Chapter 3

“I Was the Chief of Staff for Ideas.” A Conversation with Ted Sorensen

Theodore Sorensen and Gregory S.Gordon

Theodore Sorensen, speech-writer and senior policy adviser to JFK from his days in the Senate to his service in the Oval Office, sat down with Gregory Gordon, Assistant Professor of Law, for an unusually candid and informative conversation. Dr. Robert Kelley, President of the University of North Dakota, provided the introduction. Here is what each had to say:

President Kelley: Theodore Sorensen was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, went to the University of Nebraska and attended law school at the University of Nebraska. After law school, he went to Washington D.C. where he would ultimately work with JFK. This experience would grow not only into a partnership with the President, but also into a friendship that would last until the President’s death in 1963. Ted met with JFK on a daily basis as the President’s speech writer and special counsel. As a result of this relationship, Ted Sorensen is a prominent figure in the history of our country. He composed JFK’s soaring rhetoric and exerted great influence on his policies. We see Ted’s influence present at great moments in American history, moments which included the face-down with the Soviets over the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis, the civil rights marches on Washington, domestic energy policies, conservation of natural resources, and with our US policy in Asia and the founding of the Peace Corps. Leaving the White House following JFK’s assassination, Ted joined a New York City law firm where he has been engaged in international law, advising governments, multi-national organizations and major corporations around the world. He is the author of a best-selling biography on JFK and remains active in political and international issues. I’ll digress from my prepared comments for just a moment and say that after dinner with Ted I know him to be a man of humor, great warmth, and an abiding affection for everyone who comes into contact with him. Ted - it is a wonderful pleasure to have met you. Ted lives in New York City with his wife Gillian. I found out at dinner that she is also an assistant for Kofi Anan. She too has a very distinguished background. Hosting Ted Sorensen this evening will be Professor Gregory Gordon, Assistant Professor in our School of Law. Greg is the Director of the Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies and teaches in the areas of criminal procedure, international law, and international human rights law. Prior to joining the faculty of law at the UND, Greg was Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of Special Investigations in the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division. He also has served as Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and worked as Legal Officer and Deputy Team Leader on the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in Kigali. Please join me in welcoming Mr. Ted Sorensen and Professor Greg Gordon to this great conversation.

GG: Thank you Dr. Kelley for that warm and generous introduction. Good evening Mr. Sorensen and thank you for being with us tonight. This is a unique and fascinating opportunity for us to hear the thoughts and recollections of President Kennedy’s closing living adviser. I’m going to ask some questions and then we are going to open it up to the audience to ask you some questions. I know you have an excerpt from your recent book, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History, which came out, I believe, in May. We have a copy of it here with us and we will finish with you reading a selection from your book. Let me start with the beginning of your relationship with JFK. I think we would all like to know how you originally met President Kennedy and what were your first impressions of him?

TS: After law school I went to Washington because I thought I might find the kind of legal work there - public policy, national, international matters - that I probably would not find in my home city of Lincoln, Nebraska. After two early jobs, one for a federal agency, one for a temporary congressional committee, and that temporary committee expired, I had to start looking for a job all over again because in 1952 President Eisenhower had been elected - the first Republican in 20 years - he requested a freeze on the executive branch employment so I could not return to my old job. The chairman of that committee I was serving said “Don’t worry. There are some new Senators. Some of them come from the House and I’ve worked with them. I’ll recommend to them that they take a look at your availability.” He and his chief of staff sent letters to three new Senators who had formerly worked with Senator Douglas of Illinois, the Chairman. Of those three, one was Mike Mansfield from nearby Montana. One was Scoop Jackson, or Henry Jackson, of Washington, also of the Northwest. And the other was John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. I don’t think to my knowledge that I ever heard back from Mansfield, but both Jackson and Kennedy said, yes, they would be glad to interview me. I had interviews with both. In Kennedy’s case he had been a Congressman and he had invited me to meet with him in his old House office building but the newly elected Congressman assigned to that office was moving in that same day. All was chaos and confusion inside. So he took two chairs and placed them in the doorway. We perched on those chairs and had about a five minute interview. There wasn’t time for a serious investigation of my credentials, but I was impressed. Impressed, first of all, that he did not try to impress me. Here he was a millionaire, a war hero, a Harvard graduate. He had everything. And he was a newly elected member of the Senate. He didn’t try to talk about that or impress me about how important he was. He didn’t act in a pompous, self-important way as so many politicians do. He was just a good guy. I liked that. As it turned out, for the next 11 years he was a good guy.

GG: He took you all the way ultimately to the White House. When you went to the White House with JFK you described your role there as Special Counsel to the President and you indicated in your book that your role encompassed advising the
President on policy and serving as a speech writer. I was wondering, what was the relationship between speech writing and policy making when it came to domestic affairs?

TS: In a way, I had been doing that during his eight years as United States Senator. In the White House it was even easier, except I had a lot more to do. But I was a policy adviser and I would take part in the meetings on domestic policy where decisions were made. It was easy to watch the President make a decision. I could see what evidence impressed him. I could see what arguments meant the most to him. I could see what his responses were and then walk a few steps down to my office, not far from his, and put all that into a draft speech. Other presidents have had speech writing departments and the departments are usually not even in the White House. They are in the Old Executive Office Building across the street. They have seven or nine word-smiths sitting there, waiting for the phone to ring. The chief of staff calls up and says the President would like a speech on Haiti. Who knows about Haiti? Who will write a speech for the President on Haiti? And someone will say, I will, and that someone might never have met or seen the President, much less have the slightest idea what his position is on Haiti. I couldn’t do that and I certainly wouldn’t enjoy it compared to the relationship I had with John Kennedy.

GG: You knew the President’s thoughts, probably, as well as anyone.

TS. Yes. When I went into the White House I had been with him for eight years.

GG: One last question related to this. Were there some times when there was an inconsistency between writing and policy making?

TS: No.

GG: That must have made the job easier.

TS: Well, I think I say in the book, being very immodest, but comparing myself with others and I have known many presidential speech writers, they have to submit their draft to the head of the communications department. I was the head of the communications department. Then they had to submit it to the chief of staff for ideas. I was the chief of staff for ideas. I only had to submit my draft to one person, John F. Kennedy.

GG: And you had two assistants, as I recall, when you were in the White House.

TS: I had two deputies. It was called the Office of Special Counsel. They were actually lawyers, practicing law while I was working on policy matters, and for the most part they did not get involved with speech writing. Of course, John F. Kennedy did. Once in a while we drew on the wonderful historian Arthur Schlesinger who was gifted. During the first years, Richard Goodwin, who had worked with me during the campaign,
was in the White House and assisted me. But he then transferred over to the State Department and then the Peace Corps. So, basically, my two assistants worked on appeals from independent boards and agencies and those sort of legal questions. Much as I tried to get rid of the speech writing job, the President kept piling more and more responsibilities on me, but he wouldn’t let me give it up.

*GG:* As a result, you have this incredible opportunity to work with the President on a daily basis and to know what he was thinking and as well to be his adviser and special counsel. During this time with President Kennedy in the White House what actions that you took or decisions that you made do you believe have had the greatest impact on the course of history?

*TS:* I didn’t make decisions. If you’re a speech writer you always have to keep in mind that you’re just a speech writer. You’re not the president. You don’t make decisions. You don’t decide policy. The President does that. I had a background in civil rights that he did not, and perhaps my advice on that policy and the speeches I drafted regarding that policy helped to influence him as his brother Bobby, the Attorney General, was also influencing him. But influencing him even more was what was going on in our country - civil rights became a burning issue, north, south, east, west, it became a moral issue. It became a legal issue. It was an issue that the President of the United States could not ignore. So I don’t even take the credit for pushing him over that line. Events pushed him over that line.

*GG:* The book points out that you were active early in your life with civil rights. It is something that you believed in deeply and cared about. When you started at the White House, I get the impression from your book that civil rights was not at the top of the agenda at the very beginning of the administration.

*TS:* No. It was not for two reasons. One, it had not been one of Kennedy’s chief interests. He was more focused on foreign policy and to some extent making certain that the economy remained strong because he had not had an exposure to civil rights issues, although he began talking about it in his campaign. When he got to the White House the congressional leaders said that 20, or was it 23, Democratic Congressmen had lost their seats in 1960. It may have been Kennedy’s fault because his religion turned a lot of people against the Democratic Party. And they said in the previous session of Congress there had been attempts to have a civil rights bill and it failed. If it failed in the previous Congress it certainly wasn’t going to pass with 23 fewer House Democrats and for Kennedy to go through the motions of symbolically sending up a civil rights bill would only antagonize the so-called ‘Dixiecrats’, those southern Democrats, to vote against the rest of his program. Well, the rest of his program, that he wanted passed that first year included a lot of provisions to help people at the bottom of the economic ladder, including blacks. Minimal wage, better public housing programs, aid for economically distressed areas, and why jeopardize the prospects of that legislation which would actually help black Americans just to go through the political symbolism of sending up
legislation that had no chance of passing.

*GG*: It must have been gratifying, as time progressed, when you got to the point when it was politically viable to work on civil rights legislation directly.

*TS*: Truth of the matter is it was never politically viable because JFK knew that it was going to cost the Democratic Party the South and Lyndon Johnson particularly weighed in with that point. It turns out that they were right. The Democratic Party has lost something like seven out of ten presidential elections since Kennedy and Johnson. The only three exceptions were Southern governors - Carter and Clinton - and it is because we have lost all the southern border states in almost all of those elections.

*GG*: Can we say then that the civil rights legislation that you worked on and that was ultimately passed during the Johnson administration was a great act of courage?

*TS*: Yes, of course it was because Kennedy knew that it was. I still think, and both he and I hoped, that he would still win the reelection to the second term because he gained enormous popularity in all other parts of the country. And surely some southern states would recognize his leadership ability and the New Deal economic programs that had done so much to revitalize the South back in the 30s. But yes, he knew it would endanger the prospects of his party.

*GG*: If the book, *Profiles in Courage*, were updated that that would seem to be a chapter. I was thinking about the decision making in the White House, especially early on. People have heard about the Bay of Pigs and I know that President Kennedy felt that that was not an operation that went well, that he did not feel good about it. What changed in the White House after the Bay of Pigs in terms of the way operations were conducted?

*TS*: It is a very important question. Since Roosevelt, people get this idea that the real time for showing what you can do with the new president while the so-called honey-moon was on, the real time was the first 100 days. Roosevelt talked about the first 100 days. In his inaugural Kennedy said that all this *will not* be done in the first hundred days. But there was the Bay of Pigs, an operation that had been formulated by holdover CIA and military leaders who had a lot of credentials, the grey hair and the medals. So, he believed them. He believed them when we were definitely going to overthrow Castro; that is once the Cuban exile army landed on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs the Cuban people would rise up and throw out Castro. That was not very likely because the Cubans who were against Castro were all in Miami or Cuban prisons. So that was one of many false premises which they sold to Kennedy and he kicked himself afterwards for having believed them. But two good things came out of that disaster. One was that he didn’t make it worse. They wanted him, when the invasion failed, to go back and dig the hole deeper by sending US airplanes over to bomb Cuba and Kennedy was smart enough to realize that when you are in a hole the first thing to do is to stop digging. Second, he learned lessons so that a year and a half later when we had another crisis in Cuba, the
Cuban missile crisis, the people were different, the procedures for making decisions were completely different. He wanted to know the pros and cons of each one. The policy was different because he had decided that, as I said to some students at lunch today, you don’t solve political problems - whenever Americans talk rather dismissively about other countries and the need for ‘regime change’ that’s a political problem and you don’t solve political problems with military force. So the whole approach to the Cuban missile crisis was completely different, thank goodness, otherwise we wouldn’t be here talking, and it was completely different in the results.

*GG:* Obviously, he had people connected to the Cuban missile crisis that he had confidence in and whom he could trust.

*TS:* Yes, on the first day, the first day I can remember very clearly and it was the only time in my life when I can remember what day of the week it was that something happened. On Tuesday morning, October 16th, he called me in and told me what the reconnaissance planes, the U2s over Cuba, had photographed from 50,000 feet up. It was the beginning of the Soviet nuclear missile site and he was calling a meeting for later that morning, not for two months later after he had gone back to the ranch to clear brush, a meeting for later that morning. Not the National Security Council but those individuals in government whose judgment he wanted and whose recommendations he trusted - a dozen of us or so. The National Security Council has a membership set by statute and there were some members of the National Security Council whose recommendation he wasn’t interested in, and in addition to that everyone who thinks he is important in Washington has to attend the National Security Council meeting and to show his importance he has to bring along his deputy. And for the deputy to prove his importance he has to bring along an assistant. And pretty soon the meeting is too big to a.) make the kind of crisp recommendation that Kennedy liked and b.) to keep a secret. Kennedy felt that we had a brief advantage because the Russians did not know that we knew. Therefore, if we could keep it secret we would have time to work our response without some pre-emptive action by them making public that they had the missiles there, panicking the American people or inducing Congress to pressure the President into doing something he did not think was very wise.

*GG:* He was being very calm during this incredible era.

*TS:* He was calm. He was detached. He still had a sense of humor. The cool way he led that group through our deliberations, day and night, was extraordinary.

*GG:* What was your specific role in that group?

*TS:* If you have seen the movie *13 Days* which is a pretty good, accurate movie. Of course, my wife said that it was too bad that Warren Beatty wasn’t available to play me. If you see that it is clear that the director of the movie decided that my role was to worry. Every time the camera turned on the poor guy picked to play me he had his hand
on his chin and his brow furrowed. He was worried. But I had to do more than worry. I was the NSO, a hold-over from the speech writing. I still had to put some words on paper. One came early in our deliberations when the idea - everybody’s first idea was to surgical air strike, send bombers to bomb and knock the missile site out. Bobby Kennedy, who had a moral core, said yes and then we’ll kill a lot of innocent Cuban civilians working at the site. We got to notify people that we’re going to drop bombs.

**GG:** Didn’t he make an analogy to Pearl Harbor?

**TS:** He said that’s Pearl Harbor in reverse. The Air Force was not too happy about notifying the target. I was asked to draft a note from Kennedy to Khrushchev to be delivered by a secret, high-level emissary. Once I had the assignment everyone began to weigh in on their conditions they sought. They said don’t make it an ultimatum. Super-powers don’t respond to an ultimatum. Don’t make it complicated. Khrushchev will just negotiate the complicated provisions for months while he finishes the missile site. And don’t make it too one-sided or history, posterity, will blame us for mankind’s final war. I went back to my office and tried drafting a message that would meet all those conditions. I finally came back and reported it was impossible. Of course it was going to sound like an ultimatum - it was an ultimatum. So that was one specific role I had besides worrying. Finally, after there was a consensus in favor of the quarantine or blockade, and I was in the group that favored that option, we called the President back from Chicago. As I mentioned in the news conference earlier today, the President felt that all of us should keep to our commitments and regular schedules, not to let people guess that there was some emergency that was causing everyone to stay in the White House. So he, the next day, Wednesday, the 17th, that’s why I can’t believe that anyone is talking about canceling or postponing the [Presidential candidates’] debate now because of the crisis. The President didn’t cancel the election and he didn’t even cancel his own campaign schedule. He went to Connecticut to make a speech the next day while the rest of us who were meeting came back and the meetings resumed. On Friday, he went to the mid-West and Chicago. On Friday evening or Saturday morning, Bobby, the Attorney General, his brother, called him and said we have reached a consensus. Please come back. When he landed I handed him a one page memorandum which I think is in the book and which summed up my views -- what I thought was the irrefutable case for the quarantine options and the irrefutable case against the surgical bombing followed by an invasion option. Then, after the President selected the quarantine option he wanted to deliver a speech on the evening of Monday, October 22nd. He had only learned about it October 16th. We had completed our work and had a response ready to announce six days later on October 22nd. That was the speech in which he told the American people what we had discovered and what we were determined to do about it. I have been asked about this all over the country over the last few years and for some time. Men about your age, Greg, come up to me afterwards and thank me for making the President’s speech to the country that night so scary they were able to convince their girlfriends that it was the last night on earth.

**GG:** That must have been the ultimate date movie....
We continued to be in session. There were high points and low points. Finally, on Friday night, October 26th, a letter came in from Khrushchev through a secret back channel that I tell about in the book also. I was involved a little bit in that secret back channel. That letter from Khrushchev, even though it was full of threats and denials, also had buried within it at least the seed of a possible peaceful resolution of the crisis. On Saturday the 27th the Ex-Com as it was called, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the name was just made up, there was no such thing, met to decide what to do about that letter. The day was full of bad news. Another letter came in, this one not from Khrushchev personally - it sounded like it was written by the Soviet military presidium - it was stiff in tone and it said they were not going to do anything unless Kennedy took NATO missiles out of Turkey. We can’t do that in a hurry by ourselves. Then we got a briefing from the CIA that the over-flight planes have shown that the missile sites were just about completed and ready to fire. We were meeting in the Cabinet Room. Today, I am told, the Cabinet Room has become a reinforced concrete bunker, safe from outside bombardment. It wasn’t then. We knew if we took the wrong course that would be our last day. Other bad news. One of the U2 planes over Cuba had been shot down; the only fatality of the entire crisis. The low flying reconnaissance planes that I never fully liked because they were easy targets were fired upon by Cubans. The shooting down of the U2 plane could only have been done by a Soviet surface to air missile. The military insisted that because we needed that high flying reconnaissance to give us eyes on what was going on that we would have to retaliate and bomb that surface to air missile. Kennedy said there will be time enough to decide that. Let’s wait. Let’s wait to see how this correspondence turns out. Then, I think you mentioned this, then in the middle of all this tension, on the edge of war, a note comes in from the Pentagon that an Air Force plane - I think it was a fighter plane - based in Alaska had been sent out to sample the air, to see if the Soviets have been testing their nuclear weapons in preparation for war. Truth of the matter is that we were testing our nuclear weapons. This fighter plane had navigational controls which malfunctioned and he flew - how do you lose your way when with the North Pole there is only one way to go and that’s south - he flew out over Siberia, over Russian territory when both sides are on the edge of war! The Soviets understandably thought that this is the beginning of World War III and scrambled their jets. That was the message that came in and it was received in stony silence broken by JFK saying well there is always one son-of-a-bitch who doesn’t get the message. So then we were to decide about the two different letters. Again, we sat around the table arguing. Tommy Thompson was the wisest among us, a career foreign service officer who had been Ambassador to Moscow. He even knew Khrushchev personally. He said ignore the second letter. Answer the first letter. Bobby Kennedy and I said yes, that’s what we should do. I pointed out that there were some parts in that first letter that could receive a constructive response. Finally, the President said all right. You two draft a reply. So that is a long answer to your question about what role I had. It was more than speech writer.

That is an incredible story and I am glad that we got to hear it. It shows, I think, what a great role JFK played in being calm and being a good leader during this
incredible crisis. Historian Thomas Carlyle believed in the ‘great man’ theory of history and that is primarily single individuals and their personal decisions more than other forces that shape history. Did JFK’s tenure in the White House lend support to Carlyle’s theory?

TS: Yes, it did, particularly in the Cuban missile crisis because we found out afterwards that had we bombed and invaded as the Joint Chiefs and later on the Congressional leaders were urging, there were increased Soviet troops on the island equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and the authority to use them on their own initiative in the event of an American attack. Had they used nuclear weapons, even tactical nuclear weapons, against American forces, no doubt we would have responded with tactical nuclear weapons. No doubt they would have responded with perhaps strategic nuclear weapons and we would have gone up that same nuclear escalator until both sides had devastated each other. Maybe totally eliminated from the earth each other’s country and then radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions could be carried by wind and water to the far reaches of the earth until the planet is what scientists call a nuclear desert.

GG: I have to fast-forward and come to 2008. I am curious to know what you see in common between the presidential election this year and in 1960.

TS: There are many similarities between the presidential election this year and in 1960. President Kennedy, or Senator Kennedy, they said there is a young, relatively new United States Senator running in 1960 and there is a relatively young new United States Senator running in 2008. They said that Kennedy was too young and inexperienced. He said experience, that is like the tail lights on a boat that show you where you’ve been and not where you are going. Kennedy was given no chance of winning because of his demographic obstacle - his religion. The country had never elected a Catholic president. Obama is told that he can’t win because of his demographic obstacle - the country has never elected a president whose skin is black. Religion, it seems to me was more relevant to what people think about and how they decide the presidency than skin color. Yet, if we are in a contest of nerves it is true that Kennedy was under 44 years old and the country had never elected a president under 44 years old. Neither had they elected a president who was running for his first term over 70 years old. That, I think, may have more effect on a man’s performance in the White House than being too young. Being too young was an advantage for Kennedy. He had the energy to stay up all night with Bobby, me and a couple of others the night the University of Mississippi was integrated by the admission of James Meredith who encountered a violent mob. He had the energy to work day and night during those 13 days that I just mentioned. He also appealed to the emerging young leaders of the world, and in Africa in particular but also in Latin American nations there were young leaders rising to the fore. They identified with Kennedy. In my international law practice I had the opportunity to meet many of them. They told me how on election night in 1960 they stayed by their radios until the wee hours of the morning to find out if their candidate, Kennedy, had won. This year I have
received a letter just before I came out here from one of Asia’s most distinguished statesman whom I met when he was at the United Nations. He said to me the day Obama walks into the White House the opinion of the world for the United States will rise dramatically. So there are many, many similarities. Kennedy appealed to the young and Obama is bringing them back. For many years young people had been disillusioned, with good reason, with American politics and presidents. They’ve become cynical about it all, but Kennedy brought them into politics and government. Obama is doing the same thing. Kennedy had perspective on American foreign policy because of the years as an Ambassador’s son he had lived abroad. Obama has also lived abroad as a young man. So the number of parallels is remarkable. It’s a little more negative, even dirty campaigning, which I don’t like this year. Kennedy had the ability to laugh it off. In the book I quote one of my favorite lines in which he said “Mr. Nixon in the last ten days has called me a radical, a spendthrift, a pied piper, this, this and this, and all I’ve done in return is call him a true Republican and he says that’s really getting low.”

GG: You have now spoken about a lot of the similarities between JFK and Obama, but aside from race and the fact that President Kennedy had a privileged upbringing, what do you see as the difference between the two?

TS: Kennedy was a war-hero. He had learned first-hand about the horrors of war and that was one of the reasons that, like Obama, he was determined to never start another war. Obama came to that conclusion on the basis of his principles and his religious beliefs. He is a Christian, by the way, and not a Muslim. That’s important. Kennedy said in his American University commencement speech the world knows that America will never start a war; this generation of Americans has seen enough of war. So, our last two presidents did not serve. Obama has not served in the military but he has, never-the-less, a commitment against war as he demonstrated in opposing the war in Iraq before it started. Also, both of them went to Harvard.

GG: In the interest of balance, John McCain, apart from the military career, what similarities do you see between John McCain and JFK?

TS: John McCain is a conservative Republican who has views, particularly on domestic policy, completely at the opposite end of the spectrum from Kennedy’s views on the economy, on social justice, on women’s rights. John McCain, unfortunately, drew different conclusions from his war service than Kennedy did from his. John McCain seems to favor the Bush policy of perpetual war against one country after another. Kennedy, as I said, was totally opposed to war so I don’t see any similarities between those two. Also, as I said, Kennedy was the youngest man at that time to be elected president and if McCain were elected he would be the oldest man to be elected president. They are quite different.

GG: Assuming that he were alive and in office now do you think that JFK would be as effective in today’s much changed political landscape versus what it was in the
early 1960s?

TS: I think so. He would be effective in any political landscape. He was completely relaxed, whether on television or on the public platform. He had this wonderful sense of humor. He was unbelievably good looking. He simply had a personality and a manner of speaking that enabled him to build bridges to just about any audience, north, south, east, and west, rich or poor. He was a terrific campaigner and I believe he would have been reelected to a second term.

GG: I wonder if he would have wanted to be in politics today given the way that media scrutiny has gotten so intense since the early 1960s. Do you think that he might have thought that being in politics would have been too much of a burden given today how much politicians are under the microscope?

TS: There’s a lot of speculation about that. He was a man who conducted himself in a way...I have a chapter in the book about his personal life which I have never written or talked about before. I say that he was sufficiently careful and discreet in his selection of both companions and places. He didn’t use the oval office. I don’t think there was that much difference. After all, he was set upon leading this country away from the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy based on what was called massive retaliation because he thought it was a danger to our country. Even though he suffered from a very bad back and it was sometimes painful for him to climb up those steps to the airplane and to climb down later to stand on truck beds making speeches endlessly, shaking all those hands until his own hand became blistered and raw. He was a rich man. He didn’t need that job. He could have been taking in the breeze on the beach at Hyannis Port. I don’t think that other burdens that you referred to would have prevented him from trying to save his country no matter what. Just as, I might add, Obama could have been a partner in a big Chicago law firm instead of out there, day and night. I’m sure he’s hurting his back and hand too because there is nothing more exhausting than running for President of the United States. And that is even more so for the staff than the presidential candidate. He gets to go to bed at night while the staff stay up and work all night. I salute Obama as I saluted Kennedy for being willing to seek the presidency because a lot easier, more comfortable choices were open for the both of them.

GG: Thank you very much.