



7-1-1992

The Captive Samurai: Japanese Prisoners Detained in the United States During World War II

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THE CAPTIVE SAMURAI:
JAPANESE PRISONERS DETAINED IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING WORLD WAR II

by

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Bachelor of Arts,
East Texas State University, 1988

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of North Dakota

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota

July
1992

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To my wife, Beth,
without whom this paper would have never been completed.

ABSTRACT

5,424 Japanese prisoners were captured by Allied forces during World War II and brought to the United States for internment. No scholarly account has been written of these men. This thesis will explain why there were so few, where they were interned, and the conditions of their internment.

The topic was researched at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D. C., through interviews with veterans who served in the Pacific Campaign or had contact with the Japanese prisoners, through newspaper and magazine articles of the time, and through secondary sources of the Pacific Campaign.

The Campaign in the Pacific became a brutal race war, with few prisoners taken. Even those taken were not guaranteed to make it back to the United States for internment. However, those who did were treated well, in light of their circumstances. This was the result of three different factors: those in charge of the Japanese confinement saw the prisoners as humans, America did not want the Japanese to retaliate against U.S. prisoners for

actions taken against the Japanese prisoners, and the U.S. was trying to gain the cooperation of the prisoners, who responded better to kindness than to abuse, against which they were more prepared.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FEW, THE HUMBLLED

From the capture of Kazuo Sakamaki, the United States' first prisoner of war in World War II, to the capture of the last in August of 1945, only 5,424 Japanese prisoners were brought to the continental United States.¹ Although the first American prisoner--and the only one for over six months--was Japanese, the Japanese prisoners trickled in only a few at a time and they were soon heavily outnumbered by both German and Italian prisoners. The number of Japanese prisoners entering the U.S. did not even exceed 100 until March, 1944, when after two years of fighting, 206 prisoners were brought in from the Pacific.² In fact, the Battles of the Java Sea, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Savo Island, Bismark Sea, New Guinea, Kula Gulf, Bougainville, Tarawa, and Makin combined only netted the Allied forces 604 prisoners.³ Only when the emperor issued his order condemning suicide in the Philippines did numbers begin to increase in any significant measure.⁴ One reason for this small number of prisoners was the Japanese soldiers' aversion to capture.

Ruth Benedict, a sociologist who studied the Japanese during World War II, tried to explain the Japanese aversion to capture through an understanding of their culture. The Japanese, she explained, were taught from childhood that certain debts were owed to many people, including the emperor, parents, ancestors, teachers, and various superiors. These debts were known as on and were seen as unavoidable disgraces. Everyone worked all of their lives to repay the debt of on, but it could never be fully repaid.⁵

It would be impossible, they feel, to be glad of one's country, of one's life, of one's great and small concerns without thinking also of receiving these benefits. In all Japanese history [the] ultimate person among living men to whom one was indebted was the highest superior within one's horizon. It has been at different periods the local seignor, the feudal lord, and the Shogun. [During World War II] it [was] the Emperor. . . . Every partiality they have for their own way of living increases each man's Imperial 'on'; every cigarette distributed to the Army on the front lines in the Emperor's name during the war underscored the 'on' each soldier wore for him; every sip of sake doled out to them before going into battle was a further Imperial 'on'. Every kamakazi pilot of a suicide plane was, they said, repaying his Imperial 'on'; all the troops who, they claimed, died to a man defending some island of the Pacific were said to be discharging their limitless 'on' to the Emperor.⁶

However, according to Benedict, on contributed to the Japanese aversion to capture in another way as well. Accepting any gift or aid forces the recipient to accept on from their benefactor. While this was accepted practice,

it was very offensive. "Casual favors from relative strangers [were] the ones most resented, for with neighbors and in old, established hierarchical relationships a man knows and has accepted the complication of on. But with mere acquaintances and near equals men chafe. They would prefer to avoid getting entangled in all the consequences of on." ⁷ Thus, while American chivalry requires the hero to come to the rescue of a man in trouble, "Japanese valor repudiates such salvaging. . . . There was virtue only in accepting life or death risks." ⁸

Any Occidental army which has done its best and finds itself facing hopeless odds surrenders to the enemy. They still regard themselves as honorable soldiers and by international agreement their names are sent back to their country so that their families may know that they are alive. They are not disgraced as either soldiers or citizens or in their own families. But the Japanese defined the situation differently. Honor was bound up with fighting to the death. In a hopeless situation a Japanese soldier should kill himself with his last hand grenade or charge weaponless against the enemy in a mass suicide attack. But he should not surrender. Even if he were taken prisoner when he was wounded and unconscious, he 'could not hold up his head in Japan' again; he was disgraced; he was dead to his former life. ⁹

Thus, surrender, where a person must owe his life not only to a stranger, but to an enemy, was the most extreme disgrace to the Japanese. Therefore, even the most wounded or helpless soldiers normally preferred death to surrender.

Navy Captain Matao Okino, one of the most senior

Japanese prisoners held in the United States during World War II, felt that the Bushido Code or "the way of the Warrior" was the reason for this mindset. He listed six precepts he felt were vital to the battlefield psychology of the Japanese soldier:

1. Although life is important, death is lighter than a bird's feather.
2. Not only has the soldier no fear of death, but going a step further, he will not die before he overthrows his enemy.
3. The spirit of the deathless patriotism of Kusunoki Kasashigi (a historical figure of the 14th century noted for his loyalty to the Emperor Godaigo.)
4. Because there is a country, the family exists; because there is a country, the individual exists; therefore, loyalty and filial piety are the same.
5. Death in battle is not only an individual honor but family honor, and this idea is constantly handed down to children.
6. A prisoner of war not only brings disgrace on himself but also on his family, and, destroying the honor of his country, casts the shadow of disgrace on future generations.¹⁰

These precepts can be traced directly back to the Bushido Code of the Samurai, which itself can be traced back to the earliest history and religion of the Japanese people. By the eighth century, the chief of the Yamato clan, the dominant clan, had become Emperor. The chronicles, Kojiki and Nihongi, which developed the Japanese creation mythology, helped to establish his sovereignty by tracing his ancestry to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, who was

the most powerful of the Japanese deities. Later, as Japan developed a feudal system, his sovereignty was upheld by the Shoguns, who used the myth of his ancestry to maintain their own power, and the deity of the Emperor became a fundamental precept of Japanese religious life. This brought about a fierce loyalty to the emperor and nation, which, by the 13th century, had been expanded and developed into the cardinal virtue of the Bushido Code of the Samurai. With the entrance of Zen Buddhism to Japan, teaching self-discipline and intuitive "right thinking", and Confucianism, which insisted on respect for traditional authority, this Bushido Code developed into an ethic of absolute loyalty and unhesitating sacrifice.¹¹

During the same time, there also developed a form of ritual suicide known as seppuku or hari-kiri (belly-slitting). The act of hari-kiri proper can be traced back to a 12th century warrior who "ripped open his belly with a sword rather than face capture" and thus set free his spirit, but the practice of the Japanese warrior committing suicide rather than succumbing to capture dates well before that.¹² However, for centuries, the practice was reserved by law to the samurai. Only in 1887, when the Meiji government abolished the samurai caste and destroyed its last defenders in the Satsuma Rebellion, was the practice embraced by others. The Meiji forces, conscripts of all ranks and classes, overpowered the last defenders of the

Samurai tradition, who were led by Field Marshall Takemori Saigo, the former commander of the Imperial Guard. When hope was lost, Saigo and his followers killed themselves in full view of Meiji's troops. This act so impressed the Meiji troops that they adopted the tradition. Thus, the Meiji government, intending to discredit and destroy the samurai, instead filled their conscripted forces with the samurai spirit as the troops viewed themselves from that day on as the new samurai.¹³

The Meiji government continued the evolution of the Japanese Bushido code in other ways as well. Shinto became the national religion of Japan, demanding absolute "loyalty to the Emperor, divine head of the national family, at one with and indivisible from the concept of Dai Nippon ('Greater Japan')." ¹⁴ A Conscription Law made all men between 17 and 40 liable for seven years of military duty (three years active duty and four years in the reserve). When draftees protested, a Soldier's Code, listing the seven duties of the soldier--loyalty, unquestioning obedience, courage, the controlled use of physical force, frugality, honor, and respect for superiors--soon followed.¹⁵ The government also developed a modern school system, and in the late 1870's, began to impose controls over its educational content.

"The Meiji authorities wanted education to turn out citizens who spontaneously and enthusiastically supported

national policies. A willingness to die for the country in time of war was stressed as 'loyalty to the emperor and love of country'."¹⁶ Every subject was "systematically inculcated" with militarism at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war and the militaristic taint stayed with the education system until the end of World War II. "Starting in 1925, active duty military [personnel] were assigned to every school from the middle school level up (except girls' schools), and military training became part of the regular curriculum. The next year youth training centers were established in every city, town, and village as part of a four-year program of four hundred hours of military instruction for males whose formal education ended at elementary school."¹⁷ In this way, the military gained control over the training of everyone, the sons of the middle and upper classes in school and the sons of the poor with the youth training centers.

Militarism gained control over textbooks as well. In 1880, the government compiled a list of books prohibited for use as textbooks.¹⁸ Six years later, all textbooks were required to be certified by the Ministry of Education before adoption. Compulsory education was established, attaining an enrollment rate of over 90 percent, and then increased from three years to six years. Finally, in 1904, the Ministry of Education began to compile each of the texts used at the primary levels, which was the only

education most Japanese received. These books developed the same militaristic tinge that the rest of the educational system contained. For example, lesson 7 from Elementary School Reader No. 8, published in 1904, was entitled "Takeo Joins the Service" and included the following exchange:

Takeo: Father, the idea of 'joining the service of my country' makes me so proud and happy. I'll be trained and when war comes, I will not be afraid to die. I'll give everything I have to show what a good Japanese fighting man is made of.

Father: That's the spirit! You must be that determined. Don't be afraid to die. Don't worry about us here. And you must always be faithful to the Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors.¹⁹

A second story, called "A Sailor's Mother", was in another elementary reader:

A sailor receives a letter from his mother: "You wrote that you did not participate in the battle of Toshima Island. You were in the August 10 attack on Weihaiwei but you didn't distinguish yourself with an individual exploit. To me this is deplorable. Why have you gone to war? Your life is to be offered up to requit [sic] your obligations to our benevolent Emperor." An officer, seeing him reading the letter and crying, comforted the sailor: "Son, there'll surely be another glorious war before long. Let's accomplish great feats of bravery then and bring honor to our ship Takachiho. Explain that to your mother and put her mind at ease."²⁰

The government also issued the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, which all ranks were required to learn by heart and meditate on daily, and the Rescript

on Education of 1890. These taught that "duty is more weighty than a mountain; death is no heavier than a feather." Yamagata Arimoto, a forceful advocate of the rescripts, wrote that "the indispensable elements of a foreign policy to protect [Japan's] interests are first, troops and armaments and second, education. Education should foster and preserve patriotism."²¹

This training, and the Imperial Rescripts, elevated the Bushido virtues to the status of sacred obligations and made hari-kiri the only viable alternative to failure in war. This helped to cause tragedies like the one at Saipan. "When American occupation of Saipan became inevitable, approximately 200 Japanese soldiers and sailors were issued poison by their officers for the purpose of committing suicide. The poison was a white powder diluted with water, and had a very bitter taste. In a formal ceremony, the cry 'Bonzai for the Emperor' was repeated three times and the poison drunk. The men started dying about four minutes after drinking the poison."²²

There were other, more pragmatic reasons for the Japanese refusal to surrender, however. The Japanese military told its soldiers that since surrender was a disgrace to the entire country, any soldier who was captured and then returned to Japan would be executed, which was not true. Japanese prisoners taken in Bataan had been "court-martialed to determine how much information they had

divulged to the U.S. forces, but other than this were in no way shamed" after their release.²³ Prisoners who had been captured and released from the Russians or Chinese were tested for Communistic tendencies and "those considered 'reformed' were immediately discharged from the Army and returned to their villages. Thus, the only prisoners executed were those deemed to have 'Communistic tendencies'."²⁴ However, most Japanese soldiers were not informed of this, so the propaganda against surrender was quite successful. Captain Okino noted that "the honor, succor, and solace from both the government and people for the families of those who die in battle leaves nothing to be desired," but "when a man becomes a prisoner of war, he is condemned to death, regardless of the reason for his capture. Moreover, this punishment will affect his entire family and relatives."²⁵ "If and when a conscript dies in action or is, after having been missing for an unstipulated (perhaps three months) period, by the War Ministry declared dead, the employer's salary to dependents ceases, and that Ministry provides support (amount not made public) for the widow and children until full sixteen years of age."²⁶ A POW's family, not receiving this support, would wind up on the streets, destitute.

Several other prisoners reiterated Captain Okino's statements in the course of their interrogations, although some expressed hope that they might be "let off with life

imprisonment" because of extenuating circumstances, such as debilitating wounds or unconsciousness during capture. They hoped that a furyo, a man captured against his will, would be better off than a horyo, a man who voluntarily surrendered, but every prisoner felt sure he faced "execution, imprisonment, or, at best, social ostracism".²⁷ Thus, the Japanese used a modern Bushido Code to encourage their men against surrender and backed it up with threats of punishment and death.

When the tide of war began to turn against Japan, commanders, forced to use second-rate troops, began using other means to discourage surrender as well. They maintained discipline and ensured the "fighting spirit" of their troops by telling their soldiers that there was no alternative to death, since American troops would torture and kill any prisoners they captured.²⁸ Rumors were added to this propaganda. "The Chinese were reported to roast their captives and cut out their hearts. Young American men, it was said, qualified for the Marine Corps by murdering their parents, and routinely raped and killed women in Asia. . . . The Allies killed prisoners on the battlefields by laying them on the ground and running them over with tanks and bulldozers, and intended to drastically depopulate Japan itself if they won."²⁹ This propaganda was given credibility by several atrocities carried out by Allied front line troops and was quite successful. When

captured, the Japanese prisoners expressed amazement at the treatment they received and told of the horrors they had come to expect. "In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners (many of them injured or unconscious when captured) stated that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being typical . . ."30

Because of these conditions, "most of the enemy taken prisoner either were badly wounded or were unconscious; they could not prevent capture or commit suicide before falling into American hands."³¹ "On Guadalcanal between 40-45 thousand Japanese soldiers participated. Of this number approximately three thousand were evacuated and less than one thousand captured, many of these being laborers."³² In July, 1944, the Allied Translation and Intelligence Service reported that only 78 of the 1,115 prisoners they held had surrendered.³³ However, even severe wounds did not guarantee a Japanese soldier's life would be spared if capture was imminent. Many times, wounded soldiers who could not be evacuated easily with retreating troops were shot by their own officers or medical personnel or given hand grenades to kill themselves.³⁴ Only at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 did this mindset change. "In November 1944, the emperor was said to

have issued an order that should an important place, such as the Philippines, fall to the enemy, the commanding officer would not be held responsible and should not commit suicide."³⁵ "In February 1945, troops in the Philippines received an order not to kill themselves if their position became hopeless, but to try to escape since men would be needed after the war."³⁶

Japanese policies and propaganda were not the only reasons for the insignificant number of Japanese prisoners; the reluctance of American soldiers to capture their "treacherous" enemy contributed to this tragic situation as well.

The attitude of many American soldiers that "the only good Jap is a dead Jap" kept a large number of potential prisoners from ever reaching American lines.³⁷ Some Japanese prisoners reported that they had tried to surrender several times, but "every time American soldiers saw a Jap they would shoot at him and so [they] had no opportunity to surrender."³⁸ An American report backed this statement up, noting that "documents pertaining to Japanese prisoners were 'full of accounts of ingenious schemes devised by POW's to avoid being shot while trying to give themselves up' due to the fact of 'surrender being made difficult by the unwillingness to take prisoners' on the part of Allied fighting men."³⁹ Another American report stated that "a Marine Raider Battalion, while on a patrol, ran across a

Japanese Hospital bivouac area. Over four hundred, including patients and corpsmen were killed, but although large amounts of Hospital supplies and equipment were captured, no prisoners were taken."⁴⁰

Although official U.S. government policy required that prisoners be taken whenever possible, many commanding officers refused to pass along these orders, explaining "There's too much risk attached to taking prisoners and I'm not going to ask any of my men to take any" ⁴¹ Others took an even harder line against prisoners. On at least one occasion, a "commanding officer censured his men from a lower unit for bringing in prisoners, saying-- 'Don't bother to take prisoners, shoot the sons of bitches!'" ⁴² "Admiral William Halsey, soon to become the commander of the South Pacific Force, vowed after Pearl Harbor that by the end of the war Japanese would be spoken only in hell, and rallied his men thereafter under such slogans as 'Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs.'" ⁴³ Because of attitudes such as these, horrifying incidences were reported without official reprimand. One, involving the U.S. submarine Wahoo, is a prime example. After sinking a freighter and a transport from a four-ship convoy, "Mush" Morton, the skipper of Wahoo, brought his vessel to the surface:

The water was so thick with enemy soldiers that it was literally impossible to cruise through them without pushing them aside like driftwood. These were the troops we knew had been bound for New Guinea, to fight and kill our own men, and Mush, whose overwhelming biological hatred of the enemy we were only now beginning to sense, looked about him with exultation at the carnage

"There must be close to ten thousand of them in the water," said Roger Paine's voice.

"I figure about nine thousand five hundred of the sons-a-bitches," Morton calculated.

Whatever the number, Morton was determined to kill every single one. He ordered the deck guns to open fire. Some of the Japanese, Morton said later, returned the fire with pistol shots. To Morton, this signaled 'fair game.' . . . Later, Morton reported tersely, "After about an hour of this, we destroyed all the boats and most of the troops."⁴⁴

A vicious circle had developed in which the Japanese reluctance to surrender and Allied disinterest in taking prisoners had meshed sickeningly, with horrifying results.⁴⁵ Thus, "by the final year of the war, one out of four U.S. combatants stated that his primary goal was not to help bring about Japan's surrender, but simply to kill as many Japanese as possible."⁴⁶

The callous attitude of the Americans developed in many ways. Some front-line soldiers were terrified of Japanese treachery. The 2nd Marine Battalion had captured several prisoners on Guadalcanal. The prisoners rubbed their bellies and asked for food. When food was offered, they said that their whole unit was hungry and wanted to surrender. The battalion followed their captives until they reached a ravine. There the prisoners explained that

the trip would take a long time and suggested that the unit rest up for a bit. As the Americans settled down and removed their gear, they were fired upon by the very Japanese they had set out to capture. Many were slaughtered and those who made it back were reprimanded for losing their friends and much of their gear. Few were ready to trust a surrendering Japanese soldier again.⁴⁷

Others had heard of such Japanese atrocities and were eager to return the favor. Charles Lindbergh noted the common feeling that "a Japanese soldier who cuts off an American soldier's head [was] an Oriental barbarian, 'lower than a rat', [but] an American soldier who slits a Japanese throat 'did it only because he knew the Japs had done it to his buddies.'"⁴⁸ Even Time magazine displayed this attitude, noting that "low flying fighters turned lifeboats towed by motor barges, and packed with Jap survivors, into bloody sieves. Loosed on the Japs was the same ferocity which they had often displayed."⁴⁹

Souvenir hounds joined in the melee as well, eager to smuggle stolen items back home and knowing that they could not pilfer a living prisoner's belongings. One officer at the front observed that "a Japanese officer, having his sword on him, had as much chance of being captured alive as a sheep chased by a pack of wolves" because of the American "mania" for owning a Japanese saber.⁵⁰

This callousness towards prisoners had severe repercussions and was extremely hard to break. "It took the promise of three days leave and some ice cream to bring in the first Army prisoner. This broke the ice but the flow of prisoners was still slow."⁵¹ In August, 1944, Lindbergh was informed that "'the officers wanted some prisoners to question but couldn't get any until they offered two weeks leave in Sydney for each one turned in. Then they got more than they could handle.' But when they cut out giving leave, the prisoners stopped coming in. The boys just said they couldn't catch any."⁵²

Even when a prisoner was captured, this did not guarantee his safe escort to the U.S. R.J. Maness, a Marine corporal who fought in the Pacific, admitted that "some Japanese smarted off and did not make it back. Any of our men that killed Japanese after they were captured were violating battalion policy, but it was done."⁵³ In another battalion, an officer noted that "even when prisoners were taken . . . , they were lined up and asked which ones could speak English. Those who were able to speak English were taken for questioning. The others 'simply weren't taken.'⁵⁴ Official papers also show that "on several occasions, word was telephoned in from the front line that a prisoner had been taken, only to find after hours of waiting that the prisoner had 'died' enroute to the rear. In more than one instance there was strong evidence that

the prisoner had been shot and buried because it was too much bother to take him in."⁵⁵

Even when a prisoner was captured and sent to the rear, it was still not certain that he would be shipped to the U.S. Although the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War had signed an agreement saying that all prisoners captured by U.S. troops would be transferred to the War Department and delivered to the U.S., many exceptions were made.⁵⁶ On one occasion, General MacArthur made special arrangements with the Australian government to have them hold "approximately [400] American-owned prisoners of war captured in the Pacific fighting" and maintain them through a reverse lend lease agreement.⁵⁷ On another occasion, the Navy made an informal agreement with New Zealand in which New Zealand accepted the custody and responsibility of 700 U.S. Navy POW's, just as if New Zealand had captured them. The Navy explained that the prisoners were captured in the Solomon Islands and were transferred to the New Zealand government because there was no safe, reliable transport back the U.S. Those prisoners valuable for interrogation purposes, however, were ultimately to be transported to allied interrogation facilities in Australia.⁵⁸ Since no deals relating to the transfer of POW's were made at a national level with either New Zealand or Australia and since most of the field records have been destroyed, few records exist of the transactions made and many of the

records that do exist give conflicting results. For this reason, and since it was difficult to determine which prisoners were captured by each individual government during a joint campaign, no exact count can be given of the U.S. prisoners held by other countries and even less is known about the exact details of their captivity.⁵⁹

Other prisoners were held in Hawaii, Saipan, Leyte, Luzon, and Mindanao.⁶⁰ In fact, as of 11 July 1945, the U.S. had captured approximately 14,000 prisoners,⁶¹ and at least 8,664 Japanese prisoners were held by or for the United States outside of its continental boundaries.⁶²

Although 14,000 prisoners may sound like a large group, the number of prisoners captured in the Pacific was less than a fraction of the prisoners who poured into the U.S. from Europe and not all of the captured Japanese prisoners were front-line soldiers. U.S. War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, stated that "the Armed Forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and noncombatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war."⁶³ In addition, "Individuals who follow armed forces without directly belonging thereto, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, sutlers, contractors, who fall into the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from

the military authorities of the armed forces which they were accompanying."⁶⁴ Although the Japanese did not plan for the capture of their men and these documents were not provided, most front-line soldiers did not know about the required certificate and gave no consideration as to whether their captive was military or not.⁶⁵

Thus, prisoners captured ranged from first-rate front-line forces to illiterate laborers and Koreans, and from medical personnel to Japanese "comfort girls," the latter creating quite a bit of commotion among their guards. There was even a woman sniper, captured on Eniwetok, and a few Japanese-Americans who had chosen to fight for Japan.⁶⁶ The average prisoner, however, "from the beginning of the New Guinea campaign up to May 1944 was of average or above average standard of education, under 30, from a 'city occupation' (artisans or clerks), single, enlisted in the Army, and was captured rather than surrendering of his own free will."⁶⁷

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CHAPTER TWO

THE PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS

Although the first prisoners who were captured in World War II caught the U.S. off guard, the Navy quickly issued clear-cut directives concerning their care. In fact, the first letter of instructions on the handling of prisoners was issued on December 5, 1941, two days before Pearl Harbor. These instructions were accompanied by a 27-page questionnaire to assist in formal interrogations if they were ever required.¹ A revision, based upon British Naval policy and updating the procedures, was written May 19, 1942.²

According to these updated instructions, Naval commanders were to ensure that prisoners were segregated into three groups immediately as they were received on board. These groups were divided into officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men, and no member of one group was to be permitted to speak with a member of another group or with U.S. servicemen, except those specifically designated as interpreters. To ensure compliance, and to convey the urgency of proper procedures, the instructions described problems occurring during the recent capture of a

submarine crew. The captain of the submarine was given permission to speak to his crew and utilized the opportunity to remind his crew to give no information of value to their captors. Although the American crew quickly stopped him when they realized what he was saying, the damage was already done and his crew remained highly security conscious, giving very little information of value to their captors.

After being segregated, the prisoners were to be searched minutely and everything except necessary clothing was to be taken from them, made into separate bundles, and marked clearly with the prisoner's name, rank, and serial number. This would give the prisoners extra incentive to give correct information since the only way they could retrieve their possessions was to have it marked with the required information. Receipts would be given "if demanded." During the search, the instructions noted, special care was to be taken to prevent any prisoner from throwing any articles overboard or otherwise disposing of them. Also, seamen were reminded that souvenirs were not to be taken. To keep sailors from stealing items of intelligence value, the Navy implemented a policy whereby articles received by the Division of Naval Intelligence which were determined to have no technical or intelligence value would be returned to the commander of the forces involved in the capture for distribution.

Once prisoners had been segregated and completely searched, they would be fed, given warm clothing and medical attention, and provided with such amenities as cigarettes. The instructions were explicit about this; intelligence gathering was more important than the care of the prisoners and would be accomplished first.

Officers and interpreters were to stay with the prisoners during mealtimes and periods of exercise and relaxation. This way, they could listen to the prisoners' conversations and try to gather information from careless comments. If enough men were proficient in the language, others would be used as guards for the same reason, although they were never to reveal their knowledge of the prisoners' language, since this would have caused the prisoners to become more security conscious.

The instructions further ordered that "although some prisoners may be taken who are eager to talk under the stress and shock of action, capture and possible exposure", no attempts were to be made at formal interrogation unless a prisoner was suffering from wounds or exposure to such an extent that there was doubt that he would survive the trip back.³ In these cases, pertinent portions of a questionnaire were to be used as a guide to gather information the prisoner might have possessed.

A roster of prisoners and a statement describing the action in which they were taken was to be prepared. Upon

arrival in port, these documents would be turned over to the Commandant of the Naval District or his designated representative, along with the prisoners, their personal possessions, and any other material gathered in the encounter. Items of foreign military equipment which were of no further use to the prisoners was to be taken and turned over to the quartermaster salvage officer. Many items, including helmets, cartridge belts, cartridge pouches, first aid kits, canteens, and gas masks, were shipped to one of the Washington Quartermaster Depots and issued to U.S. troops for training. Other salvageable items, such as blankets and shelter halves would be kept as well.⁴

Once the prisoners were transferred to a Naval prison camp, they would be assigned a serial number, photographed, and fingerprinted; and a basic personnel record would be prepared for them. Then, as soon as possible, they were transferred to the custody of the Army for final disposition.

The serial numbers given to the prisoners consisted of four components. The first component was the symbol "ISN", standing for Internment Serial Number. The second was the numerical symbol of the naval district in which the prisoner was landed and processed and the third was the number of the individual prisoner of war. This number was determined by counting consecutively, starting with one, the number of prisoners received and processed in that district since the

beginning of the war, without regard to the country the prisoner had served. The fourth component was the symbol "Na", which designated that the prisoner had been in custody of the Navy. Thus, the twenty-fifth prisoner of war received and processed at a naval shore station in the Fourteenth Naval District would be assigned serial number: "ISN-14-25(Na)", and the twelfth prisoner received and processed in the Thirteenth Naval District would be assigned the number: "ISN-13-12(Na)".⁵

The prisoners were photographed in two positions, full face and profile. The prisoner's serial number would appear in both positions. At least five sets of each picture were printed so that five copies of the prisoner's Basic Personnel Record could be created. The prints could not be greater than 2" x 2" to accommodate the personnel record.

Five sets of fingerprints were also required. This could either be accomplished by taking one set of original fingerprints and photocopying the rest or by taking five sets of original fingerprints, one for each record.

The Basic Personnel Record itself consisted of War Department - Provost Marshal General's Office Form No. 1, printed and furnished on heavy paper suitable for permanent records. It contained the prisoner's serial number, name, personal information, the appropriate photographs and fingerprints, and an inventory of any personal effects

taken from the prisoner. Each prisoner would sign the form after inventorying his personal effects and ensuring each item was listed on the inventory.

Any "untoward incidents" such as a death or injury of a prisoner, damage or loss of property of prisoners, escapes or attempted escapes, or any other incident likely to result in complaints by prisoners occurring during the voyage was to be recorded immediately. The Commanding Officer of the vessel would then appoint a Board of Investigation consisting of three or more officers, one of whom would be a medical officer. This Board was to conduct a hearing according to the principles of military law, calling and examining witnesses, including prisoners of war, and determine whether any blame was attributable to the personnel of the United States or to the prisoners of war. The Board would then make recommendations consistent with its findings. If the Board attributed the blame to any U.S. personnel or prisoner of war who could be punished adequately by disciplinary action, such punishment was administered immediately. If the offense was serious enough for a court-martial, summaries of evidence were taken and arrangements were made for essential witnesses to be present at the trial.⁶

Arriving at processing camps like Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, California, prisoners held by the Navy were transferred to the Army. The officer in command of the

naval escort party would carry four copies of each of the transferred prisoners' Basic Personnel Records with him. The commanding officer of the Army enclosure to which the prisoners were being transferred would check the contents of the records against the prisoners and, if everything seemed in order, receipt for each prisoner in the space provided on the reverse side of each record. He would also inventory the prisoner's personal effects, which were packaged separately, and accept custody of these as well by initialing the appropriate block. He would retain three copies of the records and return the fourth copy to the commanding officer of the Naval escort party for permanent retention by the Navy. This would provide both military branches with a written record of the transfer.⁷

Conditions in Army field camps were not quite so organized. With no firm guidance, commanders were left to make their own decisions on how to properly detain prisoners until their transportation to the U.S.

On Guadalcanal, the Japanese were housed in a compound built on a former Japanese bivouac area. The prisoners cooked their own meals, often from food captured from their comrades in arms, over the same fires and in the same iron pots they had used before their capture.⁸ They were dressed in clothing captured by U.S. servicemen and identified by tags hung on each by means of a looped cord around his neck. These tags had been filled out at the division

collecting point and listed the date of capture, place of capture, and the unit that had made the capture as well as identifying the wearer as a prisoner. The prisoners were warned that if the tag were mutilated, destroyed, or lost, they would be provided with no food, but no documentation exists as to whether this threat was actually carried out.⁹

Most prisoners were quickly shipped to Army processing camps like Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, California. The camp at Sand Island consisted of several wooden barracks, only one of which was more than one-story high. John Rudolph Sulzer noted on his visit that the barracks were "of excellent construction, well-ventilated, well-lighted and having shuttered windows. Large spaces are left between the beds and in several of the barracks the beds are tiered."¹⁰ He noted that electricity had been installed in each of the barracks as well. Since the camp contained several Japanese, German, Italian, and American civilians as well as the prisoners, each race was segregated as agreed upon in the Geneva Convention and the prisoners were divided into officers and enlisted and kept separated from the civilians as well.

The prisoners prepared their meals in a kitchen provided exclusively for their use and washed their clothes in a laundry which was placed at their disposal three times a week. They shopped at a canteen, in which they could buy cigarettes, tobacco, magazines, vitamin pills, and phono-

graph records. The camp was also provided with a library and an infirmary, which was served by a Japanese doctor who worked under the surveillance of the camp doctor. Serious medical cases were taken to the military hospital at Honolulu.

Since Sand Island was a transit camp, the prisoners did not work, although they were paid as required by the Geneva Convention. Discipline was maintained by an elected representative from each barracks. In his report, Sulzer noted that the prisoners seemed happy and well cared for.¹¹

The Angel Island processing camp was located on the northern end of Angel Island, a small mountainous island at the northern tip of San Francisco Bay. It had previously served as a quarantine station for the Immigration Service and was now part of the military post of Fort McDowell. Opened the day the U.S. entered the war, it was set up to receive civilian internees. However, the internees were soon transferred and replaced by prisoners of war. Having a total capacity of 500, it was composed of a brown two-story building and a smaller building that served as a kitchen and dining area. The buildings were surrounded by a single seven-foot chain-link fence, which was topped by two feet of barbed wire with no overhang and surrounded on all sides by trees. To the north, the fence was within eight feet of the main building and nowhere was it more than 75 feet from it. Two guard towers were located at

diagonal corners of the prisoner compound and each time the guard changed a count was made of the prisoners.¹²

The prisoners slept on steel or iron three-decker cots and were each issued three blankets. Their meals were a compromise between American and Japanese food. The cooks were Japanese and worked under the direction of an American sergeant. They were provided with forty pounds of rice for every hundred people per meal. The prisoners also ate great quantities of cabbage, which they liked and believed was a sort of cure-all. They did not care for milk, but drank both coffee and tea. Before September of 1944, the prisoners were served rice with every meal, but during an inspection of the camp by the International Red Cross that month, they requested that they receive rice only twice a day and be served bread for the third meal. Their request was granted and, after that, they received bread or toast with breakfast.¹³

The prisoners received an exacting set of rules that described their daily schedule and listed required duties and restrictions (see Appendix 1). There were few disciplinary problems. For recreation, the prisoners engaged in baseball, volleyball, wrestling, or games of Mah-jongg. They liked to gamble and often used tobacco as stakes. They also spent time indoors reading, although there were no books in Japanese until after September of 1944. Being a transient camp, there were no educational services or

canteen. If the prisoners desired anything normally carried in a canteen, they would prepare a list and the items were purchased from the American post exchange. When the prisoners received the items, their accounts were debited the cost of the articles.¹⁴

While Sand Island served as just a temporary detainment camp, Angel Island, which was the main transit camp on the west coast of the continental U.S., was more than it seemed. In addition to being a temporary detainment camp and processing center, it also served as a facade for a nearby interrogation center which was so secret even its name was classified, Byron Hot Springs.¹⁵

Once prisoners arrived at the processing camps like Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, California, Army procedures became more organized. Although no one at Angel Island had prepared a written Standard Operating Procedure for processing prisoners as of September 29, 1944, a procedure had been perfected by trial and error. Prisoners were received from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Before the prisoners left the ship, Angel Island personnel obtained a passenger or sailing list and mimeographed several copies of it. These copies were furnished to personnel in the receiving room, the photo lab, the supply room, and the PW personnel section, as well as to the billeting non-com, the canteen officer, the medical officer, the sergeant of the guard, and the mess officer.

Then, as the prisoners left the ship, they were searched by the Port Provost Marshal. All of their possessions, including the articles that were to be confiscated, were placed with their baggage and tagged, to be delivered separately from the prisoners themselves. The prisoners were directed through a disinfection plant and underwent a complete medical exam at this time.¹⁶ Each prisoner stripped and took a shower while all of their clothing was treated with ethyl bromide in a nearby gas chamber. Following this, the escorting officer and the prison officer conducted a thorough inspection of each prisoner with a flood light and all of their hairy body parts were sprayed with an insecticide. The inspection was to check each prisoner for body lice, check their throat and teeth for evidence of infection, their eyes for evidence of trachoma and conjunctivitis, their skin for evidence of rashes, and their genitalia and anus for evidence of venereal disease.¹⁷ They were then counted and marched to the processing room with only the clothes on their back. Here, personnel records were initiated and serial numbers assigned, if either had not already been accomplished.¹⁸ The Army's serial numbers, however, were composed differently than those of the Navy.

If assigned in the field, the first component of the serial number consisted of three symbols, a number designating a command within the appropriate theater, a letter

designating the theater of operations in which the prisoner was captured, and the first letter of the country in whose armed forces the prisoner was serving. The second component was assigned consecutively, according to the number of prisoners captured in the command of the appropriate theater regardless of which country he had served. Thus, the 35th prisoner captured in the Southwest Pacific, if serving in the Japanese Army, would be assigned 42SJ-35.

Prisoners transferred to the continental U.S. without being processed in the field were given numbers composed in a slightly different manner. Serial numbers assigned at the Service Command consisted of a number representing the appropriate Service Command - one through nine, the letter "W", representing the War Department, the first letter of the country he had served, and the prisoner number which was assigned consecutively by the Service Command regardless of which country he had served or where he had been captured.¹⁹

If a personnel record had already been completed on a prisoner, it was checked for the legibility of the fingerprints and to ensure that there had been no major changes in the prisoner's appearance. If the prints were illegible or if the prisoner's appearance had changed materially, a notation was made on the record and an appointment set for a new photo or new set of fingerprints to be taken.²⁰ Each prisoner was given a numbered bottle and instructed how to

collect a small specimen of his feces. Direct stool cultures were plated and malaria smears made using the number from the bottle. The prisoners received immunizations for typhoid and vaccinations for smallpox.²¹ At this time, all of the Japanese prisoners chose to sign a statement saying that they did not want their relatives or their government informed of their capture. This was allowed since the United States wished to abide by the Geneva Convention, but also wanted to keep the prisoners happy. Since each prisoner signed the statement, there was no mail to or from the prisoners at Angel Island.²²

The extremely sick and wounded prisoners were taken to Letterman General Hospital, but "in the interest of efficiency and economy of manpower", their non-medical records were not transferred to that station. Thus, while the medical records went to the hospital with the prisoner, all pay and administrative procedures were still accomplished by Angel Island personnel.²³ Only those who were extremely sick or wounded were transferred, however. A Red Cross report from September 16, 1944 showed that of 450 prisoners remaining at Angel Island, fifty-one had syphilis, twelve had some kind of skin disease, and twenty-five had war wounds whose bandages required changing daily. Several others had intestinal worms or carried dysentery germs. The report also suggested that although blood tests had

shown only a few cases of malaria, there were probably many other cases that had not shown positive on the test.²⁴

While the prisoners were processed, their baggage was thoroughly searched. The prison spokesman, the section leader of the prisoners whose baggage was being searched, the receiving and property officer, and an interpreter were all present during this search. Articles to be confiscated were taken at this time and receipts were prepared for any money or valuables removed from the baggage.²⁵

The fact that conditions were more orderly than in the field did not, however, mean that every detail went according to plan. Interrogators in the U.S. often complained that prisoners they received were "stale" and almost worthless for interrogation purposes. Also, in a letter to Commander Riheldaffer, who worked closely with Byron Hot Springs, E. J. Allen, a Navy interrogator there, showed nothing but contempt for the "routine of handling prisoners in [the] custody of the Army." He described the routine as follows:

When the P/Ws were taken from the van which had transported them from the ship they were herded into a room preparatory to getting deloused. There were two young Japanese Nisei to be used as interpreters; however, they were quite useless, as they could not talk the language sufficiently to keep things orderly. The result was much confusion, with the officers and Nisei making signs to have the P/Ws get their clothing off. The captain in charge assigned six enlisted men to search their clothing. These men had not previous experience and I could not refrain from making some

suggestions which resulted in producing an array of razor blades, knives, etc., hidden in the inner soles of the P/Ws' shoes and in the seams of their hats and trousers.

The entire procedure in my opinion, was handled very clumsily. Papers and articles taken from these prisoners were thrown away and no provision was made to turn them back to the owners. Goods were thrown in a big pile and then stuffed into prisoners' bags, regardless of ownership.²⁶

While not all inprocessing worked in this manner, sometimes it did occur. Prisoners were supposed to be in the processing camps only long enough to be processed in and then moved on to a permanent camp, but sometimes this did not work according to plan either. At least on one occasion, a prisoner was held at Sand Island for over a year.²⁷ As time went on, however, things became better organized and problems such as these became fewer.

When the prisoners had been completely inprocessed and interrogated, they were ready to be shipped to their permanent camp. For the Japanese prisoners, from April 1943 until February 1945, this meant Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. When the majority of the prisoners were ready for departure, the Post Transportation Officer requested a Main number and routing from Washington, D.C. and made the necessary accommodations with the railroad for the trip, as prisoners were not allowed to fly on commercial airlines. Orders were published and the orders, as well as the routing, time of departure, and estimated time of arrival, were mailed to the POW Camp involved as well as the Commanding

Generals of each Service Command involved.

When the train arrived, the cars to be used to transport the prisoners were inspected. If possible, this was accomplished the day before, but was sometimes done the day of the trip. Prison type cars were used, if available, but if not available, care was taken that cars with blind spots or compartments were not used. "Jumpers", cars whose generators were defective and which used electricity generated by another car by means of heavy electrical cables, were also rejected. Fire extinguishers were removed from each car and the glass cases containing fire fighting equipment were covered with cardboard. The door of one toilet was locked securely and the door to the other was removed so that the guard inside the car could see all of the prisoners all of the time. Windows were blocked so that they could not be raised more than four inches. Finally, two coal lamps were suspended from the baggage racks of each car to be used as auxiliary lighting devices and a car loading schedule was furnished to the train commander by the Transportation Officer.²⁸

After being informed that they would not be allowed to reenter the barracks, the prisoners were assembled in the recreation area, carrying their baggage and memorandum receipt property, which was the U.S. government property issued to them for use during their internment. Their baggage was taken into the searching room and searched and

the memorandum receipt property was inspected for deliberate damage or loss and taken up. If deliberate damage or loss was identified, the prisoner was charged for the property. The prisoners were then marched through the Processing Room, where their identification was checked and a body search made. They then proceeded to the Searching Room, picked up their baggage, and marched out of the enclosure to the train. The prison officer and the train commander checked to ensure the proper number of prisoners as they boarded the train.

Two guards rode in each car with the prisoners. They had written orders to command "Halt" and then to fire immediately on any prisoner attempting escape. Interpreters explained the meaning of "Halt" and communicated all rules and procedures to the prisoners before the trip began. The guards were also to stop the train and call out the guard during any riot or escape attempt. Prisoners were to remain seated when the train was moving, unless given permission by a guard to leave their seat. Even then, only one prisoner could leave his seat at a time. Prisoners were not to be allowed to use the latrine when the train was stopped or slowing down to stop, but were allowed to use them at any other time. Loud singing or other such noises were forbidden. Strict military discipline was maintained and prisoners were required to be courteous and respectful toward U.S. personnel at all

times. The train commander was responsible for discipline and if punishment was ever required for an offense, a report of the offense and punishment were given to the internment camp commander along with the prisoner when the train arrived. Prisoners were not to be tied or handcuffed "unless absolutely necessary either for the protection of the prisoners or to prevent escape."²⁹ They were allowed to smoke, but since they were not allowed to have matches, lights had to be furnished by supernumeraries or non-commissioned officers. The guards assumed their duties before the prisoners entered the train and their job was not finished until they delivered the prisoners, properly aligned and together, to their relief. In this manner, the prisoners were transported to their permanent camp.³⁰

CHAPTER TWO END NOTES

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15. Letter from Col. F. E. Cookson, Director of Administration to the Director, Mobilization Division, Army Service Forces, War Department dated 2 August 1945, Record Group 165, Country File, Japan - POW Personnel (Tracy).

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18. Whitlock letter.

19. Policy letter on Serial Numbers.

20. Whitlock letter.

21. SOP for Medical Processing, 1.

22. Whitlock letter.

23. Ibid.

24. Perret report, 2.

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26. Letter to Commander Riheldaffer from E.J. Allen dated 25 February 1944, Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, 2 January to 29 January 1944.

27. Letter (WCJ-470) to Commander Riheldaffer dated 19 December 1944, p. 2, Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, 2 January to 29 January 1944.

28. Standard Operating Procedure for Transfer of Prisoners of War, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-1946, American Samoan Internees to Byron Hot Springs Activities.

29. Undated letter to the Commanding General, 4th Service Command, from Major General Allen W. Gullion, The Provost Marshal General, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File 1942-1945, 383.6 General P/W, August 1941 to October 1943.

30. Whitlock letter and ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

OUR SECRET INTERROGATION CENTERS

In addition to the processing centers and the permanent prisoner of war camps, the U.S. also had two secret interrogation centers, one at Fort Hunt in Washington, D.C. and one at Byron Hot Springs, California. These interrogation centers were used to conduct detailed interrogations of the most knowledgeable of the prisoners brought into the U.S. Although interrogations were conducted in the field, these were primarily to gain tactical knowledge for immediate use on the battlefield. Early in the war, critical information of long term strategic value was often lost or discarded before it reached the strategic planners in the U.S. The proposed interrogation centers would help to correct this situation.¹

In early 1942, the Secretaries of the Army and Navy agreed to establish two interrogation centers, one on the east coast and one on the west coast.² The interrogation centers were to be placed under the control of the Provost Marshal General, but made available to the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence for the interrogation of prisoners. The Chiefs of the Army and

Navy Interrogation Sections were responsible for providing the interrogation personnel while the Provost Marshal General was to designate the commander and provide the necessary supplies, equipment, and personnel for their operation. Later, because of the inefficiency of the dual system, the system was revised and the senior Military Intelligence Service Officer was designated as Commanding Officer as well.³

The centers were not classified as prisoner of war camps, but rather "as Temporary Detention Centers for the specific purpose only of interrogating certain prisoners of war captured either by the Army or Navy." The Provost Marshal General was to be responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the Geneva Convention were upheld and all other commanders involved were to ensure that he received the reports necessary to accomplish his task.⁴

The initial configuration determined, representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2, and the Provost Marshal General were sent to locate suitable sites for the centers. After looking at several sites, the representatives on the east coast recommended Swannanoa, a vast estate near Staunton, Virginia, and the representatives on the west coast recommended Byron Hot Springs, a private health resort near San Francisco. While Swannanoa was rejected and the center on the east coast placed at Fort Hunt, Byron Hot Springs was approved on April 25, 1942.⁵

Byron Hot Springs was two-hundred and ten acres of slightly rolling terrain surrounded by a wheat farm. Entered by way of a private macadam road, it was hidden from any public roads or nearby houses. The surrounding area was almost desolate and the only nearby town contained only a few dozen people, providing almost complete privacy. On the grounds were several sulphur springs and a small group of buildings. The main building was a four story brick hotel containing fifty bedrooms, each averaging 11' by 12' with a private toilet, washbasin, and outside exposure, a kitchen, game room, barber shop, two indoor mineral baths, and several other large rooms. Surrounding the hotel were two dorms, each containing a set of showers, a bathroom and twenty 8' by 10' rooms, several cottages with between one and eight rooms each as well as a bathroom or washstand, a nine car automobile shed, two brick bath-houses, an old farmhouse, the owner's home, and several other miscellaneous sheds and buildings.

Mrs. Reed, the owner of the property, refused to sell the property as she regarded it as a memorial to her first husband. It was he who had seen Indians taking baths in the sulphur springs on the land in 1868 and decided to establish a health resort on the area. However, she was "willing to give the property to the Army for the duration of the war and enter into a ninety-nine year lease thereafter with an agreement to leave it to the Army by will upon

her death."⁶ This sounded good to the representatives, except that Mrs. Reed had already leased the property on a ninety-nine year term to a retired Navy doctor. Mrs. Reed explained that this would be no problem as the doctor was unable to keep up with the rent and would soon have to give up the property anyway.⁷ Reports indicate that condemnation proceedings were instituted and possession of the property was effective 1 June 1942. Construction to prepare the site for its new task was begun immediately.⁸ Workers built false ceilings to cover a maze of wires that would be connected to listening devices and false partitions to provide listening spaces between the walls of rooms that would house the prisoners. Windows of wired glass construction were installed and barred with heavy steel. Locks were put on the doors and a fence erected to surround the area.⁹ Other buildings were turned into officers' quarters, MP barracks, barracks for MIS interrogators, a laundry, a guardhouse, a post exchange, and a myriad of other structures necessary to a military post.¹⁰ Construction was completed in December of 1942 and Byron Hot Springs accepted its first prisoners January 1, 1943.¹¹

This first shipment, containing ten prisoners, was received directly from Hawaii. One was an aviator observer from one of the three planes attached to the battleship Kirishima. Two others were from the destroyer Shirakumo and the final seven were from the cruiser Furutaka, which

was sunk off of Guadalcanal in October of 1942. These prisoners "were exceedingly cooperative and showed little trace of being security conscious."¹² However, soon after, the camp received sixteen new prisoners. These prisoners had been captured as far back as February 24, 1942 and came from the relative ease and comparative freedom of Camp Livingston. They included the senior ranking Japanese prisoner in the United States, Commander Kunizo Aiso of the Hiryu, and were, in nearly every case, quite careful about giving any statements helpful to their captors. The interrogators learned from this that prisoners must be interrogated soon after capture or they would become security conscious and their information stale and worthless.¹³

Because of this, the interrogation centers soon developed a system of screening prisoners while still in the theater of operations and as they arrived in the U.S. Particularly knowledgeable prisoners with long term technical or strategic information were to be flown to the U.S. for interrogation. "In theory, this procedure was excellent, but was restricted in practice, by the claim of the CSDIC - UK [Combined Services Direct Interrogation Center - United Kingdom.] At no time during the operation of the American section of CSDIC(AFHQ) was an equitable distribution of prisoners of war established."¹⁴ Thus, most of the selection process was accomplished at the U.S. ports of entry. While inprocessing at the Angel Island Processing

Center in California, prisoners were given a "registration form." This form asked for the prisoner's "name, rank and internment serial number, his birthplace, the complete inscription of his identification tag, his place of residence, civilian occupation, etc."¹⁵ In most cases, the prisoners did not realize they could not be forced to answer the questions nor did they understand the reason behind the questions, so they filled in the requested information, believing the form was an essential part of the inprocessing. However, screening teams, usually made up of one officer and four Nisei, used the forms to eliminate those prisoners least eligible for interrogation, allowing them more time to further screen more eligible prisoners. These prisoners were interrogated briefly following delousing and other sanitary procedures and information gathered on their past history, capture, and previous interrogations. Finally, all prisoners were classified as A, B, or C. Those classified as C were determined to have no information of value and not considered for interrogation. They were supposed to be shipped to Camp Stoneman, another holding area nearby, to keep them from mingling with the other prisoners, but because of problems at Stoneman, this was never done until after February, 1945.¹⁶

Prisoners classified as either A or B were selected because of their knowledge of a particular region,

technical knowledge, or because of their civilian or military experience. They were moved immediately to Byron Hot Springs by train for further interrogation.¹⁷ During the trip, absolute silence was enforced and blinds or curtains drawn.¹⁸

Upon arrival at Byron Hot Springs, the prisoners were kept separated and not allowed to communicate with anyone except their interrogation officer. This was continued until their first interrogation was completed, so interrogations were quickly accomplished. The interrogation officer checked the assessment of the first classification and ensured that his prisoners were placed in the room that would be most helpful to their captors.¹⁹ Normally, two men were assigned to a room. Their voices or dialects were to differ enough that unseen listeners could distinguish between them. They were to be from different ships or, if that were not possible, from different branches of the ship so that they would be unable to fabricate stories to tell the interrogators. "Toughs" were separated so they would not spoil the others and sometimes prisoners who had been at the camp for a while would be chosen as stool pigeons and assigned with a new prisoner to get him talking.²⁰

While the prisoners were arriving and room assignments determined, teams checked the rooms to which they were assigned to ensure that no messages or warnings had been left by the former occupant. These teams were warned to

check for messages written on walls, pinpricked into woodwork, left in the toilet, rolled into toilet paper or hidden inside the cardboard centers, or taped beneath the window ledges.²¹

Once prisoners had been placed in their rooms, one officer studied the material taken from the prisoners. Then a meeting of the interrogation officers was held. Here, the prisoners were discussed and information gathered from the screening and from the prisoner's personal items were shared with the group. Upon the basis of this information, the prisoners were assigned to the Air Section, the Geographic Section, the Army Section, etc. The head of the section then assigned the prisoner to an individual interrogation officer who worked for the section. Naval prisoners were first provided to interrogators from the Navy, then released to the Army for further interrogation or final processing. However, when the Army Air Corps discontinued its duties in anti-submarine warfare, the Army relinquished its rights to interrogate Naval prisoners as well.²²

Each individual interrogator gathered all of the information available on the prisoner he was to interrogate and studied it for several hours. He was to try to create the impression of omniscience and this often required from three to six hours of preparation for each hour of interrogation. Then, working from a daily schedule prepared by

the Chief Interrogation Officer, he had the prisoner ordered into the interrogation room.²³ Normally, the best subjects for interrogation were the petty officers, who, although having considerable knowledge of a technical nature and some intelligence, were less apt to be as security conscious as officers. Therefore, since background information was extremely useful in gaining further information, the schedule normally began with the youngest and most stupid members of the crew, followed by the officers, the junior ratings in ascending order of intelligence, and, finally, the Petty officers.²⁴

A guard, "who should be smart, of good build, salute well, and stand at attention"²⁵ would lead the prisoner into the room, which was designed to create a formal and serious impression and to make the prisoner ill-at-ease. The prisoner was to stand at attention, give the customary Japanese bow, and then remain standing at attention until the interrogation officer released him from this formality. The interrogators were warned not to ease the formal attitude until they were sure that the prisoner would not take advantage of the absence of it. The door to the room was to be closed immediately and kept closed throughout the interrogation. No person, no matter how high their rank, was to be allowed to interfere with the proceedings. This allowed the interrogator to maintain the position of power in the room.²⁶

Each interrogator was provided with a fictitious name that resembled his own enough to cover in case someone slipped and called him by his actual name, but which would protect him from repercussions once a prisoner was free. He was to show no sign of nervousness or hurriedness and was to be prepared "to recount imaginary experiences or visits to different places" to get the prisoner talking.²⁷ He was to frequently take brief notes on technical information or personal names for use during the rest of the investigation and to encourage the prisoner to believe that no other record was being made of the interrogation.²⁸

The interrogators were each allowed to use their own particular styles, but they normally began their interrogations by asking questions based on information given by the prisoner on his registration form, like the circumstances of his capture. This allowed the interrogators to check the veracity of what each prisoner said and made the prisoner realize that his statements were being checked.²⁹

With this accomplished, the interrogation was normally broken into six main stages. The first stage focused on the prisoner's "general schooling, business, sympathies and antipathies in regard to politics, economics, and Japanese social life."³⁰ This gave the interrogator an idea of how freely the prisoner would talk and also allowed him to play on the prisoner's prejudices in later interrogations.

The second stage obtained a broad outline of his career and, more particularly, his unit's recent movements. This was used to build a basis for future interrogations by allowing the prisoner to talk about things he felt were not of vital importance and to allow the interrogator to further check the information the prisoner was giving. If a prisoner refused to answer a particular question, the interrogator would not press the point, but return to the subject at a later time. However, he would not immediately move on, but allow the prisoner to be put even more ill-at-ease by the period of silence.

Later stages discussed places the prisoner had visited to determine his interests, the amount of time he had spent in each area, what he had heard about the war in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific, the importance the Japanese assigned to each action, and what they were trying to conceal or minimize. He was then to be pressed for minute details and the Japanese plan of action as he or his friends understood it.³¹ Although questionnaires were prepared to give the interrogators a focus for the interrogation, following the questionnaires to the letter was highly discouraged; they were meant only as a guide.³²

Depending on the personality of the prisoner and his reluctance to speak in the presence of others, monitors would either come into the room and take notes on the interrogation or record the interrogation by using a micro-

phone hidden in the room. When the interrogation was over, the interrogator would give a signal, normally a light flash or a buzzer, and a guard would enter the room and relieve him of the prisoner. The prisoner was then escorted back to his room where his conversation was monitored to determine his reaction and to hear any information he discussed with his roommate. The interrogator would then draft a report of the interrogation, using the documents he had studied, notes or recordings made of the interrogation, any conversation monitored in the prisoner's room, and, if available, reports from a stool pigeon.³³ This report was supposed to give the interrogator's estimate of the prisoner's personality and reliability, military history and background, an outline of the topics covered in the interrogation, specific information, such as proper names or localities, and technical information learned, special points of interest for monitors, and suggested lines for further interrogation. Once completed, the report was sent to a special section for evaluation and editing and forwarded to the appropriate authorities.³⁴

Byron Hot Springs personnel also gathered information in ways other than direct interrogation. One method used, mentioned previously, was the technique of secretly monitoring the prisoner's rooms. This method was declared "Most Secret and not divulged to anyone outside the Centre."³⁵ When the Chief Interrogating Officer and the

Navy Chief Interrogator made room assignments, they also selected, with help from the Chief Monitor, which rooms would be constantly monitored. Normal monitoring hours ran from 7:00am to 10:00pm, although special circumstances sometimes required longer hours. Three groups of monitors divided the day into five hour shifts of monitoring, transcribing, and off-duty time. Recordings were made on either glass-base or fiber-base phonograph records and were transcribed in the original language, with doubtful words and missing phrases duly marked. Once complete, the transcription was evaluated, edited, and translated. Pertinent material was extracted or combined with other related material and disseminated to the appropriate authorities.³⁶ To keep the process secret, information was "disguised as to imply that the information was given to interrogators " and placed under the heading "They are Saying."³⁷

Stool pigeons, or "cooperative guests" were also utilized. The prisoners used were to be thoroughly reliable, good actors, quick-witted, and have a retentive memory and versatile conversational powers. They were to be employed only when necessary in order to avoid detection. Normally, stool pigeons were placed under the direction of an officer handler and "paid" with extra privileges or rations or other amenities. They were fully briefed on information to be sought and then allowed to use their own methods to gain it. A stool pigeon was often placed in the

same room as the intended subject or in the exercise pen to become friendly with an obstinate prisoner. Drawbacks to this system were that stool pigeons were often sensitive to any curtailment of their extra privileges and interrogators with stool pigeons tended to get lazy. Even so, much information that could have been gained in no other way was obtained by the use of stool pigeons.³⁸

Some "guests" were even taken into San Francisco for a ride and dinner. This provided the prisoners with a chance to get away from the interrogation center and the interrogators with an opportunity to extract information from the prisoner after "their first slight contact with society and drinks."³⁹ A final method used was to take prisoners to U.S. naval vessels or military installations to allow them to make comparisons to the Japanese equivalents.⁴⁰ Both of these methods were extremely sensitive and only used with dependable prisoners.

Although most of these techniques were probably questionable, according to the Geneva Convention, the only direct violation occurring at Byron Hot Springs dealt with German prisoners and was quickly dealt with by senior officers. Five German prisoners under trial for the murder of another were at Tracy so that the U.S. could obtain additional information about the murder. "During the interrogation it was reported by the prisoners that coercive methods were used, viz., long periods standing at

attention, extra rides in a motor vehicle at night, use of a gas mask on which an onion had been rubbed, inoculations, and other physical discomitures."⁴¹ Colonel Bliss, the commander, was sent an official request for an investigation and immediately directed to find out who was at fault. He was further directed to determine if those at fault would accept a reprimand from the branch commander in order to keep the situation from becoming an international incident.⁴²

CHAPTER THREE END NOTES

1. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 17-19, Record Group 165, Interrogation Center - CPM (hereafter cited as History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy).

2. Memo for Chief of Administrative Services, Services of Supply, from the Provost Marshal General dated April 22, 1942, Record Group 389, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Subject File 1942-1946, Byron Hot Springs Activation.

3. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 9.

4. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 9-12.

5. Memo for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, from Lt. Col. B.M. Bryan, Chief, Aliens Division dated March 21, 1942, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6 Gen P/W, August 1941 to October 1943 and Memo for the Commanding General, SOS, from Major General Allen Gullion, The Provost Marshal General, Record Group 389.

6. Undated Memo for Chief, Aliens Division, from Captain Earl L. Edwards, Chief, Operations Branch, Record Group 389, Enemy Prisoner of War Bureau, Subject File, 1942-1946, Byron Hot Springs Activation.

7. Ibid., 4.

8. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 82.

9. "Resort Hotel in California a Secret Center for Questioning Top Enemy Officers in War", New York Times, July 11, 1947, 34.

10. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 84.

11. Report of Progress to date - January 25, 1943 by Kenneth Dowie, Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, Letters from December 1942 to 30 June 1943.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. and Kazuo Sakamaki, I Attacked Pearl Harbor, translated by Toru Matsumoto, (New York: Association Press by Intl. Committee of YMCA, 1949), 63-64. (Sakamaki lists the prisoner's name as Nakamune while Gordon Prange, Miracle at Midway, (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 314 gives the name as Kunize Aimune, but the descriptions of the rank of the prisoner and the place, time, and circumstances of capture are identical otherwise.)

14. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 20.

15. Ibid., 22 and 85.

16. Ibid., 22-23, and letter to Chief, CPM Branch, Military Intelligence Service, 2, Record Group 165, Interrogation Center - CPM.

17. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 23.

18. General Remarks on Interrogation of Ps/W, p. 7, Record Group 38, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name (hereafter cited as General Remarks on Interrogation).

19. Prisoners of War as a Source of Intelligence, p. 1, Record Group 38, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name (hereafter cited as Prisoners as a Source of Intelligence).

20. General Remarks on Interrogation, 6a.

21. Ibid., 6.

22. Letter to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply, Eastern, Western, Central, and Southern Defense Commands, and All Corps Area from the Adjutant General dated July 17, 1942, Record Group 389, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Subject File 1942-1946, American Samoan Internees to Byron Hot Springs Activation.

23. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 39.

24. General Remarks on Interrogation, 10.

25. Prisoners as a Source of Intelligence, 5.

26. Ibid., 5.

27. General Remarks on Interrogation, 7-9.
28. Prisoners as a Source of Intelligence, 8.
29. Ibid., 5.
30. Parker, C. K., "Interrogation Procedure", p. 1, Record Group 38, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.
31. Ibid., 1-2.
32. General Remarks on Interrogation, 7.
33. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 39-40, and Prisoners as a Source of Intelligence, 8.
34. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 41 and 46.
35. General Remarks on Interrogation, 1.
36. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 47-49, and letter to Chief, CPM Branch, Military Intelligence Service, from Lt. Col. Zenas Bliss dated 11 April 1945, Record Group 165, Country File, Japan POW Personnel (Tracy).
37. Memo to Commander John L. Riheldaffer from Lt. William P. Woodward dated 26 October 1944, Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, 2 January to 29 December 1944.
38. History of Fort Hunt and Camp Tracy, 41-43.
39. Letter (WCJ-474) to Commander Riheldaffer dated 26 December 1944, Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, 2 January to 29 December 1944.
40. Letter (WCJ-596) to Commander Riheldaffer from Lt. Woodward dated 20 April 1945 and reply (BHS-423) dated 23 April 1945, Record Group 38 Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, Letters from April to 6 August 1945.

41. Letter to Lt. Col. Zenas Bliss dated 14 February 1945 and related memo, Record Group 165, Country File, Japan POW Personnel (Tracy).

42. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE PERMANENT CAMPS

As prisoners began to arrive in the U.S., officials quickly shuttled them to former Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps and civilian internment centers. These camps could not be located within fifty miles of the U.S.-Canadian border, the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, ordnance depots, or manufacturing plants handling high explosives. They were not to be within thirty miles of the Great Lakes, twenty miles of certain listed industrial installations, or within a Vital Air Defense Zone. Additional regulations required the camps not be built in a number of large cities and, in a few cases, entire states.¹ Separate camps were to be provided for each major nationality of the Axis powers, with the Germans being separated further into anti-Nazi Army prisoners, other Army prisoners, anti-Nazi Naval prisoners, and other Naval prisoners.²

While later in the war, standard operating procedures were set up for every detail of the prisoners' capture, transfer, and internment, the first enemy prisoners caught the U.S. totally off guard. Kazuo Sakamaki, the first U.S. prisoner captured in World War II, was captured December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The commander of one of five midget submarines involved in the attack, Sakamaki found that his submarine's gyrocompass would not work. He was unable to enter the harbor and encountered some U.S. destroyers. This encounter damaged his vessel further. Finally, when the damaged vessel became stranded on a coral reef, he and his crew partner attempted to scuttle it and began swimming toward what they thought was Lanai, their planned rendezvous point with the mother submarine. Sakamaki passed out in the cold water and regained consciousness only to find Lieutenant P.G. Plybon and Corporal David Akui aiming their loaded weapons at him. The two, along with a jeep-load of other American GI's had been sent to investigate the report of "something . . . amiss offshore" and had found Sakamaki lying on the beach. Sakamaki, clad only in loin-cloth type undershorts, was quickly taken to Bellows Field and then to Sand Island, where he was interrogated and given a complete medical examination. Eight weeks later, in late February, he was transferred to the continental U.S. in a locked and guarded room on the internment ship Etlon. He stayed at the newly constructed interrogation center on Angel Island, California for one week and was then transferred to Camp McCoy, a German and Japanese internment camp in Wisconsin. His first day there, March 9, 1942, Sakamaki was allowed to mingle freely with the civilian internees from Japan. However, the next day he was removed to his own camp.

Since the Geneva convention required that captured officers be provided an aide and the U.S. had no Japanese enlisted prisoners to serve in this capacity, a German internee offered to serve. Feeling the shame of being a prisoner, Sakamaki refused the aide, but did, however, ask for, and was provided with, a pencil, pencil sharpener, notebook, library books, and a daily newspaper.³

Three months later, Sakamaki was transferred again. This time, he was sent to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, another internment camp, along with 250 civilian internees from Japan. There he attended classes provided for the internees on English, geography, agriculture, Buddhism, and theology. Sakamaki was still the only military prisoner held captive in the U.S. The civilian internees in the camp were soon repatriated to Japan and on June 30, 1942, Sakamaki was transferred a third time, this time to Camp Livingston, an internment camp in Louisiana. However, Sakamaki was no longer the only military prisoner in the U.S. On June 22, nine other Japanese prisoners had arrived and by July 1, thirty-two German prisoners had arrived as well. By October 1, thirty-seven other Japanese prisoners had been transferred to the U.S. and on October 29, three Japanese officers, one Warrant officer, and thirty-eight enlisted men who had been captured during the battles at Wake Island and Midway, in the Aleutian campaign, and from miscellaneous patrol boats joined Sakamaki in Livingston.⁴

Thus for a while, Sakamaki and his fellow prisoners were scattered among several camps, usually sharing their accommodations with Japanese-American internees and foreign nationals. However, in April, 1943, the U.S. was better prepared to hold its new prisoners, so military authorities decided to house the Japanese prisoners at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. Camp McCoy had previously been limited to a capacity of one hundred prisoners, as it was the training center for the 100th Infantry Battalion, a Japanese-American unit and the military did not feel safe placing large numbers of prisoners near the unit. However, when the unit was transferred to Europe, the Provost Marshal General decided to move all of the Japanese prisoners currently in the U.S. to the camp, to "allocate any additional Japanese prisoners of war who may be received to [the] camp and . . . [to] designate it for the permanent internment of all prisoners of war of that nationality."⁵ Thus, on May 11, 1943, Sakamaki and the other 61 Japanese prisoners were sent to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where the Japanese prisoners were to be confined for much of the rest of the war. The camp held Japanese internees, German prisoners, and had once even held the 100th Battalion, an Army unit made up of Japanese-Americans, but it was also now prepared to hold the Japanese prisoners.⁶ The camp was also opened up to its full capability of 1000 prisoners, even though there were only 62 Japanese prisoners in the continental U.S.

The interned enemy aliens held at the camp were returned to the custody of the Department of Justice and then transferred out, leaving the entire camp for prisoners of war.⁷

The prisoner of war compound at McCoy was situated about four miles from the Army's temporary training camp of the same name and about five miles from the town of Sparta. The surrounding area was relatively sparsely settled, although the main line of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad and a branch line of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway met at the training camp.⁸

The prison camp consisted of four 480 foot by 190 foot compounds situated around a 216,562 square foot recreational quadrangle. The Japanese were held in two compounds, and a group of five hundred Germans, who were brought to the camp December 20, 1943, and comprised the largest proportion of the prisoners at the time, were held in the other two.⁹ Later, the Germans were moved into a newly built fifth compound and Korean prisoners were brought into the camp.

Running throughout the camp were graded, but unsurfaced, roads. The camp also contained a ten bed hospital and sick call was held daily. A camp Medical officer and Dental officer were provided, although the medical services of the nearby post and two large wards of its hospital were available for any serious problems. The entire stockade was surrounded by a double cyclone wire fence with seven

guard towers. The outer fence was topped with three strands of barbed wire and the inner twelve-foot fence with twelve strands. There was a twenty foot wide "skinned space" between the two and a military vehicle was driven through this space frequently during the day. Each tower was equipped with its own generator in case of emergency and was manned by a single guard, who was connected to the guard house by both a telephone and a two-way walkie talkie. The camp was first guarded by members of the 667th Military Police Escort Guard company, but they were later replaced by the 1620th Military Police unit.¹⁰

The enlisted prisoners were housed in former CCC barracks, built in 1935 and used from March 1942 until the arrival of the Japanese prisoners to hold civilian internees. Each barracks measured 130 foot by 20 foot and held up to fifty men. Every man was assigned a bunk bed, spaced in accordance with current Army regulations, as well as a small space for clothing and personal effects. This latter space was smaller than normal U.S. military standards due to the small size of the buildings. Wood burning stoves were used to heat the barracks. A special barracks was built for the Japanese officers, with several private rooms and a living room as well as showers, basins, and toilets. This barracks was also provided with furniture made by the prisoners.¹¹

Each compound also contained a mess hall, which contained separate dining halls for the officers and enlisted men and was similar in size to the barracks, and a day-room, made from an extra barracks and stocked with furniture and games. The prisoners were also provided with bathhouses. Each was equipped with wash troughs, hot and cold running water, twelve laundry tubs, and a large wooden tub constructed by the prisoners, as they preferred tub baths to showers.¹²

McCoy remained the only prisoner of war camp for the Japanese until late January of 1945, when a flood of prisoners overwhelmed the capacity of the camp. At that time, military officials deactivated the German prisoner of war camp at Camp Clarinda, Iowa, and reconstituted it as a Japanese camp. German prisoners from the camp were carefully screened and 208 from the group of over 1600 were retained to do skilled maintenance work around the camp. The others were transferred to Camp Algonia, another German camp in Iowa.¹³

The camp at Clarinda was located about one mile south of Clarinda, Iowa, a small town of about 5000. It consisted of three separate prisoner compounds and a recreational area, with a separate camp capable of accommodating thirty-two officers nearby. The camp itself covered about 116 acres, although the entire reservation used around 285.¹⁴

Each compound contained twenty 20 foot by 100 foot barracks, similar to the other military barracks of the time, four 20 foot by 140 foot mess halls, four latrines, four orderly rooms, a canteen, an infirmary, and a T-shaped guardhouse. At first, while the number of prisoners remained relatively small, officials kept all of the Japanese prisoners in Compound Number 3.¹⁵ Later, as their numbers increased, they were moved into other compounds as well.

The camps at McCoy and Clarinda remained the primary prisoner of war camps for the Japanese throughout the war. Except for a few medical facilities; processing and interrogation centers; and "reeducation" camps, which were set up in Texas near the end of the war, these camps held every Japanese prisoner in the United States.¹⁶

Upon arrival at their permanent camp, the prisoners were to be "assigned to companies of approximately 250 prisoners each," although at first there were not that many Japanese prisoners in the United States. Not much effort was made to establish disciplinary measures before August, 1943, as the few prisoners interned in the U.S. caused very few discipline problems. However, as a large number of prisoners arrived during the summer months, the War Department adopted a policy that made the prisoners "subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the Army of the United States including the Articles of War [and] the civil laws of the United States and

of the state and municipality where interned."¹⁷ They were also subject to any rules that the commander deemed necessary to maintain control of the camp, although these rules had to comply with Army regulations and the Geneva convention and were to be posted prominently around the camp in the prisoners' native language. They were not, however, required to obey any laws, regulations, or orders of the country in whose military they were serving, except as they were also found in U.S. Army regulations.¹⁸

At the same time, the commander could only admonish, reprimand, or withhold privileges from any prisoner, or restrict an officer, who failed to work or comply with regulations. These were mostly useless gestures, as the prisoners had few privileges and were not concerned with admonishments or reprimands from their enemy. For more serious offenses, the prisoners were subject to courts-martial, except as prescribed by law, international agreement, or the War Department, and, except for officer prisoners, summary punishment by U.S. officers. If court-martialing a prisoner, however, the commander was required to give three weeks notice to the protecting power, which in the case of the Japanese prisoners was Spain.¹⁹

Military personnel were to be firm and exact in enforcing military discipline. Prisoners were not to be subjected to cruel or unusual punishment or to be subjected to group punishment for the misconduct of an individual.

Neither were they to be deprived of their rank. No prisoner was allowed to discipline another prisoner and fraternization between American personnel and prisoners was not allowed.²⁰

The Army soon realized that the only effective disciplinary measures involved a prisoner's food and pay, so restrictions on diet and pay were instituted as punishment for prisoners. Section V of Army Regulation 600-375 allowed commanders to restrict a prisoner's diet in addition to confining him in the guardhouse. The prisoner was to be provided with a minimum of eighteen ounces of bread a day and as much water as he desired. However, there were many limitations on this type of punishment. It could not be imposed continuously for more than fourteen days and was not to be repeated until a second fourteen days had passed. In addition, no prisoner was allowed to be put on the restricted diet for more than eighty-four days in a year and a doctor had to certify that his health could stand the diet.²¹

It also led to the policy of "administrative pressure." Under administrative pressure, a prisoner who refused to obey a lawful order or regulation could lose certain privileges or be placed on a restricted diet. This was not a form of punishment, but rather an inducement to the prisoner to obey a lawful order, as the prisoner could terminate the pressure at any time by obeying the order.

The restricted diet or loss of privileges was not limited to a definite period of time, but could extend until the prisoner conformed to his captors' desires, as long as medical inspections warranted the continuation. Thus, if the prisoner's health required that he be removed from the restricted diet, he could be given a meal or a day's rations or more until his health was better and then placed back on the restricted diet.

Camp commanders could also withhold a prisoner's pay and allowances with "administrative pressure". Any money owed to the prisoner for work completed or for his monthly stipend could be withheld in the same way as rations. However, one dollar a month was to be given the prisoner, even under administrative pressure, to allow him to purchase certain necessities.²²

The prisoners continued to wear the uniform they were captured in, unless circumstances or climate dictated otherwise, until it became unfit for use. At that time, they would be issued a new one by the processing station or prisoner of war camp. These were supplied from obsolete stock; any CCC stock, except for spruce green clothing; class "B" stock; and new stock, in that order. New stock would only be used in emergency cases, however. Some of the items available for issue included cotton trousers, a wool shirt and coat, underwear, socks, shoes, boots, a

belt, gloves, a raincoat, and sanitary items. Shorts were not allowed unless the prisoner was engaging in sports or directed by American medical authorities to sunbathe.

Except for the prisoner's national uniform and the uniforms of the officer prisoners, all outer garments were marked in white paint with the letters "PW" or the prisoner's internment serial number. Black indelible ink was used for white or light colored clothing and orange paint for certain other clothing. Six inch stencils were used to mark the back of shirts, coats, blouses, and jackets and four inch stencils were used on the backs of the prisoners sleeves, between the elbow and the shoulder, and on the pants, immediately above the knee on the front and immediately below the belt in the back. Officer prisoners were permitted to alter their uniforms in order to distinguish them from the enlisted prisoners, but other than that, the prisoners were not allowed to alter their uniforms in any way. Insignia, which designated the prisoner's rank, and decorations could be worn, however. If caught altering their uniforms, the prisoners would have to return them to their original condition. If this could not be done, the uniform would be replaced and the prisoner charged for the replacement costs. This became an issue at McCoy, where the Japanese sometimes cut their shoes into thongs during the summer. Hair and grooming standards for

the prisoners were the same as those of the U.S. military.²³

In addition to their uniforms, the prisoners were also issued various sanitary articles, including razor blades, shaving brushes and creams, toothbrushes and toothpaste, combs, handkerchiefs, shoelaces, shoe polish, soap, towels, and needles and thread for sewing. Each prisoner could receive up to one dollar's worth of these supplies each month, as needed.²⁴

Food was provided for the prisoners by each camp. Although the nutritional value of the food issued to the prisoners was required by the Geneva convention to be of the same quality and quantity as that of the food given to U.S. troops, the food itself was not required to be of the same quality and quantity. In fact, on February 24, 1945 the Provost Marshal General ordered that "immediate steps . . . be taken to ensure that rations furnished Japanese prisoners of war do not exceed minimum requirements of the Geneva Convention."²⁵ The prisoners still received wholesome food, but prime cuts of meat were replaced with poorer cuts and non-rationed foods replaced similar items that were rationed.

In September of 1943, the Office of the Provost Marshal General prepared a "Japanese Menu" which listed proposed menus to be provided the prisoners for every day of the month along with the lists of supplies required to

prepare the menu listings. These menus were only prepared as guides, however, since the Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, put out the very same month, allowed rations to be altered "to suit the needs of the various national groups" as long as the monetary value of the replacements did not exceed that of the original rations and no food was wasted.²⁶ This satisfied the Japanese, whose digestive systems were not used to American foods, and helped to prevent waste. It also allowed the guards to ensure the rations did not spoil.²⁷ The average value of the rations at Camp McCoy during February 1944 was 58.68 cents a day per prisoner, but by March 1945 the prisoners were "being fed principally rice, dried fish, and pickle." Later that year, however, the rations were increased again.²⁸

The prisoners were also encouraged to grow gardens. When the War Department determined that the cultivation increased the value of the land, the prisoners were even paid for this labor. The food grown in these gardens was used for the prisoners' food and the Quartermaster rations were decreased accordingly. This ensured the prisoners fresh vegetables and helped lower costs for the Army.²⁹

The medical and dental treatment given the prisoners was also required to be identical with that of U.S. troops. Upon arrival at their permanent camp, they were given a physical examination and "at least once a month thereafter, they [were] inspected by a medical officer for the purpose

of detecting communicable diseases and vermin infestation."³⁰ Medical records were updated and immunizations and special lab tests or examinations were made as required.

To alleviate the domestic labor shortage caused by the war and to keep the prisoners busy, the U.S. employed its prisoners in several areas.³¹ The Geneva Convention allowed this as long as the labor did not directly relate to the war effort and did not jeopardize the health or safety of the prisoners. It also implied, however, that the work could not be degrading.³² Prisoners below the rank of sergeant could be used to perform general labor, while non-commissioned officers were to serve primarily as supervisors, and officers could not be made to work at all.³³ However, this left several ideas on exactly which jobs the prisoners could perform.

Thus, in September, 1943, the War Department clarified its policies on prisoner employment. In order to comply with the requirement against work related to the war effort, prisoners were not to "handle or work on explosives, ammunition, aircraft, tanks, or other lethal weapons of war, nor could they handle any supplies destined for 'combat units'".³⁴ However, combat units were very narrowly defined as "units actually engaged or about to engage, in operations against the enemy."³⁵

Dangerous or unhealthful work was defined by "(1)the inherent nature of the job; (2)the particular conditions under which the job was to be performed; and (3)the individual capacity of the prisoner of war."³⁶ Things such as the "proper safety devices, the training and experience of the PW, and the particular task involved, rather than the overall complexion of the industry, were also considered."³⁷ American officers at the using levels were to make the final determination, although the prisoner could appeal to the Protecting Power or the Provost Marshal General.

Degrading work was at first defined simply as working as orderlies for other than their own officers, but was later defined more broadly to include work in civilian prisons, bartending for officer's clubs, entertaining U.S. military or civilian personnel, or working as pinboys at bowling alleys.³⁸

In December, 1943, the War Department established a Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board to make the final decision on any doubtful employment practice. This group determined that maintenance, repair work, or parts salvage on any vehicles designed to hold people or cargo rather than combat weapons, "scraping operations" on any military vehicle, or work on gas masks or connected with the shipment of hydrogen-filled cylinders was permissible, but preparing vehicles for overseas shipments, steam clean-

ing tanks, or work connected with guns, rifle ranges, bayonet courses, or any other aids used to train personnel in combat weapons was not.³⁹

POW labor was divided into several classes and subgroups. All work connected with the administration, management and maintenance of prisoner of war camps was Class 1 and all other types of work were Class 2. Class 1 labor was primarily for the benefit of the prisoners and included maintenance and repair of the POW compounds, labor incident to the comfort or health of the prisoners, and work connected "with the interior economy of their companies."⁴⁰ Essential labor connected with U.S. military installations was further labeled Priority I, labor contracted out to civilian employers was labeled Priority II, and non-essential work on military reservations was labeled Priority III.⁴¹

The War Department did not allow the Japanese prisoners to perform Priority II labor for much of the war because of anti-Japanese sentiment among the civilian populace. In April 1943, three Japanese-American farm boys were released from a civilian internment camp on the west coast by the War Relocation Board to help the residents of Marengo, Illinois, who were struggling with labor shortages. The boys "were marched back to the train station by an angry mob led by the mayor, the president of the Park Board, and the commander of the local post of the American

Legion."⁴² This happened even though the boys were American citizens, so after hearing about it, the War Department refused to put any Japanese prisoners in a similar situation, or worse, and only allowed them to work for the U.S. government itself.

The prisoners at McCoy and Clarinda repaired and maintained automotive equipment, handled freight in warehouses, cleared forests and underbrush, cut wood, dug ditches, repaired roads, cooked, worked in the laundry, accomplished demolition and construction work, and even worked on gas masks.⁴³ The prisoners worked best when commanded by their own supervisors, when working in a group, and when given a ten minute rest period in the middle of the morning and afternoon. "As a whole, the Japanese were anxious to make a good impression, but became sullen when urged on or hurried in their work."⁴⁴

When working outside of the camp, the prisoners worked in groups of up to one hundred and four. They were guarded by two MP's and two dog handlers. Every three weeks, the dog handlers put on a demonstration for the prisoners, which served as both entertainment and a helpful reminder of the dogs' abilities. The dogs were therefore well respected by the prisoners and this allowed the use of so few guards. If the worksite was nearby, the Japanese NCO's would march the other prisoners to the site, but if the distance was longer, the military would truck them. In

this manner, the prisoners tore down the CCC camp at Tomah, Wisconsin, a nearby town, in order to build a hospital in its place.⁴⁵ For lunch, the prisoners on these work details would bring a sandwich or donut from breakfast.⁴⁶

While the prisoners were required to work, many were compensated for their labor. Pay was given in canteen coupons so that there would be no opportunity to bribe guards or use money in an escape attempt. Each enlisted prisoner was given ten cents a day, which the War Department averaged out to three dollars a month for expediency, but laborers were rewarded with up to eighty cents a day more, based on the amount of work accomplished. This amount may seem paltry by today's standards, but was based loosely upon the twenty-one dollars a month (70 cents a day) salary paid to American privates in 1941 and would buy the prisoner eight packs of cigarettes or eight bottles of beer. In fact, prisoners at McCoy averaged nineteen dollars for the month of February, 1944, which is very close to that amount. Even when Germany admitted it could not pay the same amount and Italy and Japan failed to respond to the U.S. proposal to do so, the United States continued to pay its prisoners in this manner. In case of escape, however, the prisoner lost his allowance for any time that he was not in U.S. custody.⁴⁷

The Army quickly realized a major deficiency in its plan. Not all prisoner labor was as efficient as free

labor. To alleviate this situation and to provide an incentive for prisoners to work harder, the War Department developed a system of incentive pay. This system was used with piecework "to reward hard workers; to penalize laggards; and to encourage a greater degree of teamwork among prisoner laborers."⁴⁸ U.S. supervisors determined how much work the average free worker would be able to complete in a normal day. The prisoners were then paid, up to \$1.20 a day, for the percentage of work they accomplished. If a worker could complete 10 units of work a day, then the prisoner was paid eight cents a unit. This meant that he would be paid 96 cents if he completed twelve units, but only 64 cents if he completed only eight. To encourage teamwork, the workers were divided into small groups of twenty-five or less and each group member was paid an equal share of the total earnings of the group.

Another system used to achieve greater production was the task system. Each prisoner or group of prisoners working under this system would be assigned a definite amount of work to be completed. They were informed of the amount of work to be completed and any action that would be taken for fast or slow work. Prisoners would continue to work until the assigned amount was completed. This meant that slow workers would spend more of their day working while fast workers would go home earlier. Normally, disciplinary action was also taken for habitually slow workers.

A "reasonable" amount of work was usually given, but by the end of the war, the prisoners were required to work at least nine hour days to complete their tasks, even if they were working quickly.⁴⁹

Not all prisoners were paid for their labor, though. The War Department planned for Class 1 labor, work performed for the benefit of the prisoners, whether inside or outside the camp, to be unpaid labor. However, in practice, this work was divided into paid and unpaid labor. The War Department realized that the prisoners' morale would drop, and with it their efficiency, if they were not allowed an equal opportunity to work for pay, so "it ruled that necessary work within the camp which excluded the PW's from other remunerative labor would be classified as paid labor."⁵⁰

By January 1944, any labor associated with the management of POW camps that required special training or experience, employed prisoners full-time, and was restricted to a certain number of workers was classified as paid labor. It included cooks, interpreters, company leaders, clerks, typists, bookkeepers, stenographers, accountants, warehouse supply clerks, warehousemen, carpenters, plumbers electricians, and mechanics.

Certain housekeeping jobs, however, "which represented only irregular or occasional work were cited as typical unpaid labor. Clerks, cook's helpers, tailors, cobblers,

and barbers were among those listed."⁵¹ Other jobs, which needed to be done, but were not paid labor, including the policing of the camp and maintaining and repairing the barracks, walks, sewers, and fences of the camp, were accomplished by daily fatigue details. These details were assigned to the prisoners by the camp commander and paid the standard eighty cents in canteen coupons, which were contributed by prisoners assigned to paid work. In this way, an equitable distribution of paid labor was maintained.⁵²

If a prisoner performing paid labor sustained an injury on the job which prevented him from working for pay and the injury was not caused by willful misconduct, the intention to harm or kill himself or another, or by voluntary intoxication, he would normally be paid forty cents a day, following the first three days of the injury and not including Sundays, until he was again able to work, repatriated, or died.⁵³

The attending medical officer would determine the ability of prisoners to work and classified them in one of three categories: heavy work, light work, or sick - no work. A list of the prisoners showing their individual labor status was posted on each prisoner company headquarters from time to time.⁵⁴

Some prisoners also worked as unpaid volunteers. They engaged in teaching part-time, entertaining, jobs "connect-

ed with recreational or welfare projects," building furniture for their recreation rooms, building or decorating chapels, tending athletic fields, or planting flower gardens around the camps.⁵⁵

By 1944, non-commissioned officers were allowed to volunteer for work they would not normally do. While they normally worked as supervisors, some NCO's volunteered for non-supervisory duties in areas in which they had special skills or aptitudes. At first, these duties were to last only between thirty and ninety days, but by 1945, they were allowed to volunteer for any job for the duration of their captivity.⁵⁶

Officers, who could not be forced to work, volunteered for paid labor as well. They worked as spokesmen, leaders, and at other sub-administrative work and were paid the same eighty cents a day as the enlisted prisoners, although they received special pay as officers as well (see appendix 2). If there were no commissioned officers in the camp, the prisoners elected a spokesman, who was approved by the camp commander. In camps with officers, however, the senior officer prisoner in the highest grade served in this position, unless he was mentally or physically incapacitated or incompetent. Some officers accepted the positions, but refused the additional pay.⁵⁷

In addition to their own rooms, special pay, and the opportunity to choose not to work, officers were given

another privilege by the Geneva Convention - orderlies. These prisoners performed the duties of normal orderlies and were often paid by the officers for whom they worked. One was assigned to each general, one to every six field grade officers, and one to every twelve company grade officers. Only prisoners who could not perform a full day's work were assigned to the job.⁵⁸ There were negatives to an officer's life as well, however. Officer prisoners were required to pay for their meals, which averaged around seventeen dollars a month, and for their clothing.⁵⁹

With the money they received for their labor, the prisoners were able to purchase tobacco, cheap candies, toiletries, food, and other supplies from the camp canteen. At McCoy, the canteen was near the entrance to the gate and was shared by all nationalities. It was run by prisoners, who worked on a contract basis and were paid by profits, and supervised by an American officer who was appointed to the job by the camp commander. Anything that the prisoners wanted, as long as it was approved by the camp commander, could be obtained from the canteen. This included beer and light wines with no more than a 3.2% alcohol content. However, no prisoner was allowed to buy more than one quart in a twenty-four hour period or possess more than a certain amount at one time. The profits made by the canteen were

placed into a special POW fund and used for the benefit of all of the prisoners at the camp.⁶⁰

Prisoners were given a twenty four hour rest period once a week, normally on Sundays. They were also free during the evenings after all of their work was accomplished.⁶¹ During this free time, prisoners were allowed to engage in various recreational activities. At both McCoy and Clarinda, prisoners soon formed theatrical troupes and orchestras. Inspection reports describe various plays written and performed by the prisoners, with background music provided by their orchestra and elaborate sets and costumes created by artists within the camp and monthly concerts performed by the orchestras.⁶² Prisoners learned to ice skate, played baseball, ping-pong, tennis, and card games, listened to records, and watched weekly movies provided for them by the camp authorities. They cared for rare tropical birds provided by the camp commander⁶³ and spent time reading books from the camp libraries, which grew to well over six hundred volumes in Japanese in addition to the English books.⁶⁴ They also used this time to make toys and paper flowers out of cigarette paper and rice water, build furniture for their barracks and recreation rooms, paint, write poetry, and develop spiritually. They were allowed visitors twice a month, but it is not known whether the Japanese took advantage of this opportunity.⁶⁵

Only a few chose to become Christians during their captivity, but many were involved in Buddhist and Shinto services and participated in individual daily spiritual rituals each morning. They "fixed up a Japanese chapel . . . [with] a sanctuary and an alter with carved idols and artificial flowers made by the prisoners."⁶⁶

Schools were also set up at the camps. Although well-developed programs took a while to develop, adhoc classes in English and several other subjects started quickly. By January 1944, Japanese prisoners at McCoy had classes in English and Japanese writing, and lectures on general culture, ethics, and history.⁶⁷ Thirteen months later, a full time school had been established. In it, thirty-two high school students learned English, Japanese, geography, arithmetic, moral science, Japanese history, ancient Japanese literature, and water color painting. Forty percent of the older prisoners were also receiving instruction in these and other subjects, including American history, religion, and physical training. All of the instructors at the camp had been professional teachers in civilian life and were paid for their duties from the PW fund.⁶⁸ Military regulations also allowed prisoners to receive degrees from several prestigious universities and colleges, although no records state that the Japanese took advantage of it.⁶⁹

Once they had been assigned to a permanent camp, prisoners left in only one of three ways: transfer, death, or repatriation. With only the two main Japanese camps, the Army transferred its Japanese prisoners very infrequently. Camp McCoy transferred almost all of its officers and non-commissioned officers after a riot occurred, but all other transfers were accomplished on a case by case basis and usually involved prisoners who needed to be reinterrogated or assigned to a special "reeducation" project (see Chapter 5).

Death was not a major factor of prison camp life, either. "Of the 5,424 prisoners in the United States, only twenty-four died while in captivity. Two apparently killed themselves [one accidental], three were shot during an escape attempt [which could probably be better described as a suicide attempt, since the prisoners had attempted suicide before]. . . , one died in an agricultural accident, and the remaining eighteen succumbed to earlier wounds or natural causes."⁷⁰ However, the Army had quickly developed a policy for even this.

Upon the death of a prisoner, the camp commander or officer charged with the prisoner's custody prior to death would be immediately notified. He would then report the death to the Provost Marshal General, giving the prisoner's full name, internment serial number, place and cause of death, and note if the prisoner's death resulted from his

own misconduct. If the death was the result of an escape attempt, foul play or suspected foul play, violence, or other unnatural cause, including suicide, or if the cause was unknown, a summary court was appointed to investigate and was to report its findings directly to the Provost Marshal General.

The dead prisoner was given a funeral with full military honors. The flag of the country in whose army the prisoner had served would be draped over the casket. Also, if requested by the other prisoners, taps would be played and a salute fired by base personnel. Although military regulations allowed a burial in the nearest available permanent cemetery, most Japanese prisoners were cremated.⁷¹

This left the majority of the prisoners in their permanent camp until the war's end. Finally, on 7 September, 1945, officials at Camp McCoy and Camp Clarinda were ordered to transfer all Japanese prisoners of Okinawan origin to Angel Island. A month later, on October 5, they were to have transferred all of their other Japanese prisoners to the west coast for repatriation as well. This included 987 Japanese prisoners from Camp Clarinda and 2,550 Japanese, 144 Koreans, and 3 Formosans from McCoy. Thus, within one month of the end of the war the prisoners began to be repatriated. They were first sent to clusters of holding camps near San Francisco and Los Angeles. Here

they waited for ships to continue their journey. For a while, life remained much the same as it had been in the permanent camps. However, as ships began to arrive, each prisoner "was fingerprinted once again, his records updated, and his belongings searched for 'contraband' or money in excess of the 500 yen (\$125) or 200 yen (\$50) which the officers or enlisted men respectively were allowed to bring back to Japan" in preparation for his journey home.⁷²

On November 13, 1945, 672 Japanese prisoners were transferred to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation from Angel Island and the camp commander requested the camp be closed. By the end of December, 1,120 prisoners, including 675 who were sick or badly wounded, had been shipped back to Japan from the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, not including the numbers shipped from the other ports. Of the 5,413 Japanese prisoners who had been held in the United States in August, only 2,086 remained. By the end of January, only one prisoner remained. This prisoner was no longer held as a prisoner of war, however, but had joined 141 Germans and twenty Italians who had been incarcerated in U.S. prisons. He was held in the penitentiary at McNeil Island, Washington. The Japanese prisoners of war had been freed.⁷³

CHAPTER FOUR END NOTES

1. Memos to the Adjutant General from Major John W. Lasier, Assistant Adjutant General, and 2Lt Joseph E. Mirrissey, Assistant Adjutant General, dated February 8, 1943 and February 19, 1943, respectively, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6.

2. Memo to the Adjutant General dated 17 March 1943, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6.

3. Charles L. Jackson, On to Pearl Harbor and Beyond (Pacific Ship and Shore, 1982), Dower, California, 27-34 and Sakamaki, 47-50.

4. Sakamaki, 47-64.

5. Memo for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, from Brigadier General B. M. Bryan, Director, Aliens Division, dated April 29, 1943, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6 Gen P/W (hereafter cited as Bryan memo).

6. Sakamaki, 47-64 and study of U.S. Provost Marshall General, Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946.

7. Bryan memo.

8. Report of inspection of Camp McCoy, Wisconsin by Dr. Rudolph Fisher, Department of German Interests in the Legation of Switzerland in Washington and Mr. Darwin DeGolia, Special War Problems Division, Department of State, on March 18-20, 1944 (hereafter cited as Fisher and DeGolia report) and report of inspection of Camp McCoy by Mr. A. Cardinaux, International Red Cross, on October 25, 1943, (hereafter cited as Cardinaux report), Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - McCoy.

9. Fisher and DeGolia report, 2 and 3.

10. Ibid., 3 and 5; report of inspection of Camp McCoy by Captain DeKoven L. Schwieger, Prisoner of War Division, CMP, on December 27-29, 1943, p. 4, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - McCoy (hereafter cited as Schwieger report); and May 2, 1992, phone interview with John Wasieleski.

11. Schwieger report, 1-2, Fisher and DeGolia report, 2 and 3, and Report of September 18-19, 1945 International Red Cross inspection of Camp McCoy, Wisconsin by Mr. Eldon F. Nelson, Special War Problems Division, Department of State, p. 3, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - McCoy (hereafter cited as Nelson report).

12. Schwieger report, 2; and Fisher and DeGolia report, 3.

13. Report of inspection of Camp Clarinda, Iowa by Howard Hong, International Young Men's Christian Association, on March 1-2, 1945, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Hong report) and Field Service Report on Camp Clarinda, Iowa dated 22-23 February 1945 by Captain Alexander Lakes, (hereafter cited as Lakes report), p. 1, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - Clarinda.

14. Paragraph V of unknown document describing inspection of Camp Clarinda, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - Clarinda.

15. Ibid.

16. U.S. Provost Marshal General, Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946.

17. Lewis, George C., Lt Col, USA, and John Mewha, Captain, USA, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army 1776-1945, (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-213, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1955, 150.

18. U.S. Army Training Manual 19-500, 30 June 1945, 2.39, paragraph 62a, Record Group 407, Army Adjutant General, Decimal File 1940-1945, 330.7, Training Manual 19-500 (hereafter cited as TM 19-500, 30 June 1945).

19. Ibid., 2.36; Lewis and Mewha, 50; and War Department, Prisoner of War Circular #1, Regulations Governing Prisoners of War, Washington, D.C., 24 September, 1943, p. 43, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6, Miscellaneous to Camp Policy.

20. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 43, and TM 19-500, 30 June 1945, 2.36.

21. TM 19-500, 5 October 1944, Change 8, par 58h, 2.37.

22. TM 19-500, 5 October 1944, Change 8, par 59.

23. TM 19-500, 30 June 1945, 2.40, paragraph 62; TM 19-500, 5 October 1944, Change 8, par 37c, and Fisher and DeGolia report, 3.

24. Prisoner of War Circular #1, p. 29. Memorandum (#16808) for the Chief, Administrative Services, from Major General LeR. Lutes, Assistant Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, dated January 20, 1943, attch. p. 2, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 383.6 (hereafter cited as Memorandum #16808) lists the same supplies but limits their value to 50 cents per man per month.

25. 24 February 1945 teletype to the Commanding Generals of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Service Commands from the Provost Marshal General, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Unclassified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 300.5 Gen P/W.

26. Prisoner of War Circular #1, p. 29. See also Japanese Menu, Record Group 160, Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-1945, 383.6 Prisoner of War, Formerly Classified; Memorandum #16808, attch. 1 and 2; and Schwieger report, 1.

27. April 13, 1992 telephone interview with Ollie Drew.

28. Fisher and DeGolia report 3; Nelson report, 3; and 17 March 1945 Memorandum to CS, ASF from Col. John Nash, Record Group 160, ASF, Office of the Commanding General, Control Division, General Correspondence Files, 1945-1946, 383.6 Japanese.

29. Memorandum #16808, attch. 1 and 2.

30. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 30.
31. Krammer, 81.
32. Lewis and Mewha, 66.
33. Lewis and Mewha, 156-157 and report of inspection of Camp McCoy by Senior Gonzales, Spanish Consul at Chicago, on July 10, 1944 (hereafter cited as Gonzales report), p. 1, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - McCoy.
34. Lewis and Mewha, 112.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Lewis and Mewha, 113 and "No Pin-boys", New Yorker, February 26, 1944, 16.
39. Lewis and Mewha, 114
40. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 34.
41. Lewis and Mewha, 150.
42. Krammer, 82. See also Lewis and Mewha, 150. Information from telephone interview with Ollie Drew also supported statements.
43. Cardinaux reports of October 25, 1943, 2, and March 31, 1944, 3; Fisher and DeGolia report, 5; Gonzales report, 2.
44. Lewis and Mewha, p. 150.
45. May 2, 1992 telephone interview with John Wasieleski and Schwieger report, 6.
46. Telephone interview with Ollie Drew.
47. Lewis and Mewha, 77; Krammer, 77; Fisher and DeGolia report, 5; and Cardinaux report of March 31, 1944, 3.
48. Lewis and Mewha, 120-121.

49. Ibid.
50. Lewis and Mewha, 78.
51. Lewis and Mewha, 157-158 and "No Pin-boys", 16.
52. Lewis and Mewha, 159.
53. Lewis and Mewha, 156 and Memo #W580-6-43 from the Adjutant General dated 21 August 1943, Record Group 389, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Subject File, 1942-1946, American Samoans to Byron Hot Springs Activation.
54. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 36.
55. Lewis and Mewha, 159.
56. Lewis, 157.
57. Lewis and Mewha and Mewha, 156.
58. Lewis and Mewha, 159.
59. Gonzales report, 1.
60. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 31-32.
61. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 38-39, and Cardinaux report of March 31, 1944, 1.
62. Hong reports of January 5-7, 1944, 4, and May 8, 1944, 1; Cardinaux report of March 31, 1944, 2; and report of inspection of Camp McCoy by Mr. Goyeneche, Spanish Embassy in Washington, Mr. Gonzales, Spanish Consul at Chicago, and Mr. B. R. Johansen, Division of Japanese Affairs, Department of State, on January 25-27, 1945, p. 2, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspections and Field Reports - McCoy.
63. Cardinaux reports of October 25, 1943, 2-3, and March 31, 1944, 2; Schwieger report, 4; Hong reports of January 5-7, 1944, 4, and February 5-7, 1945, 3; and Gonzales report, 6.
64. Schwieger report, 4; Hong report of January 5-7, 1944, 4 and March 1-2, 1945, 1; and Cardinaux report of March 31, 1944, 2.
65. Prisoner of War Circular #1, 40.

66. Cardinaux report of March 31, 1944, 3; and Fisher and DeGolia report, 3.

67. Hong report of January 5-7, 1944, 4.

68. Lewis and Mewha, 160 and Lakes report, 1-2.

69. TM 19-500, 14 August 1944, p. 2.27, paragraph 48a.

70. Krammer, 90, footnote 59.

71. TM 19-500, Chapter 15; transcript of phone conversation between Col. Rogers and General Bryan, PMGO, dated 17 October, 1944, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Unclassified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 311.3; and Prisoner of War Circular #1, 52-65.

72. Krammer, 89 and letters to Commanding General, 7th Service Command, from Colonel A.M. Tollefson dated 7 September, 1945, telegram to Commanding General, 7th Service Command, from Colonel A.M. Tollefson dated 25 September, 1945, letter to the Provost Marshal General from Major Paul A. Johnson dated 10 September, 1945, letter to Commanding General, 6th Service Command, from Colonel A.M. Tollefson dated 26 September, 1945, and transcription of telephone conversation between Colonel U. and Major V. dated 21 September, 1945, Record Group 389, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Branch, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-46, Camps - Clarinda and McCoy.

73. Krammer, 89 and U.S. Provost Marshal General, Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946 and letter to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, from Captain W. P. Fischer, Assistant Adjutant General, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Unclassified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 255 General P/W, August 1945 thru December 1945.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF INDOCTRINATION

Although the United States provided for all of the physical needs of their prisoners, the Japanese training toward and shame of capture continued to have a dramatic impact on the prisoners, even after they had reached American soil. Many prisoners, when captured, requested that they be allowed to commit suicide. When the request was invariably denied, the prisoners continued their quest by other means. Several incidents took place, the most dramatic of which was at the prisoner of war camp in New Caledonia, where twenty-three prisoners committed suicide and two others attempted it in February of 1944.¹ However, by the time the prisoners reached the United States, suicide had almost always ceased to be an option. While some attempts were still made, very few were successful.

Kazuo Sakamaki lamented in I Attacked Pearl Harbor that

we were simple-minded fighting men We had been so trained that our thinking was all concentrated on the most effective means of expending our lives for a victory in war. Then we failed in the one thing we had lived for

How could we face our people again?

Death by suicide was the only logical solution to our predicament

Our desire for suicide, however, was thwarted on every hand. We had no knives to cut our throats. We had no ropes to hang ourselves with. Some of us banged our heads against every object in sight, and yet we did not die. Some refused to eat. But the idea of dying slowly was even more trying than living hungrily.²

However, the prisoners soon began conforming, at least outwardly, to their captors' standards for prisoners. Sakamaki notes later in the text that the old-timers extended the new prisoners a warm welcome and helped to acclimatize them to their new surroundings. In fact, Sakamaki himself gave a speech to each incoming group of prisoners, explaining that although he understood how they felt, they must

respect the regulations we have set up
[and] abide by the laws and regulations pertaining to the prisoner of war. I know how trying it will be for you to be a prisoner, but for your own sake I advise you to restrain yourself no matter how hard you find it

I know that since your capture you have attempted more than once, at least in your mind, to take your life into your own hands. But you are now a prisoner, not a combatant, and your life is governed not by the lawlessness of war but by an international agreement. If you have come with any idea of yourself still being a soldier, abandon that idea at once. You are not a combatant any more

No matter how much you may mourn over the uniform of a prisoner of war you are wearing, you cannot change the uniform We are prisoners of war. We cannot be anything else right now. If you will adjust your thinking to the status of a prisoner of war, you will not have to struggle so much. Your names are known to the Japanese government through the Swiss

government. That you are prisoners of war is now public information. Death or any other escape method will not alter the fact that you were once a prisoner . . .

Suppose you have decided to hang yourself, or fight the guard and be killed, or steal a knife from the kitchen and cut your throat. What will the world think of you They will not think you brave or praise you for committing suicide. They will write about it in papers and laugh about it

If you had wanted to die, you should have died before coming here. You missed your last chance to commit suicide. You and I are now prisoners recognized as such by governments. There is no more honor or freedom for suicide. A suicide in the camp will only cause trouble for others.³

The Japanese prisoners still felt they had betrayed the emperor, their homeland, and their families. Their friends had given their lives while they lived. Their friends had died in the finest tradition of the fighting man and they were living in the most contemptuous state-- as prisoners of the enemy. Because of this, they felt they would be hated and despised, even by their closest family, when they returned home after the war. Desperate for acceptance, they developed new and close social ties with each other "which tended to overshadow all former social ties and, in keeping with Japanese cultural conditioning, involved rights and obligations which apparently were rigorously adhered to."⁴

They also developed hobbies to keep their minds occupied. Some engaged in the vigorous sports programs provided by the camp. Others studied or read. One prisoner,

Lt. Commander Matsumoto, even made paper dolls. Those who could not find an outlet or some way to keep their minds off of their condition soon went crazy. Commander Nakamune, one of the first senior officers captured, was the first to do so.

Commander Nakamune was the Chief Engineer on the aircraft carrier Hiryu. He was captured at Midway, after the ship went down and he and a few other survivors had drifted in a lifeboat for fifteen days. He continually attempted suicide, but never succeeded. He began imagining that the U.S. government was transmitting waves of electric ether at the prisoners and so spent much time in the bath, which he thought protected him. If caught out of the bath, he would wrap a wet towel full of broken glass around his head. This, he felt, would prevent the electricity from penetrating to him. One day, after "jumping around in the camp ground shouting madly", he was permanently assigned to the infirmary. Although he was the first, he was not the only prisoner to lose his sanity.⁵

With few exceptions, however, the Japanese prisoners quickly became very cooperative and discharged all assigned duties with few complaints, at least until the middle of 1944.⁶ However, as greater numbers of prisoners began arriving from the battles in the Pacific, the prisoners became more apathetic and uncooperative. This culminated in a battle of wills at Camp McCoy on May 30, 1944.

When vast numbers of new prisoners were brought into the camps, telling of long strings of Japanese reverses, this exacerbated the older prisoners' fragile psychological conditions, since they had assumed that American newspaper articles on the war were only propaganda. Many could not conceive of a Japanese defeat. Others questioned how their treatment would change when Japan was no longer a threat and wondered what would happen to them after the war was over. In addition, rivalries began to develop between the old prisoners and the new, which compounded the already severe problems between Army and Navy prisoners. These conflicts made the prisoners even more anxious to do anything which would remove or lessen the stigma of being taken prisoner and prove them a "good" Japanese soldier.

The requirement in the Geneva Convention that forced them to labor for their captors provided just such an opportunity. The Japanese had never fully understood the Convention. Their country had not been one of the signatories and, although it later agreed to abide by its regulations, Japan had never taught its soldiers anything about it, knowing that any such training would negate their training against surrender. Thus, when their captors told the prisoners they were required to work for them, the prisoners understandably felt they would be further betraying their country by doing so. For this reason, and for those cited above, on May 30, 1944, many prisoners at Camp

McCoy refused to accomplish assigned tasks and others, even those who otherwise would have completed their duties, were pressured into non-compliance as well.

According to a War Department report on the matter, "the Japanese had always disliked working on such jobs as ditch digging, road repairing and similar maintenance jobs within the military reservation, adopting the attitude that such labor was of assistance to [the U.S.'s] war effort."⁷ However, they had always accomplished the duties, albeit with growing discontent, until May 30, at approximately 2:00 p.m., when the prisoners on a work detail refused to move a tent frame as ordered by 1st Sgt. Boisvert Lambert, the supervisor of their detail. The senior Japanese officer and former spokesman, Lt. Commander Matsumoto, who was viewed as a steadying influence on the prisoners, was in the hospital with a heart condition, so Lt. Kajashima, the new spokesman, was sent for. He was told to make his men accomplish their task, but he refused to do so. Lt. Col. Rogers, the camp commander, then ordered Lt. Kajashima and Ensign Sakamaki, who understood English, into the orderly room, but they pretended not to understand the orders. He then asked the American interpreter, Sgt. Tamura, to get the prisoners to work, but the officers would not pass along the orders and the enlisted prisoners refused to work without direct orders from their officers.

Lt. Col. Rogers spent several hours trying to convince the Japanese officers to change their minds and countermand their orders, but they continually refused. Finally, seeing that the situation was out of control, he had the officers moved into the prison ward of the post hospital, which was about five miles from the POW camp and was the only available space away from the other prisoners, without allowing them any opportunity to give further orders to their men.

He then called on the senior non-commissioned officer prisoners and asked for their cooperation. When the first nine, out of a group of about ninety, refused to disobey their officers and cooperate with the Americans, Lt. Col. Rogers placed them in solitary confinement and restricted their diets to bread and water.

At approximately the same time, 5:00 p.m., all of the Japanese prisoners refused to eat the evening meal, which was in the process of being prepared, to clean the mess halls, or to police up or save the unused food. Enlisted men in the POW camp's hospital refused to take their medicine, for malaria, until forced to do so by the hospital staff. This was the beginning of what Lt. Col. Rogers called a "G[h]andi sit down strike of passive resistance."⁸

Bed check was normal that night, so Lt. Col. Rogers and the post executive officer went to the hospital to see

if Lt. Commander Matsumoto would issue the necessary orders. He either would not or could not act.

The next morning, May 31, no cooks or K.P.'s showed up at 6:30 a.m. No food was prepared and no prisoners showed up for mess. At 7:50 a.m., roll call was attempted, but no prisoners reported for their work details. Instead, they chose to sit or stand in the barracks or company area. After issuing a clear warning to the NCO's, Lt. Col. Rogers asked the post commander for reinforcements. At 0815, the 1620th Military Police Group arrived. Lt. Col. Rogers explained to the unit that they were there to assert U.S. authority and had them affix bayonets to their weapons. The unit and the camp guards then marched all of the prisoners except the officers and the nine NCO's in solitary confinement, at the doubletime, one hundred and forty paces a minute, the entire five mile journey down Highway 21 to the prisoners' worksite. The prisoners were forced to work all morning then marched back to the camp for lunch in the same manner. Since many of the new prisoners had not yet regained their strength from living in poor battlefield conditions, several of them were not able to keep up with the strenuous pace. The guards hurried these stragglers with jabs to the buttocks from their bayonets. This continued until the prisoner either kept up the required pace or dropped from exhaustion or pain. About twelve of the prisoners received bayonet wounds and a few who could go no

further were picked up by a truck driven behind the group for just such a contingency. While one of the guards described the march as a "bloody mess," he also noted that it accomplished its purpose.

At 12:01 p.m., the senior NCO for the prisoners informed Lt. Col. Rogers that the prisoners had had enough and would now follow the orders of the American authorities. Cooks and K.P.'s were assigned to the mess halls and lunch was prepared and eaten. Emergency details were organized and sent to work at 2:00 p.m. At 3:00 p.m., the NCO's in solitary confinement were called in to see Lt. Col. Rogers and all agreed to obey the American authorities, according to the Geneva Convention, since the officers were no longer in the camp.

New spokesmen and company leaders were appointed and the prisoners' chain of command was completely reorganized. All prisoners, except the casualties from the march and those medically excused, worked the rest of the day. The next day, the prisoners returned to work as scheduled. The German prisoners, who quickly heard of the ordeal, were affected by the incident as well. They quickly informed their guards that no such action would be required for them.

Soon after the incident, the prisoners requested a visit from the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C., their representatives to the Geneva Convention. Senor Gonzales,

the Spanish consul at Chicago, was sent to investigate. Escorted by a member of the War Department, he completed a cursory investigation of the camp and interviewed Lt. Col. Rogers and the prisoners. By the time of his visit, all but about ten of the NCO's had refused to cooperate with the Americans in any way. Work was still being accomplished by the prisoners, however, who were supervised by the cooperative NCO's. The non-cooperating NCO's said they had no complaint with the handling of the incident, but wanted to be housed with their officers, who were still in the hospital at this time. The officers, when contacted, said they had no argument with this, but complained that they were being punished illegally by being confined to the hospital. Lt. Col. Rogers informed the investigators that he was awaiting orders to allow the NCO's and officers to be housed together and that the officers were not being held at the hospital as punishment, but that the hospital was the only place to house them until space became available at the camp. He also noted that a separate camp was being built for the Germans to help accommodate the large influx of prisoners to the U.S. and that this would help solve the problem. Senor Gonzales said he felt no inappropriate actions had been taken and that the camp was being run properly, so he would send a 'good report' to the Embassy.⁹

A second incident occurred on a Sunday night, October 29, 1944, at Fitzsimmons General Hospital, Colorado. Three prisoners, Chief Gunner's Mate Kuzuhori Mankino, Warrant Officer Saburo Nakagawa, and Private First Class Sadamu Okada, were being treated for tuberculosis. Only two months before, the three had attempted hari-kiri with kitchen utensils from the hospital. One of them had completely opened his stomach, another had attempted the same feat, and the third had inflicted a cut on his head, but all three must have been recuperating well; they had just received orders to be returned to McCoy. Although they were unaccustomed to drinking milk and had never ordered it before, that night they ordered milk. A hospital orderly passed a bottle of milk through the door to them "and they immediately threw the milk at the orderly, and broke the glass all over the floor with the milk spilling around."¹⁰ A nearby guard, armed with a billy club, came to the assistance of the orderly. They opened the door and "insisted that the prisoners clean up the broken glass and milk. The prisoners became belligerent and attacked the guard who used his club upon them."¹¹ The prisoners responded by attacking the guard with the handles of the brooms and mops they had been using to clean the room. The guard broke his billy club on one of the prisoners who then retrieved the broken end and hit the guard over the head with it. Another guard, this one armed with

a carbine, had arrived from the guard office by this time. He aimed his weapon at the floor and fired, trying to calm the situation. However, the first guard, by some means, was able to gain control of the rifle. After reportedly warning the prisoners with no response, he shot three times. Each shot hit its mark, as one prisoner was shot through the head and the other two in the heart.¹²

A third incident, another strike, occurred at Camp Clarinda on February 21, 1945. The strike started at 10:00 a.m., when a work detail refused to continue work because of weather conditions, a severe snowstorm having just occurred in the vicinity. Other work details followed suit. The strike was finally broken by the removal of all food from the compound. A Field Service Report on the event noted that the camp commander there had adopted a policy of extreme firmness, since most of the prisoners had refused to work.¹³

Several escapes occurred as well. While some of the prisoners may have escaped briefly from work details without a record being kept, the only reported escapes by Japanese prisoners came from McCoy and occurred between July 3, 1944 and August 29, 1945. The majority took place in the last three months of the war.

Terumasa Kibata was the first reported Japanese prisoner to escape. At approximately 11:30 a.m. on July 3, 1944, while working on a new road, approximately eleven

miles northeast of the camp, he slipped into the forest. He "intended 'to catch a train and get away from the camp'."14 The local radio and press was advised of the escape and a state-wide police bulletin was issued. In addition, an extensive search of the camp and surrounding areas was conducted by FBI agents, local military personnel, and surrounding police agencies. Air surveillance was provided by two army planes. However, Kibata had no idea of where he was heading or how to prolong his escape so "after wandering in the woods, [he] decided to surrender . . ."15 He reported to the Camp McCoy orderly room the day after his escape and was quickly turned over to the authorities at the nearby POW camp. The authorities blamed Kibata's escape on shell-shock.

The next escape involved three prisoners and was better planned and organized. Takeo Nakamura arrived at Camp McCoy in August of 1944 and began formulating a plan of escape in September. "He recalled from his study of geography in school that the Mississippi River ran into the Gulf of Mexico and when he was brought from the West Coast to the camp he recalled crossing the river and observing the 'mountains running alongside the river near LaCrosse, Wisconsin.'"16

While Nakamura claimed to have no hope of reaching the Gulf of Mexico or leaving the country, he explained that he had violated a sacred obligation to his people and would

probably be shot if returned to Japan. He assumed he would be shot when apprehended and believed this to be more honorable than continuing to be held prisoner.

In January, he stole a road map of Wisconsin and a topographical map of the camp. In February, he met Hajime Hashimoto and Kohei Tanaka when they were moved into the same compound. The three became friends and he enlisted them as accomplices in his plan. He explained part of his plan to his new friends, in case they were separated after the escape, but kept many of the details to himself. Throughout the rest of the spring, the three gathered materials they would need for the escape. Once everything was prepared, they waited for warmer weather and for a stormy night, which would cover their escape.

At 8:00 p.m. on May 21, they decided to leave after lights out. A short time after 10:00 p.m., Nakamura, who had pretended to fall asleep with his clothes on, cut through the camp's fences with a pair of stolen bolt-cutters and prepared to wait for his friends, who were hiding nearby. However, as he slipped through the fence, the camp dogs started barking and he became scared. He left without his friends after a short time. He followed the railroad tracks to the Mississippi River, which took five days, and then stole a rowboat and headed downstream. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on May 28, five and one half days after his escape, he was taken into custody by a commercial

fisherman, who took him to the local sheriff's office. From there, he was transferred to the custody of the FBI and then to camp authorities.

Hashimoto and Tanaka also started towards the Mississippi River when they realized that Nakamura had left without them. However, since Hashimoto's ankle had been injured in battle, the rough terrain and miserable weather forced them to leave the "mountain" area for the "flat ground." They began traveling on a country road and were captured less than an hour later, at 4:00 p.m. on June 1, by the LaCrosse County Police. The two prisoners reported that they wanted to reach San Francisco, where they entered the U.S.

The other escapes took place soon after. Kazuyuki Maeda left a work project "to aid the U.S. Army without the other Japanese in the camp knowing about it."¹⁷ He left between 1:30 and 4:30 p.m. on June 15 and was located sometime after 5:30 p.m. the same day in a hospital area of the camp.

Mitsuhei Hirose escaped during the night of July 3. He "was recaptured without resistance July 8, 1945, on a farm, where he had stopped to ask for food, by a County Traffic Officer."¹⁸ He claimed to have "had no specific reason for escaping. He stated that he was lonely and despondent at the camp because he had no friends and because he found it most difficult to make friends. He had

no intention of going anywhere. He merely wanted to get away from camp and be alone."¹⁹

The next prisoners escaped not to get away from the camp, but rather to get away from the other prisoners, who they felt would beat them up. Masao Kitamura crawled under the fence July 4. The escape was discovered the next morning at the 6:30 a.m. roll call, but Kitamura was captured in the gondola of a freight train only on July 17. He escaped "because he had lost face with his fellow prisoners."²⁰

Mitsuo Yamamoto escaped from a grass cutting detail at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that Kitamura was recaptured. Almost exactly two days later, he was "seen crossing a road on his hands and knees . . . on the South Range of the military reservation."²¹ He escaped because he thought the other prisoners would beat him up for an action he had taken of which they disapproved.

Toshio Yano escaped from a work detail on July 28 because he felt the other prisoners suspected he was an informant. He was captured the next day, still on the reservation.

The next prisoners to escape were Nobumori Kikuchi and Hideo Matsuzaki. They were tired of living in the camp and walked away from a work detail August 9. They were recaptured two days later walking down the railroad tracks leading from the camp.

Yuzo Ohashi was the last Japanese prisoner to escape. He walked away from a work detail at 9:00 a.m., August 29. He "walked south for several days . . . towards Mexico, which he believed to be located about 300 miles south of camp McCoy."²² He escaped because he believed the war was over and did not want to be returned to Japan, where he had lost face.²³

Another response to Japanese training relating to the shame of capture was voluntary cooperation with the United States. There are many recorded instances of prisoners going back into their own lines to convince others to surrender.²⁴ Other prisoners chose to help the U.S. in other ways as well, some even volunteering to fight against Japan.²⁵ However, the most extreme example of this behavior involved the politically liberal-radical prisoners who helped the United States begin their reeducation program for the Japanese prisoners.

Records show that the Navy had begun recognizing signs of discontent with Japan among its prisoners as early as September of 1944.²⁶ By February, 1945, they had transferred a prisoner from Australia to learn about the undercurrent of discontent in Japan and, if possible, the underground movement there. However, serious consideration for the reeducation program came from two events occurring soon thereafter.

Andrew Roth, a Naval Reserve Lieutenant, advised the U.S. Navy to sponsor a "Free Japan" movement among the prisoners. This movement would provide a U.S. alternative to the militarists in power and to left-wing, communistic opposition groups by training future Japanese Democratic leaders. He argued the need for such a program by explaining that there was a high probability of an imminent Japanese surrender and showing the possibilities of a Japanese civil war or the emergence of a communist regime soon after if left unresolved.

The reeducation program, he continued, was allowed under the Geneva Convention, as long as it was voluntary, and would "provide a much needed intelligence service to the Navy, Army, and other agencies dealing with the problem of military administration in Japanese territories"27 He gave additional credibility to such a program by showing its similarity to the successful Communist Chinese program.

A week later, two Japanese prisoners being interrogated at Byron Hot Springs admitted to being members of a group of prisoners "dedicated to the overthrow of Japanese militarism and to cooperate with American forces and authorities for the achievement of those ends."28 This would, they hoped, allow Japan to become a modern nation.

The movement had been organized at Sand Island, Hawaii and consisted of approximately thirty members, mostly

graduates of universities or other higher education who had been part of Japan's liberal intelligensia. Many had been members of opposition groups before the war and some had even been imprisoned for their political views and actions.

The prisoners explained that the group had been scattered by transfers, but requested that they be reassembled in a special camp, away from the other prisoners, where they could be indoctrinated with democratic principles and develop into strong, resourceful leaders.

The group's program, and that of the Japanese liberal-radical movement in general, had three objectives: the complete destruction of the militarists and their philosophies; a complete political reformation, including the establishment of a representative government; and a reeducation of Japan along modern, free-thinking, non-superstitious lines. The POW group conceived "itself as part of a powerful post-war group operating openly along usual propagandistic lines for the winning of the Japanese people over to their point of view and the consolidation of an irreversible popular opposition to the traditional militaristic-imperialistic-capitalistic Japan."²⁹

This group would serve as the nucleus for a larger group, which would be made up of prisoners who agreed with the group's philosophies. The larger group, estimated at about one hundred, would be trained for psychological warfare and would be used in many different areas. These

areas included direct voice surrender talks, writing propaganda leaflets, giving radio broadcasts, assisting in analysis of interrogation materials, infiltrating China and Japan for intelligence and information about American prisoners, appealing to well-educated "intellectuals" in Japan, and puncturing the Emperor-divinity mythology.³⁰

During this same period, the Army and the State Department had begun considering similar operations of their own, involving both prisoners of war and Japanese aliens in the United States. Very special care was being taken by each group to "devise and impose such controls as [were] necessary to ensure political objectives and methods which [were] American and not Communistic in nature."³¹ In fact, Captain Okino, a Japanese Navy officer who had expressed his hopes for the eventual establishment of a democratic government in Japan, was suggested as the leader of the Navy group, to act as a stabilizing factor and to keep the group on the proper course. Also, since most, if not all, of the prisoners to be used were well known to the Japanese police, the Navy reviewed the need to offer them special protection, possibly even involving new identities and documents.³² By March 16, although senior Navy leaders suggested separating the project into military and political programs and giving the political program to the State Department, the Office of War Information, or OSS, the program had been approved. Plans were made to cooperate

with the Army and the State Department, although the Navy hoped to retain the initiative and control of the project.

By March 24, Admiral Thebaud, the Director of Naval Intelligence, separated the program into political and military objectives, since the "division of interest and objective [would] probably necessitate segregation of those Japanese to be used by the War and Navy Departments from the remainder",³³ and requested immediate steps to start the program in a camp designed for one hundred prisoners and filled with an Indoctrination Staff. The military program would be run by the War and Navy Departments and the reeducation would be run by the State, War, and Navy Departments. Other agencies would "be permitted to participate but not control or direct" the programs.³⁴ C.K. Parker, who had interrogated the first two prisoners, then provided a list of the prisoners willing to cooperate, including a few biographical notes on each.³⁵

By the 1st of April, the Army responded. They agreed that the program would help U.S. psychological warfare, but refused to seriously consider "the infiltration of former Japanese prisoners of war before or during landing operations for espionage, sabotage, or propaganda purposes."³⁶ They also suggested that the political program would be ineffective since, in their opinion, the Chinese program had been ineffective as well. However, Colonel E.F.H. Svensson was designated as the Army representative for

further investigation into the project. The Navy responded by designating Captain E.S. Pearce as the Naval representative.³⁷

The Navy again pressed for a separate camp, explaining that if the prisoners were transferred to permanent camps, they would "be subjected to the influence of Japanese Nationalists on one hand and antagonism from guards on the other."³⁸ They also noted that the prisoners were "not merely interested or friendly individuals who have been persuaded to help us. They are men who are dead in earnest about the project they hope to undertake and are already convinced of its importance."³⁹

While the Army and Naval representatives discussed the program, the OSS met with the three "special project prisoners" to see if they would be useful to the OSS in propaganda work. The meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 14, at the San Francisco Delousing Plant and was a resounding success. The prisoners were driven to the meeting in a closed van and interviewed by a first generation Japanese-American. They discussed their background and conditions in Japan as well as the possibility of cooperation. Then samples of propaganda material they had previously prepared were shown. Finally, the prisoners were given a ride through San Francisco to show "how normal life in the city was during war times."⁴⁰

Three weeks later, May 4, 1945, the first "special project prisoner" was released from Byron Hot Springs to the Army. He was given to the OSS for propaganda use. This irritated the Navy, who felt the Army was "somewhat freehanded" with Naval prisoners, and Byron Hot Springs was directed to keep the other two prisoners until a final plan for the program had been approved.⁴¹

On July 14, the Provost Marshal General presented the Army's proposed indoctrination program. John K. Emmerson of the Department of State, Charles W. Hepner of the Japanese Section, Office of War Information, and the Special Projects Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office had conducted a secret study of the Japanese prisoners at Camps McCoy, Clarinda, and Angel Island. The Army had determined that such an indoctrination program would provide the American forces in Japan with reliable government officials to work with and test the educational and rehabilitation programs that were being considered for use during the postwar period. Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Hepner had "jointly recommended that [the] officers and non-commissioned officers be segregated from the remainder of the prisoners before any organized course of indoctrination was undertaken."⁴² This had been done, as the Army had transferred all but the most cooperative officers and NCO's from Camp McCoy to Camp Kenedy, Texas.

The Army's program proposed the establishment of an indoctrination camp, commanded by a lieutenant colonel with a knowledge of Japan and the Japanese language, which would follow the pattern of the German reorientation program. The prisoners were to study current events, American history and institutions, and the English language.⁴³ On July 18, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army approved the program and the Army began searching for an appropriate camp for the program.⁴⁴ Camp Hulen, Texas, an inactive camp in an isolated area was proposed for the site, but was quickly rejected in favor of Camp Huntsville, Texas. Two days after the program had been approved, the Army began transferring its German prisoners out of Huntsville and preparing it for use as a Japanese reeducation center.⁴⁵

Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore became the director of the reeducation program. He had been born in Japan and had lived there from 1924 to 1941. He was assisted by Dr. Hepner, one of the two men responsible for the program.⁴⁶ The Japanese prisoners were screened and evaluated and an initial group of the most cooperative were selected for special training. They studied "the English language and literature, comparisons of American and Japanese newspapers, books, and magazines" and listened to a "dazzling program of lectures by the faculty of nearby Sam Houston State Teachers College, with simultaneous translation into Japanese."⁴⁷ They also edited and published a newspaper,

which was printed for distribution to the other Japanese prisoners, similar to the German Der Ruf.⁴⁸ They were encouraged to attend worship services held each Sunday "to replace their traditional Emperor worship with a more positive philosophy, and to show them the close relationships between democracy and Christian principles."⁴⁹

The most important activity in the camp, however, was the individual and group study of certain topics "relating to the principles of American democracy and their application in Japan."⁵⁰ "The topics ranged from an assessment of Japan's civilian and military morale to the comparison of various segments of Japanese and American ways of life."⁵¹ These studies required both research and discussion and were meant to "require some measure of democratic input" from each prisoner and "serve as a barometer of the POW's morale and allegiance to the Emperor."⁵²

By December, when the prisoners began to be repatriated, a total of 205 prisoners had been selected and sent to either Camp Huntsville, Camp Kenedy, or Camp Hearne, Texas.⁵³ Other prisoners, not selected for the special training, received books and brochures especially translated into Japanese for their use, watched "suitable" motion pictures and filmstrips, and worked with an American officer whose sole job was "to foster the orientation program within the camp."⁵⁴

Although much work was put into these reeducation programs, no study was done to determine the impact of the programs on the Japanese prisoners or Japanese post-war politics.

CHAPTER FIVE END NOTES

1. Summary of the contents of a letter prepared for the signature of the Secretary of War from Brigadier General Joseph F. Battley, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, and undated, unsigned letter to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of War, Record Group 160 Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-1945, 383.6 Prisoners of War, Formerly Classified.

2. Sakamaki, 91-92.

3. Sakamaki, 94-98.

4. Carr-Gregg, Charlotte, Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 174.

5. Sakamaki, 76-78.

6. Cardinaux reports of October 25, 1943, 2, and March 31, 1944, 5; and Schwieger report, 5.

7. Gonzales report, 2.

8. Report of Japanese Prisoner of War Trouble to the Provost Marshal General from Lt. Col. Horace Rogers, Commander, Camp McCoy, dated 1 June 1944, p. 1, Record Group 160, Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-1945, 383.6 Prisoners of War, June 1944, Formerly Classified Files.

9. All information about the May 30-31, 1944 incident is from *ibid.*; the Hong report of May 8, 1944; the Gonzales report; and telephone interviews with Ollie Drew and John Wasieleski, former guards at Camp McCoy.

10. Transcription of telephone conversation between General English and ----- Nash dated October 31, 1944, Record Group 160, Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-1945, 383.6 Prisoners of War, October 1944, Formerly Classified Files (hereafter cited as English and Nash conversation).

11. Memo for the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, dated October 31, 1944, Record Group 160, Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-1945, 383.6 Prisoners of War, October 1944, Formerly Classified Files.
12. Ibid.; English and Nash conversation; and "Three Japanese Killed in Prison Hospital", New York Times, October 31, 1944, 21.
13. Memo for the Director, Prisoner of War Operations Division from Major Howard W. Smith, Jr., Chief, Camp Operations Branch, dated 22 February 1945, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Unclassified Decimal File, 1942-1945, 319.1.
14. Report to Dr. Arnold Krammer, Professor of History at Texas A & M University, from FBI Special Agent William E. Tribble, FBI Headquarters, July 15, 1980, 1, which was loaned graciously to the author by Dr. Krammer.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. Ibid., 13.
19. Ibid., 13.
20. Ibid., 14.
21. Ibid., 14.
22. Ibid., 16.
23. All information on the Japanese escapes from Camp McCoy was taken from *ibid.*
24. Masaharu Ano, "Loyal Linguists: Nisei of World War II Learned Japanese in Minnesota," Minnesota History 45 (Fall 1977): 287 and Appleman, 467.
25. Digest of information from P/W Sources (Japanese), No. 11, 19 December 1944, p. 8, Record Group 38, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), File #58, National Archives Records Administration - Modern Military Branch (cited hereafter as P/W Sources); "Japanese Now Assisting New Zealand Captors", New York Times, November 16, 1943, 5;

"Japanese Prisoners Ask For Places in Allied Army", New York Times, July 8, 1945, 2.

26. Letter (WCJ-385) to Commander Riheldaffer from William Woodard dated 6 October 1944, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File, 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, 2 January to 29 December 1944.

27. Memorandum for the Director from Lieutenant Andrew Roth, U.S.N.R., dated 27 February 1945, p. 3, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

28. Memorandum for the Director from John L. Riheldaffer dated 7 March 1945, p. 1, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

29. Enclosure (A) to WCJ-533, Nucleus for Underground Movement in Japan, pp. 1-2, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File, 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, Letters from 1 January 1945 to April 1945.

30. Ibid., 1-2. Lt. Britt's memo can also be found in Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

31. Memorandum for Op-16-Z from Captain Wallace S. Wharton, U.S.N.R., dated 8 March 1945, p. 2, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

32. Ibid., 2, and memorandum for Commander J.L. Riheldaffer, U.S. Navy (Retired) from Mr. Dennis Kildoyle dated 13 March 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

33. Letter (serial 000639216) to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, from Admiral Hewlett Thebaud,

Director of Naval Intelligence, dated March 24, 1945, p. 2, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name. H.R. Thurber also noted in an undated memo to Commander Riheldaffer that the type of individual selected for each job would be different, requiring segregation. This memo was found in the same file and may be the origination of Admiral Thebaud's idea.

34. Ibid.

35. Memorandum(WCJ-564) to Commander John L. Riheldaffer from William P. Woodward dated 27 March 1945 and memorandum to Lieutenant William P. Woodward, U.S.N.R., from Mr. C. K. Parker dated 27 March 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

36. Memorandum to Admiral Thebaud from Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated 1 April 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

37. Ibid. and letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 from the Director of Naval Intelligence, dated April 3, 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name. Col. Svensson was later replaced by Col. Coulter.

38. Memorandum (WCJ-582) to Commander John L. Riheldaffer from William P. Woodward dated 16 April 1945, p. 1, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

39. Ibid.

40. Memorandum (WCJ-581) to Commander John L. Riheldaffer from William P. Woodward dated 16 April 1945, p. 1, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

41. Memorandum (WCJ-618) to Commander John L. Rihel-daffer from William P. Woodward dated 7 May 1945 and letter to Lieutenant W. P. Woodward, U.S.N.R., from John L. Rihel-daffer dated 22 June 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, No file number or name.

42. Carbon copy of Memorandum for Mr. McCloy from Major General Archer Lerch, Provost Marshal General, dated 14 July 1945, RG 160 Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Control Division, General Correspondence files, 1945-46, 383.6 Japanese.

43. Ibid.

44. Letter to the Director of the Mobilization Division, Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces from Lt.Col. Horatio R. Rogers, CMD, for Maj.Gen. Archer L. Lerch, The Provost Marshal General, dated 7 August 1945, RG 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-46, Camps - Huntsville.

45. Letter to the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, from Maj. Gen. Daniel Moce, Director, Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces, dated 20 August 1945, RG 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-45, Camps - Huntsville.

46. Kramer, 88.

47. Ibid.

48. Letter to G-2 from Commanding General, ASF, dated 14 September 1945, pp. 1-2, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal System, 383.6 General P/W.

49. PMGO, "Reeducation of Enemy Prisoners of War," p. 18, Office of the Chief of Military History, quoted in Kramer, 89.

50. Ibid.

51. Kramer, 88.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Letter to G-2 from Commanding General, ASF, dated 14 September 1945, pp. 1-2, Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Classified Decimal System, 383.6 General P/W.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The United States entered World War II totally unprepared for the war or for the prisoners they would soon receive. However, they quickly developed a system to care for their prisoners that dealt with almost every conceivable contingency. The men in charge of the Japanese prisoners ensured the prisoners were well cared for, even though the American populace, as a whole, despised and distrusted the Japanese, as was seen by the internment of the Japanese-Americans, the ready acceptance of American atrocities in the Pacific, and the mob action at Marengo, Illinois.

Upon their arrival in the United States, the prisoners were treated rather brusquely because of the administrative and health requirements, but by the time they reached Byron Hot Springs, conditions had improved dramatically. The prisoners were required to obey strict rules and adhere to inflexible schedules, but they were able to regain some measure of the self-respect they felt they had lost when captured since they were treated as humans, rather than outcasts or non-entities. The interrogators were especially trained to deal with the prisoners and to appear omniscient and all-powerful. This allowed them to assume

the role of benevolent protector to the prisoners.

When the prisoners were transferred to their permanent camps, conditions remained much the same. They were still treated with firm discipline and held to a rigid schedule, which now included work details, but were they well provided for and allowed to maintain some independence, though only in certain areas.

When the reeducation project started, the prisoners were divided into smaller groups of more cooperative and less cooperative prisoners. This allowed those who chose to be most cooperative even more latitude in their daily decisions, although they were still prisoners of war and treated as such.

There were several reasons for this humane treatment. Most, if not all, of the men in charge of the Japanese prisoners had a broad knowledge of Japan and its people. The interrogators at Byron Hot Springs all spoke Japanese fluently and had been chosen for their knowledge of the area, even if they were not Nisei or Issei. Lt. Col. Rogers, commander at Camp McCoy, was considered a "Jap lover" by some of his men.¹ Lt. Col. Weaver, commander at Camp Livingston, told Sakamaki while he was there that:

My brother was a lieutenant of the United States Navy. He was with the cruiser Astoria. You recall that when your ambassador, Mr. Saito, died, the cruiser took the body of the ambassador to Japan. My brother received fine treatment from the Japanese people. He was always saying good things about the land of

cherry blossoms. Then, when this war came, both he and the Astoria were sunk by the Japanese. I cannot like the Japan that caused the death of my brother, but I would not forget the things he said about your country and people. You can rest assured that I will do my duty as the commander of this camp to the best of my ability.

Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore, the man in charge of the reeducation program, had grown up in Japan. These men had a respect for and at least some understanding of the Japanese people and their culture. However, this was not the only reason for their considerate treatment of the prisoners. No American wanted to give the Japanese any excuse to mistreat American prisoners in retaliation to a perceived mistreatment of Japanese prisoners in America. Neither did they want world opinion turned against them, as the Japanese had attempted after a revolt on February 25, 1943, at Camp Featherston, New Zealand, and after a second on August 5, 1944, at Cowra, Australia.³ Additionally, the Japanese prisoners had been trained to expect mistreatment at the hands of their captors. Thus, when mistreated or abused, they tended to become sullen and defiant, feeling that, in some way, they were helping to make up for being captured. However, when well-treated, they did not know how to respond. Many reacted, as was seen in chapter five, by assisting the United States in various ways. In fact, when reports arrived at Byron Hot Springs that the prisoners at Clarinda were being routinely beaten by the guards, William

P. Woodard, the officer in charge of Byron Hot Springs, quickly urged a stop to the practice. He explained his actions not in terms of human rights violations or because the actions were prohibited by the Geneva Convention, but by noting that if the prisoners were needed for further interrogation, he did not want them to be antagonistic to the U.S.⁴ Therefore, although few Japanese prisoners reached American soil, those who did were well cared for because of American self-interest and the consideration and understanding of the men in charge of their internment.

CHAPTER SIX END NOTES

1. May 2, 1992 telephone interview with John Wasieleski.
2. Sakamaki, 65.
3. Carr-Gregg, 16 and 172-173.
4. Letter (WCJ-579) to Commander Riheldaffer from William P. Woodard dated 12 April 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, Letters from 1 January 1945 to April 1945 and Memorandum (WCJ-629) to Commander John L. Riheldaffer from William P. Woodard dated 11 May 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), Subject File 1942-1945, Byron Hot Springs, Letters from April to 6 August 1945.

APPENDIX ONE

THE KOREANS

No history of the Japanese prisoners of war in World War II would be complete without mentioning the Korean prisoners. While the Korean prisoners had technically fought on the side of Japan, it is doubtful that anyone hated the Japanese more. Korea had once been an independent nation, but had been occupied by the Japanese since the turn of the century. For thirty years, the Japanese had treated the Koreans with contempt and disrespect.¹ Then, with the beginning of war, the treatment became worse. After January, 1944, the Japanese had conscripted any Korean between the ages of twenty and twenty-one who had five years of primary education and any Korean between twenty-one and twenty-five who was in good physical condition, regardless of educational level.² Although no complete records were kept, the impact of this can be seen by noting that "in one village of 93 houses, 30 men were conscripted in the years of 1942-43" alone.³ The Koreans were conscripted for only two year terms, but "it was believed that many were kept for three years or longer."⁴ Once in the service, they were treated horribly by the Japanese. In fact, several prisoners stated that the

Koreans were treated worse than Allied prisoners. They were "required to do the worst type of work and those used in the coal or iron mines were always found in the deepest and hottest places."⁵ When there was any possibility of their surrender, they were immediately killed. "One P/W captured on Saipan saw two women with babies strapped on their backs heading for American lines. A lieutenant, hiding in the same cave with them, killed them all for security reasons and would have killed [the] P/W had he known he was Korean."⁶ On another occasion, when a Korean attempted to escape from a coal mining camp near Yoshima, he was "apprehended, taken to Yoshima and, after being tortured for fifteen days, was imprisoned."⁷

These insults and atrocities developed a fierce hatred of the Japanese among the Koreans. When captured, they often volunteered to help their captors in any way possible and, on several occasions, volunteered to fight with the Americans against the Japanese.⁸

In fact, the Korean National Committee even proposed in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War that the Korean prisoners' "services should be utilized as an aid in the American war effort and as a Korean contribution to the United Nations at war with Japan and her Allies."⁹ More specifically, the Committee proposed "that these Koreans serve as labor units in American occupied territories, as aid to military intelligence, as infiltrative van to enemy

territories, as liaison details in relation to other Koreans as may still be found in increased service of the Japanese" in order to advance the cause of Korean independence.¹⁰

The Judge Advocate General, after reading the proposal, determined that, although any use of the Korean prisoners of war for these purposes would violate Article 31 of the Geneva Convention, the United States could release them from their status as prisoners of war and then be able to legally accept their voluntary services without violating international law. However, this would not preclude the Japanese from declaring the Koreans guilty of treason and executing them if they were recaptured, as the U.S. could find no basis for recognizing Korea as an independent nation.¹¹

When the U.S. chose to utilize Korean labor for the war effort without releasing them from their status as prisoners, Joseph R. Farrington, the U.S. Representative from Hawaii, asked that they be reclassified as a Korean service unit. This would "serve to reward them appropriately for their good conduct and numerous and consistent manifestations of friendship to the United States and opposition to Japan; contribute in an important way to friendship between this country [U.S.] and Korea in the future; win the lasting gratitude of the permanent residents of this country of Korean extraction . . . , and

reduce the military overhead required to maintain a prisoner of war camp, and thereby release that many more soldiers to their homes."¹² There is no indication that the military accepted this advice.

Even without this recognition, the Koreans continued to press their battle against Japan. In March, 1944, the Korean prisoners, led by Ch'anghwan Kim, formed the Kanshu, or Korean Eagle, Party. This party was dedicated to "repay at least in some slight measure the favors of our benefactor, the United States," and to form a Korean independence movement.¹³ To accomplish these purposes, the members were to offer their lives to America and their homeland" to "fight for the righteous United Nations forces until the day of the final annihilation of Japan and Germany," who were responsible for both the war and the fact that they were held as prisoners.¹⁴

The chartering members of the group felt that all Korean prisoners were duty bound to join the organization and respect its precepts. Dues would be used to defray the expenses of the club and U.S. military forces. The U.S., while acknowledging the party, required membership to be both voluntary and free.¹⁵

APPENDIX 1 END NOTES

1. Letter to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, from Joseph R. Farrington, U.S. Representative from Hawaii, dated September 6, 1945, Record Group 407, Army Adjutant General, Decimal file 1940-1945, 383.6, 9-6-45 to 9-30-45 (cited hereafter as Farrington letter).

2. P/W Sources, No. 12, 21 December 1944, File #58, 4.

3. Confidential memo, WCJ 632, to Commander Rihel-daffer dated 11 May 1945, Record Group 38, Records of the Navy Unit, Tracy, California, Special Activities Branch (OP 16-Z), File #59 Tracy (Jap).

4. Ibid.

5. P/W Sources, No. 25, 18 May 1945, File #59, 14.

6. Ibid.

7. Memo for the Judge Advocate General from Lt. Col. Abe Goff, Acting Chief, War Plans Division, pp. 1 and 11, Record Group 389, Provost Marshal General, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Policy File 1942-1945, Population Report to Port of Discharge.

8. P/W Sources, No. 25, 18 May 1945, File #58, 14.

9. Memo for the Judge Advocate General from Lt. Col. Abe Goff, Acting Chief, War Plans Division, p. 1, Record Group 389, Provost Marshal General, Prisoner of War Operations Division, Operations Branch, Policy File 1942-1945, Population Report to Port of Discharge.

10. Ibid., 1 and 11.

11. Farrington letter.

12. Ibid.

13. General rules of Kanshu, Record Group 389, Provost Marshal General, Classified decimal file, 080, Kanshu club.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

APPENDIX TWO

MONTHLY CENSUS OF PRISONERS

<u>End of month</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Total</u>
December 1941			1	1
January 1942			1	1
February			1	1
March			1	1
April			1	1
May	31		1	32
June	32		1	33
July	39		10	49
August	55		10	65
September	130		47	177
October	130		53	183
November	380		51	431
December	512	1,317	52	1,881
January 1943	990	1,313	62	2,365
February	1,026	1,356	62	2,444
March	1,334	1,359	62	2,755
April	2,146	2,799	62	5,007
May	22,110	13,911	62	36,083
June	34,161	19,212	62	53,435
July	54,502	25,969	87	80,588
August	94,220	35,986	93	130,299
September	115,358	48,253	95	163,706
October	119,401	48,252	95	167,748
November	122,350	49,039	95	171,484
December	123,440	49,323	116	172,879
January 1944	124,822	49,826	116	174,822
February	127,252	49,993	142	177,387
March	133,135	50,136	347	183,618
April	133,967	50,168	367	184,502
May	135,796	50,164	408	186,368
June	146,101	50,278	569	196,948
July	173,980	50,276	607	224,863
August	192,868	50,272	730	243,870
September	248,205	51,034	1,143	300,382
October	248,781	51,032	1,242	338,055
November	306,856	51,156	2,443	360,455
December	306,581	51,071	2,629	360,281

<u>End of Month</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Total</u>
January 1945	306,306	50,561	2,820	359,687
February	307,404	50,571	3,021	360,996
March	312,144	50,550	3,260	365,954
April	345,920	50,304	3,294	399,518
May	271,683	50,273	3,915	425,871
June	371,505	50,052	4,249	425,806
July	367,513	49,789	4,828	422,130
August	361,322	49,184	5,413	415,919
September	355,458	42,915	4,938	403,311
October	351,150	35,065	4,930	391,145
November	324,623	29,539	4,257	358,419
December	313,234	25,696	2,086	341,016
January 1946	275,078	11,532	1	286,611
February	208,403	561	1	208,965
March	140,572	33	1	140,606
April	84,177	31	1	84,209
May	37,460	30	1	37,491
June	141	20	1	162

There were 32,000 PW's on military and civilian work projects which terminated 15 June 1946. All PW's were repatriated by 30 June 1946 except 141 Germans, 20 Italians, and 1 Japanese serving sentences in U.S. penal institutions. Information gathered from U.S. Provost Marshal General, "Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946."

APPENDIX THREE

RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO PRISONERS

1. The prisoners will be organized into sections under their own officers and non-commissioned officers who will be responsible for their conduct. Prisoner of War officers and non-commissioned officers who fail to perform properly their duties of supervision of the men under them, or any other duty with which they may be entrusted, will be punished as offenders against good order and discipline.
2. No prisoner will be allowed to have in his possession any matches, knives, sharp instruments, razor blades, weapons of any description, photographic apparatus, field glasses, lamps, flashlights, inflammable articles, maps, tools, or money.
3. Smoking by prisoners is not permitted in any portion of the main building and mess hall. Smoking will be permitted in the recreational area and in latrines when recreational area cannot be used.
4. The prisoners will not be permitted to take knives and forks from the mess hall.
5. The necessary number of prisoners may be used at any time in the mess hall as kitchen police under the supervision of the mess sergeant.
6. Under the supervision of the Surgeon, each prisoner will be required to bathe at stated intervals and keep his person and clothing in a sanitary condition.
7. Arrangements for hair cutting will be made by providing barbers from among the prisoners.
8. A daily inspection of prisoners, dormitories, latrines and mess building will be made by the Commanding Officer or such other officer as he may designate.
9. A physical inspection of the prisoners and a sanitary inspection of the enclosure will be made at stated intervals by the Surgeon.

11. Each prisoner will make his own bed daily immediately upon arising and in the manner prescribed by the Commanding Officer.

12. Any prisoner conducting himself in a disorderly manner will be segregated from the other prisoners.

13. Any prisoner refusing to halt when ordered to do so by a sentry or guard will be fired on.

14. Prisoners will be required to salute all officers of the United States Army as prescribed for United States Troops.

15. Any prisoner who violates any lawful order or commits any military offense will be tried in the manner prescribed by law.

16.a. In case of fire all prisoners will assemble in the recreational area, and wait there until further orders.

b. In case of a "black out", prisoners will remain in their dormitories.

17. All prisoners will adhere to the following daily schedule:

5:30am - Lights on in sleeping quarters and check of prisoners. Prisoners will immediately police their persons, bunks and proceed with general inside policing of barracks until breakfast.

6:30am - Breakfast. Just as soon as the mess sergeant notifies the sergeant of the guard that breakfast is ready, the sergeant of the guard will require the prisoners, excepting the sick prisoners, to fall out immediately and form at the north entrance to the mess hall.

7:00am - Outside fatigue when ordered. One outside detail will daily police Headquarters Office and vicinity. The inside detail will proceed immediately to the barracks and complete policing up the barracks. All prisoners, excepting those on the inside detail and those who are ill, will vacate the barracks on or before 7:00am, except on days of inclement [sic] weather, and will remain in the recreation area until after the enclosure is inspected. The inside detail will vacate the barracks just as soon as their work is completed. During inclement [sic] weather the prisoners will be permitted to remain in the barracks, but during inspection they will be required to stand by their bunks.

8:30am - The sergeant of the guard will notify the Dispensary at or before 8:30am the exact number of prisoners remaining in their bunks because of illness.

11:00am - Recall.

11:50am - Check of prisoners.

12:00 Noon - Dinner.

1:30pm - Recreation or fatigue when ordered.

3:30pm - Bathing, shaving, washing of clothing or fatigue when ordered.

5:30pm - Supper.

8:15pm - All in quarters.

8:20pm - Check prisoners.

9:00pm - Lights out.

18. These rules and regulations may be changed, varied, altered or modified and new or additional regulations prescribed from time to time, as circumstances may require.

Information from Rules and Regulations Applicable to Prisoners at Angel Island, California, dated 2 September 1944, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspection and Field Reports, Angel Island.

APPENDIX FOUR

ITEMS ISSUED TO PRISONERS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity per individual</u>
Bags, Barrack	1
Bed, Sacks	2
Belts, Waist	1
Blankets or Comforters	2
Breeches, cotton, or trousers, working	2 pair*
Caps, or Hats, cotton	1
Coat, Cotton Khaki or Coat-working, denim	2*
Coats, wool	1
Cots, canvas	1
Drawers, cotton	4 pair
Gloves or Mittens	1 pair

*When deemed necessary by the camp commander.

Leggins (when Breeches are issued)	1 pair
Overcoats (or suitable substitute)	1
Raincoat (dismounted)	1
Pillows	1
Shirts	2
Shoes	1 pair

A second pair of shoes is authorized for issue when deemed necessary by the camp commander to safeguard the health of prisoners against inclement weather.

Socks	4 pair
Trousers or Breeches (wool)	2 pair
Undershirts, cotton	4

Straw or an adequate substitute for bedding may be issued at the rate of 15 pounds per man per month.

In addition, the following items are authorized for officer prisoners:

Cases, pillow	2
Chair, steel or folding	1

Cot, steel or bedstead, wooden		1
Covers, mattress		2**
Mattress		1
Sheets, bed	4	

**In lieu of, not in addition to, bedsacks.

Items of clothing and equipment will be supplied from the following sources in the indicated order of priority:

- (1) Obsolete Stock.
- (2) CCC stock, except spruce green outer clothing.
- (3) Class "X" Stock.
- (4) Class B Stock.
- (5) New stock, except that new stock of outer clothing and shoes, will be utilized only in cases of emergency.

Toilet articles, barber's and tailor's supplies will be issued in accordance with paragraph 10, AR 6003-75, 17 May 1943, which states that the value of such supplies will not exceed one dollar per man per month. The following items are authorized:

Blades, safety, razor	Laces, shoe
Brooms, whisk	Needles
Brushes, shaving	Polish, shoe, or dubbin
Brushes, shoe	Powder or paste, tooth
Brushes, tooth	Razor, safety
Buttons	Soap, hand
Clippers, hair	Soap, shaving
Combs, medium	Thread
Handkerchiefs	Towels

A record of all clothing and equipment will be kept as provided for the enlisted men of the Army.

The following is a table of allowances of general supplies:

Item	Quantity	Remarks & Basis of Issue
Chinaware (thick ware):		
Boat, sauce, 13 oz.	1	Per 10 men capacity
Bowl, general issue or plate, soup	1	Per man
Bowl, sugar, with cover, 17 oz. capacity	1	Per 5 men
Cup, coffee, unhandled	1	Per man
Dish, vegetable,		

11-7/8 in. width (Bakers) (Plate, soup may be substituted)	1	Per 2 men
Plate, dinner, 9-5/8 in. dia.	1	Per man
Saucer, coffee	1	Per man

Glassware:

Bottle, vinegar with stoppers, 14-1/2 oz. cap.	1	Per 10 men
Pitcher, syrup, 20 oz. capacity	1	Per 2 men
Shaker, salt	1	Per 10 men
Shaker, pepper	1	Per 10 men
Tumbler, 10 oz. cap.	1	Per man

Kitchen Utensils:

Bowl, mixing, large	1	Per 150 men
Brush, meat block, wire	1	Per 150 men
Cleaver, butchers 8 in. blade	1	Per 75 men
Clock	1	Per mess
Colander, 6-1/4 in. x 6 1/2 in.	1	Per mess
Dipper, tin or enamelware 1-2 qt.	1	Per 30 men
Fork, cook, flesh, 2 tine, 15 in.	1	Per 30 men
Fork, cook, flesh, 2 tine, 21 in.	1	Per mess
Grater, vegetable	2	Per mess
Griddle, cast iron, 20x20	1	Per 75 men or major fraction thereof but not to exceed 5 per mess.
Knife, boning	1	Per 75 men
Knife, bread, 10 in. blade	1	Per 75 men
Knife, butcher 10 in. blade	1	Per 75 men
Knife, cooks	1	Per 75 men or major fraction
thereof		
Knife, paring	1	Per 25 men or major fraction
thereof		
Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia. bowl 15 in.	1	Per 40 men or major fraction thereof

Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia.	1		Per 40 men or major fraction there-
bowl 21 in.			
of Machine, hand operated			
chopper or grinder			
(meat and food),			
large	1		Per 75 men
Masher, potato pounder	1	1	Per 150 men
Measurer, 1/2 qt.			
tin or enamel	1		Per 150 men
Measure, 1 qt.			
tin or enamel	1		Per 150 men
Opener, can,			
hand operated	1		Per 25 men
Pan, bake & roast			
4-3/4x12-1/2x			
20-1/4 in.	1		Per 25 men
Pan, bake & roast			
4-3/4x20-1/4x			
26-1/4 in.			
(100 ration)	1		Per 50 men
Pan, baking sheet,			
1x18x25 in.	1		Per 30 men
Pan, cake or pie,			
9 in.	1		Per 6 men
Pan, dish	1		Per 30 men
Pan, frying, 12 in.	1		Per 75 men
Peeler, potato	1		Per 25 men
Pin, rolling	1		Per 150 men
Pots, stock, with			
cover, 10 gal.	1		Per 50 men
Pots, stock, with			
cover, 15 gal.	1		Per 50 men
Pots, stock, with			
cover, 20 gal.	1		Per 75 men
Saw, butcher, 22 in.	1		Per 75 men
Scale, weighing,			
counter scoop,			
10 lbs.	1		Per mess
Scraper, dough,			
6 in.	1		Per 75 men
Sieve, flour,			
wood, 18 in.	1		Per 150 men
Skimmer	1		Per 75 men
Spatula, wood,			
37 in.	1		Per 75 men
Spoon, basting,			
15 in.	1		Per 25 men
Spoon, basting,			
21 in.	1		Per mess
Spoon, serving,			
slotted	1		Per 40 men

Steel, butchers', 10 in.	1	Per 150 men
Stone, sharpening Turner, cake, 15 in.	1	Per mess
Whip, egg, 12 in.	1	Per 40 men
Whip, egg, 16 in.	1	Per 75 men

Miscellaneous:

Axe, handled, chopping, single, standard grade 3-1/2-4 lb.	3	Per company
Bit Board, wash	1	Per 25 men
Brooms, corn	1	Per 14 men per month
Brush, floor, scrubbing, hand	1	Per 14 men per month
Bucket, general purpose galvanized 14 qt.	1	Per 20 men
Can, ash or garbage, galvanized w/ cover (approx. 32 gal.)	1	Per 25 men
Candles, pound	1	Per 60 men per day when no other light is furnished.
Handles, mop, Handle, mop, spring	1	Per 50 men or frac- tion level there- of per annum
Irons, hand	5	Per company
Mop, cotton	1	Per 25 men per month

Tableware:

Fork, table	1	Per man
Knife, table grill	1	Per man
Pitcher, water 5-1/2 qt.	1	Per 10 men
Platter, meat	1	Per 10 men
Spoon, table (med.)	1	Per man
Spoon, table (serving)	1	Per 2 men
Spoon, tea	1	Per man

Information found in Prisoner of War Circular #1,
Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division,
Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945,
383.6, Misc. to Camp Policy.

APPENDIX FIVE
SUGGESTED MENUS

Menu for the 1st, 11th, and 21st Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Wheat Cereal	Oriental Stew	Japanese Soup
Potatoes	Boiled Rice	Red Bean Salad
Salt Pork	Cauliflower	Rice
w/ Milk Gravy	Bread	Bread
Bread	Fresh Fruit	Butter or Oleo
Butter or Oleo		Apple Pie
Milk		Tea
Tea		

Menu for the 2nd, 12th, and 22nd Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Stewed Prunes	Japanese Mixed	Bean Soup
Oatmeal	Rice w/Beef	Pickled Beet Salad
Toast	Cabbage	Rice Pudding
Butter or Oleo	Bean Sprouts	Tea
Milk	Bread	
	Butter or Oleo	
	Spice Cookies	

Menu for the 3rd, 13th, and 23rd Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Grapefruit	Sushi	Vegetable tempura
Cornmeal Mush	Bread	Noodles
Milk	Fried Potatoes	Fried Onions
Rice	Escalloped Tomatoes	Bread
Bread	Bread Pudding	Butter or Oleo
Butter or Oleo		Sliced Cheese
Tea		Crackers
		Tea

Menu for the 4th, 14th, and 24th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Stewed Raisins	Sukiyaki	Spaghetti w/Cheese
Wheat Cereal	Rice	& Tomato Sauce
Milk	Carrots	Green Salad
Fried Eggs	Onions	Bread
Fried Potatoes	Bread	Butter or Oleo
Bread	Cornstarch Pudding	Tea
Tea	Butter or Oleo	
Apple Butter		

Menu for the 5th, 15th, and 25th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Grapefruit	Chashu & Noodles	Japanese Soup
Fried Rice	Spinach	Boiled Beans
Bread	Rice	Fresh Pickled Cab-
Butter or Oleo	Bread	bage
Tea	Sweet Potato	Bread
	Pudding	Butter or Oleo
		Sliced Cheese
		Tea

Menu for the 6th, 16th, and 26th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Baked Apples	Beef Heart	Egg Soup
Wheat Cereal	Boiled Potatoes	Rice
French Toast	Celery	Peas
Sirup [sic]	Bread	Bread
Butter or Oleo	Fresh Pickled	Butter or Oleo
Tea	Turnips	Jelly
	Rice Pudding	Fruit Cocktail

Menu for the 7th, 17th, and 27th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Oranges	Veal Stew	Baked Beans
Oatmeal	String Beans	Vegetable Salad
Milk	Rice	Bread
Fried Potatoes	Bread	Butter or Oleo
Bread	Butter or Oleo	Oatmeal Cookies
Apple Butter		Tea
Tea		

Menu for the 8th, 18th, and 28th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Tomato Juice	Scrambled Eggs &	Fish Teriyaki
Oatmeal	Sliced Cheese	Boiled Noodles
Boiled Rice	Rice	Pickled Rutabagas
Bread	Boiled Lima Beans	Bread
Butter or Oleo	Eggplant	Apple Butter
Tea	Bread	Tea
Toastie	Butter or Oleo	
	Bread Pudding	

Menu for the 9th, 19th, and 29th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Apples	Egg Foo Young	Tomato Soup
Boiled Rice	Shoyu Sauce	Macaroni & Cheese
Bread	Rice	Sliced Onions
Butter or Oleo	Spinach	w/ Greens
Tea	Bread	Bread
	Butter or Oleo	Butter or Oleo
	Cottage Pudding	Tea

Menu for the 10th, 20th, and 30th Days

<u>Breakfast</u>	<u>Dinner</u>	<u>Supper</u>
Oranges	Sukiyaki	Potato & Celery Soup
Oatmeal	Rice	Cabbage Roll w/
French Toast	Japanese Pickles	Tomato Sauce
Sirup [sic]	Escalloped Tomatoes	Sweet Potatoes
Tea	Bread	Bread
	Butter or Oleo	Butter or Oleo
	Bread	Prune Pudding
	Butter or Oleo	Tea

Japanese Menu, Prepared in Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington, D.C., RG 160 Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-45, 333.6 Prisoners of War, Form Class.

APPENDIX SIX

MONTHLY PAY CHART FOR OFFICER PRISONERS

<u>JAPANESE</u>		PAY	<u>AMERICAN EQUIVALENT</u>	
ARMY	NAVY		ARMY	NAVY
Taisho	Taisho	128.91	General	Admiral
Chujo	Chujo	113.29	Lt General	Vice Admiral
Shosho	Shosho	97.66	Maj General	Rear Admiral
Taisa	Taisa	81.06	Colonel	Captain
Chusa	Chusa	62.90	Lt Colonel	Commander
Shosa	Shosa	45.51	Major	Lt Commander
Taii Itto	Tokumu Taii	40.43		
Taii Nito	Taii Itto	37.11		
Taii Santo	Taii Nito	32.23	Captain	Lieutenant
	Taii Santo	28.71		
Chui Itto	Chui			
Chui Nito	Tokumu Chui	28.00	1st Lieutenant	Lt(j.g.)
Shoi Shoi	Tokumu Shoi	25.00	2nd Lieutenant	Ensign

Information from TM 19-500, 25 April 1945, Change 4, Section 3, Paragraph 9, p. 4.5.

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