in March 1700. Anglo-Dutch naval intervention resulted in the Treaty of Travendal in August, settling the dispute between the Danish king and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The success of the Anglo-Dutch action gave William III the upper hand with the Northern Powers. But Sweden invaded Denmark in August 1700 as part of the initial phase of the outbreak of the Great Northern War. This
conflict kept Sweden and Denmark from joining the War of the Spanish Succession.


Professor John S. Bromley of the University of Southampton investigates the Anglo-French commercial conflict during the War of the Spanish Succession. In this conflict Louis XIV's France possessed a smaller naval fleet than the combined might of the Maritime Powers. At the suggestion of Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the king decided to pursue a naval strategy designed to make use of France's limited naval capabilities in the systematic destruction of the Maritime Powers' seaborne commerce, which would also weaken their military effort in the Low Countries. Vauban's plan called for the use of French corsairs or privateers stationed at Saint Malo, Dunkirk, Boulogne, Brest, Calais, La Rochelle, Marseilles, and other French ports to intercept Anglo-Dutch merchantmen using well-established shipping lanes off the French coast. This strategy allowed the French navy to concentrate on protecting France's own merchant fleet while heavily damaging that of the Maritime Powers. Bromley shows that Vauban's strategy was extremely effective. By researching French court and naval records the
author proves that French corsairs captured at least 4,173 English merchant ships during the war (p.216). Almost a thousand of these prizes were captured off the coasts of Dunkirk (p.214). Bromley argues that such losses seriously hurt the English war effort as well as the commercial community.


Professor Linda Frey analyzes diplomatic relations between Louis XIV and Frederick I of Prussia during the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession. She notes that official Franco-Prussian diplomatic talks terminated at the beginning of the conflict, but both monarchs maintained numerous unofficial contacts. In these talks, the Sun King attempted to bribe the Prussian king away from the Grand Alliance. Louis XIV wanted to establish a Franco-Prussian alliance, or at least Prussian neutrality. In either case, the Grand Alliance would suffer a significant loss of military manpower: Frederick I provided troops to both the Maritime Powers and Austria. To achieve this end, the Sun King offered recognition of Frederick I's kingship, substantial subsidies, support for the Orange inheritance, Cologne, Liège, Guelders, the county of Meurs, and the return of Cleves in different negotiations. Frey points out that the Prussian king seemed ready to defect from the anti-French
coalition at various times. Frederick I was upset about the poor
treatment he received from his allies, including being overlooked for the
Orange inheritance. With French military victories in early 1706 the
Prussian monarch especially looked ready to desert the Grand Alliance.
However, Marlborough’s victory over the French at Ramillies in May put
Louis XIV on the defensive in the Low Countries, and ended the
possibility of Prussian defection from the Grand Alliance. The author
believes that Frederick I flirted with the French to acquire more favorable
terms from Austria and the Maritime Powers. He continuously leaked
the news of Franco-Prussian talks. His duplicity, however, resulted in
the growth of suspicion among the Prussian king’s allies.

7.3.4. Frey, Linda and Marsha Frey. "Le Roi Soleil et Le Singe, Louis XIV and
Frederick I: Franco-Prussian Relations, 1707-1713." Proceedings of the

Linda and Marsha Frey continue the examination of Franco-Prussian
relations to 1713 (see 7.3.3). They argue that Louis XIV still hoped to
bribe Frederick I into a French alliance or neutrality after the battle of
Ramillies. The authors stress the continuing poor relations between the
Prussian king and his Austrian, Dutch, and British allies in 1707-8.
Frederick I was infuriated at Joseph I’s appointment of Georg Ludwig of
Hanover as commander of the Imperial army as well as the emperor’s
failure to provide winter quarters for Prussian troops in his service.
Moreover, the Prussian king quarreled with the Austrians and Dutch over the payment of subsidies. The authors, nonetheless, point out that the Swedish threat kept Frederick I in the Grand Alliance in 1708. Even so, the Prussian ruler was enraged with his allies concerning the preliminary peace talks and the Barrier Treaty in 1709. Prussian ministers were refused admission to the peace talks, while the negotiators assigned the much coveted Spanish Guelders to the Dutch Republic. At this point, Frederick I reopened his diplomatic negotiations with France. But, the Sun King soon realized Frederick I was only using the talks to strengthen his position within the Grand Alliance, and he thus gave up on drawing Prussia away from the coalition.


In this dissertation, Dale A. Gaeddert examines the alliance of Louis XIV and Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria in the War of the Spanish Succession. The author stresses the importance of the Bavarian alliance to Louis XIV. The Sun King was willing to subsidize the Bavarian army to ensure the elector's neutrality in February 1701. With the outbreak of war against the Grand Alliance, Louis XIV outbid Leopold I to acquire a Bavarian alliance. To acquire an offensive alliance, the Sun King agreed to support Maximilian II's ambitious demands, including territorial
expansion in the German Empire, the status of kingship in Bavaria, and the acquisition of part of the Spanish inheritance, in June 1702. The Bavarian alliance became more vital to Louis XIV after the defection of Portugal and Savoy from the Franco-Spanish bloc in 1703. In fact, the Sun King sent Marshal Villars to Munich to persuade the German elector to launch a Franco-Bavarian assault on Vienna to knock Austria out of the war. The Franco-Bavarian forces held a strong position in southern Germany, but Maximilian II Emanuel objected to an attack on Vienna. He preferred to keep his army closer to home to consolidate his acquisitions in southern Germany. However, the Duke of Marlborough's march from the Low Countries to the Danube, and subsequent victories destroyed the Bavarian army. The defeat of the Franco-Bavarian armies at Blenheim resulted in the collapse of Louis XIV's strong position in southern Germany as well as ended the threat to Vienna. The dissertation is based on archival research in Bavaria as well as published German, French, and English primary sources. It includes two maps and a useful bibliography of primary and secondary works.


In this doctoral thesis, Joseph A. Klaits examines the efforts of Colbert de Torcy, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to
influence public opinion in Louis XIV's favor during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author finds that Torcy employed his power as the king's leading minister to censor unfavorable political and military news in the printed literature in France. Moreover, he manipulated French literature to reflect the government's view of politics and war. Such efforts were necessary because of the increasing domestic opposition to Louis XIV as well as the strength of the Grand Alliance.

The study is based on archival research and published primary sources.


Professor John C. Rule of Ohio State University explores the rise of the foreign ministry under Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Marquis of Torcy, from 1698 to 1715. The author describes the emergence of a bureaucratic hierarchy in the ministry; the functions of Torcy's commis or secretaries in collecting, sorting, evaluating, and disseminating information; as well as the influence of the foreign ministry on Louis XIV's policy decisions.
This is an examination of French policy from the failed preliminary peace talks at The Hague in the spring of 1709 to the opening of the Gertruydenberg negotiations in March 1710. Professor Rule stresses the confusion in French leadership and policy after the preliminary talks. Different political factions supported various policy options. However, Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy both hoped to renew the peace talks and modify the harsh terms of the preliminary negotiations. Even so, Rule points out that the foreign secretary vacillated for several months between support for a Jacobite invasion of Scotland, a French invasion of southern Germany, encouragement for the expansion of the Great Northern War to force Prussia out of the Grand Alliance, a revision of the peace settlement with Victor Amadeus II to encourage a Savoyard defection from the coalition, as well as the reopening of peace talks with the Grand Alliance (pp.114-15). In the end, France's severe economic problems forced Torcy to press forward for the renewal of peace negotiations. As a result, the Sun King sent his plenipotentiaries, Abbé Melchior de Polignac and Marshal Nicolas du Blé, Marquis of Huxelles, to Gertruydenberg in March 1710. The monarch and his foreign secretary instructed the diplomatic representatives to secure a partition
of the Spanish inheritance. This is an interesting study of peacemaking based on Rule's doctoral dissertation (see Rule, A.7.5).


In this essay, Rule concentrates on the career of Colbert de Torcy and his working relationship with the Sun King. He describes Torcy's schooling to follow in the footsteps of his father, Colbert de Croissy, and father-in-law, Arnold de Pomponne, as foreign minister. Torcy shared the position of secretary of state for foreign affairs with Pomponne in 1696-99. Torcy and Pomponne were the architects on the French side of the Peace of Ryswick and the partition treaties. With the death of his father-in-law, Torcy became Louis XIV's sole foreign minister. Torcy persuaded Louis XIV to accept Carlos II's will in 1700. Nevertheless, the new minister was challenged by the finance and war minister, Michel de Chamillart, for control of foreign policy until Louis XIV dismissed him in 1709. Afterwards, Torcy became the Sun King's chief minister, and he was instrumental in the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Utrecht. Rule argues that "no small credit for the final 'winning of the peace' must be given to the working arrangements between Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy" (pp.236-37). He claims that Torcy was able to
"play upon the king’s moods and to mould them to his purpose" (p. 237).


Professor Thomson explores the reasons for the lack of an early peace settlement to the War of the Spanish Succession. He stresses the coalition's caution as well as its mistrust of Louis XIV in his early peace offers. Thomson notes the Sun King failed to address and satisfy the key war aims of England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria. In his peace overtures, Louis XIV made proposals that would not satisfy all three of the major powers. The result was that many of the Sun King's peace attempts looked like "crude attempts to split the Allies" (pp.211-12). However, Thomson argues the coalition itself was confused and argued over war aims, including the priority of these goals in peace negotiations. He believes the main issues focused on Austria's demands for Spanish Italy, especially the Milanese; the Dutch need for a fortress barrier against France; and England's requirement for Louis XIV to recognize Queen Anne and the Protestant succession (p.195). Without an agreement among the allies over these issues a successful peace conference was out of the question. In the peace talks of 1709-10,
Louis XIV made a peace settlement much easier for the Grand Alliance by yielding to most of the coalition's demands. But, the Sun King rejected an agreement in the preliminary talks and at the Gertruydenberg conference when the allies insisted the French ensure that Philip V comply with the proposed peace settlement. Louis XIV refused to fight his own grandson, leaving the Grand Alliance once again suspicious of his sincerity in the peace proposals.


In this article, Ben S. Trotter of Ohio State University screens Vauban's viewpoint considering the problem of the Spanish Succession. The author notes Vauban's opposition to returning French territorial gains in the Peace of Ryswick. Vauban, Louis XIV's chief siege engineer and close collaborator in the creation of France's frontier defenses, argued that France needed to round out its frontiers to achieve defensible borders. In fact, during the negotiations for the First Partition Treaty, Vauban suggested that Louis XIV acquire and then trade away parcels of land from the Spanish inheritance for places along French borders, such as Lorraine or Savoy. He urged the French monarch to support the candidacy of Pedro II of Portugal as the successor to Spain, its overseas possessions, and some territory in Italy. As for the rest of
the Spanish inheritance, Maximilian II Emanuel would receive the
Spanish Netherlands, and Austria would gain Sicily, Sardinia, and
perhaps, Bavaria. He insisted that France should gain Italian territory to
exchange for Lorraine and Savoy. Although the Sun King and his
council disregarded his suggestions, Vauban continued to press for the
Portuguese solution during the negotiations of Second Partition Treaty.
He viewed Pedro II as a compromise candidate who would be acceptable
to French interests and whose accession would do little to alarm Europe.
Trotter, however, points out that Louis XIV held a low opinion of the
Portuguese candidacy. The author notes that when the Sun King
accepted the will of Carlos II Vauban quickly accepted the choice of a
Bourbon king in Madrid. Trotter stresses that Vauban "felt that France
and Spain as separate but allied kingdoms could muster enough power
between them to prevent a war, despite European fears of a French
universal monarchy" (p.65). The article shows that Vauban was heard
at Louis XIV's court, but his advice was not followed in the partition
treaties.

See also:

1.1.8. Lossky, Andrew. "International Relations in Europe." In The Rise of
Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25. Volume VI in The New
Cambridge Modern History. Edited by John S. Bromley. Cambridge:


7.4. Foreign Policy of the Maritime Powers, 1697-1713


In this master's thesis, Douglas R. Bisson considers English public opinion towards the Spanish succession leading up to the outbreak of war. In an attempt to avoid a costly European war, William III concluded treaties with Louis XIV in October 1698 and March 1700 concerning the partition of the Spanish Empire. The author shows William III failed to inform his English subjects of the partition treaties until July 1700. English public opinion attacked the treaties because William III agreed to
the French acquisition of Naples and Sicily, two vital English trading ports in the Mediterranean. The English king's main concern had been keeping the French out of the Spanish Netherlands. Several months later, William III was surprised to discover English support for Louis XIV’s acceptance of Carlos II’s will. Bisson argues that Parliament believed the French and Spanish crowns would remain separate, and Spain would maintain the customary trading agreements with England. However, the author shows that a shift in English public opinion occurred after the French entry into the Spanish Netherlands in February 1701. This action aroused English opinion to the danger of the Franco-Spanish threat to English security. In the following months, Franco-Spanish hostility towards English trade and Louis XIV’s recognition of James II’s son as the King of Great Britain stimulated the public support the British monarchy needed to declare war in May 1702. The thesis is based on published primary sources.


Douglas S. Coombs investigates the working relationship between the Maritime Powers in the winter of 1708-9. He relates the complicated politico-military talks regarding the augmentation of the Anglo-Dutch armies in the Low Countries. The author shows the Dutch
Republic hired more than the number of troops requested by Marlborough for an invasion of France (pp.658-59). Coombs' study corrects the view of W.A. Shaw who argued in his *Calendar of Treasury Books, 1709* (1949) that the United Provinces had failed to live up to military requirements in the augmentation of 1709. In fact, the author stresses the timely Anglo-Dutch augmentation of forces demonstrated the "solidarity of the alliance" (p.660).


Coombs provides a detailed study of British public opinion towards the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession. His research shows that Queen Anne, the Godolphin ministry, and English subjects viewed the Dutch alliance as necessary at the beginning of the conflict. The successful conduct of the war against Louis XIV took priority over other Anglo-Dutch issues. He states: "there remained a fundamental assumption that the Dutch were allies first, and everything else -- commercial rivals, . . . republicans, ex-enemies -- second" (p.382). However, English opinion of the United Provinces varied depending upon the perceived conduct of the Dutch in carrying on the war against France. Moreover, the stress of the commercial rivalry loomed in the background of Anglo-Dutch relations.
With the rise of the Oxford ministry, the Tory party began making large-scale efforts to influence public opinion on questions of foreign policy. The Tories churned out propaganda against the war policies of the Whigs and the Dutch alliance. Attacks on the Dutch included:

their shortcomings in the field, their naval and military deficiencies, their 'league' with the Whigs, their alleged responsibility for the failures to obtain peace in 1706, 1709, and 1710, their 'insults' to the queen and their alleged desire for the prolongation of the war . . . (p.383).

Coombs believes the Oxford ministry's propaganda efforts shaped public opinion. He claims the anti-Dutch campaign was instrumental in the Tory struggle for peace. In fact, the author stresses:

The overwhelming popular support that the Oxford ministry acquired for its peace policies was largely due to the shrewd and unscrupulous action of the ministers themselves in initiating an intensive propaganda campaign designed to play upon the growing war-weariness of their countrymen and their traditional and deep-rooted hostility towards the Dutch (p.384).

The study is based on research in British and Dutch archives as well as contemporary literature. It includes a valuable bibliography of contemporary pamphlets, journals, newsletters, and tracts. The work is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


Godfrey Davies of the Huntington Library explores English troop reductions after the Nine Years' War. He stresses that William III
wanted to maintain a large standing army to defend British interests, especially in light of the approaching demise of Carlos II of Spain. Nonetheless, in December 1697, the House of Commons voted to slash the British army from approximately 87,000 men to a peacetime footing of 10,000 troops (pp.15-17). Parliament found keeping a large standing army too expensive. In fact, much of the army's pay was in arrears. In addition, the House of Commons disliked paying foreign troops, and the British army consisted of many foreigners, including Dutch, Danes, Huguenots, and Germans from various states. Davies describes in detail the procedures and difficulties of troop reduction. After one year the British army still had 30,322 men in England and Ireland (p.17). The task became more difficult when Parliament reduced the troop level to 7,000 in 1699 (p.24).


Harry Dickinson of Edinburgh University supplies a full-scale biography of Henry St. John, Viscount of Bolingbroke (1678-1751). Bolingbroke served as Queen Anne's secretary for war (1704-8) during Marlborough's great victories and secretary of state (1710-14) during the making of the Peace of Utrecht. However, two-thirds of the study concerns Bolingbroke's career after the War of the Spanish Succession. The biography is based on archival research in numerous British,
German, American, French, and Irish archives. It includes thirty-four illustrations and a valuable bibliography.


Dickinson furnishes a study of Sidney Godolphin (1645-1712). Godolphin as Lord Treasurer (1702-10) and virtual head of the government played a critical role in England's war effort. The author focuses on Godolphin's part in planning and financing the war, as well as his relations with Marlborough and British ambassadors. The biography is based on research in British archives and published primary sources.


In this article, David Francis briefly describes the background and negotiation of the Methuen Treaties of 1703. The author sketches the personal history of John Methuen, whom the Godolphin ministry sent to Lisbon in April 1702 to encourage Pedro II's defection from the French alliance as well as promote closer Portuguese relations with the Grand Alliance. Methuen found Pedro II willing, albeit hesitant, to abandon the alliance with Louis XIV and acquire closer relations with England. Methuen's persistent diplomacy and the movement of the British fleet off the Portuguese coast convinced Pedro II to desert the French in
August 1702. The talks with Portugal crept along until Pedro II agreed to join the Grand Alliance in May 1703. Afterwards, the Godolphin ministry appointed John Methuen as English ambassador to Lisbon, and he negotiated a commercial treaty with Portugal in December 1703. Francis' study is a good introduction to the English negotiations with Portugal based on research in British archives.


This is an account of Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic and commercial relations under the influence of the Methuens. David Francis describes the diplomatic missions of John Methuen (1691-96) and Paul Methuen (1697-1705) as English ministers to Lisbon. In 1702, John returned to Lisbon as ambassador with instructions to detach the Portuguese from the French alliance and urge them to join the Grand Alliance. John, supported by his son, succeeded on both accounts despite Austro-Dutch reluctance to the entry of Portugal into the alliance. In the Offensive Quadruple Treaty and the Defensive Triple Treaty of May 1703, the English and Dutch promised Pedro II substantial subsidies to maintain a Portuguese army on the Iberian Peninsula. Leopold I agreed to send Archduke Charles, recognized by the allies as the King of Spain, to Portugal (and hence to Spain), where the allied army, including forces from Austria, England, Portugal, and the Dutch Republic, was to win his
crow. Moreover, the Maritime Powers pledged to send ships to protect the Portuguese coast against French and Spanish attack. Shortly thereafter, in December 1703, John Methuen strengthened the Anglo-Portuguese bond with a commercial treaty concerning English woolen cloth and Portuguese wine. Francis, however, shows that Portugal’s allies failed to fulfill many of their military agreements, resulting in the failure of the Peninsular War. Even so, the author credits the Quadruple Treaty as well as the Methuen’s efforts to keep Portugal in the war as important in the struggle to weaken Louis XIV’s France. The study is based on archival research in Britain, including the Methuen family archives; Portugal; and The Netherlands. It includes a useful bibliography. The study is suggested reading for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


In her doctoral dissertation, Linda Frey examines Anglo-Prussian relations and the impact of Thomas Wentworth’s diplomacy at Berlin during the War of the Spanish Succession. Wentworth, Baron Raby, was the English representative to Frederick I from 1703 to 1711. The author shows that Wentworth became a close friend and influenced the Prussian king to stay with the Grand Alliance. Indeed, she argues that
England played a decisive role in swaying Frederick I to fulfill his obligations as an ally despite his bitterness towards Austria and the Dutch Republic. In addition, Wentworth was instrumental in keeping Prussia out of the Great Northern War (p.317). The English diplomat held sway over Prussia because of Frederick I's dependency on the Maritime Powers. England and the Dutch Republic provided much needed subsidies to maintain the Prussian army. Furthermore, Frey declares that Frederick I gained from his association with England. England supported the recognition of Frederick I's royal title as well as territorial gains in the Peace of Utrecht. The Prussian king acquired some of the disputed Orange inheritance, including Moers, Lingen, Valengin, and Neuchâtel. He also acquired part of Guelders in the Spanish Netherlands as compensation for parts of the Orange inheritance that had been given to France. Frey's dissertation is based on research in British, Dutch, Hanoverian, and Austrian archives. It is useful for depicting Wentworth's diplomatic mission and Prussian foreign policy.


This is a study of Wentworth's diplomatic mission to the Dutch Republic in 1711-12. Frey argues that Wentworth's mission reflected the Oxford ministry's attempt to coerce its Dutch ally to accept British
war aims as well as the eventual abandonment of the United Provinces. In 1710, the Tories began seeking an end to the war, and they hoped to renew Anglo-Dutch peace talks with France. However, Oxford and Bolingbroke disliked the Dutch alliance because of the Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry. They abhorred Dutch demands for equal trading rights with Britain in Spanish dominions. Without success in reducing Dutch demands, they therefore opened secret talks with the French while sending Wentworth (created Earl of Strafford in 1711) to The Hague to fool the Dutch about English intentions.

Strafford was instructed by Bolingbroke to create the illusion of close cooperation between the Anglo-Dutch allies. England needed to convince Louis XIV of Anglo-Dutch cooperation to get the best possible peace terms from France. Moreover, Strafford had to keep the Dutch Republic from making a separate peace with France. Nonetheless, the British diplomat failed to obey these instructions, and "often angered the Dutch leaders by his bullying, hectoring, and tactless behavior" (p.10). His tactics reflected his second set of instructions which called for him to coerce the Dutch into limiting their war aims, including commercial rights. With the opening of the Congress of Utrecht in January 1712, Strafford and John Robinson, the Bishop of Bristol, acted as Britain's chief negotiators in the United Provinces. Failing to change Dutch
commercial demands, the Oxford ministry chose to negotiate a separate peace with France in April. Bolingbroke had Strafford tell the Dutch that their high peace demands forced England to pursue a separate path towards peace. The split between the allies was complete by July 1712. The thesis is based mainly on published primary works.


In this essay, Linda and Marsha Frey examine the Maritime Powers' policy concerning the Rákóczi insurrection (1703-11) against Austria. They note that the Maritime Powers, especially England, "felt a special kinship" with the Hungarians because of their Protestantism and struggle against absolute monarchy (p.456). As a result, the Maritime Powers pressured the German emperor to negotiate with the rebels with Anglo-Dutch diplomats serving as mediators. The German emperor agreed to the talks because of his dependency on the Maritime Powers for financial and military support. He, nonetheless, dragged out the negotiations until the talks stalled in 1706. The authors believe that Joseph I carried on the talks to appease his allies and to gain time to suppress the Hungarians militarily. This strategy seemed to work because the Maritime Powers abandoned their policy of pressuring the Habsburgs for a negotiated settlement with Rákóczi after 1706, and the
Austrians launched a successful military offensive against the Hungarians in 1708. The German emperor diverted troops and supplies from the war with France to put down the Hungarian insurrection.


Linda and Marsha Frey profess the importance of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of 1704 to the cause of the Grand Alliance in its struggle against Louis XIV. They scrutinize Frederick I's negotiations with Saxony and Russia concerning the possibility of Prussia entering the war against Sweden. Charles XII of Sweden had occupied Poland and was threatening Saxony in 1704. Frederick I considered the need to join Peter the Great and Augustus II against Charles XII to turn back Swedish expansionism, with the hope of acquiring part of Sweden's trans-Baltic empire for Prussia. The authors stress that Prussian involvement in the Great Northern War would result in the withdrawal of Frederick I's troops from the Grand Alliance which would significantly disrupt the coalition's war effort. Recognizing this possibility, Marlborough visited Berlin and convinced the Prussian monarch to agree to the so-called Italian Treaty in November 1704. In this arrangement, Frederick I conceded to supply the Grand Alliance with 8,000 Prussian troops for service in Italy in exchange for subsidies from the Maritime Powers and promises of future rewards (p.29). To fulfill this treaty, Frederick I had
to transfer a large part of his army from the north to the Italian theater of operations. Without an army in the north, the Prussian king was forced to brush aside alliance talks with Saxony and Russia. The authors believe Marlborough’s diplomacy and the victory at Blenheim played a major role in keeping Prussia out of the Great Northern War and keeping Prussian troops under allied command. Prussian forces proved invaluable in the coalition’s success in Italy.


In this master’s thesis, Marsha Frey studies Charles, Viscount Townshend’s diplomatic mission at The Hague from May 1709 to March 1711. Godolphin sent Townshend to the United Provinces to assist Marlborough in British relations with the Dutch. Frey agrees with Geike and Montgomery that the Godolphin ministry feared Louis XIV would negotiate a separate peace with the Dutch in 1709 (see 7.4.14). Thus, Townshend’s mission was to ensure the Dutch continued their involvement in the war on the side of the Grand Alliance. To achieve this goal, Godolphin instructed Townshend to appease the Dutch concern for a military barrier system manned by Dutch garrisons in the southern Spanish Netherlands. The Spanish Netherlands had come under allied rule after the battle of Ramillies in 1706. Frey shows that Marlborough was against this appeasement policy. Nonetheless,
Townshend negotiated and concluded the Barrier Treaty in October 1709 (see 7.4.14). The author believes that England's appeasement of the United Provinces paid off at the Gertruydenberg talks when the Dutch fully supported the harsh peace terms that Louis XIV rejected. Frey calls Townshend's mission at The Hague "the high point in the Anglo-Dutch relations during the war" (p.67). The thesis is based on published primary sources.


Isabel A. Montgomery and Roderick Geike examine the three separate barrier treaties that were negotiated and ratified between 1705 and 1719. The barrier treaties centered on the creation of a line of fortifications in the southern Netherlands manned by Dutch garrisons that would check French aggression against the Dutch Republic. The barrier system was developed at the Peace of Nijmegen (1678) and Ryswick (1697). However, Louis XIV shattered the system when he sent his army to occupy the fortresses in 1701. The reestablishment of a barrier system quickly became the primary aim of the United Provinces in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Anglo-Dutch negotiations for a barrier agreement began in earnest in 1705-6. Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, wanted a
guarantee that England would support the establishment of a stronger barrier system. For its part, the Godolphin ministry wanted a Dutch guarantee for the Protestant succession in Britain. In 1706, the Dutch pressed for a quick barrier agreement after the allies defeated the French at Ramillies and gained control of the Spanish Netherlands. Nevertheless, Marlborough, who was England’s diplomatic representative in The Hague, objected to an agreement that would allow Dutch dominance in the Spanish Netherlands. He realized that such an accord would trouble Austria and Prussia. The negotiations were in a deadlock in 1707-8.

Louis XIV’s resumption of peace talks with The Hague scared the Godolphin ministry into taking Dutch concerns more seriously in 1709. The British government believed the Sun King was attempting to appease the Dutch need for a barrier system in order to draw the United Provinces away from the Grand Alliance. The Godolphin ministry sent Townshend to The Hague to negotiate a barrier settlement. The Barrier Treaty of October 1709 was Heinsius’ price for Dutch support of England’s conditions for peace with France. The agreement allowed the Dutch to man fortresses at Nieuwpoort, Fort Knocke, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Charleroi, Namur, Lier, Hal, Dendermonde, Lille, Ghent, as well as the forts at St. Donas, Perle,
Phillipe, and Damme. Geike calls the Barrier Treaty of 1709 a major triumph for Dutch diplomacy.

The rise of the Tory government in 1710 meant trouble for the Anglo-Dutch accord. The Oxford ministry repudiated the Townshend Treaty. The Barrier Treaty of 1709 had given the Dutch virtual domination of the major cities of the Spanish Netherlands and made the British furious when commercial control accompanied military occupation. Afterwards, Dutch concern to reestablish a barrier settlement resulted in their virtual subjugation to British interests. But, French victories in the Spanish Netherlands in 1710-11 changed the scope of the barrier talks. In the end, the Maritime Powers agreed to the Barrier Treaty of January 1713. The military barrier was greatly reduced from the 1709 accord. The barrier consisted of Dutch garrisons at Mons, Furnes (Veurne), Fort Knocke, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Charleroi, Namur, Ghent, Perle, Philippe, and Damme. After the war, British and Dutch representatives met in Vienna and Antwerp to hammer out an agreement to satisfy Charles VI. In the Barrier Treaty of November 1715 the Dutch received only Namur, Menin, Tournai, Warenton, Veurne, Ypres, and Fort Knocke, along with a partial garrison at Dendermonde. Charles VI would garrison the other fortresses with his own troops. The study is supported by research in
British and Dutch archives. It is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


Professor Edward Gregg of the University of South Carolina provides a full-scale, balanced biography of Queen Anne (1702-14). The author argues that Anne ruled at the center of the British political system, and she influenced, if not dominated, the political developments of the reign. He stresses the queen's resistance to Whig and Tory attempts to dominate the crown. Anne determined English policy. She supported Marlborough's continental war in the early years, and later changed governments to pursue peace in 1710. Gregg shows Anne as a conscientious ruler concerned with the war and the Protestant succession. She consulted daily with her ministers, presided at cabinet meetings, as well as attended the House of Lords. The author's study of the monarch destroys the myth that Queen Anne was "a weak, irresolute woman beset by bedchamber quarrels and deciding high policy on the basis of personalities" which was largely propagated by the Duchess of Marlborough (p.401). The biography is highly informative and based on research in British, Hanoverian, Dutch, French, and American archives. It contains an illustration of Anne's genealogy.
Edward Gregg’s doctoral dissertation examines the Protestant succession to the British throne and international political relations from 1710 to 1716. He investigates the complex relationship between Oxford; Marlborough; Georg Ludwig, the Elector of Hanover; James III, the Stuart claimant to the British throne; and the French monarchy. He finds that Oxford sought a Protestant succession. However, Oxford hoped that James III would convert from Catholicism to Protestantism. Oxford also hoped to act as "kingmaker" in the Stuart and Hanoverian quest for the British throne. Marlborough, like Oxford, played both camps, but the duke gave more support to Georg Ludwig. In addition, Gregg shows that Georg Ludwig, and not his mother, Sophia, the Electress of Hanover, directed the House of Hanover's succession policy. The author argues that Georg Ludwig was well informed about British politics, and he held a strong Whig bias long before the succession. Nevertheless, Georg Ludwig was suspicious and wary of British politicians, irrespective of party. He also stayed out of British party quarrels, realizing that involvement would only undermine the Hanoverian settlement. As for the Stuart claimant, Gregg shows that
James III never seriously considered converting to Protestantism, and therefore put his faith in armed force to acquire the British throne. But, the Jacobite movement, received little, if any, effective support from France during these years. The study is based on archival material in Britain, Hanover, France, and The Netherlands. It contains a valuable bibliography.


Professor John B. Hattendorf of the United States Naval War College sketches his analysis of British decision-making and the formulation of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession. He argues that English strategy consisted of "encircling France through an active allied offensive on several fronts, and fighting a war of attrition to achieve limited political objectives" (p.20). The author describes the implementation of British grand strategy. The essay is a brief version of his doctoral dissertation (see 7.4.18).
In his published dissertation, Hattendorf presents an analytical study of English war aims, grand strategy, and the conduct of operations during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author's thesis is that England possessed a clear grand strategy as well as war aims throughout the entire conflict and pursued its objectives to the Peace of Utrecht. This grand strategy consisted of creating and supporting a Grand Alliance that encircled France and attacked the French from all sides until the English achieved their war aims. England's limited objectives were the maintenance of a weak and independent Spain, French recognition of the Protestant succession in England, an end to French expansionism, and the creation of an acceptable European balance of power.

Before his death, William III responded to the French takeover of the barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands by creating the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV in September 1701. The government of Queen Anne and the United Provinces declared war against France seven months later. Hattendorf dispels the belief that Marlborough was the virtual master of English strategy and military policy by showing that...
England's grand strategy and conduct of the war was formulated and carried out by a large, complex bureaucracy, including Queen Anne and her Whig cabinet under Lord Godolphin. English strategy consisted of engaging mighty France on as many fronts as possible to divide and weaken French forces in order to achieve England's war aims. To carry out this strategy, the English contributed subsidies, naval operations, and troops to the Grand Alliance. Under English leadership, the diplomacy and military actions of the Grand Alliance won over Portugal and Savoy to the anti-French coalition in 1703 as well as captured Gibraltar and defeated the Franco-Bavarian armies at Blenheim in 1704. By 1705, England and the Grand Alliance had gained the strategic, geographical position needed to defeat France. England planned for the Grand Alliance to launch simultaneous attacks on France from Spain, Savoy, southern Germany, and Flanders, while threatening French commerce and security on the high seas.

Despite such high hopes, England was unable to lead such an attack on France because of numerous problems. First, England lacked sufficient resources to equally and adequately support offensive operations on the fronts in Flanders, Spain, Germany, and Italy. Secondly, Leopold I died in 1705, leaving England's Austrian ally slightly disorientated during the succession of Joseph I and the Hungarian
revolt. The Austrians lacked supplies and troops to face both the Hungarians and the French simultaneously. In addition, the coalition squabbled among themselves concerning military strategy and tactics. Without sufficient cooperation among the allies, the Grand Alliance was forced to fight to a military stalemate against the French in Flanders from 1706 to 1711.

Weary of war, England replaced the Whig government with the Tories under the leadership of Robert Harley in 1710. Although the Tories sought peace, Hattendorf argues that Harley maintained the Whig war strategy and aims to a large degree. The Oxford ministry hoped to establish a strong military edge against France before negotiating peace. However, the death of Joseph I dramatically altered England's commitment to the Grand Alliance in 1711. The new German emperor, Charles VI, was also the Grand Alliance's candidate as King of Spain. The Tories could not commit themselves to allow the Austrian Habsburgs the opportunity to create a hegemony over Europe, so they quickly began peace talks with French diplomats. The author argues that the English negotiated peace with France with the clear interests of England in mind, believing that if they acquired a peace treaty their allies would accept the terms. With the initiation of Anglo-French peace talks, the Grand Alliance soon collapsed as the United Provinces and Austria...
became suspicious of English diplomacy. England had led the alliance, and, as the author points out, the English gained their long-established war aims in the Peace of Utrecht. Hattendorf accepts the charge that the English abandoned their allies, but he is quick to add that England had the interests of her allies in mind at Utrecht. England had achieved its war aims ending French expansionism, establishing an acceptable balance of power, maintaining a weak and independent Spain, and gaining French recognition of the Protestant succession in England.

Hattendorf's study is a rare treat. Most studies of England's participation in the War of the Spanish Succession are narrative accounts that relate the politics of the Whig and Tory governments in addition to the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough. This is the only full-scale study of English grand strategy, consisting of alliances, military actions, and naval operations, as well as war aims. It is based on archival research in Great Britain, The Netherlands, Germany, Canada, the United States, and Sweden. The study is highly recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


Hattendorf supports his view of English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession with an analysis of the Blenheim campaign in 1704.
524

(see 7.4.18). In this article, the author shows that the Godolphin ministry recognized the Bavarian threat to English strategy in the war against France. The Bavarian alliance with Louis XIV disrupted England's attempt to encircle and place military pressure on France. When an English attempt to negotiate with Maximilian II Emanuel failed, the Godolphin ministry made the decision to launch a military campaign into Bavaria to pressure Maximilian to drop out of the French camp and join the Grand Alliance. However, the English government gradually realized the need to destroy the Bavarian threat to Austria. England needed to knock Bavaria out of the French alliance to allow Austria to resume its military pressure on the French border in Germany and northern Italy. Thus, the Blenheim campaign, according to Hattendorf, was nothing more than an attempt to put an end to the Bavarian disruption to the pursuance of English grand strategy in the struggle against Louis XIV's France.


In this essay, Hattendorf argues that historians have overemphasized the role played by Marlborough in the formulation and conduct of war strategy and policy. Instead, the author believes that Queen Anne, the
English cabinet, secretaries of state, Admiralty, and Board of Trade were the key players in the formulation of strategy. He declares that:

decisions regarding grand strategy and the general conduct of the war were not made by any single individual. They appear to have been reached by the consensus of cabinet members acting on a consideration of facts, opinions, and reports obtained from many sources (p.83).

Hattendorf, nevertheless, concedes that information from generals, admirals, and diplomatic envoys influenced the decisions of the cabinet. Moreover, English military commanders and diplomats in the field could significantly influence the conduct of the war.


The author examines the concern of the English government with the Rákóczi insurrection (1703-11). He notes England’s initial support for the Hungarian Protestants, including Queen Anne’s request for Leopold I to grant religious freedom to the rebels. However, the author shows the growing English distress with the Austrian attempt to put down the rebellion with Imperial troops. The German emperor’s increasing involvement in Hungary drew Austria away from the allied war effort in Germany, Italy, and Spain. To end this threat to English grand strategy, the Maritime Powers attempted to mediate a peace settlement between Joseph I and Rákóczi at Tyrnall in 1706. However, the German emperor...
was determined to put down the rebellion with military force. The continued war in Hungary weakened the Grand Alliance by increasing tension between London and Vienna. Hattendorf stresses that the English cabinet viewed Hungary as the hinge to the War of the Spanish Succession. A peace settlement in Hungary meant Austria could concentrate all of its forces against France. But, the continuing rebellion resulted in the German emperor keeping up to half of his army in Hungary (p.99). The author argues that this significantly damaged English strategy.


Professor Ragnhild M. Hatton of the University of London sketches the diplomatic activity of John Drummond (1676-1742), a Scottish merchant and banker in Amsterdam, during the War of the Spanish Succession. During the conflict, Drummond acted as the commercial and financial agent for Robert Harley, the English secretary of state (1704-8), in the Dutch Republic. He was a key player in the paying of British forces on the continent. Drummond later played a political role as a diplomatic agent for the Oxford ministry in English negotiations with the United Provinces after 1710. He was especially important as an intermediary between the English government and Anthonie Heinsius,
the Grand Pensionary of Holland, in 1711-12. In fact, Heinsius employed Drummond to find out English intentions in the peace talks with Louis XIV. The Oxford ministry, however, was bent on a separate peace with France. Dutch public opinion blamed Drummond for the deterioration of Anglo-Dutch relations.


Brian W. Hill of the University of East Anglia furnishes a biography of Robert Harley, the first Earl of Oxford (1661-1724). The author describes Harley as a complex person and a politician with moderate views. He served as the speaker of the House of Commons (1701-4) and secretary of state (1704-8). Harley was forced to resign after his bid to replace Godolphin as chief minister to Queen Anne failed in 1708. However, he returned to office as Chancellor of the Exchequer following the collapse of the Godolphin ministry in 1710. After the elections of 1710, he became the head of the new government and was made the Earl of Oxford. He initiated and conducted secret peace negotiations with Louis XIV in 1711-12. But, the widening split between Oxford and his secretary of state, Bolingbroke, and his loss of credibility with Queen Anne resulted in his dismissal in 1714. The biography is based on archival research in Great Britain.

This is a collection of the correspondence between Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland (1689-1720), and the Duke of Marlborough from 1701 to 1711. The collection of 1,014 letters reveals the close cooperation between the Dutch Republic and England during the War of the Spanish Succession. It sheds light on Marlborough as a general and diplomat as well as the motives of Heinsius and Dutch generals and diplomats. B. van 't Hoff points out that the correspondence disproves the views of George M. Trevelyan (see 7.4.35) and Winston S. Churchill (7.8.13) that Marlborough was the commander-in-chief of Dutch forces (pp.xii-xiii). Marlborough’s letters to Heinsius are published in the English language while the Grand Pensionary’s correspondence with Marlborough is published in French. Heinsius could read English but not write in this language. The volume includes a thirteen page introduction, several appendices, and a valuable index.


The latest biography of John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722). Using published primary sources, Professor James R. Jones of the University of East Anglia sketches Marlborough’s military
and courtier career during the reigns of Charles II, James II, and William III. However, his central focus is on Marlborough's diplomatic and military role in the War of the Spanish Succession. The author praises the duke's service as a diplomat and military commander. He credits Marlborough with holding together the Grand Alliance against France through his military victories and constant attention to allied interests. The duke promoted an offensive strategy, emphasizing mobility to force battles on Louis XIV's army. However, Jones points out that Marlborough's strategy suffered from Dutch restrictions on military operations and Austrian involvement in Hungary. He also believes that Marlborough's mental and physical ability as military commander declined after Malplaquet because of his age and the stress of nearly a decade of responsibility (p.233). Even so, the author credits Marlborough with great achievement.

He . . . determined the shape of the European state system for eighty years, until the French Revolution. He completed William's work in converting Britain from a peripheral and quasi-isolationist kingdom of little influence into a great power. He defeated the French bid to establish hegemony, which if successful would have included the restoration of the dependent Jacobite pretender to the thrones of England, Scotland, and Ireland, in the process dismantling the union between the first two (p.234).

In this article, June Milne examines the role of Dr. John Robinson (1654-1723) as English envoy to Sweden from 1697 to 1709. In the War of the Spanish Succession, Robinson had the mission of blocking French attempts to acquire a Swedish alliance as well as preventing Swedish intervention in the German Empire. The envoy possessed extensive knowledge of Anglo-Swedish trade, spoke fluent Swedish, and had considerable knowledge of the court of Charles XII. Robinson accompanied the Swedish monarch to Narva in 1700 and to Poland in 1703, where he also served as the envoy to Augustus II of Poland-Saxony. Milne describes Robinson's crucial role in easing Anglo-Swedish tensions and the part he played in keeping Charles XII from intervening in the War of the Spanish Succession.


Lois G. Schwoerer addresses William III's attempt to maintain a peacetime standing army in England after the Nine Years' War. The king wanted to keep at least 30,000 men in uniform (p.76). But, the House of Commons pressed for a reduction of the army to under 10,000 men in the debates and bills of 1697 to 1699. William III continued the reproduction with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
struggle against the House of Commons, but failed to achieve his goal. Schworer stresses William III's failure to keep his ministers and Parliament informed of international affairs and military requirements. Moreover, the House of Commons resented William III's European orientation as well as feared the possible threat of a standing army to civil liberties. The contest for a standing army "intensified the estrangement between the King and a House of Commons which was already resentful, among other things, of . . . foreign advisers" (p.94).


Henry L. Snyder of the University of Kansas reevaluates the role of Sidney Godolphin, Lord Treasurer, in the War of the Spanish Succession. Past historians have seen the role of Godolphin as a supporter of Marlborough with limited influence on foreign policy. Snyder, however, stresses that the formulation of foreign policy was the function of an inner circle of ministers, including Godolphin, Robert Harley, and Marlborough. The rest of the cabinet assisted in the day-to-day direction of foreign affairs. Moreover, Snyder argues that new evidence shows Godolphin had a predominant role in foreign affairs. He was "far more independent of Marlborough in his views on the war and foreign affairs than is generally believed" (p.153). "Policy," according to the
author, "was the result of a consensus rather than the strategy developed by the great general and diplomat in Flanders" (p.153).


Snyder provides a exceptional collection of correspondence between the Duke of Marlborough, Godolphin, and the Duchess of Marlborough written from 1701 to 1711. The correspondence, consisting of 1,785 letters, is from the archive at Blenheim Palace (now lodged at the British Library). These letters are extremely valuable for showing the close working relationship between Godolphin and Marlborough in the formulation and conduct of diplomacy and war strategy. The work includes an introduction describing the limited access for historians to the Blenheim archives from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, a useful index, four maps, and appendices discussing the ciphers employed by the correspondents as well as a list of Dutch field deputies for 1702-12. It is highly recommended for specialists.


This is a brief essay about Marlborough's visit to Charles XII of Sweden's camp at Altranstädt, near Leipzig, in April 1707. Marlborough made the journey to query Charles XII about his intentions after the Swedish victory over Augustus II of Poland-Saxony in September 1706.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The leaders of the Maritime Powers feared Sweden would join France in the War of the Spanish Succession or attempt to mediate a peace settlement. Ideally, Anglo-Dutch leaders wanted Charles XII to pursue the war against Russia. In the visit, Marlborough acquired Charles XII's promise not to intervene in the war between the Grand Alliance and France. But, the Grand Alliance continued to worry about Swedish intentions until Charles XII broke camp and moved eastward in August 1707. This is a dated, but still useful essay.


Johanna G. Stork-Penning provides a valuable insight into Dutch politics and diplomacy during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author explores the "uneasy partnership" between the Dutch Republic and England. She stresses the close cooperation between Anthonie Heinsius and Willem Buys, the Pensionary of Amsterdam (1693-1725) in formulating and conducting Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch saw the conflict as a defensive war against Louis XIV. As such, Dutch leaders urged caution in military operations as well as peacemaking. Stork-Penning describes the Dutch view in the peace negotiations of 1709-11. She emphasizes Heinsius and Buys' desire for an Anglo-Dutch preliminary agreement concerning war aims before assenting to a
general peace conference. Dutch policy failed with the English betrayal of the alliance in 1712. Stork-Penning points out the Dutch difficulties in the "uneasy partnership" with England, including Dutch dependence on Britain, dissimilar war aims, and English insistence on "No Peace without Spain." The article is based on Stork-Penning's *Het Grote Werk: Vredesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse Successie-Oorlog, 1705-1710* (1958). But the article lacks notes.


Professor Roy A. Sundstrom of Humboldt State University produces an important full-scale biography of Sidney Godolphin. The author describes Godolphin's relationship with Queen Anne and his influence in government, his massive overhauling of the Treasury and public credit system, his role in acquiring the finances to keep English armies in the field, as well as his important part in shaping diplomacy and military strategy. This role in molding strategy resulted from Godolphin's control of English finances and close working relationship with Marlborough. In addition, Godolphin's control of public finances gave him considerable leverage in pressing England's diplomatic agenda on its allies. The Lord Treasurer used subsidies paid to English allies to keep them in line at critical times. The biography is based on research in British, Dutch, American, and German archives.
Thomson considers the English obsession with the Protestant succession in the early eighteenth century. In fact, he calls the conflict of 1702-13 the "War of the English Succession" (p.42). The author discusses Louis XIV's recognition of William III as King of Great Britain at the Peace of Ryswick. In 1700, the death of the heir to the throne, the young Duke of Gloucester, son of Anne, forced Parliament to make provisions for the Protestant succession. In the Act of Settlement (1701), the English government agreed that the crown should go after Anne to the nearest Protestant heir, the dowager Electress Sophia of Hanover (1630-1714), a granddaughter of King James I, and her heirs. However, in the tension leading up to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Sun King recognized James Francis Edward Stuart (1688-1766) as King James III of Great Britain after the death of his father, the exiled James II. This act not only upset William III but drove England to war against France to protect the Protestant succession.

In the "War of the English Succession," England pressed other members of the Grand Alliance to accept the Protestant succession in
England. The Godolphin ministry acquired Leopold I's reluctant acceptance. However, the English government wanted much more from the United Provinces. The Godolphin ministry began negotiations with Heinsius to secure a Dutch guarantee for the Protestant succession in 1706. The English wanted the Dutch to defend the Protestant succession with military force as well as refuse to enter peace talks with France until Louis XIV had pledged to acknowledge the succession (p.45). Heinsius agreed to these conditions to acquire the Barrier Treaty of 1709. The Oxford ministry regained Dutch acceptance of the Protestant succession in the Barrier Treaty of 1713. In the Peace of Utrecht, Louis XIV and Philip V both accepted the Protestant succession in Britain. After the war, England made support of the succession a condition of the Triple Alliance of 1717 (Britain, France, and the United Provinces) and the Quadruple Alliance of 1718 (the addition of Austria). Thomson shows the great concern of the English government for the safeguarding of the Protestant succession in the early eighteenth century.


In this article, Preben Torntoft of Århus University examines William III's policy towards Denmark from 1697 to 1702. The author stresses William III's desire for peace in the north, especially during the
negotiations concerning the Spanish inheritance. However, the struggle between Christian V (1670-99) and Frederick IV (1699-1730) of Denmark-Norway with the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and King of Sweden played havoc with Anglo-Dutch plans. The Danish monarchs wanted to secure their border in the south as well as take revenge on Sweden. The author shows that Anglo-Dutch talks with Denmark broke down over the Gottorp Question. William III leaned towards Sweden and Gottorp in his dealings with the Northern Powers. He acquired an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden in January 1700. But, in the meantime, the Danish rulers acquired an offensive alliance with Poland-Saxony and Russia against Sweden in 1698-99. In the beginning stages of the Great Northern War (1700-21), the Danes invaded the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's lands. As a consequence, Swedish and Lüneburg forces advanced on Denmark from the south while Swedish forces invaded Zealand from the sea. The threat of naval action by the Maritime Powers forced the Danes and Swedes to accept the Peace of Travendal (1700). By this action, William III preserved the peace with the threat of military force. Torntoft views William III's Northern Policy as successful. William III followed up the peace settlement with an alliance with Denmark and a renewed alliance with Sweden. William III
had achieved peace in the north and blocked Louis XIV's attempts to gain alliances with the Northern Powers.


This is an extensive study of England during the reign of Queen Anne by George M. Trevelyan of Cambridge University. A central feature of this work is England's involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession. This is a classic study, albeit dated and slanted to the English point of view. It is based on research in British archives. Unfortunately, Trevelyan lacked access to the manuscripts at Blenheim Palace (see Snyder, 7.4.29). It contains twenty-six valuable maps.


David H. Wollman investigates the role of Parliament in the conduct of foreign relations from the Peace of Ryswick to the Peace of Utrecht. The author describes William III's complete control of foreign affairs in the 1690s and changes which gave Parliament limited influence over the conduct of international relations during the War of the Spanish Succession. He addresses the disbandment of the army, the partition treaties, war aims and conduct of the Grand Alliance, as well as the making of the Peace of Utrecht. The thesis is based on archival research in Britain.
In this thesis, Curtis W. Wood, Jr., addresses the Anglo-Dutch alliance during the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession. The author stresses that the rulership of William III resulted in the diplomatic, financial, and military union of the Maritime Powers. The Grand Alliance revived by William III "was based essentially upon the close cooperation and combined resources and determination of England and the United Provinces" (p.382). His death ended this personal union of the Maritime Powers in 1702. Nevertheless, Marlborough and Heinsius continued the work of the late monarch and stadholder. Wood discusses the Anglo-Dutch partnership leading up to Marlborough's victory at Ramillies in 1706. He shows that England gradually increased in importance and the Dutch Republic declined as a diplomatic and military force. He writes: "the history of the first four years of the war presents a clear picture of a Dutch state in serious difficulty, yielding diplomatic and political preeminence to the English" (p.384). Moreover, "the shift of power that was taking place had no doubt been in the making for some years, but the stress of the war accelerated the process and made it a matter of public knowledge and a preoccupation of European politics after 1702" (p.386). Wood views the partnership as successful during the first four
years of war. The Maritime Powers achieved most of the initial war aims of 1701. The Grand Alliance had contained Louis XIV's expansionism and drove the French out of the Spanish Netherlands, thus securing the United Provinces. However, this success marked the turning point in Anglo-Dutch relations as the allies entered a new phase of the war after Ramillies with a different set of problems. The thesis is supported by research in British and Dutch archives.

See also:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


7.5. Austrian Policy under Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI, 1697-1714


Professors Marsha and Linda Frey scrutinize the diplomatic relations between Leopold I of Austria and the Maritime Powers. They argue that relations between the German emperor and the Maritime Powers were shaky at the conclusion of the Peace of Ryswick (1697), during the negotiation of the partition treaties, and in the War of the Spanish Succession. Leopold I objected to the partition treaties, believing the
Austrian Habsburgs had a justified claim to the inheritance of the whole Spanish Empire. But, the Sun King's acceptance of Carlos II's will and the Austro-French war in northern Italy forced Leopold I to recognize Philip V as the Spanish king as a condition for the renewal of the Grand Alliance against France in 1701. Even so, the German emperor continued to claim the entire Spanish inheritance for his son, Archduke Charles. The Frey sisters show that the different war aims, military strategy, and Austrian preoccupation with the Rákóczi rebellion eroded the alliance between Austria and the Maritime Powers during the last years of Leopold I's reign. The Maritime Powers continually disregarded Austrian interests and attempted to control Leopold I's policy. Such interference in Austrian policy resulted from Leopold I's dependence on England and the Dutch Republic for financial and military support in the war.


In this monograph, Linda and Marsha Frey consider Leopold I's diplomatic and military policies during the War of the Spanish Succession. They argue that "Leopold’s main aim at the onset and throughout the conflict remained that of procuring the Spanish inheritance for his younger and favorite son, Archduke Charles" (p.25). To this end, the
German emperor concluded alliances with German states and the Maritime Powers in addition to sending Austrian forces into Italy in 1701. The authors focus on Leopold’s relations with the Maritime Powers, especially the disagreements over war strategy and goals. The monograph is based on research in British, Austrian, German, French, Dutch, and American archives. The work is a synthesis of the authors’ earlier works (see 7.4.11, 7.5.1, 7.5.3, 7.5.4, 7.5.5. and 7.5.6).


Linda and Marsha Frey examine the formulation and execution of Austrian foreign policy from 1700 to 1705. The authors find that Leopold I hesitated in making decisions. Such procrastination resulted from Leopold I’s own personality as well as the factional struggles at the Imperial court. The Freys find that eight factions had influence in the making and conduct of policy. Some supported the war effort, some urged peace, some concentrated on the Hungarian problem, and others pressed for military and financial reforms. The Freys believe that "the divisiveness of the Viennese court in the early years of the war was particularly pernicious for the Habsburgs because it greatly impeded the war effort, decreased diplomatic effectiveness, and damaged Imperial
prestige" (p.490). The article includes an appendix listing the members of the eight circles of influence at the court of Leopold I.


This is an examination of the impact of the Rákóczi rebellion on the Grand Alliance. Linda and Marsha Frey discuss the role of the insurrection in accelerating the deterioration of an already shaky coalition of Austria and the Maritime Powers. In 1703, the Hungarians, led by Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi of Transylvania, rebelled against the rule of the Habsburgs. The Rákóczi insurrection, subsidized by Louis XIV, forced Leopold I to redirect his military efforts away from France towards Hungary. English and Dutch leaders, requiring Austrian military action against France, responded by attempting to pressure the German emperor to accept Hungarian demands to end the insurrection. However, the authors argue that Leopold I played along with Anglo-Dutch mediation efforts in 1704-6 only because of Austrian dependency upon the Maritime Powers for financial and military aid. He preferred to put down the rebellion by military force. Nevertheless, Anglo-Dutch interference in Habsburg affairs was strongly resented. Linda and Marsha Frey believe that "the insurrection . . . fractured the already weakened Grand Alliance" (p.25).

In this brief article, Professor Marsha Frey stresses the struggle between Leopold I and Louis XIV for Italy at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. The Austro-French war broke out in the Milanese during the summer of 1701. Louis XIV had occupied Spanish Italy in support of his grandson. But, the German emperor deployed forces into northern Italy to secure the lands for the Habsburgs. Frey emphasizes Leopold I's great interest in securing Italy as well as the Austro-French diplomatic battle to gain Savoy and Venice as allies. Victor Amadeus II deserted the Sun King for the Grand Alliance in 1703, but Venice remained neutral.


In this dissertation, Marsha Frey considers Austrian relations with the Maritime Powers during the early years of the war. She argues that the anti-French coalition was weak from the beginning because of irreconcilable differences in the war aims and strategy pursued by Leopold I and his allies. The German emperor's goal was to procure the entire Spanish inheritance for Archduke Charles. His war strategy focused on concentrating the Austrian war effort in Italy. However,
Frey shows that the Maritime Powers consistently disregarded Austria's policies and strategic interests, including the Habsburg desire to inherit the entire Spanish Empire. England and the Dutch Republic were willing to barter away parts of the Spanish inheritance to gain Bavaria, Savoy, and Portugal as allies. Moreover, the Maritime Powers meddled in the domestic affairs of the Habsburgs in Hungary. Nevertheless, Austrian dependency on Anglo-Dutch financial and military support forced Leopold I to "accept the unpalatable policies of her Allies" (p.203). The dissertation is based on research in British, Dutch, Hanoverian, Austrian, and American archives.


Professor Charles W. Ingrao of Purdue University fills an important historiographical gap with his study of the brief reign of Joseph I (1705-11). The monograph includes discussions of Austrian administration and finances, Joseph I's relations with the German states, war in Italy, the Hungarian rebellion, and Austrian diplomacy. Ingrao acknowledges Joseph I's decisive leadership in Austria establishing hegemony over Italy and suppressing the Rákóczi rebellion in Hungary. He also stresses the German emperor's role in creating a strong, secure Austrian state. However, the author accuses Joseph I of pursuing solely Austrian
interests in the War of the Spanish Succession. The German emperor failed to fully cooperate with his allies in the war against France as well as consider the war aims of the Maritime Powers. Writing about Joseph I, Ingrao accentuates:

He devoted the monarchy's limited resources to the pursuit of specifically Austrian interests. This was the case in Hungary, and also in Italy . . . . Throughout the struggle, he took his allies for granted, relying increasingly on British money and diplomacy to maintain the alliance and provide him the support he needed in critical situations (p.220).

Such behavior contributed to England's abandonment of Austria in 1711-12. The study is based on archival research in Austria, Spain, Germany, Hungary, and the United States. It is highly recommended for students of international relations, teachers, and specialists.

See also:


7.6. The Minor Powers and the Grand Alliance, 1697-1714


Kálmán Benda argues the importance of foreign assistance to the Hungarian rebellion of 1703-11. The Hungarians took the initiative to rebel against Habsburg rule while the Imperial army was engaged in war against France in Italy and the Rhineland. Rákóczi expected immediate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
political and military assistance from Louis XIV. But the Sun King, after some hesitation, granted the Hungarians only a small financial contribution to subsidize Rákóczi’s army (p.434). Even so, Louis XIV began to consider a joint French, Bavarian, and Hungarian attack on Vienna. In early 1704, Rákóczi’s army marched towards Vienna, tying down Imperial forces to allow Franco-Bavarian troops in the west to advance on Vienna. But, the Franco-Bavarian move failed to materialize because of a disagreement over strategy between the Bavarian elector and French commander. The Franco-Bavarian forces were later defeated at Blenheim during the summer of 1704. The author sees the 1704 campaign as a missed opportunity to defeat Austria. Rákóczi hoped to renew Franco-Hungarian collaboration, but the French defeat at Ramillies (1706) and Turin (1706) put France on the defensive. The Sun King provided only a token force of French officers and soldiers to assist Rákóczi (pp.436-37).

Benda also describes Rákóczi’s attempts to acquire foreign assistance against the Habsburgs elsewhere. He failed to interest Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, the Papacy, Venice, and the Ottoman Turks. Diplomatically isolated, Rákóczi was forced to negotiate with Austria while the Maritime Powers acted as intermediates at Nagyszombat in 1706. The talks failed due to Austro-Hungarian mistrust and Rákóczi’s
high demands, including imperial recognition of his title as Prince of Transylvania.

After the failed talks, Rákóczi had the fleeting hope of Russian assistance. Peter the Great's ally, Augustus II, had lost Poland to Charles XII of Sweden during the Great Northern War. In the election of a new Polish king, the Tsar favored Rákóczi instead of Charles XII's candidate Stanislaus Leszczyński. In the Warsaw Agreement of 1707, Peter the Great promised to provide the Hungarians military aid against the Habsburgs in exchange for Rákóczi's willingness to accept the Polish crown (p.438). However, Swedish military power negated the Warsaw Agreement. Afterwards, Rákóczi had no hope for foreign assistance. The defeat of his army at Trencsén (1708) resulted in a continual advance of the Habsburg army in Hungary until the Peace of Szatmár (1711).


The War of the Spanish Succession was fought for the dynastic and commercial issues that dominated the concerns of the rulers and statesmen of western Europe in the early eighteenth century. In this doctoral dissertation, Laurence H. Boles, Jr., considers the Protestant interest in defeating Catholic France. Specifically, he explores the
efforts of the Huguenot refugees in Britain and the Dutch Republic; Calvinist activists in the Holy Roman Empire and Switzerland; and their sympathizers throughout northwestern Europe to persuade the rulers of the Grand Alliance, especially the Maritime Powers, to adopt the war aims of improving the security of the Protestant religion in Europe and restoring the civil and religious rights of the Huguenots in France. The author shows that support for the Protestant interest, except for the Protestant succession in Britain, remained unimportant in the peace settlements at Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden. Religion played a backseat role to the more important issues of state sovereignty, dynastic interests, and the establishment of a political balance of power in Europe (pp.481-87). The dissertation is based mainly on published primary sources.


David Francis provides a sketch of Portuguese relations with the Grand Alliance from the making of the partition treaties to the Utrecht settlement. He discusses Portugal's dependency upon Anglo-Dutch maritime power for the preservation of Portuguese overseas commerce. But, Pedro II's fear of the increasing might of Louis XIV, combined with the Maritime Powers' lack of military, financial, and diplomatic support for Portugal, necessitated his alliance with the Franco-Spanish bloc in
1701. The author describes Anglo-Dutch-Austrian negotiations that led to Pedro II's desertion of the Franco-Spanish alliance and accession to the Grand Alliance in 1703. Francis stresses the importance of Anglo-Portuguese trade.


Professor Linda Frey believes that Frederick I avidly pursued the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia as a kingdom, a projection of Prussian power by a display of courtly magnificence, as well as the acquisition of territory. She writes, Frederick I "was tenacious in defending and promoting the glory of the state" (p.489). Nonetheless, the Prussian monarch was a poor ruler for his indecisiveness and susceptibility to be exploited by the people around him. His foreign policy was influenced by his wife, Sophie Charlotte of Hanover; his mother-in-law, Sophie of Hanover; and ministers in the *Staatsconferenz*. Frey stresses that the formulation of Prussian policy was muddled by the intrigues and factions rife in the Berlin court during the early eighteenth century.


The reign of Frederick I has been overshadowed by his father, the Great Elector, and his son, Frederick William I. Professors Linda and Marsha Frey fill an important historiographical gap with a study of
Frederick I's reign. They show that the Prussian king made considerable headway in centralizing the bureaucracy, destroying the power of the nobility, and strengthening the army. The insecure and precarious position of Brandenburg-Prussia between the wars in the west and wars in the east led Frederick I to increase the army to 40,000 (p.248). The Freys argue that the Prussian monarch sought to avoid war, but the French threat to Germany moved him to join the Grand Alliance. "A policy of neutrality," they write, "could have meant the devastation of his lands by armies of both the East and West" (p.249). The authors are sympathetic to their subject, and believe that Frederick I pursued the interests of Brandenburg-Prussia. Frederick I's foreign policy attempted to safeguard his kingdom and to fulfill his moral commitments to the German Empire. By participating in the War of the Spanish Succession he gained recognition of his kingship and additional lands. The kingship and Prussian army enhanced Frederick I's position, giving him greater leverage in international affairs. The study is based on research in German, Austrian, British, French, Dutch, Hungarian, and American archives. It lacks a bibliography. The study is recommended for graduate students, teachers, and specialists.

Linda and Marsha Frey question the traditional view of Frederick I as a vacillating, weak monarch with an indecisive and ineffective foreign policy. They argue that Frederick I lacked the military and diplomatic power to effectively exploit Brandenburg-Prussia's precarious position between the War of the Spanish Succession and Great Northern War. They defend Frederick I's support of the Grand Alliance, noting the advantages gained by this association, including recognition of his kingship, subsidies to maintain the Prussian army, and territorial aggrandizement. Moreover, the Freys stress that Frederick I's support of the Grand Alliance safeguarded Brandenburg-Prussia's neutrality in the east and kept his lands almost entirely free from the devastation of war. The Freys stress that Frederick I's involvement in the Great Northern War was unlikely to result in Brandenburg-Prussia's acquisition of West Prussia and West (Swedish) Pomerania, as well as the establishment of a strong position for Brandenburg-Prussia on the Baltic.


Professor Ragnhild M. Hatton of the University of London provides a full-scale biography of Georg Ludwig, Elector of Hanover (1698-1727), later known as George I of Great Britain (1714-27). She devotes 110
pages to Georg Ludwig's early life leading up to his kingship. The author describes the elector as keen on foreign affairs. He had participated in the Dutch War against Louis XIV in the 1670s as well as fought against the Turks in the 1680s. In the War of the Spanish Succession, Georg Ludwig showed interest in the strategy and tactics of the conflict. He supported Marlborough's march to southern Germany in 1704. The Imperial Diet promoted Georg Ludwig to Reichsfeldmarschall and he commanded Imperial forces in the Rhineland from 1707 to 1709. His contribution to the Imperial war effort was rewarded by the Imperial Diet admitting Hanover into the Electoral College in 1708. Georg Ludwig thus completed his father's work of establishing Hanover as the ninth electorate. Hatton supports her study with archival research in Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, and France. This is a brilliant biography which provides a rare look at Georg Ludwig before his accession to the throne of Great Britain.


In this essay, Peter Pastor considers the relations between Rákóczi and Peter the Great during the Hungarian insurrection of 1703-11. He describes the phases of Russo-Hungarian relations. At the beginning of the conflict, the Hungarians and Russians showed little interest in each
other's affairs. This phase was followed by Peter the Great's offer to the German emperor to crush the Hungarian insurrection in return for Russia's admission into the Grand Alliance. At the same time Rákóczi attempted to incite the Turks to attack Russia. Both Rákóczi and Peter I were unsuccessful in their endeavors. The next phase occurred when Russia was desperate in the war against Sweden. Peter the Great hoped that friendship with Hungary would result in Rákóczi influencing Louis XIV to stop inciting the Turks to attack Russia as well as French mediation of a Russo-Swedish peace agreement. However, Peter the Great's victory over Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava (1709) gave the Tsar a new sense of security, resulting in his declining need for Hungarian friendship. In the last years of the insurrection, Rákóczi failed in his attempts to ingratiate himself with the Russians. Pastor sees Russo-Hungarian relations as "inconsequential" during the first decade of the eighteenth century (p.485).


In this essay, Géza Perjés analyzes the strategic planning of the Rákóczi War. The author shows that Rákóczi and his associates anticipated diplomatic, financial, and military support from Louis XIV. Rákóczi expected to rely on foreign mercenaries in the struggle against
the Austrian Habsburgs. He had little confidence in the Hungarian forces and their light cavalry tactics. The author argues that Rákóczi attempted, but failed to convert Hungarian troops into a regular army based on the West European model during the war. This is a valuable essay using Hungarian sources on Hungarian strategy, military tactics, and campaign of 1703-4.


Professor William B. Slottman of the University of California at Berkeley investigates the diplomatic, political, and social aspects of the Rákóczi rebellion. The author begins by examining the Anglo-Dutch mediation of the Karlowitz peace conference in 1698-99. He discusses the efforts of Lord William Paget and Jacob Coyler in bringing about the Peace of Karlowitz, which gave Leopold both Hungary and Transylvania. Slottman clearly establishes the Maritime Powers close involvement in eastern European affairs. This interest continued after the outbreak of the Rákóczi insurrection. Slottman relates the efforts of George Stepney and J.J. Hamel Bruyninxc, the Anglo-Dutch envoys to Vienna, in attempting to mediate the Austro-Hungarian conflict. He also traces Rákóczi's diplomacy with the Maritime Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The study is based on Dutch, English, and Austrian archival sources.
Andrew S. Szarka examines Franco-Portuguese diplomatic relations leading up to and including the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. The author examines Portuguese attempts to acquire a French alliance during the Portuguese war of independence against Spain (1640-68), followed by the Portuguese attempt to remain neutral in European power politics until the 1690s. Pedro II perceived little need for a French alliance in light of the decline of Spain.

The real focus of Szarka's study is Franco-Portuguese relations from 1697 to 1703. The author describes Pedro II's reluctant involvement with France in the Spanish succession crisis. In 1697, Louis XIV challenged Portugal's control of Brazil. To protect his empire, Pedro II agreed to the Maranhão Provisional Treaty with France in March 1700. In the meantime, Louis XIV and the Maritime Powers courted Portugal's support concerning the Spanish succession. In 1700, French diplomacy acquired Pedro II's backing of the Second Partition Treaty. The Portuguese monarch agreed to support the treaty because it assigned the Spanish crown to Archduke Charles. An Austrian Habsburg on the Spanish throne would be less of a threat to Portuguese security than a Bourbon. Even so, Pedro II supported Louis XIV's acceptance of Carlos
Il's will in late 1700. The Portuguese king feared French power, and he hoped that support for the Bourbons would result in friendly Franco-Portuguese relations which would check the Spanish threat to his kingdom. Szarka's thesis is that fear of Spain drove Pedro II into the Franco-Portuguese alliance of 1701. The king needed French assistance against Spain as well as the Maritime Powers. However, Louis XIV failed to provide the promised military support. This neglect, combined with Pedro II's fear of Bourbon Spain, allowed England to enlist Portugal into the Grand Alliance in 1703. Protection from Spain remained the Portuguese king's primary concern. The dissertation is based on research in Portuguese and French archives. It includes two maps. The work is highly recommended for specialists.


Despite the title, this study considers the House of Schönborn from the Peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. Richard H. Thompson examines the diplomacy of Johann Phillip, Bishop of Würzburg and Worms as well as Elector-Archbishop of Mainz (1642-73). The Bourbon-Habsburg rivalry forced Johann Phillip to align himself with France during the first half of his reign and with
Austria in the second half. The author next contemplates the diplomacy of Lothar Franz, Bishop of Bamberg (1693-1729) and Elector of Mainz (1695-1729). After the Peace of Ryswick, Lothar Franz attempted to organize the Imperial Circles and create a peacetime Imperial military army separate from the Austrian Habsburgs. At the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession the Elector of Mainz and other German princes sought to remain neutral in the Bourbon-Habsburg struggle. But, Leopold I acquired Lothar Franz's support with the promise of subsidies and a guarantee of Mainz's security. In return, the Elector of Mainz was instrumental in influencing the Imperial Circles to back the Habsburgs and the Grand Alliance in 1701. The study is supported by research in German and Austrian archives.


In this unpublished doctoral dissertation, Roger Wines examines the role of the Franconian Circle in Imperial affairs after the Peace of Ryswick and during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author discusses the role of Lothar Franz von Schönborn, Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden, and Johann Georg von Kulpis in the formation of an Association of Circles for Imperial defense in 1697. Wines stresses that Franconia quickly supported the German emperor at the outbreak of war...
in May 1701. In fact, the Elector of Mainz and Margrave Christian Ernst of Bayreuth invaded the Bavarian Upper Palatinate as well as supplied forces for Austrian military actions against the French on the Rhine before the Imperial Diet sided with Leopold I in September 1702. Wines shows that the Franconian Circle made a significant contribution of money and troops to the war effort during the course of the conflict. He argues that the war stirred a sense of loyalty in the small German states for the German emperor in the struggle against Louis XIV. The dissertation is supported by research in German archives. It is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.

See also:


7.7. The War of the Spanish Succession - General Military Studies


Christopher T. Atkinson of Oxford University, a military historian, explores the financial cost of the War of the Spanish Succession for England based upon an examination of the Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers for 1702 to 1712. He considers the cost of guards and garrisons, ordnance, transport, as well as the cost of war in the Low Countries, Spain, and Portugal. His analysis supports the concept that the cost of war led to English war weariness and the political upheaval of 1710.


This is a narrative study by Atkinson of the military campaigns and diplomacy of the War of the Spanish Succession. The author focuses on the war effort from the side of the Grand Alliance. The study is still a useful essay despite its age and lack of notes.


Anthony Kemp presents a valuable survey of military organization, administration, weapons, equipment, and tactics employed by armies, especially the forces under the Duke of Marlborough, during the War of
the Spanish Succession. He primarily focuses on the weapons, equipment, and tactics of the infantry, cavalry, artillery corps, and engineers. He argues that Marlborough's army and other European armies were "organized and equipped along basically the same lines" (p.3). The study includes 108 illustrations depicting military operations, weapons, equipment, infantry tactics, and tactical formations. Moreover, Kemp provides a useful glossary of military terms, bibliography, and chronology. Recommended for the military specialist.


John H. Owen, a commander in the Royal Navy, furnishes a valuable study of English naval operations during the first few years of the War of the Spanish Succession. He provides a description of Queen Anne's navy and naval operations in the Mediterranean, including the Cádiz (1702), Vigo Bay (1702), Gibraltar (1704), Barcelona (1705), Toulon (1707), and Port Mahón (1708) expeditions. The author also describes naval protection of English trade and shipping, in addition to the defense of the British Isles against an attempted invasion by Franco-Jacobite forces in 1708. The study is supported by research in British archives. It includes five charts and plans, six illustrations, and six appendices. The study is highly recommended for specialists and naval historians.

August J. Veenendaal, Jr., the senior research historian at the Institute of Netherlands History at The Hague, provides an excellent survey of the War of the Spanish Succession. He describes the foreign policies, war aims, and military capabilities of the combatants as well as the military campaigns on land and sea. The author is especially strong on Dutch participation in the war. The study is highly recommended as a balanced introduction to the conflict.

See also:


7.8. The Conflict in the Low Countries and Germany


Atkinson furnishes a full-scale study of Marlborough's military career, especially concentrating on his generalship, strategy, and tactics during the War of the Spanish Succession. The work is based on contemporary authorities, including Sir George Murray's five volumes of The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1712 (1845), Archdeacon William C. Coxe's six volume set of Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (1820), Calendar of State Papers, Treasury Books and Papers, memoirs and diaries of soldiers, as well as documents published by the Historical Manuscript Commission and Camden Society. The study includes eight illustrations and sixteen maps. This is a dated, but still useful work on Marlborough and the British army.


In this article, Atkinson stresses that Marlborough conducted more siege operations than field battles in the War of the Spanish Succession.
Marlborough was forced to concentrate on siege warfare because of the objections of Dutch field-deputies to risky field battles. Moreover, he was forced to fight siege warfare due to the strength of the heavily defended French frontier. Atkinson writes that "the combination of [French] fortresses and fortified lines forced upon an assailant the necessity of undertaking the systematic reduction of successive fortresses in order to obtain elbow-room for manoeuvre . . ." (p.197). Siege warfare, however, cost Marlborough's army more casualties than field battle (p.198). In fact, Atkinson provides information on eighteen siege operations which cost the allies over 60,000 casualties (pp.202-5).


Atkinson makes further comments on Marlborough's sieges (see 7.8.2). He further describes the duke's siege efforts and the high cost in casualties. The article is based on the Nicholls newspapers in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.


Atkinson brings to light the British involvement in the battle of Wynendael (Wijnendaal) in September 1708. During the campaign of 1708 the allies had defeated the French at Oudenarde in July, and then besieged Lille in August. While Prince Eugene of Savoy and Johan
Willem Friso, the Prince of Nassau-Dietz and Orange, laid siege to Lille, the Duke of Marlborough and Field Marshal Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk (Overkirk) kept an eye on the French army. However, French forces under the Count de la Motte-Houdancourt tried to surprise a large convoy of allied munitions at Wynendael in the Spanish Netherlands. Atkinson shows that the allied order of battle included four British regiments. The Anglo-Dutch force commanded by General John Richmond Webb and Count Cornelis van Nassau-Woudenberg defeated the vastly superior French forces, suffering 912 casualties while the enemy lost between 6,000 and 7,000 men (p.30). The article includes a map and an order of battle.


The authors argue that Marlborough's tactics in the battle of Ramillies (1706) equaled his tactical brilliance in the battle of Blenheim (1704). They provide a brief account of the battle as well as analyze the topography of the battlefield. They point out that the undulations of the ground must have made it difficult for Villeroi to view the complete field of battle. As a result, Marlborough effectively used the slopes to tactically outmaneuver the French and deliver a crushing blow to Louis XIV's army. The article includes one battle map and seven photographs.

Correlli Barnett, a British military historian, provides a biography of the Duke of Marlborough. He concentrates on Marlborough's personality and war leadership. The author praises Marlborough's contribution to British history. Barnett's study is based on archival research in Britain and France as well as published primary sources. The study includes thirteen maps and 145 illustrations. It is recommended as an introduction to Marlborough.


Eversley Belfield of the University of Southampton describes the events leading up to and the conduct of the battle of Oudenarde in July 1708. Marlborough defeated the French forces under Marshal Vendôme and Louis, Duke of Bourgogne, the grandson of Louis XIV. The study includes brief biographies of the leading British, Dutch, Prussian, and French commanders involved in the action in addition to an analysis of military command and control, organization, tactics, and weapons of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The work contains six maps. It is based on secondary sources and lacks footnotes. The study is recommended for military historians and those individuals interested in war games.

This is a study of the combat tactics and strategy employed by Marlborough in six key military engagements. Hilaire Belloc examines the duke's generalship at the battle of Blenheim (1704), the forcing of the lines of Brabant (1705), the battle of Ramillies (1706), battle of Oudenarde (1708), battle of Malplaquet (1709), and the forcing of the lines of Flanders and Artois (1711). The work includes eighteen valuable maps of battlegrounds. It is a dated study which lacks footnotes.


In this brief article, the author investigates the reasons for a high casualty rate on the allied left flank in Marlborough and Prince Eugene's attack on prepared French entrenchments at the battle of Malplaquet in September 1709. On the allied left flank, the Prince of Orange led the Dutch army in charge after charge over open ground near the wood of Laniere against a superior French force behind fortified positions. The attacks led to an extremely high casualty rate, and much criticism for Orange's action. H.G. Bowen notes that Christopher T. Atkinson (7.8.1) and Frank Taylor (7.8.21) believe Orange exceeded his orders. However, the author believes the Dutch suffered a high casualty rate.
because Orange attacked at the wrong place according to battle plans. Marlborough's orders given the day before the battle had Orange attacking and clearing the wood of Laniere, giving allied forces the benefit of cover from the trees (p.41). However, Marlborough failed to inform Orange that his action would be a feint designed to keep Marshal Villars from transferring forces from his right flank to his center and left flank. Thus, the high loss of Dutch forces was the result of Marlborough's poor communications with subordinate commanders as well as Orange's mistake in launching an attack at the wrong location. Bowen clears Orange of the charges that he exceeded his battle orders. The article includes a battle map.


In this excellent study, Ivor F. Burton of the University of London addresses the Duke of Marlborough's military strategy and tactics during the War of the Spanish Succession. He examines Marlborough's leadership in securing the Dutch Republic from a French invasion in 1702, the march to the Danube and defeat of Bavaria in 1704, and conquest of the Spanish Netherlands in 1706. These actions put Louis XIV on the defensive. Burton firmly believes that Marlborough's military achievements should have ended the conflict in 1706. But, the allied
enlargement of war aims to include the conquest of Spain and the transfer of the entire Spanish inheritance to Archduke Charles of Austria prolonged the conflict. The author stresses that in the subsequent military campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands Marlborough almost succeeded in forcing Louis XIV to accept allied war aims regarding Spain in 1709-10 (p.194). However, Marlborough's success was frustrated by the allied military failure in Spain as well as allied demands that the Sun King force his own grandson off the Spanish throne. The author stresses that:

Marlborough . . . achieved all that military power can achieve; he destroyed the offensive potential of a great power by defeating its armies in whatever they attempted; . . . however, his military genius was not, and could not be, sufficient to make up for the political and military failures of the Allies to win the entire kingdom of Spain (pp.3-4).

The study includes eight maps and battle plans. It is based on archival research in Britain as well as published primary works.


Professor David G. Chandler of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst provides a brief sketch of Marlborough's campaign of 1704. He discusses the planning, march to the Danube, and battles of the Schellenberg and Blenheim. The article includes eight illustrations and
two maps. It is a fine introduction to the campaign of 1704. But the article lacks notes.


Chandler provides a brief biographical sketch of the Duke of Marlborough. The article is recommended as a quick introduction to the duke and his military accomplishments. However, one should consult Chandler's study *Marlborough as Military Commander* (3.3.5) for detailed information.


Sir Winston Churchill provides a full-scale biography of his ancestor, the first Duke of Marlborough. The author praises Marlborough and his military and diplomatic leadership of the Grand Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession. The study is based on archival research in England, France, The Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and the United States as well as published primary sources. Churchill had access to Marlborough's correspondence at Blenheim Palace (see Snyder, 7.4.29). The study is recommended for students of military and diplomatic history despite Churchill's concentration on the English viewpoint of the war. It includes 194 maps and battle plans.

This is a brief study of the Duke of Marlborough's military campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession. The study lacks notes, but it contains seven battlefield maps. This is an older work with limited value.


Francis discusses the planning and movement of Marlborough's army from the Low Countries to the Danube. He describes the cooperation of Marlborough; Count Johann Wenzel von Wratislaw, the Imperial ambassador to London; and Prince Eugene in the planning and execution of the Danube campaign of 1704. The author stresses the support of the Imperial Circles in Marlborough's march to the Danube. This support provided food and forage for the Anglo-Dutch forces. The author uses Wratislaw's correspondence to illuminate the Imperial viewpoint of the campaign.


David Green provides a narrative account of the Duke of Marlborough's 1704 military campaign, including the march to the Danube and battles at the Schellenberg and Blenheim. The study presents the English point of view and it is based largely on British
secondary sources. The work lacks notes and a bibliography, but it contains nine useful maps and twenty-eight interesting illustrations. It is useful for the general reader.


In this master's thesis, Jamel M. Ostwald examines the Duke of Marlborough’s "strategy of annihilation" against France in the Low Countries during the War of the Spanish Succession. The duke continuously sought the decisive battlefield victory. However, the French strategy of avoiding a full-scale battle made it difficult for Marlborough to achieve the much desired decisive victory. The French offered only three major battles (Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet) in nine years. Instead, French forces remained behind heavily fortified defense lines and in fortresses, opting to wage a war of attrition. French strategy, centered on siege warfare, combined with Marlborough's lack of large-scale cavalry forces led to the failure of British military strategy in the Low Countries. This is a valuable study.


Ivan P. Phelan furnishes a study of Marlborough's management of logistical requirements for his army during the War of the Spanish
Succession. The author focuses on Marlborough’s march to the Danube in 1704. He points out that the duke led a force of 25,000 troops and 4,000 support personnel; 1,700 supply carts drawn by 5,000 horses; an artillery train pulled by another 5,000 horses; as well as 2,000 cavalry horses on a forty-four day march over 300 miles on difficult roads from the Low Countries to southern Germany (pp.36, 40, 107). Upon arrival at Donauwörth, Marlborough led this army into combat and victory against Bavarian forces at the Schellenberg. Phelan argues that this success was achievable in part by Marlborough’s genius as a logistician, or attention to administration and supply. The author describes the difficulty of supplying bread for the troops, acquiring transport horses to haul the army’s equipment and stores, as well as forage for the cavalry and transport horses. Marlborough succeeded by paying great attention to arranging magazines along the route to be stocked with supplies ahead of time, the support of the Imperial Circles, and paying with gold for needed food, forage, and supplies. Phelan credits the duke with developing an effective logistical system based on immediate payment for goods.

Major R.E. Scouller, the author of *The Armies of Queen Anne* (3.3.11), analyzes the Duke of Marlborough's administrative and logistics system in Flanders during the War of the Spanish Succession. Scouller addresses Marlborough's primary logistical problems of procuring bread for his troops, horse forage, as well as transportation of food, forage, and equipment. He argues that the duke's success came from efficient staff officers who supervised logistics; carefully planned marching routes; the maximum employment of bread contractors; and a systemized practice of levying and hiring local population.


Professor Claude C. Sturgill of the University of Florida studies the generalship of Claude Louis Hector, Duke of Villars (1653-1734) in the War of the Spanish Succession. At the beginning of the conflict Villars served as second-in-command to Marshal Catinat. His command of French forces in the victory over Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden at Friedlingen (1702) resulted in his promotion to Marshal of France. However, Villars was recalled from Germany in disgrace because of his arguments with the Elector of Bavaria over the conduct of the war.
Marshal Villars suppression of the Camisard revolt in 1704 regained the king's favor and led to his appointment as commander of the French army on the Rhine in 1705. As such, Villars defeated Imperial armies at Wissembourg (1705), Hochenfelden (1705), and Schorndorf (1707). Louis XIV next placed Villars in charge of the French army in Flanders in 1708. Sturgill credits Villars with stopping the allied advance into France at Malplaquet (1709). His victory at Denain forced the Dutch to negotiate peace at the Congress of Utrecht. His capture of Landau and Freiburg-im-Breisgau in 1713 forced Austria into the Peace of Rastatt, negotiated by Marshal Villars and Prince Eugene of Savoy in 1714. In his assessment, Sturgill does not see Villars as a great strategist or tactical commander. He recognizes Villars' "drive and determination" as the key element to the marshal's success. The study is based on archival research in France and Austria. It is highly recommended reading for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


In this classic study, Frank Taylor of Oxford University provides a full-length narrative of the Duke of Marlborough's military campaigns from 1702 to 1709. Taylor builds on the works of Archdeacon William C. Coxe's Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (1820) and Field-
Marshal Garnet Wolseley's two-volume biography Life of Marlborough to the Accession of Queen Anne (1894) using primary documents unavailable to the mentioned authors. This is a useful study that should be supplemented with the biographies by Sir Winston S. Churchill (7.8.13.), David G. Chandler (3.3.5.), and James R. Jones (7.4.25). It contains ten valuable maps.


This is a biography of Marlborough by George Malcolm Thomson. The author concentrates on the duke's life and his role in making England a dominant power in the early eighteenth century. The work is based on published primary and secondary sources.


Veenendaal addresses Marlborough's military plans for the campaign of 1708 and Marshal Vendôme's countermove to disrupt the allies in the Spanish Netherlands. In early 1708 the duke planned to evacuate allied forces from Brussels and then employ these troops elsewhere against the French. Word of this plan quickly leaked to the French. Veenendaal stresses that Marlborough left various parts of the Spanish Netherlands undefended. Vendôme took advantage of this situation and moved to
surprise and occupy Ghent on 4 July and Bruges on 5 July. Dutch military and political leaders criticized Marlborough's exposure of Ghent and Bruges to the French threat. They, according to the author, considered replacing Marlborough with Prince Eugene as allied military commander in Flanders. But, the Dutch kept their faith in the Englishman. Veenendaal stresses the lack of a Dutch military leader comparable to Marlborough or Eugene. Marlborough, nonetheless, reclaimed honor with the victory at Oudenarde on 11 July. Marlborough's army besieged and captured Ghent and Bruges in January 1709.


Major Peter Verney of the British Army supplies an outstanding study of the 1704 campaign and the battle of Blenheim. In this balanced account, the author examines the military operations of the Grand Alliance, led by Marlborough, Baden, and Prince Eugene, as well as the Franco-Bavarian forces, commanded by Tallard, Marsin, and Maximilian II Emanuel. Verney describes Marlborough's march to the Danube, the attack on the Schellenberg, and the battle of Blenheim in great detail. He praises Marlborough's administrative ability to create a patchwork army, including professional soldiers, conscripts, and mercenaries from numerous countries, that was capable of defeating the Franco-Bavarian
opponent. The study is based on research in British and French archives, diaries of the participants, and documents from the Historical Manuscripts Commission. It includes eight valuable maps and fifteen illustrations. The work is highly recommended for specialists and military historians.

See also:


7.9. The Conflict in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula


This is an account by an anonymous member of the British army who fought in the Iberian campaigns in the War of the Spanish Succession. Atkinson highly recommends the forty-nine page narrative as "a trustworthy addition to the slender contemporary sources for the story of the campaigns" (p.8). It includes two maps.


Atkinson analyzes the size and losses of General James Stanhope's British army at the battle of Brihuega in 1710. The author uses archival material to place the size of Stanhope's forces at 3,700 at the beginning of the battle. He figures the French army under Marshal Vendôme killed
400 of Stanhope's force, as well as captured 3,300 British officers and men, including 200 wounded, in the action (p.121).


In this article, Atkinson studies the deployment of British forces to the Iberian Peninsula in the attempt to establish Archduke Charles on the Spanish throne. He concludes that the second front in Spain and Portugal absorbed a substantial number of British troops with little result. Atkinson argues that these forces could have been employed by Marlborough in Flanders in the quest for a decisive victory over Louis XIV.


Burton argues that the diplomatic commitment to establish Archduke Charles on the Spanish throne was beyond England's military capabilities. "The government," he writes, "had undertaken commitments beyond the resources of manpower available to it" (p.57). The "chronic shortage" of infantry meant British regiments and battalions were undermanned in the Iberian theater of operations (p.57). In fact, this shortage of forces resulted in Galway's defeat by a much larger army under Berwick at Almanza in April 1707. The author
stresses the impossibility of a British military victory in Spain, and the
government's ignorance of military reality with the cry "No Peace
without Spain!" The article includes appendices listing regiments and
the locations where they served in the war from 1703-7 and the annual
requirements of infantry recruits for 1704-7.

7.9.5. Carr Laughton, L.G. "The Battle of Velez Malaga, 1704." The Journal

The author analyzes the naval battle of Málaga (Vélez Málaga) off
the southeastern coast of Spain in August 1704. The action was the
only major naval engagement of the Anglo-Dutch and French fleets
during the War of the Spanish Succession. In the battle the French
fleet, commanded by Admiral Louis Alexandre of Bourbon, Count of
Toulouse, engaged the Anglo-Dutch fleet of Admiral Sir George Rooke.
The battle was indecisive, but the Maritime Powers prevented the
French fleet from approaching and recapturing Gibraltar. The author
focuses on naval tactics and the order of battle.

7.9.6. Chandler, David G. "The Siege of Alicante." History Today 19 (July

Chandler describes Major General John Richard's heroic defense of
Alicante in a 136-day-long siege by the forces of Philip V. Allied forces
had captured the port city and its formidable fortress of Santa Barbara
for Archduke Charles of Austria in 1706. The port was valuable to
resupply allied forces in Valencia. However, Bourbon forces commanded by General Jacques-Vincent Bidel of Asfeld began siege operations against Santa Barbara, which rested on a 400-foot hill, in December 1708. The author renders an account of Asfeld's establishment of siege lines and mining operations with 12,000 men against Richard's garrison of 800 defenders (p.481). Chandler depicts how Asfeld detonated 1,200 barrels of gunpowder planted beneath the fortress and killed Richards and many of his men in March 1709 (p.483). The remaining men in the garrison held out until relieving forces arrived off Cape Huertas. Admiral George Byng and General James Stanhope, however, decided not to send forces ashore in the face of Bourbon defenses. Instead, they handed the fortress over to a surprised Asfeld in return for the garrison's safe conduct from Alicante in April 1709. The article includes five illustrations.


Dickinson considers the capture and importance of Port Mahón on the island of Minorca. In September 1708, British naval ships transported a force of Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish troops to Minorca. The author describes the assault led by Stanhope that captured the forts and Port Mahón manned by Franco-Spanish forces. He also stresses the strategic importance of Minorca to England. Port Mahón gave England
a secure winter base for naval ships. The port allowed England to maintain the fleet in the Mediterranean for trade protection and blockading operations against France and Spain. Moreover, the port served as a springboard for allied attacks on the Bourbons in Spain and Italy. The English possession of Gibraltar (1704) and Minorca made England a Mediterranean power. The article includes a map that outlines the defenses of Port Mahón.


Dickinson supplies a brief, but detailed treatment of the Anglo-Dutch siege and capture of Barcelona in 1705. He agrees with George M. Trevelyan’s assessment (see 7.9.20) that Charles Mordaunt, the Earl of Peterborough (1658-1735) planned the attack on the citadel of Montjuich, located on top of a 700-foot hill, and the fortified city of Barcelona. Peterborough and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt led the charge that captured Montjuich in September. Under the earl’s direction the allied forces captured Barcelona in October 1705. The article includes six illustrations and one map.


In this article, Dickinson stresses the Earl of Peterborough’s difficult personality, his strained relations with the court of Archduke Charles of
Austria at Barcelona, as well as the campaign of 1706 in Spain. After having captured Barcelona and securing Catalonia for Archduke Charles in 1705, Peterborough looked forward to an offensive in Valencia. Dickinson describes the quarrels between Peterborough and the court of Archduke Charles, which delayed the beginning of allied military operations in Valencia. Even so, Peterborough marched into Valencia and led a successful campaign of maneuvers against the Count de las Torres in 1706. In the meantime, however, the delay in allied action allowed Philip V to recover the initiative and advance on the allies in eastern Spain. Philip V and Marshal Tessé marched from Madrid and began to besiege Archduke Charles at Barcelona. The author points out that Peterborough failed to quickly respond to Archduke Charles' pleas for military assistance. In the end, the English navy played the key role in forcing the Franco-Spanish army to abandon the siege of the city. Dickinson clearly shows that Peterborough's arrogance and difficulties in allied leadership was a disruption to effective allied operations in Spain. The article contains three illustrations.


Dickinson examines the controversy surrounding the recall of the Earl of Peterborough from his command in Spain in 1707. The author begins by describing the Earl of Galway's capture of Madrid in June 1706 and
the need for Archduke Charles of Austria to show himself in the capital city. The Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne failed to show, resulting in the Bourbon forces of Philip V reclaiming the city during the following month. Dickinson stresses that the failure of Charles to enter Madrid led to the collapse of Castilian support for the Habsburg cause. He writes, "this astonishing dilatoriness was perhaps the greatest single reason for the failure of the Austrian cause in Spain" (p.177). The author places the blame for Charles' inaction on the dispute between Peterborough and the court of Archduke Charles over strategy, Peterborough's personal conflict with Galway, and the question of command authority. As a consequence of the disaster, Peterborough was recalled to England in early 1707. The Godolphin ministry needed a commander in Spain who would cooperate with Archduke Charles. Dickinson points out that allied commanders continued to argue over strategy after the recall of Peterborough.


In this article, Francis discusses the influence of Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt on the military plans of the Maritime Powers. Leopold I urged the Maritime Powers to launch an expedition to Naples and Sicily in 1702. However, Prince George, who had served as viceroy to
Catalonia from 1697 to 1701, traveled to London and convinced William III to direct this military expedition to Spain instead of Naples. In the subsequent military operation, the German emperor had Prince George accompany the expedition against Cádiz as an observer in 1702. The plan called for the seizure of Cádiz to provide the allies a strong seaport on the straits, open the way to the Mediterranean, impress Portugal with allied strength, and provide England with a base for trade with the new world.


Francis furnishes a valuable survey of the diplomatic and military operations concerning the Iberian Peninsula during the War of the Spanish Succession. He argues that English, Dutch, and Austrian leaders had little enthusiasm for a ground war in Spain. The Maritime Powers preferred to fight a naval war against the Bourbon Powers in the west, while the German emperor wanted to concentrate on Spanish territory in Italy rather than Spain itself. However, the Maritime Powers committed themselves to a land war in the Peninsula to gain a Portuguese alliance and trade concessions in 1703. Even so, the Iberian Peninsula remained a secondary theater of operations for the warring parties. In fact, the German emperor reluctantly allowed Archduke Charles to participate in Anglo-Dutch operations to claim the Spanish...
crown for the Habsburgs. Francis, nevertheless, stresses the importance of the ground war in the Peninsula in the Anglo-Dutch struggle against Louis XIV's growing power. Unfortunately, the study fails to consider the Franco-Spanish Bourbon point of view. The study is based on research in British, Dutch, Austrian, and German archives and published primary sources. It includes ten maps and a useful chronology. The study is highly recommended for specialists, graduate students, and military historians.


Professor Stephen F. Gradish of St. Thomas More College surveys the events beginning with William III and the Nine Years' War to the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession that led to Britain becoming a Mediterranean naval power. He stresses England's need to deploy the fleet into the Mediterranean to check French military operations in southern Europe during both wars. The acquisition of Gibraltar (1704) and Minorca (1708) made Britain a naval power in the Mediterranean. This achievement allowed England to disrupt Louis XIV's dominance in southern Europe and create a balance of power in the Mediterranean.

Nicholas Henderson provides the first full-scale biography of Prince Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy-Carignan (1663-1736) published in the English language. The author focuses on Prince Eugene's military career. He describes Eugene's military exploits in the Austrian struggle against the Turks (1683-99), including his famous victory at Zenta (1697), and in the Nine Years' War (1688-97). In the War of the Spanish Succession Prince Eugene commanded Imperial forces in Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries, forming a close partnership with the Duke of Marlborough. The author relates Eugene's military campaigns, including the battles at Chiari (1701), Cremona (1702), Blenheim (1704), Turin (1706), Toulon (1707) Oudenarde (1708), Malplaquet (1709), and Denain (1712). The study is based on published primary and secondary works. It includes twelve maps and twenty-four illustrations.


Tony Hurgill fills a historiographical gap with this balanced account of military operations in the Iberian Peninsula during the War of the Spanish Succession. The author relates both the military efforts of the Grand Alliance and Bourbon Powers. Hurgill notes the lack of innovations in military tactics or land strategy in this conflict, but he
declares that the Royal Navy first developed a consistent Mediterranean strategy in this war. The author describes the events of the war in the peninsula, including the final siege of Barcelona in the summer of 1714. The work is based on archival research in Britain, Spain, and France. It complements the study by David Francis (7.9.12). The study contains eight illustrations and twenty battle maps.


Henry Kamen of the University of Warwick reassesses the traditional view that the Anglo-Dutch naval victory over the Spanish silver fleet, escorted by French warships, at Vigo Bay resulted in the allies reaping a huge booty of silver. Instead, the author argues that the Spanish had removed most of the silver from their ships before the allied attack. He stresses that the allies "won no immediate benefit from Vigo apart from the satisfaction of having destroyed a large number of good French warships and several Spanish merchant ships" (p.172).


Kamen investigates French policy in Spain and the effect of the War of the Spanish Succession on the finances of the Spanish crown. He shows that Philip V reformed the administrative structure of Spain in an attempt to arrest the decline of the country. The study is supported by
research in Spanish, French, and British archives. It includes three
diagrams and eighteen tables. The work is recommended for individuals
interested in economic and administrative history.


In this study, Derek McKay of the University of London considers the
military and political career of Prince Eugene. The author relates
Eugene's military campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession,
his actions as president of the Imperial War Council, and the negotiation
of the Peace of Rastatt. The study is based on archival research in
Austria, Germany, and Great Britain. It includes a useful chronology,
bibliography, five maps, and forty-three illustrations.


Sir Charles Petrie, the President of the Military History Society of
Ireland and Corresponding Member of the Royal Spanish Academy of
History, provides a biography of James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick
(1670-1734). Berwick was the illegitimate son of James II of England
by Arabella Churchill, the sister of the Duke of Marlborough. He fought
for the Jacobites during the Nine Years' War in Ireland, and later in the
service of Louis XIV in Flanders, including the battles of Steenkirk
(1692) and Neerwinden (1693). During the War of the Spanish
Succession, Berwick served under the Duke of Bourgogne and Marshal Boufflers in Germany and Flanders in 1701-3. In 1704, he commanded the Spanish forces attacking Portugal. After his recall to France, the duke captured Nice (1706) and earned a marshal's baton. Next, Berwick, commanding Franco-Spanish forces, recaptured Madrid (1706) and defeated Galway at Almanza (1707). After spending a year in Flanders, Berwick was charged with defending the Alpine passes against an enemy invasion in 1709-12. The Sun King transferred Berwick back to the Iberian Peninsula, where he seized Barcelona in 1714. A fascinating life of a military commander who served in numerous theaters of operations. The study contains eight illustrations and four maps. It is based on the Berwick papers as well as published primary sources. The study is suggested reading for military enthusiasts.


Trevelyan argues that the Earl of Peterborough planned and led the allied attack on Montjuich and Barcelona in June 1705. He cites the papers of Colonel John Richards who directed the artillery fire during the attack on Barcelona. Previous historians had ignored Peterborough's contribution and gave credit to Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, who was killed in the charge on Montjuich, for planning the capture of Barcelona.
Professor Basil Williams of Oxford University examines the military and diplomatic career of James, first Earl of Stanhope (1673-1721). The study contains a discussion of Stanhope's service in the War of the Spanish Succession, including his participation in the Cádiz expedition (1702), military operations in Flanders (1703), Portugal (1704), and the capture of Barcelona (1705), as well as his activities as British envoy to Archduke Charles of Austria. In 1708, Stanhope was appointed commander of the British forces in Spain. Stanhope and Rear Admiral Sir Edward Whittaker mounted a combined expedition that rapidly overran the island of Minorca and captured Port Mahón in September 1708. He also led the allied army to victories at Almenara, Lérida, and Saragossa in 1710. But, Marshal Vendôme defeated and captured the earl at Brihuega in December 1710, which, in effect, ended the allied war effort in Spain. The study is based on British archival sources. It includes maps of allied campaigns in Spain and Portugal, the attack on Port Mahón, and Brihuega.

See also:


7.10. The Peace of Utrecht and Rastatt


Mark C. Herman examines the role of Sir Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford (1672-1739), in the making of the Peace of Utrecht in 1712-13. At the peace congress Strafford served as the second British plenipotentiary. The author shows that Strafford played a minor role in the formulation of the peace settlement. He was nothing more than a messenger of the Oxford ministry. The dissertation is based on British archival sources.


Brian W. Hill of the University of East Anglia argues that Robert Harley, the Earl of Oxford, played a significant role in the making of the Peace of Utrecht. The author challenges the traditional view (see Pitt, 7.10.4) that Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, was the chief author of the peace settlement. Hill shows that Oxford directed the peace negotiations with France that led to the preliminary peace agreement in 1711. In fact, Oxford kept his correspondence with the Duke of Shrewsbury at Versailles secret from Bolingbroke. The earl also kept close supervision over Bolingbroke's diplomatic activities. Although his participation in the peace process waned after October 1712, Oxford
had played the key role in the decisions that shaped the final settlement in 1713 (p.262).


In this essay, A.D. MacLachlan of the University of Sydney stresses the role of English domestic politics in the making of the Peace of Utrecht. The author examines the roles of Oxford and Bolingbroke in England's relationship with the Dutch Republic and Austria, as well as the secret talks with France. MacLachlan argues that Oxford controlled British negotiations with Louis XIV's diplomatic representatives.


H.G. Pitt of Oxford University provides a concise survey of the making of the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt. He begins his narrative after the battle of Ramillies (1706) and discusses the early negotiations, recounting the difficulties of achieving a satisfactory agreement between France and the Grand Alliance, as well as between the allies themselves. Serious negotiations, however, began after the battle of Oudenarde (1708). The author focuses on the problems of the Dutch barrier, Protestant succession in Britain, and the allied desire to remove Philip V from the Spanish throne.
Pitt argues that the turning point in the peace talks was the downfall of the Godolphin ministry in 1710. The new British government, the Oxford ministry, sought to end the war. In ending the conflict, the Earl of Oxford wanted the cooperation of the Dutch Republic. Nonetheless, Viscount Bolingbroke, the secretary of state, took charge of the peace negotiations and "wished to present the Allies with a fait accompli" (p.458). Pitt stresses that Bolingbroke responded to the French initiative to negotiate a separate peace while launching a propaganda war to stir up anti-Dutch sentiment in England. The key factor in the Anglo-French talks was the Oxford ministry's refusal to continue the war in Spain in favor of Archduke Charles who had acquired the entire Habsburg inheritance in April 1711. As a result, the British government and Louis XIV reached a preliminary peace agreement at the London (Mesnager) Convention of October 1711. This agreement served as the foundation for the peace congress which opened three months later in Utrecht.

Pitt describes the British attempt to achieve a general peace settlement during the next fifteen months at Utrecht. British diplomacy played a key role in a series of peace treaties between Britain, Savoy, Portugal, Prussia, the Dutch Republic, and France in April 1713. However, Charles VI of Austria refused to make peace without the acquisition of Catalonia. The war between the German Empire and
France continued for another year, but the author points out that this struggle brought Austria the reward of Sardinia, the Netherlands, and a free hand in Italy (p.474). He adds that with the conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht and later treaties, including those involving Spain, the balance of power in Europe was restored.


This is a biography of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury (1660-1718). Shrewsbury served as Lord Chamberlain in the Oxford ministry (1710-12) and later as British ambassador to France (1712-13). He negotiated important issues at Versailles and communicated with the Earl of Strafford and John Robinson at Utrecht during the making of the peace settlement. The study contains a short chapter on Shrewsbury's diplomatic activities. It has limited value for historians interested in diplomacy.

See also:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE BALTIC AND THE TURKISH THREAT IN EASTERN EUROPE, 1648-1721

The Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) established Sweden as the leading power in the Baltic and as a Great Power in Europe.¹ The Swedish Empire, ruled by Queen Christina (1644-54), consisted of Sweden; Finland; the islands of Öland, Åland, Gotland, Dagö, and Ösel; as well as Ingria (Ingermanland), Estonia (Estland), Karelia (Kexholm), and Livonia (Livland) in northeast Europe. Much of this land had been acquired by military conquest against Denmark, Poland, and Russia during the previous century.²


In 1648, Sweden, a co-guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, added to its far-flung empire the bishoprics of Verden and Bremen (not including the Imperial city of Bremen), Wismar, and West (Swedish) Pomerania with the cities of Stralsund and Stettin (Szeczin) in northern Germany. These territorial acquisitions gave Sweden control of the mouths of the Weser, Elbe, and Oder rivers, and bestowed a seat to the Swedish monarch in the German Imperial Diet.

After 1648, Sweden continued to pursue the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic Region. On the one hand, the Swedish monarchy looked for an opportunity to acquire the southern province of Scania (Skåne) from Denmark and the Baltic coastline, including West (Royal) Prussia, East (Ducal) Prussia (ruled as a Polish fief by the Elector of Brandenburg), and Courland (Kurland) from Poland. On the other hand, the Swedes had to defend their empire against the ambitions of their neighbors. Threats to the Swedish Empire included King John Casimir (Kazimierz) of Poland-Lithuania (1648-68) claiming the Swedish throne; Denmark, Poland, and Russia seeking to regain lost lands;


Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg's (1640-88) coveting West Pomerania; and the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg wanting Bremen and Verden.\(^4\)

While Sweden was ascending towards domination of the Baltic, the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, the second largest state in Europe, experienced severe troubles. In 1648, the Commonwealth included the Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Courland, Semigalia (Polish Livonia), East Prussia, Smolensk, Belorussia (Byelorussia/Białorus/White Russia), Podolia, and the Ukraine.\(^5\) The Commonwealth had lost Livonia to Sweden in the Second Polish-Swedish War (1617-29). Moreover, the Commonwealth, under the newly crowned king, John Casimir, experienced a major rebellion. In 1648, the Orthodox Cossacks in the Ukraine rebelled against Polish rule and Roman Catholicism. The Cossacks, led by Bogdan Khmelnitsky (Chmielnicki/Khmel’nts’kii), had the support of the Ukrainian peasants, Crimean khan, and Tartar army. However, in July 1651, the Polish army decisively defeated

\(^{4}\)The two brothers, Duke Christian Ludwig of Celle (1648-65) and Duke Johann Friedrich of Calenberg (1648-65) ruled the lands that would form the future Electorate of Hanover (1692). Contemporary usage called them the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg.

Chmielnicki at the battle of Beresteczko. This victory resulted in the Peace of Bila Tserkva (Biała Cerkiew) (1651). But, in January 1654, in the Treaty of Pereiaslav (Pereyaslavl/Perejasław), the Cossacks betrayed the Polish king and placed the Ukraine east of the Dnieper under the protection of Tsar Alexis I of Russia (1645-1676).

At this point, Alexis I decided to intervene in Polish affairs to assist the Cossacks in their struggle. The Tsar wanted to unite the Orthodox Christians, as well as win back lands in Smolensk, the Ukraine, and Belorussia that were lost in previous wars with Poland. In July 1654, the Tsar led the Russian army into the Commonwealth, beginning the Thirteen Years’ War (1654-67) between Russia and Poland. After a three-month siege, the Russians captured Smolensk in September 1654. In the meantime, a joint Russian and Cossack army invaded the Ukraine and occupied Kiev. The Polish army defeated the Russo-Cossack army at Okhmativ in southern Poland, temporarily halting their advance, in January 1655. But, a Russian offensive in Lithuania, assisted by Swedish attacks on Poland, allowed Alexis I to capture Wilno (Vilna/Wilnius) and declare himself Grand Duke of Lithuania in August. At the same time, the Russo-Cossack army in the south conquered all of southern Poland to the lower Vistula, except for the fortified cities of Kamieniec (Kamenec/Kamenets)

---

Podolski and Lwów (Lvov/Lviv/Lemburg). Russian success, however, was upset by the intervention of Poland’s ally, the Crimean khan. The Khan led 150,000 Tartars into the Ukraine.\(^7\) He defeated the Russo-Cossack army at Zalozce in November.

In June 1654, one month before the Russian invasion of the Commonwealth, Charles Gustavus of Zweibrücken ascended to the Swedish throne as Charles X (1654-60). He succeeded his cousin Queen Christina, who had abdicated. Charles X was the son of the Count Palatine of Zweibrücken and Gustavus Adolphus’ sister Katrina. Charles X had served as a military commander in the Swedish army during the Thirty Years’ War. This military background, according to David Kirby, influenced Charles X’s foreign policy.\(^8\) In fact, the Swedish king’s foreign policy focused on securing Swedish control of the Polish Baltic coastline and ports, especially West Prussia. He was encouraged to attack Poland-Lithuania based on Russian success and the belief that the Commonwealth was about to collapse.\(^9\) Charles X was also determined to block the Russian threat to Sweden’s Baltic lands.


\(^8\) Kirby, 184.

In the summer of 1655, Charles X invaded Poland with an overwhelming force of 50,000 men, beginning the First Northern War (1655-60). The Swedish army made a two-prong invasion against Poland: one attack was launched from West Pomerania and the other from Livonia. The Swedish army under Count Arvid Wittenberg quickly occupied western Poland, capturing Poznań (Posen) in July. The Swedish army entered Warsaw without opposition in September, and forced the main Polish army to surrender at Cracow (Kraków) in October. The Polish king, subsequently, fled across the Polish border to Silesia. In the meantime, the Swedish army, under the command of Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie, advanced from Livonia and captured most of Samogitia (Žemaitija/Žmudž). In October 1655, Charles X turned north and occupied West Prussia. He then attacked East Prussia, defended by Frederick William of Brandenburg. The elector was forced to accept Swedish demands concerning Prussia in the Treaty of Königsberg in January 1656. In this treaty, Frederick William agreed to accept East Prussia and Ermland (Warmia) as fiefs of the Swedish crown. Moreover, Sweden and Brandenburg formed an alliance in the Treaty of Marienburg. To ensure the elector’s loyalty, Charles X gave

---


11 This conflict is sometimes referred to as the War of the North, Nordic War, the Deluge, and the Second Northern War by historians.
Frederick William full sovereignty over East Prussia in the Treaty of Labiau in November 1656.\textsuperscript{12}

While Charles X concentrated on Prussia, John Casimir returned to Poland to lead a national uprising against the invaders.\textsuperscript{13} During the spring of 1656, the Polish army defeated the Swedes at Sandomierz (Sandomir). The Poles regained Warsaw in June. Even so, Charles X and Frederick William joined forces to defeat the Polish king in the battle of Warsaw. The Swedes once again occupied Warsaw in July 1656.

In 1656, Alexis I became alarmed about Sweden’s expansionism along the Baltic at the expense of Poland. In May 1656, the Tsar declared war against Sweden. The Russian army advanced towards the Gulf of Finland, capturing the Swedish fortresses of Nöteburg (Schlüsselburg) and Nyenskans (Nienshanz), near the mouth of the Neva, in Ingria. Then, in the summer of 1656, Alexis I led his army from Połotsk (Połock) down the Dvina River and captured Dvinsk (Daugavpils/Dünaburg/Dźwińsk) and the fortress of Kokenhausen (Kukenaus/Kukenhuzen). Next, the Russian army besieged the fortress of Riga in Livonia. However, Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie defeated the


Russian army in the battle of Riga, forcing Alexis I to retreat to Russia. At this point, in November 1656, the Tsar concluded a three-year truce and an alliance with Poland against Sweden in the Treaty of Wilno. Even so, Swedish forces defeated Russian invasions of Livonia, Karelia, and Estonia in 1657-58. As a consequence, the Tsar agreed to a three-year truce with Sweden in 1658.

While the Swedes were engaged in military operations in Poland and the East Baltic, Frederick III of Denmark (1648-70) contemplated war against Sweden. Frederick III sought to recapture the provinces lost to Sweden in the Peace of Brömsebro at the conclusion of the Dano-Swedish War of 1643-45. In addition, the Danish king wanted to seize Bremen and Verden while Charles X was fully occupied elsewhere.\(^\text{14}\) In this endeavor, the Danish monarch was encouraged by the Polish king, German emperor, and the Dutch Republic. The Dutch feared that Sweden would gain complete control of the Baltic.\(^\text{15}\) Subsequently, in June 1657, Frederick III declared war on Sweden.

Charles X responded to the Danish threat by withdrawing his forces from Poland to reinforce Swedish possessions around the Baltic. He then directed an offensive against Denmark. In this situation, Charles X saw the chance to acquire strategic territory in the Baltic area, including the Sound and control of

---

\(^{14}\) Lisk, 99.

all Baltic trade. Therefore, the Swedish king led his army across the frontier of Holstein and forced the Danes out of Bremen in July 1657. The Swedish force then moved northward into Jutland and captured the fortress of Frederiksdodde (Fredericia/Bersodde). From there, in January and February 1658, a Swedish army of 10,000 soldiers crossed over the frozen sea using the islands of Fyn (Fünen), Taasinge, Langeland, Lolland (Laaland), and Falster as stepping stones to attack Zealand (Sjælland).16 The Danes were unprepared for this move on Copenhagen. As a result, Frederick III was forced to agree to the humiliating Peace of Roskilde, mediated by French, English, and Dutch diplomats, in February. The Great Powers wanted to maintain peace in northern Europe to avoid disruption to the valuable Baltic trade. They also wanted to keep the Sound divided between Denmark and Sweden. In the peace agreement, Frederick III handed the provinces of Scania, Halland, and Blekinge as well as the island of Bornholm to Sweden. Charles X also gained Trondhjem (Tröndelag) and Boshuslän (Bohuslen) in Norway. Moreover, Sweden’s ally, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, ceased to be the vassal of the Danish king.17 Roskilde was a great diplomatic victory for Sweden. The Swedish Empire had reached its greatest extent.


17Derry, 133. The Duke of Holstein-Gottorp possessed the ducal lands in Schleswig and Holstein while the Danish king ruled the royal lands in these duchies.
In the meantime, Frederick William of Brandenburg abandoned his alliance with Sweden. When Sweden pulled out of Poland, the elector moved his army to East Prussia in 1657. Frederick William then informed the weak Polish king that he was willing to strike an agreement. As a result, John Casimir conceded full sovereignty over East Prussia and other lands to Frederick William in the Treaty of Wehlau (Welawa) in September 1657. Four months later, in January 1658, the elector allied with John Casimir and the German emperor against Sweden. The elector was excited by the prospect of acquiring territory, especially West Pomerania, at the expense of Sweden.

Ignoring the Brandenburger threat to the Swedish Empire, Charles X decided to resume the war against Denmark. The Swedish king sought more territory from Denmark as well as the Sound.\(^{18}\) He wanted to "destroy Danish power once and for all."\(^{19}\) Therefore, in August 1658, Charles X sent Swedish forces across the Baltic from Kiel in Holstein to the island of Zealand. The Swedish army quickly captured the fortress of Kronborg at Helsingør (Elsinore) with its much needed artillery in September, and then besieged Copenhagen. This hostile action served as the catalyst that brought together a large, but loosely allied anti-Swedish coalition. In August, Frederick William of


\(^{19}\)Oakley, *War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790*, 89.
Brandenburg led a coalition army of 30,000 Brandenburgers, Austrians, and Poles against the Swedes. The elector forced the Swedes out of Schleswig (Slesvig) and Holstein, and from there he attacked the enemy in Jutland.\(^\text{20}\) At the same time, the Dutch Republic sent thirty-five warships, seventy supply ships, and 2,200 soldiers to support its Danish ally. The Dutch fleet fought and broke through a Swedish blockade, entering the Sound in October.\(^\text{21}\) The Dutch force, combined with the coalition army under Frederick William, compelled Charles X to break off his siege of Copenhagen temporarily. At the same time, the presence of the Dutch navy in the Sound caused the Swedish fleet to retreat to Landskrona, while an allied army impelled Swedish troops on the island of Fyn to surrender in November.\(^\text{22}\) However, in late November, the Swedish fleet renewed its blockade of Copenhagen. Then, in February 1659, Charles X launched a nighttime assault on the city. The attack failed. Moreover, in April, the Dutch fleet returned and drove the Swedish ships out of the Sound. The Dutch fleet was supplemented by forty-four English ships in May.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{20}\)Ibid., 90.

\(^{21}\)Ibid.; Derry, 134.


\(^{23}\)Oakley, *War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790*, 90.
Military and diplomatic intervention by the United Provinces and England aimed at ending the First Northern War. In a meeting at The Hague (May 1659), English, Dutch, and French diplomats called for an end to the Dano-Swedish war.\(^{24}\) The Great Powers were tired of the war disrupting Baltic trade. But, the Swedish king refused to engage in peace negotiations. As a result, the allies pursued an offensive against Swedish positions in Denmark and West Pomerania. In May, Austro-Brandenburger forces captured Frederiksodde. Five months later, in October, the Dutch fleet, commanded by Admiral Michiel de Ruyter, transported Dano-Dutch troops from Kiel to the island of Fyn. The allied force defeated the Swedish army in the battle of Nyborg, capturing the entire island. In the meantime, in August, an allied army, led by Frederick William, invaded West Pomerania. The elector captured most of West Pomerania, except for Stettin, by the end of the year. Both Frederick William and Frederick III wanted to continue the war to conquer Swedish lands.

The premature death of Charles X changed the diplomatic situation in February 1660. The new Swedish monarch, Charles XI (1660-97), was only four-years-old. Sweden sought peace. England, France, and the Dutch Republic urged Denmark, Brandenburg, Poland, and Austria to end the war. In May 1660, the Swedes ended their war with Poland, Brandenburg, and Austria in the Peace of Oliva (Oliwa). In this French-mediated treaty, Sweden agreed to

\(^{24}\) Frost, 164.
evacuate Courland, Frederick William acquired full sovereignty over East Prussia, and John Casimir renounced his claim to the Swedish throne as well as recognized Sweden's sovereignty in Livonia. Cardinal Mazarin's support for Sweden against Brandenburg ensured that Charles XI kept West Pomerania.25 The French wanted to acquire a Swedish alliance. One month later, in June 1660, Sweden and Denmark agreed to the Peace of Copenhagen. In the settlement, Sweden kept Scania, Blekinge, Boshuslän, Halland and the island of Bornholm, but returned Trondhjem to Denmark. In addition to these peace settlements, the Russo-Swedish war ended with the Peace of Kardis (Käärde) in June 1661. Sweden and Russia accepted the status quo in the Baltic Region: Alexis I acquiesced to Swedish control of the Baltic provinces. The Tsar wanted peace with Sweden to allow Russia to concentrate on the Thirteen Years' War with Poland.

In 1656, the Russian tsar agreed to a three-year truce in the war with Poland. But, in 1658, the Ukrainian Cossacks, who sought independence, betrayed the Tsar and renewed their allegiance to Poland in the Treaty of Gadiach. The Ukrainians also gained the support of the Crimean khan, Turkish

sultan, and Sweden.\textsuperscript{26} The Cossack Hetman (chieftain) Ivan Vykovsky (Vykovskii/Wykowski) mobilized the Cossack and Tartar armies, besieged Kiev, and captured Mirgorod and Poltava. Consequently, the Tsar declared war against Poland and the Ukraine. One Russian army defeated the Poles at Werki, occupied Wilno, captured Grodno and Nowogrudok (Nowogródek), as well as besieged the fortress of Lachowicze in Lithuania during 1658-59. Another Russian army was crushed by a combined force of Cossacks and Tartars under Vykovsky at Konotop (Sosnówka) (July 1659) in the Ukraine. However, the Cossacks replaced Vykovsky with Hetman Iurii Khmelnitsky who sought to reestablish ties with Russia. This led to the Tsar claiming all of the Ukraine in the Second Treaty of Pereiaslavl (1659).

In 1660, the Tsar launched a two-prong invasion of the Commonwealth. One army marched west, capturing Brest-Litovsk (Brześć Litewski) in January. However, the Polish army facing the Russian invasion increased in size after the Peace of Oliva. The Poles, under Stefan Czarniecki and Paul Sapieha, defeated the Russians at Połonka in June, crossed the Dnieper and then forced the enemy to retreat to Polotsk and Smolensk. Polish forces pressed forward and liberated Lithuania, and then attacked Russian positions near Vitebsk (Witebsk), Polotsk, and Velikye Łuki (Wielkiełuki). In the meantime, the Tsar

\textsuperscript{26}C. Bickford O'Brien, \textit{Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 49-50.
ordered a Russian army to invade the Ukraine. This army attacked Lwów, but was defeated by a combined Polish-Tartar army at Lubar (Liubar) under Stefan Czarniecki and George (Jerzy) Lubomirski in September. Lubomirski then defeated the Cossack army at Slobodyszcze (Slobodishche). This victory resulted in Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks transferring their allegiance to the Polish king in the Treaty of Chudnov (Cudnów) in October 1660. The Polish army had successfully defended the Commonwealth.

The failure of the Russian offensive in 1660 served as a turning point in the Thirteen Years’ War. Russia had failed to conquer the Commonwealth, had lost the Ukraine, and was now threatened by a Polish invasion. However, the Polish invasion failed to materialize. Instead, the Poles concentrated on removing Russian garrisons from Lithuania in 1661-62 and the new Cossack threat in the Ukraine in 1661. Although Khmelnitsky remained loyal to Poland, the Cossacks on the eastern bank of the Dnieper split from their leader and sided with Russia. Colonel Iakim Samko, the uncle of Khmelnitsky, led the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the rebellion against their leader. He invited Russian troops into the region, and suggested that a Russo-Cossack army cross the Dnieper and occupy the western side of the Ukraine. Even so, Khmelnitsky and a Polish-Tartar army beat Samko to the attack. The Polish-Cossack-Tartar army crossed the Dnieper, captured Nasofka, and fought off a Russian Cossack attack at Terekhtemirow in 1662. However, a large-scale civil war broke out
on both sides of the Dnieper in the Ukraine. In 1663, John Casimir’s armies, commanded by John Sobieski and Stefan Czarniecki, moved into and occupied large parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia, as well as regained Wilno in Lithuania. But, the Polish-Cossack-Tartar army on the eastern side of the Dnieper failed to force the Russo-Cossack troops out of fortified towns to fight a decisive battle. The Russo-Polish war in the Ukraine was at a stalemate.

The military situation in the Ukraine changed dramatically in 1665. In October, the Polish Cossacks elected Peter Doroshenko (Doroszenko/Doroszenko) as their new leader. Doroshenko sought to establish Ukrainian independence and liberate the region from Russo-Polish domination. As such, Doroshenko obtained assistance from the Crimean khan and the Tartars, and accepted the protection of the Turkish sultan, Mehmed (Mohammad) IV (1648-87). Meanwhile, John Casimir was busy dealing with the rebellion of George Lubomirski, the Grand Marshal of the Crown, and Polish nobles who challenged the authority of the Polish monarch. Lubomirski’s army defeated Casimir at the battle of Mątwy in July 1666. The rebellion allowed Doroshenko’s Cossack forces and the Tartar army the opportunity to attack the weakened Polish positions in the Ukraine. The Tartars defeated the Poles at Mezhibożh

27Ibid., 107-8.

28After the Mątwy, the Polish nobles deserted Lubomirski, forcing him to enter exile abroad.
(Miedziborz) in November, and then attacked the cities of Lwów and Kamieniec Podolski. As a result, the Polish king and Russian tsar, exhausted from war and fearing a large-scale Turkish invasion, negotiated a cease-fire to the Thirteen Years’ War.\textsuperscript{29} In the Truce of Andrusovo (Andruszów), signed in January 1667, Poland and Russia divided the Ukraine along the Dnieper, and the Tsar gained Kiev, Smolensk, Seversk (Siewiersk), and Czerniaków (Czernichów). The Polish king had to allow Alexis I a diplomatic victory because of the Lubomirski rebellion and Turkish threat to his lands.

Unfortunately, Hetman Peter Doroshenko would not submit to Polish and Russian rule in the Ukraine. Instead, in 1667, Doroshenko placed the entire Ukraine under the sovereignty of Mehmed IV (1648-87).\textsuperscript{30} Sobieski defeated the enemy at Podhajce (1667) in the West Ukraine, but the Poles failed to achieve a decisive victory. On the other hand, Alexis I forced Doroshenko out of the East Ukraine in 1668. Then, in 1671, the Cossacks and Tartars invaded the eastern provinces of Poland. The new Polish king, Michael I Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669-73), directed John Sobieski, the Grand Marshal of the Crown, to defend Poland. Sobieski quickly subdued the West Ukraine and forced Doroshenko to sue for peace. But, at this point, Sobieski’s Lithuanian

\textsuperscript{29}Reddaway, 1:528.

troops gave up the fight and returned home, forcing the marshal to end the campaign in the West Ukraine. Within a few weeks the Cossacks renewed the rebellion against Polish rule, and the Turks, defending their claims to the West Ukraine, declared war on the militarily unprepared Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania in December 1671.

The Ottomans began the Polish-Turkish War (1671-76) by crossing the Dniester and invading Polish territory in August 1672. The Turco-Cossack-Tartar army, under the command of Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Köprülü (1661-76), captured the strategic fortress of Kamieniec Podolski in Podolia, and then sacked Pokucie and besieged Lwów. The Turkish threat forced Michael I, who was also fighting political enemies in Warsaw, to agree to the Peace of Buczacz (Bučač/Buczacs) in October. The Polish king agreed to surrender the West Ukraine to the Cossacks and accept Turkish sovereignty over the region, hand over the province of Podolia to the Sublime Porte, and pay an annual tribute to the Sultan.

Humiliated by the peace settlement, the Polish nobles united together to renew the war against the Turks. Sobieski raised an army of 30,000 men in the spring of 1673.31 In November, Sobieski led a Polish army that crossed into Moldavia and defeated the Turkish army at Chocim (Chotin/Hoțin/Khotyn/Khoczim), captured the fortress, and overran much of Moldavia. Sobieski,

31Reddaway, 1:535.
however, had to call off further military operations because of Michael I's death. The military hero returned to Warsaw where the Polish nobles elected him as King John III Sobieski (1674-96) in May 1674.

As the monarch, Sobieski continued the war against the Ottoman Turks. He led the Polish army south and restored Podolia to the Commonwealth in 1674-75. But, in the spring of 1675, Sobieski sent his forces north to prepare for an invasion of Brandenburg in support of his alliance with Louis XIV in the Dutch War (1672-78). Consequently, a few months later, 160,000 Turks and Tartars invaded the Ukraine, Podolia, and southern Poland as far as the province of Volhynia (Wolyn).\textsuperscript{32} In response, Sobieski quickly led a force of 5,000 Polish cavalry to the south, where he defeated 20,000 Tartars near Lwów.\textsuperscript{33} Once the rest of the Polish main army reached the south, Sobieski employed them to drive the Turks out of Poland by October 1675. But, Sobieski failed to invade enemy lands because of political opposition in Warsaw. The delay gave the Turks a chance to reorganize and launch another invasion of southeastern Poland in September 1676. In response, Sobieski hurriedly led the Polish army south and blocked the Turkish advance near Lwów. The Polish king had his army fortify and defend a position at Žórawno (Žuravno) for three weeks. In the meantime, French and Tartar diplomats

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32]Dupuy and Dupuy, 575.
\item[33]Reddaway, 1:542.
\end{footnotes}
mediated the Truce of Żórawno in October 1676, ending the Polish-Turkish War of 1671-76. The treaty called for the Turks to return the West Ukraine to Poland, but the Sublime Porte would retain Podolia, including Kamieniec Podolski and Chocim.

The Truce of Żórawno dissatisfied the Cossack leader, Peter Doroshenko. He therefore requested assistance from the Ottoman Empire. But, Hetman Ivan Samoilovich defeated Doroshenko in 1676, and supported Russian claims to the West Ukraine. The Sultan responded by renewing his claims to the entire Ukraine, and sending a large Turkish army under the command of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1676-83) to drive the Russians and Poles out of the Ukraine in 1677. In the Russo-Turkish War (1677-81), the Turks and Tartars advanced towards Kiev and Chigirin (Chihirin/Tchicherin). Mustafa sacked Chigirin in 1678, but the Russians, under Tsar Theodore (Féodor/Feodor) III (1676-82), blocked the Turco-Tartar offensive in 1679-80. The indecisive battles, mostly in the West Ukraine, resulted in the Truce of Bakhchisarai (Radzin) in January 1681. In this treaty, the Turks renounced their claim to the Ukraine, leaving Kiev and the East Ukraine to Russia.


At this point, the Sultan decided to redirect Turkish war efforts from the Ukraine to the German Empire. Mehmed IV had already fought one war with Leopold I of Austria (1658-1705) when the Habsburgs meddled in Ottoman affairs in Transylvania. In this conflict, the Austro-Turkish War of 1663-64, Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Köprülü invaded Habsburg Hungary with 100,000 troops and captured the fortress of Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel) in September 1663. In the following spring, the Turks resumed their advance towards Vienna, occupying Zerinvár. In view of this threat, Leopold I sought a peaceful agreement to end the war. He agreed to the preliminary Truce of Vasvár in July, but Köprülü crossed the Raab and advanced on Habsburg territory. Count Raimondo Montecuccoli responded by blocking the path to Vienna and decisively defeating the Turks at St. Gotthard, ninety miles from Vienna, in August 1664. Shortly after the battle, the German emperor and Sultan confirmed the terms of the Truce of Vasvár. In the treaty, Leopold I agreed to a twenty-five year truce, the cession of Nové Zámky and Nagyvárad (Grosswardein) to the Turks, as well as accepted the Sultan’s influence in Transylvania. Leopold I acquiesced to such terms to end the war in the east


Ibid., 510.
so that he could turn his attention to the threat of Louis XIV in the west and the question of the Spanish succession.38

The Turks upheld the Truce of Vasvár while they fought the Poles and Russians. But, in 1682, Kara Mustafa rejected the German emperor's request to extend the truce. Instead, the Grand Vizier chose to support a request for assistance from Imre Thököly and other nobles in Habsburg Hungary in their struggle for independence from Vienna. In fact, the Sultan recognized Thököly as the King of West Hungary and provided him troops in 1682. One historian believes that Mustafa's eagerness to incite war with Habsburg Austria "may have stemmed from his desire to achieve a spectacular success so that his humiliation at Russian hands would be forgotten."39 Therefore, in the spring of 1683, the Grand Vizier led an army of 200,000 Turks and Tartars from Constantinople towards Vienna.40 The Turks reached the Habsburg capital and began the siege of Vienna in July.41 The siege lasted for two months until a

38See Chapter IV.


40Kurat, 513.

Polish-Imperial relief force, led by John III Sobieski of Poland-Lithuania and Duke Charles V of Lorraine (1675-90), surprised and defeated the Turks in battle outside the walls of Vienna in September 1683. Sobieski's army pursued the Turks and liberated most of Habsburg Hungary by the end of the year.

In March 1684, at the instigation of Pope Innocent XI (1676-89), the German Empire, Poland, and Venice created the Holy League. Russia, under the regency of Sophia Alekseevna (1682-89), allied with Poland in the struggle against the Turks in April 1686. Sophia had delayed declaring war against the Turks until the Russo-Polish Treaty of Eternal Peace (1686) confirmed Moscow's territorial acquisitions in the Truce of Andrusovo (1667).

In the War of the Holy League (1683-99), the alliance achieved considerable success against the Ottomans. At first, Charles V of Lorraine captured Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel) in 1685 and Buda in 1686, followed by defeating the Turks at Nagyharsány (Harkány), near Mohács, in 1687. This victory established Habsburg control over all of southern Hungary and much of Transylvania, and resulted in the forced abdication of Mehmeh IV. In the meantime, the Venetians, led by Francesco Morosini, were successful in

---

42 The German emperor and Polish king made an alliance in April 1683.

43 Sophia served as regent during the minority of the joint-Tsars, Ivan V (1682-96) and Peter I (1682-1725).

44 Hughes, Sophia: Regent of Russia, 1657-1704, 192.
Dalmatia and southern Greece. Morosini conquered the Peloponnesus (the Morea) in 1686, marched through the Isthmus of Corinth, and then captured Athens in 1687. This triumph against the Turks was followed by the Imperial army capturing Eger (Erlau) in 1687, Peterwardein and Belgrade in 1688, as well as Nish (Niš) and Vidin in 1689. However, the Russians, under Prince Vasily Golitsyn, failed to achieve success against the Tartars in the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. Moreover, the Polish offensives into Podolia and Moldavia achieved little success beyond the capture of Neamțu and Soroca in Moldavia (1691) and victories over Turco-Tartar forces at Pomorzany (1694) and Lwów (1695).

From 1688 to 1697 the German Empire fought the Nine Years’ War against Louis XIV in the west.45 Taking advantage of the situation, the Turks, under Sultan Suleiman II (1687-91), defeated the Imperial-Transylvanian armies at Zernyest in Transylvania, followed by the capture of Nish, Smederevo, Vidin, and Belgrade in Serbia in 1690. But, the Imperial commander, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden-Baden, defeated a Turco-Hungarian army at Zalánkemén (Szalánkemen), securing all of Transylvania for the Habsburgs, while the Venetians captured Chios in 1691. For the next six years, the Austro-Turkish war dragged on with inconclusive military campaigns on the frontier. Even so, Tsar Peter I led a Russian army south towards the Black Sea

45See Chapter VI.
and captured Azov (Azak) in 1696. Then, in 1697, Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Imperial commander, fought and crushed Sultan Mustafa II (1695-1703) and the Turkish army at Zenta in Hungary. As a result of this great victory, the German Empire, Poland, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire agreed to the Peace of Karlowitz (Carlowitz/Karlowice) in January 1699. In the peace settlement, Austria received all of Hungary and Transylvania, except the Banat of Temesvár (Timișoara); Venice obtained the Peloponnesus and most of Dalmatia; and Poland regained all of Podolia, including Kamieniec Podolski. As a consequence of the War of the Holy League, Austria had become the dominant power in southeastern Europe. Soon afterwards, in 1700, Russia and the Turks agreed to the Peace of Constantinople. The Tsar acquired Azov from the Sultan.

While Poland and Russia fought the Turks after the First Northern War, Charles XI of Sweden, Frederick III of Denmark, and Frederick William of Brandenburg continued their struggle for supremacy in the north. However, after the treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen, this clash was overshadowed by the contest between Louis XIV and the growing anti-French coalition of the Dutch Republic, England, and Austria. The Great Powers sought to enlist the support of the Northern Powers in the War of Devolution (1667-68), Dutch War (1672-78), and Nine Years’ War (1688-97).
In the War of Devolution, England and the Dutch Republic enlisted the support of Sweden in the Triple Alliance to oppose French aggression in the Spanish Netherlands. The regency government of Charles XI joined the alliance in return for a Spanish subsidy to support his army.\textsuperscript{46} The alliance forced the Sun King to sign the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668). But, Louis XIV sought revenge against the Dutch for the creation of the alliance. He therefore isolated the United Provinces by acquiring an English alliance in 1670 as well as buying a Swedish alliance in 1672.

In 1672-73, at the beginning of the Dutch War, Sweden, under the provisions of the Franco-Swedish alliance, stationed 16,000 troops in West Pomerania. Louis XIV wanted the Swedes to pressure Frederick William of Brandenburg into abandoning his assistance to the Dutch Republic.\textsuperscript{47} These forces, along with the French occupation of the duchies of Cleves and Mark as well as the offer of subsidies, convinced Frederick William to withdraw from the war in the Peace of Vossem (June 1673). However, in July 1674, Frederick William renewed his alliance with the United Provinces and joined the anti-French coalition of Austria, Spain, and the Duke of Lorraine. Brandenburger forces immediately attacked French positions on the upper


\textsuperscript{47}Oakley, \textit{War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790}, 97-98.
Rhine. As a consequence, the Sun King pressured Sweden to attack Brandenburg. In December 1674, Karl Gustav Wrangel, the Swedish commander in West Pomerania, led an army of 20,000 men into the Uckermark of Brandenburg.\textsuperscript{48} In turn, Frederick William acquired his allies permission to withdraw from combat along the Rhine and focus his military efforts against the Swedes in Brandenburg and West Pomerania in the Protocol of Cleves (May 1675). Upon his return to Brandenburg, the elector attacked and defeated the Swedes at Rathenow and Fehrbellin in June 1675. The victory at Fehrbellin earned Frederick William the title "the Great Elector," and served as a "moral blow to Sweden's military prestige."\textsuperscript{49} The Swedes quickly retreated to West Pomerania, pursued by the Great Elector.

The victory over the Swedes encouraged Frederick William of Brandenburg to pursue the war into Swedish territory on the southern shore of the Baltic. It also resulted in Christian V of Denmark (1670-99) making the decision to fulfill his alliance with the Dutch Republic (1673) and enter the struggle against France and Sweden. In this war, known as the Scanian or Pomeranian War, the Danish king laid claim to the lost provinces in southern Sweden, Wismar, and the island of Rügen at the mouth of the Oder. The Great Elector sought the Swedish territory of West Pomerania, especially the port of Stettin with

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., 98.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
access to the Baltic. In the Dano-Brandenburger onslaught of Swedish territory, Christian V seized control of the Baltic, the lands of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Wismar, and the island of Gotland in 1675-76. But, Charles XI defeated the Danes in the battle of Lund (December 1676) and Landskrona (July 1677) in southern Sweden. At sea, the Dano-Dutch fleets defeated the Swedes at Jasmund (May 1676), near the island of Öland, and Køge Bugt (Kjøge Bight) (June 1677) to maintain naval supremacy in the Baltic. In the meantime, Frederick William captured Stettin and became the master of West Pomerania, including Stralsund and Greifswald, in 1677-78. Moreover, the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Bishop of Münster, assisted by the Danes and Brandenburgers, captured the duchies of Bremen and Verden in 1676.50

Then, in 1678, the Swedes launched an invasion of East Prussia. The Great Elector easily repulsed this attack, and pursued the enemy into Livonia in 1679.

The Dutch War ended in the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678/79. Even so, the Swedish war with Denmark and the German states continued until Louis XIV’s army invaded Cleves in March, besieged Minden in June, and threatened to occupy Oldenburg in the summer of 1679. The Sun King wanted to protect his Baltic ally, Sweden. Under such threats, Frederick William agreed to the

---

Peace of St. Germain-en-Laye in June and Christian V accepted the Peace of Lund in September 1679. In the peace settlements Frederick William had to return all of his conquests to Sweden, except for a small concessionary strip on the right bank of the Oder. Louis XIV forced the Danish king to return all of Sweden’s lost territory as well as restore the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp to his lands. However, Brunswick-Lüneburg was allowed to keep a small territorial gain from Bremen and Verden.

Sweden and Denmark for a short time drew closer after the Peace of Lund. In fact, in October 1679, Charles XI and Christian V became allies, with the aim of keeping foreign influences, especially the Dutch, out of the Baltic. But, events elsewhere in Europe drove a wedge between the Northern Powers. It began when the Swedish monarch abandoned his alliance with Louis XIV in 1681, and sided with the United Provinces in the Association of The Hague against France. The Sun King, during his Reunion program against the German Empire, had annexed Charles XI’s family estate of Zweibrücken. The League of Association sought to uphold the treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Nijmegen (1678/79) against French aggression. As a result of the Association Treaty, Louis XIV quickly negotiated alliances with Sweden’s potential enemies, Denmark and Brandenburg, in 1682. Christian V and Frederick William both believed that the French alliance would assist them in acquiring Verden, Bremen, Wismar, and West Pomerania from Sweden as well as the
lands of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. With this alliance, the Danish king pressured Duke Christian Albert of Holstein-Gottorp to flee to the Imperial Free City of Hamburg in 1682. Soon afterwards, the Danish king and Great Elector manipulated the Sun King into an offensive alliance and prepared for war against Sweden, resulting in the so-called “Baltic Crisis of 1683.”

In the summer of 1683, northern Europe was at the brink of war. Brandenburg and Denmark prepared to attack Swedish territory, backed by the French fleet in the North Sea. Charles XI braced Sweden for a war in the north, supported by the Dutch fleet in the Baltic. Nevertheless, at the peak of the crisis, Louis XIV averted a war in the north by withdrawing his military support from Denmark and Brandenburg. The Sun King had wanted the alliance to counterbalance the Dutch-Swedish alliance in the north, not to engulf French resources in a major war in the north during his Reunion program. Thus, without French support, Frederick William quickly backed down from launching an attack against Sweden. Even so, Christian V declared the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s land in Schleswig incorporated into Denmark in 1684.

After 1684, Denmark quickly became diplomatically isolated. Frederick William, fearing French aggression in the Rhineland, allied with the Dutch

---

Republic (1685), Sweden (1686), and the German emperor (1686). Moreover, the Great Elector agreed to defend the rights of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp against Denmark. Then, in 1686, Christian V attempted to coerce Hamburg into accepting his overlordship. In response to this threat, Frederick William and the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg (Georg Wilhelm of Celle and Ernst August of Calenberg) deployed their armies to defend the city. Moreover, Sweden drew closer to Brunswick-Lüneburg. But, Charles XI was not in a position to provide military assistance against Denmark. The Swedish fleet had still not recovered from the crippling naval defeats at the hands of the Danes during the Dutch War.\textsuperscript{52} At this point, other powers became interested in the crisis and supported the return of Holstein-Gottorp to Duke Christian Albert. In November 1687, the German emperor, Brandenburg, and Saxony pressured the Northern Powers to meet at the Congress of Altona.\textsuperscript{53} The talks, especially after the death of the Great Elector in April 1688, quickly came to a standstill with neither Christian V nor Christian Albert willing to compromise. Consequently, in 1689, Charles XI and the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg made plans to use military force to restore Christian Albert to Holstein-Gottorp. Charles XI realized that the Danish monarch had little chance of French military

\textsuperscript{52}Kirby, 296.

support because of Louis XIV’s involvement in the Nine Years’ War. Nonetheless, William III, the Dutch stadholder (1672-1702) and English king (1689-1702), threatened to militarily intervene against any power that broke the peace in the north. William III’s action restrained Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg from launching a war while his diplomacy acquired Denmark’s acceptance of the Peace of Altona in June 1689. The treaty resulted in Christian V restoring Christian Albert to his lands in Holstein-Gottorp. Moreover, the Maritime Powers and Brunswick-Lüneburg agreed to guarantee the lands of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp.

At the beginning of the Nine Years’ War, William III sought to bring both Sweden and Denmark into the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. The King-Stadholder wanted the Northern Powers to provide troops for the war effort as well as accept a ban on trade with France. Charles XI and Christian V, however, sought to remain neutral and continue trade with the Sun King. In fact, they agreed to a Dano-Swedish defensive alliance in February 1690. Then, in 1691, the Dutch seizure of merchant ships belonging to the Northern Powers resulted in the establishment of the League of Armed Neutrality.

---

54 Ibid., 69.

55 Derry, 147.

56 Despite neutrality, Christian V supplied Danish forces to the Maritime Powers during the Nine Years’ War.
In the course of the Nine Years' War Christian Albert of Holstein-Gottorp died in 1695. He was succeeded by Duke Frederick. The new duke soon built five fortresses on his territory, including the largest at Molmerkrans, and acquired Swedish troops for protection against Denmark. This action resulted in a split between Sweden and Denmark. In the ensuing crisis, William III, a guarantor of the Altona agreement, sought to mediate the Holstein-Gottorp Question in the diplomatic talks that began at Pinneberg, near Hamburg, in August 1696. However, the Danish monarch saw a window of opportunity after acquiring an alliance with the Maritime Powers (December 1696) and the death of Charles XI of Sweden (April 1697). In June 1697, Christian V sent Danish forces into Holstein-Gottorp to raze the fortresses in question. The Swedes responded by requesting assistance from the Maritime Powers. William III answered by threatening to send a Dutch naval squadron into the Sound. Christian V, who was not prepared for a major military operation, withdrew his forces from Holstein-Gottorp after two weeks of military operations.57

Despite destroying the fortresses in question, the Danish king sought revenge against Sweden. Shortly after the withdrawal from Holstein-Gottorp, Christian V began to build an anti-Swedish coalition. He believed that Sweden

57Oakley, William III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Years' War, 1689-1697, 298-301; Oakley, War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790, 107.
had no allies other than Holstein-Gottorp and was ruled by a weak, inexperienced fifteen-year-old, Charles XII (1697-1718). In March 1698, Christian V acquired an alliance with Augustus II, “the Strong,” of Poland-Saxony. Elector Frederick Augustus I of Saxony had been elected as King of Poland-Lithuania after the death of Sobieski in 1696. Then, in March 1699, Christian V acquired an alliance with Peter I of Russia. Seven months later, in October, the Tsar and Augustus II agreed to an alliance to complete the anti-Swedish coalition in the Treaty of Preobrazhenskiy. Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg (1688-1701) kept out of the coalition, fearing a Dutch invasion of the duchy of Cleves. As for war aims, the Danish king sought to reclaim Scania as well as annex Holstein-Gottorp; Augustus II wanted to conquer Swedish Livonia and the valuable port of Riga with Saxon troops, and hand this territory over to Poland in exchange for hereditary kingship of the Commonwealth; and Peter I looked to take Ingria away from Sweden. The three rulers expected to defeat Sweden in a brief war. But, the Tsar insisted that Russia would not attack Sweden until the end of the Russo-Turkish war (1686-1700).

---

58 Kirby, 299.

In February 1700, Augustus II of Poland-Saxony launched a surprise attack against Swedish Livonia. A Saxon army of 14,000 men captured the fortresses at Koborn and Dünamünde by the end of March. Augustus II then laid siege to Riga.

One month later, in March 1700, Frederick IV of Denmark (1699-1730) launched a surprise attack against Holstein-Gottorp. The Danish forces quickly occupied the ducal parts of Schleswig and Holstein, and initiated a siege of Tønning, the main fortress of the Duke Frederick. Charles XII responded by calling on the Maritime Powers and Elector Georg Ludwig of Hanover (1698-1727) to assist him in upholding the Peace of Altona. The Dutch Republic responded by transporting an army of 18,000 Swedes, Hanoverians, and Dutch across the sea to attack the Danes in May 1700. The allied army marched across Holstein and forced the Danes to break off the siege of Tønning. Then, in June, the Maritime Powers deployed a fleet of twenty-three ships to join with the main Swedish fleet in the Sound. The combined fleets forced the Danish navy to withdraw into the harbor of Copenhagen. Afterwards, they


61 As recent as January 1700 the Maritime Powers, Hanover, and Sweden had agreed in the Treaty of The Hague to guarantee the treaties of Altona (1689) and Ryswick (1697).

62 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare, 2:197.

63 Oakley, War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790, 113.
transported the main Swedish army from Landskrona to the Danish island of Zealand. Charles XII led his army of 20,000 towards Copenhagen. At this point, Frederick IV asked the Maritime Powers and Hanover to end the conflict. In August 1700, the Danish king and Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp agreed to the Peace of Travendal. Frederick IV of Denmark agreed to restore the duke's lands as well as withdraw from the Polish-Saxon-Russian alliance. England and the United Provinces agreed to guarantee the Travendal settlement.

Having acquired peace with the Turks, Peter I of Russia launched an invasion of Ingria in September 1700. The Russian army of 40,000 laid siege to Narva. The Swedish monarch responded to the Russian and Saxon threats in Ingria and Livonia by transporting his army by sea to Pernau after the Peace of Travendal. In November, Charles XII led 8,000 Swedes into Ingria to relieve the attack on Narva. At Narva, the Swedes decisively defeated a much larger Russian army during a snowstorm. Now, at this point, Charles XII turned his attention away from Russia to the Saxon threat in Livonia. In June 1701, the Swedes defeated a Saxon-Polish-Russian army and relieved the city of Riga. One month later, in July, Charles XII crossed the Dvina, defeated a Saxon-Russian army at Dünamünde, overran Courland, and then invaded Lithuania.

---

64 Ibid.

65 Dupuy and Dupuy, 614.

66 McKay and Scott, 82.
The Swedish king had made the decision to ignore Peter I and concentrate his forces against Augustus II. The Swedes captured Wilno and Warsaw, and then defeated the Saxons at Kliszów (Klissov/Clissow), north of Cracow, in July 1702. Next, Charles XII defeated Augustus II at Pułtusk in April and captured the key fortress of Thorn (Toruń) on the Vistula after an eight-month-long siege in December 1703. During this time the Swedish monarch systematically eliminated Augustus II’s control over most of Poland. Augustus II, however, continued to draw some support from the Polish nobility. The supporters of the Elector-King formed the Confederation of Sandomierz. Charles XII reacted by having the Confederation of Warsaw, a group of Polish nobles under his influence, elect Stanislaus (Stanisław) Leszczyński as their new king in July 1704. As a consequence, in August, the Confederation of Sandomierz allied with Russia in the Pact of Działyński, promising Livonia to the Tsar, and declared war against Sweden. Charles XII, however, quickly defeated Augustus II at Pünitz (Poniec) in October 1704, and drove him back into Saxony.

After the disaster at Narva, Peter I reconstructed the Russian army. The Tsar quickly rebuilt his forces by using conscripts and volunteers to expand the

---

67 Stanislaus Leszczyński was crowned King of Poland in Cracow in September 1705.
army from 34,000 in 1700 to 200,000 troops in 1705.\textsuperscript{68} He employed foreign experts to train his new army, equipped with modern weapons, in the methods of western European warfare. In 1701-2, with Charles XII busy in Poland, Peter I began an offensive against Sweden’s Baltic provinces. Field Marshal Boris Petrovich Sheremetev marched the Russian army into Livonia and defeated smaller Swedish armies at Eristfer (Erestfer) in December 1701 and Hummelshof (Hummselsdorf) in July, as well as captured Marienburg in August 1702. Sheremetev then led the Russian army northward into Ingria. In October 1702, the Russians captured the fortress of Nöteburg on the Neva which guarded the entrance to Lake Ladoga. Then, in May 1703, the Russian fleet destroyed a small Swedish fleet at the mouth of the Neva, and the rest of Ingria quickly fell to the Russians. During that same month, Peter I founded the city of St. Petersburg at the mouth of the river. In 1704, the Russians captured the fortresses of Dorpat (Tartu) in Livonia, Narva in Estonia, and Ivangorod in Ingria. Only the Swedish fortresses of Riga, Pernau, and Reval (Tallin) remained out of enemy hands. Then, in 1705-6, the Tsar’s army overran most of Courland and invaded Lithuania. Peter I aimed to sweep the

Swedes from Livonia as well as restore Augustus II to the Polish throne. However, the Swedish army under General Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt (Löwenhaupt) defeated the Russians at Jakobstadt and Gemäuerthof in Lithuania in July 1705. The Swedish army chased the Russians into Courland. But, the Swedish move into Lithuania allowed Augustus II the opportunity to retake Poland from the west. Even so, a smaller Swedish army of 10,000 commanded by General Karl Gustaf Rehnskiöld (Rehnskjold/Reinschild) decisively defeated a Saxon-Russian force of 20,000 at Fraustadt (Frauenstadt/Franstadt/Wschowa) near Poznań in February 1706. Receiving news of this defeat, the Russian forces in Lithuania and Courland withdrew to Kiev. This gave Charles XII the opportunity to attack Saxony. In August, the Swedish monarch led his army across Silesia into an undefended Saxony. Charles XII captured Dresden and Leipzig in August before Augustus II agreed to the Peace of Altranstädt in September 1706. In this agreement, the Elector of Saxony gave up his claims to the Polish crown as well as abandoned the alliance with Russia.

Charles XII had fought seven military campaigns and defeated Denmark and Saxony. Now, the Swedish army occupied Saxony in the German Empire and


could possibly enter the War of the Spanish Succession. At this point, in 1706-7, diplomats from France and the Grand Alliance visited Charles XII at Altranstädt. Both sides wanted Sweden to join them against the other in the western conflict. However, in April 1707, the Duke of Marlborough visited the Swedish monarch at his camp. At this meeting Charles XII promised to remain neutral in the War of the Spanish Succession. In fact, Marlborough encouraged Charles XII to turn eastward and attack Russia. The Swedish king was in full agreement. He wanted to conquer Moscow.

In August 1707, Charles XII and the Swedish army left Altranstädt. As the Swedes left Saxony, Prince Alexander Menshikov and the Russian army fell back from their position in western Poland. The Russians, under orders from the Tsar, instituted a scorched-earth policy, burning crops and buildings, killing or driving off livestock and poisoning wells. At Poznań Charles XII waited for new recruits that increased his army to 44,000 men. When the Swedes renewed their advance, Charles XII forced the Tsar and Menshikov to fallback from Grodno in January 1708. The Russian army withdrew to the Lithuanian-Russian border, devastating the countryside along the way. Continuing to

71Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, 225.

72Andrew Rothstein, Peter the Great and Marlborough: Politics and Diplomacy in Converging Wars (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1986), 75.

73Angus Konstam, Poltava 1709: Russia Comes of Age (London: Osprey, 1994), 32.
advance towards Russia, Charles XII directed General Lewenhaupt to march from Livonia with 12,000 reinforcements and a full supply train to join the main Swedish army near the Lithuanian-Russian border in mid-summer.\textsuperscript{74} During the spring thaw the Swedish army encamped at Radovskoviche, near Mińsk, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, in June, Charles XII marched from Radovskoviche towards Russia. He attacked and defeated the Russian attempt to block the Swedish advance at Holowczyń (Holovzin/Golovchino) in July. The Swedes marched to Mogilev on the Dnieper, waiting for General Lewenhaupt’s reinforcements and the much needed supplies.

In August 1708, Charles XII, still without Lewenhaupt’s reinforcements and supplies, crossed the Dnieper and marched towards Smolensk. The Swedes defeated a small Russian attack at Malatitze. But, the Tsar avoided a major battle with the Swedes. As a result the Swedish king captured Tatarsk in September. At this point, Charles XII decided that without adequate supplies, and facing the Russian scorched earth policy, the Swedish army would march on a southerly route towards Moscow. Charles XII hoped to acquire military assistance and supplies from the Cossack leader Ivan Mazeppa and the Crimean Tartars in the Ukraine. Unfortunately, Charles XII failed to capture key fortified towns, other than Mglin, along the route. Moreover, Charles XII did not receive the expected supplies and reinforcements from General

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 33.
Lewenhaupt when they joined forces in October. The Swedish commander had been attacked and defeated by the Tsar and Menshikov at Lesnaya, southeast of Mogilev. In the battle Lewenhaupt suffered the loss of his artillery, the supply train of 1,000 wagons, and most of the reinforcements. Then, the Swedish king lost the race to the Ukraine. The Tsar’s army had captured Mazeppa’s capital of Baturin in November, destroying the food, fodder, and ammunition meant for the Swedes. In the following months, Charles XII lost 22,000 soldiers from the harsh winter of 1708-9 and Russian raids against Swedish winter quarters. The lack of manpower was now becoming a problem.

At the beginning of the 1709 campaign, Charles XII decided to lay siege to the Russian fortification at Poltava. The Swedes besieged Poltava for eight weeks before the Tsar approached the area with a large army of 42,000 men in June. At this point, Charles XII needed a quick victory to convince the Turks and Tartars to support him. Therefore, he ordered his poorly fed and

75 Ibid., 52.


77 Rothstein, 122.

78 Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, 293.
equipped army of 24,000 to attack the Russian position.\textsuperscript{79} In the battle of Poltava, the Swedish army was outnumbered and outgunned. The Tsar decisively defeated the Swedes, forcing Charles XII and the remnants of his army to flee southward. The Swedish king abandoned his army at Perevolochna (Perevoletjna/Perevolochnaya), and fled to the Turkish frontier where he would stay for the next five years. Lewenhaupt and almost 17,000 Swedish soldiers surrendered to the Tsar at Perevolochna.\textsuperscript{80} Peter I’s victory became a turning point in the Great Northern War. Poltava destroyed Sweden’s position as a Great Power and paved the way for Russian ascendancy during the next decade.

The Russian victory at Poltava quickly led to the revival of the alliance of the Tsar, Frederick IV of Denmark, and Augustus of Saxony against Sweden. In 1709, the Tsar invaded Poland and forced Stanislaus Leszczyński to flee to Stettin in West Pomerania. Augustus II was restored to the Polish throne, but Peter I controlled Poland with a Russian occupation force. Then, in 1710, the Russian army overran Livonia, Estonia, and Karelia. The Russians besieged and captured Elbing (Elbląg) in February, Viborg (Vyborg) in June, Riga in July,

\textsuperscript{79}Duffy, \textit{Siege Warfare}, 2:200-1. Charles XII had an additional 6,000 soldiers that could not participate in the battle because of the lack of ammunition (Rothstein, 122).

\textsuperscript{80}Rothstein, 122.
Dünamünde and Pernau in August, Kexholm (Korela), Reval, and the fortress of Arensburg on the island of Ösel in September 1710.

In the meantime, the Danish monarch declared war against Sweden and invaded Scania in November 1709. Magnus Stenbock defeated the Danish army at Hälsingborg in February 1710, forcing the Danes to withdraw across the Sound. Afterwards, the Danes occupied the lands belonging to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, attacked Wismar, and seized the duchy of Bremen in 1711-12. Stenbock defeated the Danes at Gadebusch near Wismar in December 1712. The Swedish army then marched into Holstein to support the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. But, the Danes defeated the Swedes at Fredrikstadt and forced Stenbock to surrender at Tønning in May 1713.

The Tsar’s conquest of Sweden’s Baltic provinces was diverted by the Sultan’s declaration of war against Russia in November 1710. The Turks entered the Great Northern War on the side of Sweden in response to appeals from Charles XII in Moldavia. In the following spring, the Sultan sent Grand Vizier Baltaji Mehmed at the head of an army of 200,000 men to the Russian frontier. To meet this threat Peter I led a Russian army of 45,000 into

---


82 Dupuy and Dupuy, 616.
Moldavia and Wallachia in June.\textsuperscript{83} In the campaign, the Tsar was outmaneuvered, surrounded, and forced to surrender at Stanelishte on the Pruth in July 1711. Peter I was surprised to discover that the Sultan was willing to negotiate a peace with lenient terms. In the Peace of Pruth, the Tsar agreed to return Azov to the Turks, dismantle the fortresses of Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton along the Dnieper, sell or destroy the Russian fleet at Azov, and withdraw the Russian army from Poland. Although the peace settlement was lenient, Matthew S. Anderson has stated that the Russian defeat at the hands of the Turks was a "serious and humiliating setback."\textsuperscript{84} The Tsar, nonetheless, was slow to carry out the peace terms. As a consequence, the Sultan declared three more wars against Russia in 1711-13.\textsuperscript{85} This series of bloodless wars ended with the Peace of Adrianople in June 1713. In this treaty, Peter I agreed to the Sultan's demands of quickly executing the Pruth settlement and a twenty-five year truce.\textsuperscript{86} The Tsar accepted the demands of

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{84}Matthew S. Anderson, \textit{Peter the Great} (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 67.

\textsuperscript{85}The Sultan declared a second war in December 1711 which ended in the Peace of Constantinople in April 1712. A third war was declared in October 1712 and quickly petered out. The Sublime Porte declared the fourth war in April 1713 which ended in the Peace of Adrianople in June 1713. See Hatton, \textit{Charles XII}, 46-47.

\textsuperscript{86}Rothstein, 206.
\end{flushleft}
the Sublime Porte because he needed peace in the south in order to concentrate his military power against Sweden.

With peace in the south, Peter I launched an invasion of Finland in May 1713. The Russians captured Helsingfors in May and Åbo (Turku) in August. A victory at Storkyro gave the Russians control of the southern Finnish coastline in February 1714. Then, in July, the Russian fleet defeated the Swedish navy at Cape Hangö (Gangut/Hanko) off the tip of Finland. This naval victory ended Swedish naval predominance in the Baltic and gave Russia control of the Baltic as far west as the Åland Islands.87 Now the Russian fleet threatened the Swedish coastline.

Before attacking mainland Sweden and West Pomerania, the Tsar negotiated alliances with Brandenburg-Prussia in 1714 and Hanover in 1715. Frederick William I of Brandenburg-Prussia (1713-40) sought to acquire Stettin and part of West Pomerania.88 Georg Ludwig of Hanover, who had occupied Verden in 1712 and bought Bremen from Denmark in May 1715, sought to

87Derry, 161.

88Menshikov captured Stettin in September 1713. Peter I turned the city over to Frederick William I to ensure his loyalty.
secure these acquisitions with a Russian alliance.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, Russia, Denmark, Saxony-Poland, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Hanover formed an anti-Swedish coalition. The coalition with English naval support captured the island of Rügen and Stralsund in December 1715, and Wismar, the last Swedish foothold in the German Empire, in April 1716. Thereafter, the Tsar and Frederick IV made plans to invade Scania with English naval assistance. Peter I positioned 30,000 Russian soldiers in Zealand to carry out this plan.\textsuperscript{90} Moreover, the Tsar was in command of an allied fleet of sixty-seven warships.\textsuperscript{91} But, Peter I called off the invasion of Scania in September 1716. Charles XII’s attack against Norway in the spring had delayed Danish preparations for the invasion of Sweden until late in the campaigning season. Moreover, Frederick IV and Peter I argued over military strategy. Therefore, the Tsar made the decision to transfer his army to the duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin for winter quarters.

The stationing of Russian troops in Mecklenburg created a crisis that split the anti-Swedish alliance. A few months earlier, in April 1716, Peter I had gained a Russian foothold in Mecklenburg with the marriage of his niece


\textsuperscript{90}Lisk, 186.

\textsuperscript{91}Oakley, \textit{War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790}, 122.
Ekaterina Ioannovna to Duke Karl Leopold. The Tsar promised to protect the Duke of Mecklenburg against his enemies with ten Russian infantry regiments. The Russian protectorate over Mecklenburg alarmed Peter I’s allies, Denmark and Hanover. Georg Ludwig of Hanover had hoped to acquire Mecklenburg for himself. Furthermore, as King of Great Britain, George I worried about the growing Russian military presence in northern Germany and the Baltic, and the possible domination of Baltic trade by Russia. Consequently, Hanover and Denmark withdrew from the Russian alliance, leaving Russia, Poland-Saxony, and Brandenburg-Prussia in the anti-Swedish coalition.

After the split, George I steadily built an alliance system against the threats of Russia in the Baltic and Spain in the Mediterranean. He acquired an alliance with France and the Dutch Republic in January 1717, followed by the creation of the Quadruple Alliance in August 1718. England, France, the Dutch Republic, and Austria did not want Russia to dominate the Baltic. The anti-Russian alliance encouraged Peter I to withdraw his forces from Mecklenburg in late 1717. Moreover, in January 1719, Hanover, Austria, and Saxony united in the Treaty of Vienna to drive the Russians out of Poland.

---

92Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 53.
After the split in the coalition, Charles XII led a Swedish invasion of Norway in August 1718. The Swedish king believed that the time was right to attack Norway because Frederick IV of Denmark had isolated himself by abandoning the Russian alliance and England was engaged in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-20) against Spain. The Swedish monarch hoped to conquer Trondhjem. But, he was killed during the siege of Frederiksten (Fredrikshald) in November 1718. With his death, the Swedish army withdrew from Norway. Charles XII was succeeded by his younger sister Ulrika Eleanora (1718-20), and later her husband, Frederick I (1720-51).

The death of Charles XII and the growing fear of Russia led to a series of Anglo-French mediated peace agreements between Sweden and her enemies in 1719-20. The new Swedish monarch was willing to trade territory for peace to end the wars with Hanover, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Denmark. In November 1719, in the First Treaty of Stockholm, Ulrika Eleanora agreed to cede Bremen and Verden to Hanover, making Hanover the second largest power in northern Germany. In January 1720, in the Second Treaty of Stockholm, Sweden accepted the loss of Wollin, Usedom, and West Pomerania south of the Peene, including Stettin, to Brandenburg-Prussia. Sweden kept Wismar and part of West Pomerania, including Stralsund. Sweden acquired peace with Denmark in the Treaty of Frederiksborg in July 1720. Frederick I reacquired the island of Rügen while he agreed that Frederick IV could keep the
Schleswig lands of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. These peace treaties were accompanied by the creation of an Anglo-Swedish alliance against Russia in February 1720. George I quickly deployed part of the English fleet to prevent Russian domination of the Baltic. At this time the Russian fleet controlled the eastern Baltic, bombarding and raiding the Swedish coastline in 1719-20. George I also planned to create a large anti-Russian coalition, including Austria, France, Brandenburg-Prussia, the Dutch Republic, Saxony, Poland, and Turkey. However, the British monarch failed to acquire European support for the alliance. George I therefore urged the Swedish king to make peace with Russia. In August 1720, the Tsar proposed peace to Sweden. Under French mediation the peace negotiations dragged on for a year. But Peter I’s large military forces influenced the outcome of the peace talks. Russia had 115,000 troops, forty-eight warships, and 300 galleys ready for combat in early 1721. In August 1721, Russia and Sweden agreed to the Peace of Nystad (Uusikaupunki). In the treaty, the Swedish king ceded Livonia, Estonia, Ingria, part of Karelia, with the towns of Riga, Dünamünde, Pernau, Reval, Dorpat, Narva, Viborg, Kexholm, and the islands of Ösel, Dagö, and Meno. Sweden regained Finland, except for Viborg. Peter I’s military success in the Great

---


96 Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 55.

97 Anderson, *Peter the Great*, 75.
Northern War and the Peace of Nystad made Russia the dominant power in the Baltic as well as a Great European Power.

As for literature regarding the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic one should begin with Stewart P. Oakley’s *War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790* (1.7.3), Jill Lisk’s *The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic, 1600-1725* (1.7.2), and David Kirby’s *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World, 1492-1772* (1.7.1). Zbigniew Wójcik, “From the Peace of Oliwa to the Truce of Bakhchisarai: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1660-1681” (1.7.7) is valuable for linking the Baltic struggle with the Turkish threat.

1666” (8.1.11) address important aspects of Polish policy. Foreign affairs during the reigns of Michael I Korybut Wiśniowiecki and John III Sobieski are considered in Horst Jablonowski, “Poland to the Death of Sobieski” (8.1.5), Anna Kamińska, Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (1669-1672) (8.1.6), Otton Laskowski, Sobieski, King of Poland (8.1.7), Zbigniew Wójcik, “King John III of Poland and the Turkish Aspects of his Foreign Policy” (A.8.2), and Charles Sass, “The Election Campaign in Poland in the Years 1696-1697” (8.1.10). For the Polish military, see Wiesław Majewski’s “The Polish Art of War in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” (3.5.6) and Jan Wimmer’s “Jan Sobieski’s Art of War” (3.5.8). A major historiographical gap is the lack of a detailed study on the foreign policy of Augustus II of Poland-Saxony.

In addition to the studies cited above by Oakley, Lisk, and Kirby, the foreign policies of Sweden and Denmark are addressed in Jerker Rosén’s “Scandinavia and the Baltic” (1.7.5). Moreover, the Swedish Empire is surveyed in Michael Roberts’ The Swedish Imperial Experience, 1560-1718 (1.7.4) and Sven Lundkvist’s "The Experience of Empire: Sweden as a Great Power" (8.2.10). Danish foreign policy, however, lacks adequate historiographical treatment. Sweden has been better served by historians, despite the inadequate attention paid to Charles X’s foreign policy and the First Northern War. Even so, Halvdan Koht, "Scandinavian Preventive Wars in the 1650s"
(8.2.7) and Michael Roberts, "Charles X and the Great Parenthesis: A Reconsideration" (8.2.11) are useful. Swedish foreign affairs under Charles XI are treated in Göran Rystad, "Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie" (8.2.13), Michael Roberts, "Charles XI" (8.2.12), and Anthony F. Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism (8.2.15). Particular aspects of Charles XI's policy are examined in Göran Rystad, "Sweden and the Nijmegen Peace Congress" (8.2.14), Andrew Lossky, "The Baltic Question, 1679-1689" (8.2.9), Andrew Lossky, "Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683" (6.1.7), Joseph A. Klaits, "The Idea of a Diplomat in the Age of Louis XIV: The Danish Envoy Extraordinary to France, 1688" (8.2.6), and Stewart P. Oakley, William III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Years' War, 1689-1697 (6.3.21). For the Swedish army, see Alf Åberg's "The Swedish Army: From Lützen to Narva" (3.5.1). Charles XII and the Great Northern War are treated in Ragnhild M. Hatton's Charles XII (8.2.3), Charles XII of Sweden (8.2.5), and "Charles XII and the Great Northern War" (8.2.4). Peter Englund, The Battle of Poltava: The Birth of the Russian Empire (8.2.1) and Angus Konstam, Poltava 1709: Russia Comes of Age (8.3.9) consider the campaign and battle that served as the turning point in the Great Northern War.

Jeremy Black, "Russia's Rise as a European Power, 1650-1750" (8.3.5), Werner Philipp, "Russia: The Beginning of Westernization" (8.3.19), and Matthew S. Anderson, "Russia under Peter the Great and the Changed
Relations of East and West" (8.3.3) provide brief introductions to Russian history during this period. Russian foreign policy during the reign of Alexis I is examined in Philip Longworth’s *Alexis: Tsar of All the Russias* (8.3.13) and "Tsar Alexis Goes to War" (8.3.14). C. Bickford O’Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667* (8.3.16) examines Russo-Ukrainian relations during the Thirteen Years’ War. The Russo-Turkish War during the reign of Theodore III receives attention in C. Bickford O’Brien’s "Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai" (8.3.17). Sophia’s diplomatic triumph with the Treaty of Eternal Peace between Russia and Poland as well as the Russo-Polish alliance against the Turks are discussed in C. Bickford O’Brien, *Russia under Two Tsars, 1682-1689: The Regency of Sophia Alekseevna* (8.3.18), Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia: Regent of Russia, 1657-1704* (8.3.8), Lindsey Hughes, *Russia and the West: The Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer, Prince Vasily Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643-1714)* (8.3.6), L.R. Lewitter, "The Russo-Polish Treaty of 1686 and Its Antecedents" (8.3.12), and Carol B. Stevens, "Why Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Campaigns against Crimea Fell Short of What Counted" (8.3.21). Biographies on Peter the Great includes Matthew S. Anderson, *Peter the Great* (8.3.2), Bernard H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (8.3.22), and Robert K. Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and World* (8.3.15). The Tsar’s foreign policy is also scrutinized in Lindsey Hughes,
Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (8.3.7), George Barany, The Anglo-Russian Entente Cordiale of 1697-1698: Peter I and William III at Utrecht (8.3.4), Andrew Rothstein, Peter the Great and Marlborough: Politics and Diplomacy in Converging Wars (8.3.20), L.R. Lewitter, "Poland, Russia and the Treaty of Vienna of 5 January 1719" (8.3.10), L.R. Lewitter, "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697-1721" (8.3.11), and Bernard H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (8.3.23). For Peter I’s armed forces, see Christopher Duffy’s Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800 (3.5.2), Angus Konstam’s Peter the Great’s Army (3.5.5), Angus Konstam’s Poltava 1709: Russia Comes of Age (8.3.9), and Edward J. Phillips’ The Founding of Russia’s Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688-1714 (3.5.7).

Ottoman foreign policy towards the West has received little treatment. Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (1.7.6) surveys Ottoman relations with the West. The Turkish threat to Europe is discussed in A.N. Kurat, “The Ottoman Empire under Mehmed IV” (8.4.2) as well as A.N. Kurat and John S. Bromley, “The Retreat of the Turks, 1683-1730” (6.6.2). John W. Stoye’s The Siege of Vienna (6.6.13) and Ivan Părvev’s Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade (1683-1739) (6.6.6) address the War of the Holy League. As for the Ottoman style of
warfare, see Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman War and Warfare" (8.4.1) and Rhoads Murphey, _Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700_ (8.4.3).

**8.1. The Decline of Poland-Lithuania**


In this volume Norman Davies, a lecturer at the University of London, surveys Polish history from the Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth century. Besides examining Polish religious, social, economic, urban, and constitutional history, the author analyzes the foreign affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Union of Lublin (1569) to the Third Partition of Poland (1795). The study is valuable as an introduction to Polish history. It includes a chronology, twenty-two maps, thirteen diagrams, and eight illustrations. The study is based on Polish, English, French, and Swedish secondary sources.


In this monograph, Robert Frost of the University of London examines the conduct of the Polish-Lithuanian government during the First Northern War. Frost shows that John Casimir attempted to reform the

98Frost, himself, refers to the war as the Second Northern War. He views the Seven Years' War of the North (1563-70) as the First Northern War.
Polish government to increase his authority over the Commonwealth while at war with Sweden and Russia. However, the nobility of Poland-Lithuania were greatly divided over the rule of Casimir and the election of a successor. The intense factional rivalry among the nobles limited the effectiveness of the Polish crown, caused a long struggle to gain a successor to Casimir, and ended any hope for political reform. As such, the Polish monarchy failed to increase its power over the nobles, finance, elections, and the military. The author sees the stalemate that resulted from the struggle between the Polish crown and the nobility during the First Northern War as the turning point which led to the decline of the Commonwealth. The study is based on research in Polish, British, and French archives. It contains a gazetteer, glossary, list of Polish-Lithuanian office holders, pronunciation guide, map of the Commonwealth, and a map of the Swedish invasion of Poland-Lithuania. The study is recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students interested Polish politics and international relations.


In this essay, Professors Józef Gierowski and Andrzej Kamiński of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow examine the reign of John III Sobieski and the rapid decline of Poland-Lithuania under Augustus II
during the Great Northern War. They concentrate on Polish political and foreign affairs, noting that factional struggles among the nobles as well as two costly wars, the War of the Holy League and the Great Northern War, weakened the Commonwealth and allowed Saxons, Swedes, and Russians the opportunity of influence the destiny of the country. The authors state that “Poland became, after Sweden, the second major victim of the Great Northern War” (p.714).


Professor Gierowski provides an overview of Poland-Lithuania and international relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The author begins by stating that the Commonwealth was one of the most powerful states in eastern Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, the Khmelnitsky uprising of 1648, which resulted in a crisis in the Ukraine, revealed Poland-Lithuania’s multinational, financial, and military weaknesses resulting in Russian and Swedish invasions in 1654-55 (p.228). As a consequence, the Commonwealth fought a series of wars that resulted in the decline of Polish power and prestige in Europe. Gierowski points out that while other European states became more powerful under royal absolutism, Poland remained politically divided without a modern standing army and
effective diplomatic corps (p.231). These shortcomings meant that the Commonwealth, even after the dynastic union with Saxony, could not compete with the growing power of Russia, Austria, and Brandenburg-Prussia in the new European balance of power of the eighteenth century. In this new environment Poland-Lithuania became a target for foreign intervention.


Professor Horst Jablonowski of the University of Bonn provides a brief essay on Polish history from 1648 to 1696. He discusses domestic politics, international relations, religion, and economics of the period. The essay lacks notes, but it serves as a good introduction to Poland in the late seventeenth century.


In this monograph, Anna Kamińska examines Polish-Brandenburg relations from 1657 to 1672. In 1657, the Poles forced the Swedes out of Poland-Lithuania in the First Northern War. As a consequence, John Casimir acquired an alliance with Frederick William of Brandenburg in the treaties of Wehlau (September 1657) and Bromberg (November 1657). In these treaties Casimir conceded full sovereignty over East Prussia and
other lands to Brandenburg in return for a military alliance. However, the treaties stated that Brandenburg’s sovereignty over East Prussia would have to be confirmed by future Polish monarchs. As such, Frederick William sought confirmation of his rule in East Prussia from Michael I Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669-73). Unfortunately, Frederick William had to negotiate for confirmation while the politically weak Michael I struggled to maintain the Polish throne against the opposition of the nobility. The Elector of Brandenburg found that Bishop Andrew Olszowski, the Polish Vice Chancellor, objected to the confirmation. But, John Sobieski, the Grand Marshal of the Crown, pressed for improved Polish-Brandenburg relations because he needed Frederick William’s military and financial assistance to defend the Commonwealth against the Turkish threat. Diplomatic talks dragged on until Michael I decided to confirm the treaties of Wehlau and Bromberg to ensure the Polish-Brandenburg alliance in March 1672. The Polish monarch needed Frederick William’s support in case the political situation in the Commonwealth erupted into a civil war (p.157). The alliance also promised the Commonwealth military aid against the Turkish threat at the outbreak of the Polish-Turkish War (1671-76). Kamińska sees Wehlau-Bromberg as the turning point in the rise of Brandenburg as well as the decline of Poland-Lithuania in eastern European affairs (p.3). The
study is supported by archival research in Poland and Germany. It lacks a bibliography. The study is recommended for the specialist.


Major Otton Laskowski provides a detailed politico-military biography of John Sobieski (1629-96). The study is a translation of a work originally published in Poland in 1933. In it, Laskowski discusses Sobieski’s activities in the First Northern War (1655-60) and his quick promotion to Grand Marshal of the Crown after his victory over the Tartars and Cossacks at Podhajce in 1667. Laskowski depicts Sobieski’s actions in the Polish-Turkish War (1671-76), including his victory at Chocim (1673) which resulted in his election as King of Poland-Lithuania in 1674. As the Polish monarch, Sobieski defeated the Turks at Lwów in 1675 as well as blocked a Turkish advance into Poland and negotiated the Truce of Żórawno in 1676. In addition to fighting the Turks, John III maintained an alliance with Louis XIV against Frederick William of Brandenburg during the Dutch War (1672-78). He deserted this alliance to ally with Leopold I of Austria against the Turkish threat to Europe in April 1683. Sobieski saved Austria by defeating the Turks at Vienna (September) and Parkany (October) in 1683, but he failed to extend Polish influence into Moldavia and Wallachia as far as
the Baltic Sea in the War of the Holy League (1683-99). His war efforts were affected by Turkish-Tartar defenses, opposition in the Polish Sejm (Diet), and the lack of military cooperation from Austria. The study is based on Polish archival as well as primary sources published in the Polish, German, Italian, French, and English languages. It contains sixteen illustrations. Unfortunately, the English version of Laskowski's valuable study lacks notes and an index.


Karol Marcincowski's work contains a misleading title. The study fails to examine the entire conflict between Poland and Sweden in the First Northern War. Instead, the author presents an argument that Hetman Stefan Czarniecki, in support of King John Casimir, began the Polish uprising against the Swedish military occupation in 1655. Marcincowski shows that Polish historians have incorrectly credited Augustyn Kordecki, the prior of the monastery at Częstochowa, with the leadership of the uprising. Instead, Czarniecki and the Polish army forced the Swedes to retreat from advanced positions in Poland in late 1655. The study has limited value and shows the signs of poor editing. It is based on Polish and Swedish sources.

This is a collection of sixty essays surveying Polish history to 1935. Professors M. Korduba and W. Tomkiewicz discuss the reign of John Casimir (1648-68), including the Khmelnitsky insurrection, First Northern War, and Thirteen Years’ War. O. Forst de Battaglia considers the Polish-Turkish War and War of the Holy League during the reign of John III Sobieski (1674-96). Poland during the reign of Augustus II and the Great Northern War is the subject of Wł. Konopczyński. The study includes five maps and sixteen illustrations. It lacks a bibliography and notes.


In this article, Charles Sass describes the election campaign for the Polish throne after the death of John III Sobieski in 1696. He discusses the complex diplomatic and political intrigues associated with the election campaigns of the French and Austrian candidates, François Louis de Bourbon, Duke of Conti and the king’s eldest son, James Sobieski. Both Louis XIV and Leopold I sought to influence Polish affairs. However, Elector Frederick Augustus I of Saxony, a last minute candidate, won the support of the Polish nobility through timely bribes.
and secured his election after moving into Poland with the Saxon army in 1697. The article is based on Polish and German sources.


Professor Zbigniew Wójcik explores the Polish-Crimean Tartar alliance during the Thirteen Years’ War and First Northern War. He finds that John Casimir and the Polish Sejm gave the Crimean khanate numerous gifts and large subsidies to maintain the alliance from 1654 to 1666. Afterwards, the Tartars broke the alliance and joined with the Cossacks of Hetman Doroshenko to attack the Polish army in the Ukraine. The author believes that the costly Polish-Tartar alliance was valuable for political and military reasons during the Commonwealth’s struggle against Russia and Sweden. Wójcik stresses that more historical research needs to be conducted on Polish-Tartar relations in the seventeenth century, especially the extent of Tartar raids into Poland and the Polish-Tartar financial relationship.

See also:


8.3.11. Lewitter, L.R. "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697-1721." The Historical Journal 11 (1968): 3-34.


8.2. Sweden, Denmark, and the Baltic


   This is an English translation of Peter Englund's popular study of the battle of Poltava originally published in Sweden in 1988. In this work Englund of the University of Uppsala vividly describes Charles XII's military campaign across Poland-Lithuania into the Russian Empire in 1708-9, culminating with the Russian victory at Poltava in the Ukraine. The Swedish loss served as a turning point in the Great Northern War. The study is exceptionally well-written. It is based on primary sources, but lacks notes. The work includes eight maps and a biographical appendix.

In this article, Harold A. Hansen of John Muir College renders an account of the diplomatic mission of Marcus Gjøe, the Danish envoy to England (1672-78). He focuses on Gjøe's detailed diplomatic reports to Christian V concerning the initial phase of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74). The outcome of the conflict between two important naval powers and the possible breakup of the Anglo-French alliance were of vital interest to Danish foreign and commercial policy. Gjøe's dispatches depicted the ill preparedness of the English fleet for combat as well as the incompetence of its commanders. He also describes the lack of French support to the English fleet in naval battles with the Dutch.


In this pamphlet, Professor Ragnhild M. Hatton of the University of London furnishes a brief analytical overview of Charles XII of Sweden. The author addresses the creation of the anti-Swedish coalition and the Great Northern War, military reforms, as well as Swedish Old and New School historical debates concerning Charles XII. Hatton believes that Charles XII should have allied with another Great Power to protect Sweden's position in the Baltic during the Great Northern War (p.39). The pamphlet includes two maps and a useful chronology.

Hatton furnishes an outstanding introduction to Charles XII of Sweden and the Great Northern War. The author surveys Swedish foreign policy in the late 1690s; the creation of the anti-Swedish coalition of Denmark, Poland-Saxony, and Russia; Charles XII's military success in the early years; as well as his failures after 1708. Hatton credits Charles XII with saving Sweden against the onslaught of hostile neighbors in 1700. Moreover, she professes that Sweden's best chance to retain Great Power status rested with Charles XII. Even so, Hatton believes that the increasing power of Russia cast a shadow over the Swedish Empire and the Tsar would ultimately control the East Baltic.


This is an outstanding biography of Charles XII of Sweden (1697-1718). Professor Hatton focuses on the political, diplomatic, and military life of the Swedish monarch in this massive study. She stresses the Great Northern War, relating Charles XII's military campaigns in Denmark, Russia, Poland, Saxony, and Norway. In 1700, the eighteen-year-old king had to defend his empire against the anti-Swedish coalition. Charles XII defeated his enemies in the first six years of his
reign, but he made the mistake of invading Russia and losing to Peter I at Poltava in 1709. After his stay in the Ottoman Empire Charles XII sought to defend his empire against a renewed anti-Swedish coalition. Hatton believes that Charles XII was a military "strategist and tactician of proved merit . . . with the indefinable gift of command that inspired confidence and encouragement, terror and awe" (p.521). However, the warrior-king died attacking a fortress in Norway at the early age of thirty-six. The biography is based on published and unpublished primary sources written in the Swedish, English, and French languages. It includes six maps and thirty-eight illustrations. The study is highly recommended for specialists, teachers, and graduate students.


Joseph A. Klaits examines the diplomatic mission of Henning Meyercrone, the Danish envoy extraordinary to the court of Louis XIV, during the dramatic year of 1688. Christian V wanted Meyercrone to acquire French military assistance against the Duke Christian Albert of Holstein-Gottorp, Sweden, and Brunswick-Lüneburg. He also wanted Louis XIV to influence James II to use the English fleet to support Denmark. Meyercrone failed to acquire the needed support because of the French war in the Rhineland and the Glorious Revolution. In the
Nine Years’ War, Louis XIV placed Denmark in the center of his plans for defending French interests in northern Europe. Christian V, nevertheless, refused to militarily support the French war in Germany. The thesis is based on Danish archival material and published French primary sources. The study has limited value.


In this brief article, Halvdan Koht argues that the Northern Powers launched three preventive wars during the First Northern War. He believes that Charles X’s invasion of Poland-Lithuania in July 1655 was a preventive war against John Casimir who sought the Swedish crown. Moreover, Frederick III of Denmark, fearing the aggression of Charles X, launched a preventive war against Sweden in June 1657. The Danish king feared that Charles X would attack Denmark to conquer Scania, Halland, and Blekinge after Sweden was finished with Poland. The Danish attack on Sweden led to a humiliating defeat and the Peace of Roskilde (February 1658). But, Charles X turned around and launched the third preventive war by attacking Denmark in August 1658. The author believes that Charles X feared the Danes would soon attack Sweden to regain the lands lost in the Peace of Roskilde.

Professor Waldemar Westergaard of the University of California at Los Angeles supplies a collection of diplomatic dispatches by Christopher Lindenov, the Danish envoy to England (1668-72). Westergaard also provides a useful introduction to Lindenov's diplomatic mission to the court of Charles II depicting Anglo-Danish relations from 1661 to 1672. He notes Frederick III's commercial agreements with both England and the Dutch Republic, and the Danish concern with poor Anglo-Dutch relations that erupted into the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). Charles II sought closer political ties with Denmark to block Dutch commercial advantages in the Baltic. However, the Danes allied with the Dutch and French against England during the conflict. With the Peace of Breda (1667) and the creation of the Triple Alliance (1668), the Danes concerned themselves with the combination of England, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden against France. Frederick III sent Lindenov to England to improve Anglo-Danish relations in 1668, fearing the combination of the Triple Alliance in the Baltic. Lindenov gained a commercial agreement with Charles II, but the Danes were left out the Anglo-French-Swedish alliance against the United Provinces in the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) and Dutch War (1672-78). Lindenov's
dispatches hold limited value because Denmark failed to join the Triple Alliance of 1668 and the Danish envoy was slow to discover the secret Anglo-French alliance of 1670 against the Dutch Republic.


In his unpublished doctoral dissertation, Andrew Lossky examines Baltic diplomacy from the Dutch War (1672-78) to the outbreak of the Nine Years' War (1688-97). He surveys the foreign policies of Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, Poland-Lithuania, and Russia. His main focus is on explaining the decline of Sweden in international affairs during the Dutch War, the course of the Baltic Crisis in 1682-83, and the subsequent revival of Swedish power in the Baltic region. He describes Sweden's intervention in support of its French ally during the Dutch War (1674); its military defeat at the hands of the Great Elector at Fehrbellin (1675); and the loss of West Pomerania and Wismar to Brandenburg, the forfeiture of the southern provinces of Sweden to Denmark, as well as the loss of Bremen and Verden to the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Bishop of Münster in 1675-78. Louis XIV, however, saved the Swedish Empire from dissolution by applying diplomatic pressure against Brandenburg and Denmark to restore most of the lost lands to Sweden in 1679. Even so, Charles XI's fleet had been seriously weakened, the army disbanded, and his treasury emptied.
After the war, Charles XI changed the course of Sweden by embarking on a program of social and military reform designed to strengthen his empire. He sought peace in the Baltic. The Great Elector and Christian V, on the other hand, were determined to regain the Swedish lands won in the Dutch War and lost in the peace treaties. They attempted to gain the support of Louis XIV for a war of conquest against Charles XI, but the Sun King refused to fully support his new allies in the Baltic Crisis of 1682-83. Afterwards, French influence in the Baltic and the anti-Swedish coalition quickly declined. French aggression evident in the Franco-Spanish War of 1683-84, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1684), and the threat to German lands quickly drew the Great Elector and Charles XI together along with William III of Orange, Leopold I, and other German princes to defend the Truce of Regensburg (1684). In fact, Charles XI and Frederick William made a defensive pact in 1686. Denmark was too weak to oppose Sweden alone. In the meantime, Sweden's Polish and Russian enemies were occupied with the Turkish menace. Charles XI took advantage of international attention drawn away from the Baltic to central Germany and southeastern Europe by completing his social and military reforms and rebuilding Swedish financial, army, and naval power (p.278). In 1689, Sweden stood as the most powerful Baltic power, maintaining an
army of 64,000 men and a navy consisting of twenty-eight ships-of-the-line and eight frigates mounting 2,200 guns (p.407). Moreover, Charles XI had achieved alliances with Brandenburg, Brunswick-Lüneburg, and the Dutch Republic. Lossky's dissertation is based on published Swedish, Danish, Dutch, French, German, and Russian primary documents. It is highly recommended reading for those individuals interested in Baltic affairs.


Sven Lundkvist of the University of Uppsala examines the Swedish Empire from the early seventeenth century to the Peace of Nystad. He argues that Sweden lacked the demographic and economic resources to sustain its position as a Great Power while surrounded by hostile foreign powers. Sweden relied upon the manpower and financial resources of its possessions abroad to maintain the empire. But, once Charles XII lost the overseas possessions in the Great Northern War Sweden quickly became a second-rate European power.


Professor Michael Roberts of Queen's College at Belfast scrutinizes the historical argument that Bohdan Kentschynskyj presented in
Karolinska Förbundets Årshok in 1956, the so-called “Great Parenthesis” thesis. Kentrschynskyj argued that Charles X sought a Polish alliance against Russia in 1654-55. When this alliance failed to materialize, Sweden attacked Poland-Lithuania as a preliminary move towards war against Russia. Charles X was a forerunner to Charles XII who saw Russia as Sweden’s primary enemy in the Baltic. Roberts, on the other hand, argues that Charles X saw Poland-Lithuania as Sweden’s prime enemy. Charles X’s objective was to conquer Poland, secure the Polish crown for himself, annex Poland’s Baltic coastline, and dominate the Baltic Sea.


The first study of Charles XI (1660-97) in the English language. Professor Roberts briefly examines the regency government (1660-72). He notes that the regency lacked the needed finances to maintain a large peacetime standing army to protect the vulnerable Swedish Empire after 1660. In fact, Chancellor Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie’s need for foreign subsidies resulted in an alliance with France (1672) and humiliating military setbacks in the Dutch War.

Roberts also considers the personal rule of the Swedish king after the Dutch War. He stresses the creation of royal absolutism. Charles
XI used the *reduktion* to create financial resources that allowed him to avoid entangling alliances and war, as well as recover from the Dutch War. This foreign policy enabled Charles XI to carry out much needed domestic reforms, including the reorganization of the army and navy. In addition, Roberts points out that Charles XI utilized the *indelningsverk* to create a first-class peacetime standing army. The author believes that the Swedish king made Sweden a strong second-rate European power (p.191).


Göran Rystad of the University of Lund furnishes a brief political biography of Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie (1622-86). De la Gardie served as treasurer under Queen Christina, governor-general of Livonia for Charles X, and chancellor during the early years of Charles XI’s reign. Rystad describes de la Gardie’s chancellorship noting his political opposition in the Council of State and the struggle over financial and foreign policy problems. He points out the Chancellor’s pro-French attitude. However, de la Gardie’s political opponents forced through the council Sweden’s admission to the Triple Alliance (Sweden, England, and the Dutch Republic) against Louis XIV in 1668 (pp.213-14). But, in 1672, the Chancellor was able to enlist support in the council for a
French alliance against the Dutch Republic. The author argues that de la Gardie’s foreign policy was not centered on French subsidies (p.215). Instead, the Chancellor believed that Sweden could avoid military involvement in the Dutch War by maintaining an army in West Pomerania while serving as the mediator between the warring parties. Rystad calls de la Gardie’s plan a “policy of peace” (p.218). Nonetheless, Swedish mediation at the beginning of the Dutch war failed. Louis XIV soon pressured the Swedes to attack Brandenburg by threatening not to pay promised subsidies. Consequently, Sweden invaded Brandenburg and became embroiled in a war against the Great Elector, Denmark, the Dutch Republic, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Münster, and Austria that led to military disaster and the downfall of de la Gardie. Rystad states that “Sweden had been dragged into a war which she was totally unequipped to wage” (p.218).


Rystad discusses de la Gardie’s foreign policy that engulfed Sweden in the Dutch War. He argues that Sweden sought to maintain peace and the status quo in the Baltic (p.133). Moreover, Sweden allied with Louis XIV to avoid diplomatic isolation and a possible French alliance with Denmark against Sweden (p.134). The Council of State also needed
French subsidies to rearm its military. De la Gardie's failed foreign policy resulted in the loss of Swedish territory. Consequently, at the Congress of Nijmegen (1676-79), Swedish diplomatic representatives were willing to serve as mediators between Louis XIV and his enemies in exchange for the promise of full territorial restoration in the peace settlement. Rystad believes that France, Austria, and the Dutch Republic wanted to maintain Swedish power in the Baltic (p.141). Hence, Louis XIV assisted Sweden after the Peace of Nijmegen (1678/79) to regain most of its lost territories in the treaties of Celle, Münster, St. Germain-en-Laye, and Lund from January to September 1679.


Professor Anthony F. Upton of the University of St. Andrews examines the reign of Charles XI of Sweden. The author addresses the rise of Swedish royal absolutism and Charles XI's reform of government and finances. Through the proceeds of the reduktion Charles XI was able to rebuild a first-rate army of 61,100 men with modern arms and equipment by 1697 (p.71). However, Upton points out that Charles XI lacked the knowledge and skills to conduct Swedish foreign policy (p.105). As such, after 1679, the king relied upon his chancery
president, Bengt Oxenstierna, and the Council of State to direct foreign affairs (pp.156, 201). Swedish policy centered on the defense of the Swedish Empire and Holstein-Gottorp as well as maintaining peace in the Baltic. The study is based on Swedish and French archival material. It includes a valuable chronology and three illustrations. The study has limited value for students of diplomacy and warfare.

See also:


8.3. The Rise of Russia


Professor Matthew S. Anderson of the University of London briefly treats Peter the Great in this pamphlet. He surveys and praises the Tsar’s reforms, especially his political and military achievements. He argues that Russia’s enhanced international status was achieved by the military which Peter I had improved after the disaster at Narva in 1700. The Tsar initiated reforms that expanded and created a western-style army for Russia which defeated the Swedes at Poltava and took control of the East Baltic. Anderson notes that Peter the Great controlled an army of 210,000 Russian soldiers and 100,000 Cossacks (p.17). His efforts to build a Russian navy resulted in a fleet of forty-eight ships-of-the-line and over 800 smaller vessels (p.17). Anderson stresses that the
leadership of Peter the Great as well as the military made Russia one of the Great Powers of Europe.


In this biographical study, Professor Anderson argues that Peter I's efforts to westernize and modernize Russia, starting with the military machine, resulted in Russia's diplomatic and military victories against Sweden and the acquisition of Great Power status. The author is quick to point out that Peter built on the efforts of his predecessors to modernize the Russian army as well as expand diplomatic and trading relations with western Europe.

Anderson describes Peter I's upbringing during the regency of Sophia. He was interested in military training and military science. After 1689, the Tsar also became interested in state affairs. Anderson points out that Peter I fell under foreign influence during his youth: this closeness to western ideas would greatly sway his future policies regarding military modernization, social reform, the building of a navy, and the promotion of industrial expansion.

In addition to his interest in military matters, Peter I was ambitious for territorial expansion. The Tsar successfully captured Azov in 1696. With this port, Russia gained access to the Sea of Azov, which increased the Tsar's aspirations to gain access to the Black Sea.
Moreover, Azov served as the place to build the first Russian fleet. Shortly after this success, the Tsar ventured to western and central Europe on his "Great Embassy" in 1697-98. He recruited foreign technicians to move to Russia and assist him in modernizing his empire, as well as sought to reaffirm his support to the Holy League in the war against the Turks. The Tsar hoped to acquire Kerch as a seaport near the Black Sea. However, Peter I's Austro-Venetian allies failed to satisfy his desire for Kerch in the Peace of Karlowitz (1699). The Tsar's Black Sea fleet was to be confined to Azov!

Having no immediate success in the south, the Tsar looked to the Baltic for territorial expansion. He joined the Danish-Polish-Saxon alliance against Sweden in 1699. His war aim was the acquisition of the Baltic coastline in Ingria and Karelia. In 1700, the alliance attacked Sweden, beginning the Great Northern War. But, Charles XII of Sweden led his forces to victories over the Danes and Russians in 1700, and then invaded Poland in 1701.

Anderson argues that Russia quickly recovered from the military disaster at Narva because of military reforms initiated in 1698-99. These reforms included the conscription of a large standing army that was organized and trained along western standards, as well as promoting economic growth in iron production, textile manufacturing,
arms production, and ship building. In what Anderson calls the creation of "formidable military strength" Russia became a rising power in the Baltic (p.86).

With this military power, Peter invaded Swedish territory along the Baltic while Charles XII was engaged in war against Augustus II off Poland-Saxony. The Russian army broke through to the Baltic, capturing Nöteborg (1702), Narva (1704), and Courland (1705-6). Peter began building the city of St. Petersburg in 1703. According to the author, the Tsar was determined to keep his outlet to the Baltic. But, after the Peace of Altranstädt (1706), Charles XII turned away from Saxony to meet the Russian threat. In response, the Tsar withdrew from the Swedish provinces and fell back to defend Moscow in 1707-9. Russia, however, achieved victory over the Swedes at Poltava (1709). Anderson argues that this battle actually decided the outcome of the Great Northern War. Afterwards, Peter I assisted Augustus II to regain Poland, resulting in Russian hegemony over Poland. Moreover, the Russian army overran Livonia, Estonia, and Karelia in 1710. Anderson writes: "The victories of 1709-10 meant for Russia not merely security in Poland and territorial gains on the Baltic but a new international position, a revolutionary change in the outside world" (p.61).
With this increased international prestige Russia was courted by the Great and Minor Powers of Europe. England, for instance, sought to gain Russian adherence to the Grand Alliance against France. Soon Russian forces overran southern Finland in 1713-14, and began attacking the rest of the Swedish Empire with the assistance of Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Brandenburg-Prussia. But, the Great and Minor Powers quickly became uneasy about the growth of Russian power in northern Germany and the Baltic, resulting in the Northern Crisis of 1716-17. In this crisis, Denmark, England, and Hanover pressed for and acquired the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mecklenburg. Even so, England, Hanover, Austria, and Saxony created an alliance (Treaty of Vienna) in support of Sweden against Russia in 1719. Such opposition resulted in the Tsar pulling his forces out of Poland. Although George I of England pressed for action against Russia, the alliance failed to form an effective military coalition because of overwhelming Russian forces, Prussian neutrality, the death of Charles XII, and Anglo-Russian trade difficulties. In the end, George I pressured the Swedes to sign the Peace of Nystad with Russia in 1721. Russia formally acquired Livonia, Estonia, Ingria, and Karelia, thus cementing Russia's claim to Great Power status.
This biographical study is based on Russian, German, English, and French sources. It includes forty-four illustrations, two maps, a chronology, and a genealogical table of the Romanov dynasty. The study is recommended for teachers and graduate students.


Professor Anderson supplies a brief essay on Russia during the reign of Peter I. He discusses the Tsar's attempts to change the Russian economy, church, administration, culture, military, and navy. Moreover, Anderson focuses on Peter the Great's involvement in the Great Northern War and Russian expansionism. He stresses that Peter I's military victories, especially at Poltava, increased Russia's international prestige and contacts with western Europe. However, western European states quickly learned to fear the Russian threat to the Baltic.


George Barany examines the personal meeting of Peter I and William III at Utrecht in September 1697. The meeting set up a short-lived entente cordiale between Russia and the Maritime Powers against Louis XIV's designs on Poland and the Baltic. Moreover, the Tsar sought to
improve Russian trade relations and acquire technology from the
Maritime Powers. The *entente cordiale* began to fall apart when Peter I discovered that William III was mediating a separate peace for Austria in the War of the Holy League in April 1698. The Tsar, nevertheless, tried to maintain close relations with England throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. The work is based on English, Russian, Dutch, French, and German sources. It lacks a bibliography. The study includes twelve illustrations. It is recommended for the specialist.


Professor Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter stresses the link between the reigns of Alexis I and Peter the Great in the rise of Russia as a Great Power. The author argues that Alexis I and Peter I established Russian hegemony in eastern Europe and significantly changed the European international system. Black points out that Russia’s rise to Great Power status was based on Alexis I and Peter I’s diplomatic and military achievements against Poland-Lithuania, the Turkish Empire, and Sweden. This is a valuable introduction to Russian foreign policy during the reigns of Alexis I and Peter the Great.

Professor Lindsey Hughes of the University of London furnishes a short biography of Prince Vasily Vasil’evich Golitsyn. Golitsyn began serving Alexis I in 1658 and rose to the status of boyar and military commander during the reign of Theodore III. As such, he served as a commander of Russian garrisons at Sevsk and Putivl’ in the Ukraine during the Russo-Turkish War (1677-81). He saw limited action at Chigirin in 1677. After the Tsar’s death Golitsyn served as the chief of the foreign office, handling foreign affairs for the Regent Sophia. He achieved a diplomatic success in the Treaty of Moscow (Treaty of Eternal Peace) with Poland-Lithuania in 1686. In this treaty, he acquired Polish recognition of Russian rule over the East Ukraine, Kiev, and Smolensk. Moreover, Russia and Poland became military allies against the Ottoman Turks and Crimean Tartars. Consequently, Golitsyn served as commander-in-chief of the Russian forces that failed in two campaigns against the Tartars in 1687 and 1689. In the first campaign, Golitsyn called off the invasion of the Crimea after the Tartars lit brush fires on the steppes which prevented the advance of the Russian army. The second campaign was terminated after Golitsyn reached Perekop, but the Russian forces lacked enough food and fodder to besiege the
fortress. Hughes points out the rumors that Golitsyn accepted gold from the Crimean khan to call off the 1689 campaign (p.64). With the end of the regency, Peter I banished Golitsyn from Moscow. Nonetheless, the author believes that Peter I missed the chance to use Golitsyn as an expert on Polish and Turkish affairs (p.97). The biography is based on published Russian, German, English, and French primary sources. It contains five illustrations. The biography should be read as a supplement to the study of Sophia’s regency by Hughes (8.3.8).


Professor Hughes produces a magisterial study on Russia during the reign of Peter I. The work includes a survey of Russian foreign policy and the military. The author examines the Azov campaigns, Grand Embassy to the West, Great Northern War, Russo-Turkish War (1710-13), and Persian campaign (1722-23). She also discusses Peter I’s military reforms, recruitment, training, logistics, as well as the creation of a Russian fleet. The study contains a valuable chronology of events, bibliography, and twenty-six illustrations. It is based on Russian sources.
Hughes examines the regency of Sophia (1682-89). The author argues that Sophia effectively ruled Russia and that she, along with Prince Vasily Golitsyn, promoted progress and religious tolerance as well as expanded Russia's foreign relations. Hughes argues that after the death of her brother, Theodore III, and during the strel'sty (musketeer) revolt of 1682, Sophia took charge in dealings with the unruly strel'sty and served as the court spokesperson in support of the joint-Tsars, her invalid brother Ivan V (1682-96) and her much younger half-brother Peter I (1682-1725). In the following negotiations the strel'sty proposed that Sophia serve as a regent for the joint rule of Ivan V and Peter I. This revolt began the regency of Sophia, who Hughes stresses was more than a figurehead for Prince Golitsyn's administration of Russia. The author disproves any notion of a romantic link between Sophia and Golitsyn. However, Golitsyn served as Sophia's chief statesman, formulating foreign policy and managing the activities of foreign mercenaries and the cavalry. Hughes points out Sophia and Golitsyn's efforts to advance foreign trade with the West as well as importing western industries to Russia. She describes the regency's religious tolerance of Roman Catholics and Protestants, illustrated by the
acceptance of French Huguenots into Russia after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1684).

Professor Hughes declares that Sophia assisted Golitsyn in the formulation of foreign policy (p.189). The regent increased diplomatic links with Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, England, Denmark, and the German states. The primary goal of Sophia’s foreign policy was to maintain peace and avoid war with Russia’s three main enemies: Sweden, Poland, and the Turks. In regards to the first neighbor, Sophia achieved a mutually beneficial trading relationship with the Swedish Empire. The regency made every effort to maintain good relations with Sweden, especially since the Poles and Turks threatened Russian territory. Sophia even passed on the Danish proposal of a Russo-Danish alliance against Sweden in 1684.

On the other hand, Moscow’s relations with Poland had declined since the Truce of Andrusovo. Russia and Poland disputed the sovereignty of Kiev. This dispute might have led to war if it was not for the Turkish threat. The Turks and Crimean Tartars threatened both Poland and Russia. Sophia ignored diplomatic pressure to join the Holy League against the Turks in 1684. However, Polish setbacks against the Turks resulted in John III Sobieski’s acceptance of Russian demands regarding a Russo-Polish alliance. Hughes calls the Treaty of Eternal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Peace (1686) the high point of Sophia’s regency. The agreement was a major Russian diplomatic victory over the Poles. Sobieski agreed to relinquish claims to Kiev as well as the East Ukraine (pp.192-93). As a result, Russia declared war on the Turks in 1686. But, Golitsyn and the Russian army failed in two campaigns against the Turks in 1687 and 1689. The author blames Golitsyn’s failures on the lack of Russo-Polish military coordination and cooperation in their battle against the Turks. These military failures were used by supporters of Peter I to discredit the regency in 1689, and contributed to the downfall of Sophia’s rule in favor of the two Tsars. This is an outstanding study based on Russian primary sources. The work includes a glossary, genealogical table, chronology of events, and nineteen illustrations.


This is a valuable description of the conflict between Peter I and Charles XII in the Great Northern War to the Swedish surrender at Perevolochna (July 1709). Angus Konstam considers the Russian and Swedish commanders, their armies, and war plans concerning the military campaigns of 1707-9. He depicts the Swedish advance through Poland-Lithuania and the Russian retreat and scorched-earth policy. The author explains the Swedish victory at Holowczyń (July 1708), followed by Tsar Peter I’s victory over the Swedes at Lesnaya (September 1708)
and Poltava (June 1709). He states that Poltava "marked a turning point in the fortunes of two empires – the start of the decline of the sixty-year Swedish empire; and the rise of Russia as a European power" (p.88). The study includes a chronology, six order of battle plans, nine maps, and seventy-one illustrations. It is recommended for individuals interested in military history and war games. The work lacks notes.


In this article, L.R. Lewitter of Cambridge University surveys the diplomatic activity caused by Russian predominance in the Baltic which resulted in the Northern Crisis of 1716-17 and the Treaty of Vienna in 1719. His argument is that Peter I's diplomacy and military strength maintained Russia's newly won Great Power status despite the forced withdrawal from Mecklenburg and Poland. The author begins by describing the Russian alliance with Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin in 1716 and the deployment of 30,000 Russian troops to Mecklenburg to conduct both naval and military operations against Sweden in the Great Northern War (p.4). Lewitter states that such an extension of Russian power into northern Germany heightened the concerns of George I of Great Britain and Hanover and Charles VI of Austria regarding the Russian threat to the northern German states and trading privileges in the Baltic. George I and Charles VI sought to drive
the Russians out of Mecklenburg and Poland. At the same time, Augustus II of Poland-Saxony, living under Russian domination, urged the formation of a coalition against Peter I. In this Northern Crisis, the Tsar agreed to pull his troops out of Mecklenburg so as to avoid war with Britain and Austria.

Nonetheless, in 1719, Britain, Hanover, Austria, and Saxony-Poland signed the Treaty of Vienna. These powers had the goal of reestablishing the status quo in the north as well as driving Russia out of Poland and Lithuania. Again, to avoid an unwanted war, Peter withdrew his forces from Poland except for Courland. Next, the anti-Russian alliance planned to reclaim Kiev and Smolensk for Poland in addition to restoring the lost Baltic lands to Sweden. George I, acquiring an Anglo-Swedish alliance, pressed the Swedes to attack Russia in 1720. However, British diplomacy failed because Russian military strength deterred both the Swedes and the Poles from attacking Russia, especially since Frederick William I of Brandenburg-Prussia supported the Tsar. In the end, Sweden was forced to agree to the Peace of Nystad in 1721, thus ending the Great Northern War.

8.3.11. Lewitter, L.R. "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697-1721." The Historical Journal 11 (1968): 3-34.

Lewitter's article addresses Peter I's motives for territorial expansion on the Baltic. The author argues that the Tsar was determined for
Russia to become a Baltic power for the economic gain involved with controlling major seaports. Without a Baltic port, Russian trade with the West traveled through the Swedish seaports of Narva and Riga with Charles XII making profit off Russian exports. Peter, so argues Lewitter, aspired to annex these seaports so as to control and benefit from trade with the West. He desired to redirect the Oriental trade to western and northern Europe through Russia to reap a significant profit. For similar reasons, Augustus II of Poland-Saxony conspired with Peter I against the Swedes in 1698-99. After defeating the Russians at Narva (1700), Charles XII left the Tsar alone and concentrated his military efforts against Augustus II from 1701-6, thus allowing the Russians to capture Narva (1704). Charles XII's success against Augustus II made Poland a Swedish satellite. However, once the Tsar defeated the Swedes at Poltava (1709), he was able to capture Riga (1710) as well as turn Poland into a Russian satellite. He quickly redirected Ukrainian trade with the West away from routes through Poland to the Russian seaports on the Baltic. Lewitter professes that control of Baltic seaports and trade, defended by a growing naval fleet, brought Russia much profit, but it also antagonized Britain by threatening English interests in maintaining free navigational rights in the Baltic.
Lewitter provides an excellent introduction to Russo-Polish relations during the late seventeenth century. He addresses Russo-Polish relations from the Truce of Andrusovo (1667) to the Treaty of Eternal Peace (1686). Andrusovo ended the Thirteen Years’ War between Muscovite Russia and Poland-Lithuania. Soon afterwards, the Turkish threat absorbed Poland-Lithuania (1671-76) and Russia (1677-81) in war. With the Turkish threat facing Europe, John Sobieski agreed with Popes Clement IX (1667-69) and Innocent XI (1676-89) in their call for an anti-Turkish coalition. Sobieski urged for the German Empire, France, Venice, Russia, and Persia to join Poland in a Holy League against the Turks in the 1670s. This league was slow to form. However, the Russians and Poles improved their relations by exchanging their first permanent diplomatic representatives in 1673 (p.18). Moreover, Russia and Poland sent permanent diplomatic missions to Vienna during the Russo-Turkish War in 1679. As a result, Sobieski allied with Leopold I of Austria and served as the allied commander that defeated the Turks at Vienna in 1683. Poland became a member of the Holy League along with the Papacy, the German Empire, and Venice in 1684. But, Sobieski, encouraged by the Pope, continued to seek a Russian alliance against the Turks. Lewitter believes that Sobieski was willing to agree


Professor Philip Longworth of McGill University examines the reign, diplomacy, and military prowess of Alexis I (1645-76). Longworth’s thesis is that Russia emerged as a Great Power under the rule of Alexis I because of his skill in war and diplomacy.

Alexis I had a background in political, military, and diplomatic affairs. As such, the Tsar was keen to formulate foreign policies aimed at territorial expansion and keeping the threats from the Poles, Tartars, Turks, and Swedes in check. Alexis I, so argues Longworth, had aspirations for the spiritual and political union of all the Russias, including Muscovy, Belorussia, and the Ukraine under his rule. This dream, along with recapturing Smolensk, guided his initial foreign adventures.

Preparing the way for war, Alexis I looked to western Europe for assistance in modernizing the Russian army. He imported western mercenaries, including officers, military engineers, gunners, and firearm
makers, as well as weapons, artillery, and ammunition. He not only equipped the Russian army along western lines, but he changed the military's organization, composition, and training to reflect western concepts. Using foreigners on a large scale, the Tsar vastly improved his infantry, artillery, and cavalry capabilities.

The Tsar declared war on Poland-Lithuania in 1654. Longworth argues that Alexis I launched a religious crusade against the Poles to relieve the Orthodox Christian Belorussians and Ukrainians from persecution by the Roman Catholic Poles (p.91). The Tsar's goals were to regain Smolensk, expel the Poles from the Ukraine, and capture Belorussia. The declaration of war and the Pereiaslavl Agreement of 1654 embroiled Russia in the Thirteen Years' War with Poland. The war began with Russian victories. The Tsar captured Smolensk and much of Belorussia and Lithuania in 1654, and then captured Wilno and Mińsk in 1655. With the Swedish invasion of Poland and the resulting collapse of the Commonwealth in 1655, the author argues that Russia emerged as a Great Power because of the significant change in the balance of power in East Europe (p.109). In fact, the leaders of Denmark, the German Empire, Venice, Sweden, and Poland sent diplomatic representatives to Moscow in an attempt to influence the Tsar's foreign policy.
Having tasted such success, Alexis I believed that the time was right for a preemptive attack against Sweden. The Swedes under Charles X represented a threat to Russian security and trade routes, as well as blocked Russia’s aspirations for an outlet to the Baltic. Thus, in 1656, the Tsar declared war against Sweden. In this war, the Russians captured large parts of Livonia, Estonia, and Finland, but they failed in the siege of Riga before signing a truce in 1658. Nevertheless, according to the author, Alexis I was on the verge of greatness (p.116).

Unfortunately, the greatness of the Tsar took a turn for the worse. Tartar attacks against Russia and the Ukraine, combined with revolts against Russian rule and a renewed Polish offensive, forced Alexis I to pull back his forces from many of his recent territorial acquisitions during 1658-63. The Thirteen Years’ War, Tartar raids, and rebellions drained the military and financial resources of Russia. The Russian claim to Great Power status was in serious jeopardy.

A change in fortune for the better resulted from Poland’s difficulties in 1665-72. First, the Commonwealth experienced a major rebellion. Then, the Turks and Tartars attacked Poland, resulting in John Casimir’s desperate pleas for a truce with Russia. Alexis I kept his demands high, and received Poland’s recognition of Russian occupation of Smolensk and the East Ukraine in the Truce of Andrusovo (1667). The Poles,
however, were severely defeated by the Turks in 1672 and lost the
West Ukraine in the Peace of Buczacz. With this turn of events, Alexis
I had to refocus his diplomatic and military efforts towards deterring the
growing Turkish threat. He sought to rebuild the Russian army and
avoid war with Sweden while attempting to create an anti-Turkish
coalition before his death in 1676. The study contains a map,
genealogical table, bibliography of Russian sources, and ten illustrations.
It is based on Russian primary sources. The work is recommended for
teachers and graduate students.


In July 1654 Tsar Alexis I led the Russian invasion of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. He began the war to protect the Orthodox
Ukrainians from the Roman Catholic Poles as well as to recapture the
city of Smolensk. In the 1654 campaign the Tsar captured Smolensk,
as well as overran a large part of Belorussia, including the city of
Vitebsk, and had penetrated Lithuania. In the following campaign Alexis
I captured Wilno, Kovno (Kaunas), and Grodno. The Russian army
occupied virtually all of Lithuania and half of Poland. However, Charles
X of Sweden entered the war in 1655, and the Commonwealth was
about to collapse. Consequently, Alexis I allied with Poland-Lithuania
against the Swedes, with the aim of acquiring Livonia and an outlet to
the Baltic (p.53). Even so, the Tsar, failed to capture Riga during his last campaign in 1657. Nonetheless, the author argues that Alexis I's three military campaigns were a major turning-point in Russian history (p.58). The campaigns marked the beginning of the westernization of Russia (p.56). He states that "certainly his [Alexis I] experiences on campaign sharpened his curiosity about the West" which led to the gradual westernization of Russia during the next half century (p.56). Moreover, Longworth stresses that "Russia's emergence as a world power" had become "irreversible" (p.58).


This is a massive narrative study on the life and times of Peter the Great. The work includes coverage of Russian foreign affairs, especially the Great Embassy to the West in 1697-98 and the Great Northern War. Massie's popular biography won the Pulitzer Prize. It is based mainly on English and Russian sources. The work contains thirteen maps and thirty-four illustrations. It is recommended for undergraduates.


Professor C. Bickford O'Brien of the University of California at Berkeley examines Russo-Ukrainian relations between the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654) and the Truce of Andrusovo (1667). O'Brien's thesis
is that Cossack leaders failed to achieve independence from Poland-Lithuania and Russia because of the shrewd diplomacy of Tsar Alexis I and the lack of unity among the Cossacks.

In 1654, the Tsar exploited the opportunities presented by the Cossack revolt against Polish rule to acquire a union between Russia and the Ukraine in the Treaty of Pereiaslav. In the treaty Alexis I promised to protect the Ukraine against the Poles and Crimean Tartars. Cossack Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky agreed to the union as a temporary measure, but the Tsar viewed the union as permanent. Alexis I cunningly used the Ukrainian rebellion to assist Russian military actions against his main rival, Poland-Lithuania. In the resulting Thirteen Years’ War, the diplomatic and military fortunes of Russia varied as did the political stability of the Ukraine and its loyalty to Russia. Various Ukrainian leaders sought to gain the support of the Turks, Tartars, and Swedes to win independence from Russia. O’Brien points out that weak Cossack leadership after the death of Khmelnitsky in 1657 and continued civil war in the Ukraine made the Tsar’s task of consolidating his grip on the East Ukraine much easier.

As a result of the military battles of the Thirteen Years’ War, the Ukraine was divided between Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and the Sultan. Russia secured the East Ukraine, Poland the West Ukraine, and the
southern Ukraine fell into the hands of the Turks and their vassals. In 1666, King John Casimir of Poland-Lithuania, fearing a full-scale Turkish invasion while suffering from civil war, was forced into agreeing to the Truce of Andrusovo with Russia. In this treaty, Casimir recognized Russia's rule of the East Ukraine. O'Brien believes that the acquisition of the East Ukraine established the groundwork for further Russian expansion in the eighteenth century (p.119). The study is based on Russian, French, British, and Austrian primary sources.


In this short article, Professor O'Brien discusses the clash of Russo-Turkish interests and the Russo-Turkish War of 1677-81 that ended with the Truce of Bakhchisarai. The author discusses Kara Mustafa's invasion of the Ukraine in 1677 and the capture of Chigirin in 1678. In the following year Tsar Theodore III sought Polish and Austrian military aid against the Turkish threat. However, the Sultan offered the Tsar an advantageous peace agreement which ended any possibility of the creation of an Austro-Polish-Russian coalition against the Turks and Tartars. In the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, the Turks agreed to demilitarize the area between the East Ukraine and the Crimea for twenty years. O'Brien views the Russo-Turkish War of 1677-81 and the Truce of
Bakhchisarai as an important first step in Russia's increasing value as a defender of Europe against the Turkish threat (p.268).


O’Brien stresses the importance of Sophia’s regency in the expansion of Russian foreign relations and trade with the West. He shows that Russian interest in western culture and goods increased during Sophia’s regency resulting in foreign trade agreements. Moreover, Sophia and Prince Golitsyn responded to pleas from the West to join the war against the Ottoman Turks. But, Sophia joined the war effort only after Poland-Lithuania agreed to the Treaty of Eternal Peace. Besides confirming boundaries, the treaty created a Russo-Polish alliance against the Turks. In addition, Golitsyn sought formal alliances with other European powers, including France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Venice. However, the West, including Leopold I of Austria, declined Russian offers. The German emperor was content with the Russo-Polish alliance supplementing the Holy League in the war against the Turks. Russia’s attempt to create closer ties with the West was ignored (pp.101-4). In any event, the failure of Golitsyn’s two Crimean campaigns resulted in the downfall of the regency in 1689. The study is based on published Russian primary sources.

In this brief essay, Professor Werner Philipp of the Free University of Berlin surveys Russia during the reigns of Alexis I and Theodore III. He touches on the Thirteen Years' War and Russo-Turkish War of 1677-81. He states that Alexis I sought a European coalition against the Turkish threat (p.577). Moreover, Alexis I extended Russian diplomatic contacts with Austria, Brandenburg, Saxony, Venice, France, Spain, and the Papacy. These relations added to Russian relations with Sweden, Denmark, Poland-Lithuania, and the Dutch Republic. As such, Alexis I and Theodore III began the move towards westernizing Russia long before the reign of Peter the Great.


Andrew Rothstein of the Marx Memorial Library in London examines Anglo-Russian relations during the War of the Spanish Succession and Great Northern War. His thesis is that the Duke of Marlborough was determined to keep Russia and Sweden out of the Grand Alliance's struggle with Louis XIV. Rothstein argues that Anglo-Dutch policies centered on keeping both Russia and Sweden neutral in the struggle.
against France as well as maintaining the diplomatic and economic status quo in the Baltic.

Marlborough's policy of keeping Russia and Sweden out of the War of the Spanish Succession was threatened by Louis XIV’s diplomacy aimed at acquiring an alliance with either country. Louis XIV saw Sweden as a likely ally because of its military strength and status as a Great Power. But, the Sun King also considered an alliance with Peter I after Russian victories against Sweden in 1701-4. Neither Sweden nor Russia would ally with France.

The Tsar’s victories against Sweden in the Baltic states enhanced the international prestige of Russia. At this point, in 1704, the British government sent Sir Charles Whitworth to Moscow in an attempt to influence Peter I’s foreign policy. But, the Swedes defeated the Saxons at Fraustadt and forced Augustus II out of Poland in 1706. Charles XII then marched his army into Saxony and forced Augustus II to surrender at Altranstädt. Sweden’s success against Saxony worried the leaders of the Grand Alliance that Charles XII would continue to march into the heart of the German Empire to assist the war effort of Louis XIV. Consequently, in April 1707, Marlborough traveled to Altranstädt to convince Charles XII to turn his forces eastward against Russia. The Tsar, on the other hand, feared the Swedish threat so much that he sent
Andrei Matveyev on a diplomatic mission to London to seek Russian admittance into the Grand Alliance in 1707-8. Peter I believed that entrance into the Grand Alliance would deter a Swedish attack against Russia and result in a Russo-Swedish peace. However, Matveyev failed to acquire the alliance because the Dutch Republic feared that an alliance would result in the convergence of the two wars. Soon afterwards, Charles XII invaded Russia. The Tsar, nevertheless, surprised the Maritime Powers by defeating the Swedes at Poltava. Rothstein notes that the victory not only destroyed the Swedish army, but it also changed the European balance of power, making Russia a Great Power.

After Poltava, the Maritime Powers became fearful of Russia's increasing power in the Baltic. British diplomacy failed to prevent the formation of a Russo-Danish-Saxon alliance against Sweden in 1709-11. Rothstein believes that there was a very real danger of both wars converging with the Maritime Powers support of Sweden. However, the rise of the Oxford ministry (1710) in England resulted in the gradual end to the War of the Spanish Succession and the threat that the two wars would converge. The study is based on British archival material and published British and Russian primary sources. It contains two maps. The work lacks a bibliography.

Carol B. Stevens of Colgate University scrutinizes Prince Golitsyn’s failed military campaign against the Crimean Tartars in 1687. She finds that Golitsyn had no choice but to call off the campaign after the Tartars lit brush fires and devastated the open steppe. The author believes that Russia was capable of accumulating the initial supply requirements, but Golitsyn faced an impossible task of leading an army of 112,000 men with a large baggage train across 300 to 400 miles of almost uninhabitable steppe in the summer heat to reach and capture Perekop (pp.491, 493). She notes that Golitsyn lacked supply magazines along the route. The wasteland did not allow the Russian forces to forage for needed supplies.


This is a brief study of Peter the Great and the rise of Russia as a Great Power by Bernard H. Sumner of the University of London. The author concentrates on Russian foreign affairs and reforms. The book is a fine introduction to the Tsar. The work lacks notes, but it includes two maps. It is recommended for undergraduates.

In this brief study, Sumner considers Peter the Great's relations with the Ottoman Empire. His thesis is that the Tsar was unable to successfully fight both Sweden and the Turks simultaneously so he sought peaceful relations with the Turks after the Peace of Karlowitz (1699) in order to concentrate his military efforts against Sweden in his quest to achieve territory on the Baltic. For this reason Peter I accomplished little against the Turks.

Like his predecessors, Peter I experienced problems with the Turks. The Crimean Tartars, vassals of the Sultan, raided Russian territory, taking prisoners and selling them in Turkish slave markets, as well as forced the Tsar to pay tribute to the Crimean khan. In the early phase of his reign, Peter I continued to participate in the War of the Holy League against the Turks by directing two consecutive campaigns that eventually captured Azov in 1695-96. With plans to attack Narva in the north, Peter I subsequently agreed to the Peace of Constantinople in 1700. In this settlement, the Sultan agreed to discontinue the Tsar's annual payment to the Crimean khan as well as allowed the Russians to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Constantinople. In return, Peter I agreed to raze four forts in the south. Despite the treaty, tension between the Russians and Turks remained high. Peter continued
to build his Azov fleet, work on new forts, and demanded free navigation on the Black Sea. As the Tsar experienced military success in the Baltic region, the Turks began to fear the Russian threat. Turkish fear of the Russian threat increased with the Tsar's victory over Charles XII at Poltava.

In 1710, the Sultan, who sought peace, was influenced by the Turkish war party and Charles XII to declare war on Russia. Peter I also wished to avoid a Russo-Turkish war. But, the Turkish declaration of war forced him to react. He commanded the army that marched south to meet the Turkish menace in 1711. To disrupt the Sultan's empire, Peter I declared himself as protector of the Balkan Christians, and encouraged them to join in the fight against the Turks. The Russian army marched towards Moldavia and Wallachia. As the Tsar moved south he was outmaneuvered by the Turks and forced to surrender at Stanelishte on the Pruth in July 1711. He acquired easy surrender terms because of disunity among the Turkish alliance. Sumner insists that Peter lost at Stanelishte because of overconfidence, logistical problems, poor intelligence, and too few Russian troops. He writes:

Peter miscalculated both the strength of the Turks and above all the effective aid he would receive from the hospodars and from the other Balkan Christians. The Christians might rise and lend effective aid only if the Russians first proved by a defeat of the Turks that they might be on the winning side: but the Russians
were not in sufficient force to achieve a victory without substantial help from the Christians (p.42).

The study is based on Russian sources, but it lacks an index and bibliography.

See also:


8.4. The Turkish Threat to Europe


In this essay, Virginia Aksan briefly surveys Ottoman warfare from the fall of Constantinople to the Treaty of Bucharest. She examines the most important Turkish campaigns during three eras: 1453-1566, 1566-1699, and 1699-1812. The author explores such topics as the Crimean Tartars and their contribution to Ottoman warfare, the Turkish campaigns of the War of the Holy League, and the Ottoman victory over Peter the Great at Stanelishte on the Pruth (1711). She notes that the Tartars contributed up to 100,000 cavalry in Turkish wars (p.152). In the War of the Holy League, the Ottomans were defeated because of incompetent commanders, the lack of military discipline, inefficient artillery, and outdated tactics (p.165). Moreover, Aksan believes that the Sultan gave the Tsar easy peace terms at Stanelishte because the Ottoman leader's war aims were already met by stopping the Russian onslaught and regaining Azov (p.166).

Professor A.N. Kurat of the University of Ankara briefly surveys the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Mehmed IV (1648-87). The author discusses the decline of the Ottoman army and navy in the early seventeenth century as well as the revival of Ottoman power under the leadership of the Köprülü family. Kurat describes how Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü (1656-61) gained firm control over the Ottoman Empire. In foreign affairs, Mehmed continued the war against Venice (1645-70), conquering the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos (1657), freeing the Dardanelles from the Venetian threat, as well as gaining naval superiority in the Aegean Sea. Moreover, Mehmed put down a rebellion in Transylvania. Kurat credits Mehmed Köprülü with halting the decline and quickly reviving the power of the Ottoman Turks. His son, Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Köprülü (1661-76), captured Candia from the Venetians (1669), and ended the Venetian-Turkish War with the acquisition of most of Crete, several Aegean islands, and a large part of Dalmatia. The conquest of Crete gave the Turks naval superiority in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Fazil Ahmed led the Turkish army that invaded Habsburg territory and captured the fortress of Nové Zámky in northwest Hungary in 1663. However, Count Raimondo
Montecuccoli, the Imperial commander, defeated the Turks at St. Gotthard in August 1664. Even so, the Grand Vizier achieved a diplomatic triumph with the acquisition of Nové Zámky and Nagyvárad, as well as the Austrian acceptance of Turkish influence in Transylvania in the Truce of Vasvár (1664). In addition to success against the Austrians and Venetians, the Turks under Fazil Ahmed acquired Podolia, including Kamieniec Podolski and Chocim, in the Polish-Turkish War of 1671-76. The third Köprülü who served as Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa (1676-83), led the Ottomans into the Russo-Turkish War (1677-81), which resulted in the Sultan renouncing his claims to the Ukraine. However, Kara Mustafa’s “thirst for glory and fame” led to the Turkish invasion of Austria in 1683 (p.513). Kurat believes that the Turks were defeated at Vienna because of poor planning, the lack of heavy artillery, and the failure to pay attention to the arrival of Imperial and Polish relief forces. But, the author thinks that the execution of the Grand Vizier was a mistake. Kara Mustafa was the only Turkish commander capable of defeating the western coalition (p.517).


Rhoads Murphey of the University of Birmingham examines Ottoman warfare from 1500 to 1700. He analyzes Turkish military manpower, logistics, finances, troop movements, transport, tactics, leadership, and
motivation. The author finds the Ottoman war machine capable of victory in most circumstances, especially localized conflicts. But, in his discussion on the War of the Holy League, the author argues that this conflict was "exceptional" for the Turkish military because the Ottomans faced a coalition of powers that forced them to fight a war on three fronts: the Aegean, central Europe, and the northern shores of the Black Sea. Moreover, the Western European powers were better-organized, financed, and more determined than past opponents. The Ottoman military was not capable of fighting a war against a coalition of absolutist states. As a result, Prince Eugene of Savoy decisively defeated the Turks at Zenta, resulting in the Peace of Karlowitz (1699).

The study is based on Turkish primary sources. It includes fourteen tables, five maps, a chronology, and seven appendices.

See also:


APPENDIX A
ADDENDUM TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following is a select list of valuable works not reviewed in this annotated bibliography of studies on war and diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV. In some cases the studies are doctoral dissertations or theses that have been published under the same title or similar titles and the published works are reviewed in the previous eight chapters of this bibliography. Other studies included in the list below are those which the author was unable to review despite repeated efforts to borrow a copy with the assistance of the hard-working interlibrary loan staff at the Chester Fritz Library of the University of North Dakota.

A.2.1. Altbauer, Dan. "The Diplomats of Peter the Great, 1689-1725." Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1976. Harvard University denied the loan of this study and University Microfilm International (UMI) does not have a copy. The author's work is summarized in his article "The Diplomats of Peter the Great" (2.2).


A.7.2. Denman, T.J. "The Debates over War Strategy, 1689 to 1714." Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1984. Unavailable through interlibrary loan or UMI.


A.7.5. Rule, John C. "The Preliminary Negotiations Leading to the Peace of Utrecht, 1709-1712." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1958. Harvard University denied the loan of this study and UMI does not have a copy.


A.7.8. Turner, Mary. "Anglo-Portuguese Relations in the War of the Spanish Succession." Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1952. Unavailable through Interlibrary loan or UMI.


APPENDIX B

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

The following studies were published too late to be reviewed in this bibliography.


727

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


INDEX OF AUTHORS CITED

Åberg, Alf 103, 170, 658, 685
Adair, Edward Robert 57, 59
Adcock, Sir Frank 52
Aksan, Virginia 661, 718
Allen, E. John B. 53
Altbauer, Dan 59, 94, 716, 718, 723
Anderson, Matthew S. 8, 54, 57, 61, 100, 103, 180, 650, 653, 655, 658-659, 686-687, 691
André, Louis 1
Asch, Ronald G. 8
Asher, Eugene L. 466, 487, 488, 685
Ashley, Maurice 243, 247, 365, 405
Atkinson, Christopher T. 161, 220, 277, 280, 474-475, 477, 564, 568-570, 572, 584-585, 598
Aubrey, Philip 328, 371, 406
Badalo-Dulong, Claude 1
Bamford, Paul W. 117
Barany, George 542, 660, 691
Barker, Nancy Nichols 194
Barker, Thomas M. 103, 180, 328, 416, 627, 670, 722
Barnett, Correlli 101, 147, 261, 475, 567, 571
Barthorp, Michael 149, 476, 567, 583
Batiffol, Louis 55
Battaglia, O. Forst de 668
Battick, John Francis 253, 262
Baudrillart, A. 1
Baumber, Michael 101-102, 150, 152, 245, 276
Baxter, Douglas Clark 118
Baxter, Stephen B. 3, 102, 162, 170, 193, 242, 325-326, 372, 468, 487, 541
Belcher, Gerald L. 192, 221, 230, 254, 278, 301
Belfield, Eversley 476, 571
Belloc, Hilaire 475, 572
Bély, Lucien 89

729
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coxe, William C.</td>
<td>568, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crabtree, Roger</td>
<td>253, 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuttino, G.P.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davies, Godfrey</td>
<td>326, 378, 468, 487, 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davies, Norman</td>
<td>608, 656, 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Ralph</td>
<td>252, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Vries, Harry</td>
<td>255, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean, John Marshall</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denman, T.J.</td>
<td>469, 542, 725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derry, T.K.</td>
<td>606, 614, 616, 637, 651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickinson, H.T.</td>
<td>468, 477, 505, 587-589, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickinson, Joyce</td>
<td>Glyn Gledhill, 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickinson, William</td>
<td>Calvin xi, 3, 465, 478, 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doherty, Richard</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doyle, William</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukes, Paul</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunthorne, Hugh</td>
<td>xi, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dupuy, R. Ernest</td>
<td>2, 610, 624, 641, 649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dupuy, Trevor N.</td>
<td>2, 610, 624, 641, 649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrman, John</td>
<td>102, 162, 327, 379, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekberg, Carl J.</td>
<td>146, 190-192, 195, 198-199, 723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, John H.</td>
<td>7, 41, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Englund, Peter</td>
<td>180, 658, 671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epstein, Klaus</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fay, Sidney B.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayard, Janine</td>
<td>324, 334, 433, 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feiling, Keith G.</td>
<td>254, 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson, John</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson, Kenneth</td>
<td>327, 382, 406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firth, Charles H.</td>
<td>101, 157, 161, 253, 265, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foley, Michael F., Jr.</td>
<td>253, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortescue, John</td>
<td>475, 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis, David</td>
<td>459, 468, 471, 473, 476-477, 481, 506-507, 552, 563, 576, 590-591, 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis, Samuel T.</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franken, M.A.M.</td>
<td>94, 192-193, 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser, Antonia</td>
<td>243, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frey, Linda</td>
<td>433, 438, 444, 446, 448, 465, 467, 469-473, 479, 490-491, 508-509, 511-512, 542-545, 549, 553, 555, 563, 604, 727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Frey, Marsha 433, 438, 444, 446, 448, 465, 469-473, 479, 491, 511-513, 542-546, 549, 553, 555, 563, 604, 727
Frost, Robert 615, 617, 656, 661, 727
Gaeddert, Dale A. 453, 466, 492, 563
Gagliardo, John 11, 45, 329, 432, 442, 473, 562
Gaunt, Peter 244
Geike, Roderick 469, 478, 513, 514, 604
George, Robert H. 326, 367
Geyl, Pieter 38-39, 193, 240, 399, 467, 541
Gibbs, Graham C. 326, 383
Gibson, John S. 726
Gierowski, Józef Andrzej 656, 662-663
Gillingham, John 243
Gisselquist, Orlov E. 94, 307, 322, 325, 336, 400
Godley, Eveline 724
Goubert, Pierre 24, 146, 219, 363, 466, 500
Gradish, Stephen F. 474, 592
Green, David 576
Gregg, Edward 468, 517-518, 604
Grever, John H. 232
Grew, Marion E. 385, 541
Groenveld, Simon 241, 253, 267
Grose, Clyde L. 241, 254-255, 283-284
Grosz, Lothar 82
Guercio, Henry 98, 121
Hainsworth, Roger 252, 256, 727
Hale, John R. 53
Hamilton, Keith 63
Handen, Ralph D. 94, 329, 406, 408
Hansen, Harold A. 301, 672
Hardacre, P.H. 161, 290
Harding, Richard 727
Hattendorf, John B. 447, 469-470, 477, 519-520, 523-525, 568, 583, 598
Hebbert, F.J. 101, 122, 323, 364
Hellie, Richard F. 103, 175, 717
Henderson, Nicholas 329-330, 416, 434, 473, 476, 549, 593
Herd, G. 718, 726

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Herman, Mark C. 94, 478, 599
Hill, Brian W. 468, 478, 527, 599, 604
Hill, David Jayne 16
Hippeau, C. 1
Hitchcock, Eloise R. xi, 3, 465, 478
Hoff, B. van 't 470, 528
Holborn, Hajo 45, 311, 442, 449, 473, 562
Holmes, Richard 243
Horn, David Bayne 59, 65, 541, 603
Hornstein, Sari R. 724
Howat, G.M.D. 33, 245, 252, 254, 261, 370, 398
Hughes, Lindsey 625, 628, 644, 653, 655, 659, 693-695
Hurgill, J.A.C. 476, 593
Hutton, Ronald 246-247, 254-255, 291-292
Immich, Max 1
Ingrao, Charles W. 11, 46, 328, 432, 472, 547, 549
Jablonski, Horst 657, 664
Jensen, De Lamar 53-54
Jones, D.W. 37
Jones, George H. 326, 392, 433
Kamen, Henry 477, 594
Kamiński, Anna 657, 664
Kamiński, Andrzej 656, 662
Kearsey, A. 726
Keens-Soper, H.M.A. 56-58, 67-69, 500
Keep, John L.H. 176, 717
Kemp, Anthony 162, 474, 564, 584
Kennedy, Paul M. 101, 157, 245, 261, 567
Kentschynskyj, Bohdan 679
Kenyon, John P. 243
Kerbey, John 727
Kirby, David 47, 606, 610, 636, 639, 656-657, 669, 684, 716
Kirchner, Walther 606
Kissinger, Henry 9
Klaits, Joseph A. 58, 69, 364, 466, 493, 500, 658, 674
Kleinman, Ruth 200
Knecht, Robert J. 182
Koch, G. 1
Koch, H.W. 46, 562
Koehler, K. 1
Koenigsberger, Helmut G. 7
Koht, Halvdan 657, 675
Konopczyński, W. 668
Konstam, Angus 177, 180, 645, 658, 646-647, 660, 697, 717
Korduba, M. 668
Korr, Charles P. 253, 268
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl 253, 269
Kurat, A.N. 328, 417, 625, 626-627, 660, 719, 722
Lachs, Phyllis S. 58, 70, 301, 326, 371
Laffin, John 644
Lane, Margery 58, 73, 327, 399, 541
Langford, Paul 35, 399, 467, 540
Langhorne, Richard 57, 63, 74, 603
Laskowski, Otton 657, 666
Lee, Stephen J. 647
Leitsch, Walter 328, 419, 670, 722
Lewis, William H. 101, 123, 131
Lewitter, L.R. 659-660, 671, 698-699, 701
Lindenov, Christopher 242, 302, 676
Lisk, Jill 11, 48, 49, 606, 613, 652, 656-657, 669, 684, 716
Livesey, Anthony 185
Livet, Georges 190, 201, 322, 420
Lockhart, Paul Douglas 607
Lockyer, Roger 7
Longworth, Philip 181, 609, 659, 702, 705
Loomie, Albert J. 74
Lopez, Antonio Espino 325
Lundkvist, Sven 657, 679
Macartney, Carlile A. 47
MacLachlan, A.D. 478, 600, 604, 725
Majewski, Wieslaw 178, 432, 657, 670
Maland, David 8
Marcincowski, Karol 656, 667

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Martin, M.A. 605, 725
Martin, Ronald 101, 135-137, 202, 323, 364
Massie, Robert K. 659, 706
Mattingly, Garrett 53
McIntosh, Claude T. 191, 203
McJimsey, Robert D. 393
McKay, Derek 10, 17, 54, 56, 93, 304, 328, 330, 416, 421, 434, 438-439, 441, 443, 466, 471, 473, 476, 486, 500, 540, 548-549, 595, 602, 613, 618, 641
McNeill, William H. 622
Michael, Wolfgang 482
Miller, John 254, 293, 326, 369, 406
Milne, June 471, 530, 686
Montgomery, Isabel A. 469, 478, 513, 514, 604
Moote, A. Lloyd 182
Mosley, Derek J. 52
Mowat, R.B. 18
Murphey, Rhoads 181, 661, 720
Murray, John J. 75, 652, 684
Murray, Sir George 568
Nicolson, Harold 52, 58, 76
Nordmann, Claude 324, 342, 405
Norton, Mary Beth 4
Nosworthy, Brent 100, 113, 474, 567
Nussbaum, Frederick L. 18
O'Brien, C. Bickford 619, 621, 659, 706, 708-709, 722
O'Brien, Dennis Harold 58, 79-80, 191, 220
Ogg, David 254, 294, 308, 320, 396, 616
Ollard, Richard 294
Oresko, Robert 329, 409-410, 413
Ostwald, Jamel M. 162, 451, 475, 577, 728
Owen, John H. 102, 162, 474, 565, 598
Padfield, Peter 100, 102, 114, 193, 240, 261, 321, 364, 399, 474, 567
Pagès, Georges 1, 8, 183
Palmer, Dave R. 114, 183, 567
Parker, Geoffrey 7-8, 96, 134, 183, 315, 390
Parrott, David 183
Pårvev, Ivan 328, 423, 627, 660, 670, 717, 722
Pastor, Peter 474, 556, 717
Pearsall, A.W.H. 170, 241, 255, 296
Perjés, Géza 115, 474, 557
Pernal, A.B. 656, 671, 726
Petrie, Sir Charles 19, 476-477, 595
Phelan, Ivan P. 577
Philipp, Werner 658, 710
Phillips, Edward J. 103, 179, 660, 717
Picavet, Camille-Georges 1, 54, 87
Pilgrim, Donald G. 137, 146, 324, 349, 364
Pillorget, René 205, 432
Pincus, Steven C.A. 252, 259, 261, 296, 724
Pitt, H.G. 94, 478, 599, 600
Place, Richard 312, 322-323, 350, 352-353, 433, 721
Porshnev, B.F. 607
Powley, Edward B. 724
Prestage, Edgar 480
Prestwich, Menna 253, 270
Price, J.L. 252, 254, 285, 297, 326, 400, 724
Quainton, C. Eden 253, 271
Queller, Donald E. 52
Ranum, Orest A. 19, 185
Ranum, Patricia 19
Reddaway, W.F. 608, 622-624, 656, 668
Rietbergen, P.J. 205, 207
Roach, John xi, 3
Roelofsen, C.G. 57, 80
Rogers, Clifford J. 96
Rogers, P.G. 170, 193, 233, 301
Roider, Karl 328, 424, 627, 722
Roorda, D.J. 194, 234
Roosen, William J. 55-58, 81-88, 437-438, 465, 483, 501, 603
Rosén, Jerker 50, 633, 657, 684, 716
Rothrock, George A. 101, 122, 323, 364
Rothstein, Andrew 471, 542, 645, 647-648, 650, 660, 686, 710
Routledge, Frederick J. 230, 254, 273
Rule, John C. 1, 3, 16, 57, 89-90, 94, 141, 323, 354, 466-467, 478, 494-496, 501, 603, 605, 725
Russell, Joycelyne Gledhill 53
Ryan, A.N. 100, 107, 327, 397
Rystad, Göran 658, 681-682
Sass, Charles 657, 668
Schevill, Ferdinand 329, 426
Schoolcraft, Henry L. 255, 298, 685
Schweizer, Karl W. 57, 69
Schwoerer, Lois G. 468, 530
Scott, C.F. 192, 226
Scott, Hamish M. xi, 4, 10, 17, 54, 56, 93, 438-439, 441, 466, 486, 500, 540, 548, 602, 613, 641
Scouller, Major R.E. 102, 160, 476, 567, 579, 583, 598
Seaward, Paul 254, 296, 299
Setton, Kenneth M. 328, 426, 722
Shapiro, Sheldon 322, 354, 433
Shaw, W.A. 503
Shennan, Margaret 612
Simms, John G. 327, 398, 402-403, 406
Slottman, William B. 433, 542, 549, 558
Snyder, Henry L. 58, 90, 468-469, 531-532, 538, 541, 575, 603
Somerville, Dorothy H. 602
Spielman, John P. 328, 427, 472, 549, 598
Srbik, H. Ritter von 1
Stamp, A.E. 471, 532, 686
Stapleton, John M., Jr. 102, 160, 400, 476, 541, 567, 583
Steinberg, S.H. 8
Stevens, Carol B. 659, 713
Stork-Penning, Johanna G. 469, 478, 533, 604
Storr, Christopher 103, 325, 329, 400, 411-412, 416, 724, 728
Stoye, John W. 10, 20, 100, 103, 107, 180, 328, 417, 428-429, 472, 549, 627, 660, 670, 717, 722
Stradling, Robert A. 11, 41-42, 183, 185, 192, 227-229, 230, 324, 439, 724
Sturgill, Claude C. 146, 476, 501, 579, 725
Sumner, Bernard H. 625, 659-660, 713-714
Sundstrom, Roy A. 468, 534
Symcox, Geoffrey W. 20, 100-101, 139-140, 146, 313, 316, 321, 323-324, 329, 357-359, 405, 414-415, 471, 476, 486, 562, 598
Szarka, Andrew S. 443, 466, 473, 487, 501, 559, 598
Tapié, Victor-L. 47, 58, 91, 182, 603
Taylor, Frank 162, 475, 572, 580
Tazbir, J. 612
Thompson, Richard H. 434, 473, 487, 560, 725
Thomson, George Malcolm 475, 581
Thomson, Mark A. 36, 324, 360, 400, 405, 439, 465, 467-468, 481, 485, 497, 535, 603-604
Tomkiewicz, W. 668
Tornroft, Preben 471, 487, 536, 686
Treasure, Geoffrey R.R. 10, 30, 99, 182, 190, 218, 305, 457, 500
Trevelyan, George M. 239, 528, 538, 588, 596
Trevelyan, Mary Caroline 170, 193, 239
Troost, Wouter 242, 326, 400, 429
Trotter, Ben S. 141, 466, 487, 498
Trout, Andrew P. 219
Turner, Mary 471, 542, 563, 725
Upton, Anthony F. 658, 683
Valfrey, Jules 1
Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de 142
Vaughan, Dorothy M. 50, 328, 432, 660, 721
Veenendaal, August J., Jr. 442, 444, 447, 474, 566, 581, 584, 598
Venning, Timothy 253, 274, 276
Verney, Peter 475, 582
Ward, A.W. 478
Wauchope, Piers 327, 404
Weber, Ottokar 1
Weber, R.E.J. 169, 241
Wedgwood, C.V. 8, 182, 243
Weigley, Russell F. 100-101, 115, 475, 583
Welch, P.J. 542, 605, 725
Westergaard, Waldemar 242, 302, 676
Weygand, General Max 142
Wijn, J.W. 570
Williams, Basil 477, 597
Williams, Noel St. John 162, 300
Wilson, Charles 193, 241, 252, 258, 260
Wilson, Lester N. 94, 324, 361
Wilson, Peter 727
Wimmer, Jan 180, 657, 670
Wines, Roger 329, 431, 473, 561, 563
Wismes, Baron Armel de 101, 140, 143, 474, 567
Wójcik, Zbigniew 51, 656-657, 669, 670-671, 716, 721-722, 726
Wollman, David H. 468, 538
Wolseley, Garnet 581
Wood, Curtis W., Jr. 469, 539
Young, Peter 243
Zeller, Gaston 1, 11, 31, 93, 220, 363
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

William Young was born in Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, in April 1957. He attended elementary school in Nekoosa, junior high in Friendship, and graduated from Adams-Friendship High School, Wisconsin, in 1975. He served in the United States Air Force from 1975 to 1997, achieving the enlisted rank of senior master sergeant. Young served as an Air Force historian for fifteen years (1982-97). He was the recipient of the Outstanding Graduate of the Year Award in the Unit Historian Development Course at the Air University in 1983. During his career Young was awarded the prestigious Air Force Historian of the Year Award in 1985, 1989, and 1991. His military assignments included thirteen years in Germany, England, The Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. While in the Air Force, Young earned a bachelor’s degree in government and politics from the University of Maryland (1982), bachelor’s degree in history from the University of the State of New York (1990), master’s degree in international relations from the University of Southern California (1985), and master’s degree in history at the University of North Dakota (1993). Since 1997, Young has taught history courses as a graduate teaching assistant at the University of North Dakota and as a lecturer at Valley City State University, North Dakota. He was selected as the D. Jerome Tweton Outstanding Graduate Historian at the University of North Dakota in 1999. He received First Prize in Graduate History at the Phi Alpha Theta Regional Conference at Vermillion, South Dakota, in 2000. Young is a member of the American Historical Association, Phi Alpha Theta, Society for History Education, Society for Military History, North American Conference on British Studies, Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, and Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He served as the president of the Beta Upsilon Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta at the University of North Dakota in 1999-2000. William Young is married to the former Patricia Groves of Shropshire, England, and they have four children.